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ABHINAVAGUPTA

AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY

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RANA UMANATH BUKSH SINGH BAHADUR,

TALUQDAR,

KHAJURGAON RAJ.

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INTRODUCTION.

The following pages present a short but comprehensive study of Abhinavaguptapāda, the Kashmir S'aiva Philosopher and Literary Critic. His name is familiar and his fame is still alive. His writings are voluminous and his philosophical and poetical theories hold their ground even to-day. To most Sanskrit Scholars, however, he is known only from references in the generally studied books on poetics, such as the Sāhitya Darpaṇa and the Kāvya Prakāśa. Very few know that he was more a philosopher than a literary critic, and that his contribution to S'aiva philosophy is much greater both in volume and importance than that which he made to poetics.

For about two hundred years so little has he been studied that the oral tradition about the interpretation of his works may be considered to be practically dead. The modern scholars, both in the east and the west, have not so far made any attempt to revive the study of Abhinava. His most important philosophical work, the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī, has not yet been published. The Tantrāloka and the Abhinava Bhāratī have appeared only in parts. The difficulties, therefore, that a person, attempting such a work as the one in hand, has to face, are considerable.

When I started the work, I could not even dream of the difficulties which arose in the course of its progress. I had hopes that the Kashmir Government would help me in my undertaking by allowing me access to their two libraries, one in Raghunātha Temple of Jammu and the other in the Research Department in Srinagar, where the extant MSS. of Abhinava's works are kept. But I am sorry to say that only severe disappointment was in store for me at the hands of the authorities concerned. Inspite

of my repeated earnest entreaties, they could not see their way to allowing me even a glance at the MSS. For some time I thought that the completion of the work was impossible. But soon a suggestion came from my brother that I might look for the required MSS. in private houses. I began my search immediately and with the kind help of my sympathisers at that time of utter disappointment and great dejection I was fortunate enough, in the end, in securing all the MSS., excepting one, which I required for my immediate purposes. What difficulties I experienced in persuading the owners to part with them or at least to allow me to copy them and what heavy prices I had to pay for some of them, this is not the place to state.

My original plan was to include in the present work a chapter on Abhinava's theory of Rasa. But after a careful study of the published portion of his contribution to the alaṅkāra literature, I discovered that, without the help of the unpublished portion of the Abhinava Bhāratī, to which there are good many forward references in the part dealing with Rasa, my exposition of the theory would hardly add anything to what has already been written by some of the most eminent scholars. But when I got the necessary material and studied it, I found that the subject required more space than could be given in the present volume. I have, therefore decided to deal exhaustively with Abhinava's æsthetic theory in a separate volume.

I have used the following MSS. in the preparation of the present work :—

1. Anuttarāṣṭikā.
2. Anuttara Tattva Vimarśinī Vṛtti.
3. Anubhava Nivedana.
4. Bṛhatī Vimarśinī or Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.

5. Bhagavadgītārtha Saṁgraha.
6. Bhāskarī (a commentary on Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī).
7. Bhairava Stotra.
8. Bhairava Stotra Ṭīkā.
9. Bimbapratibimba Vāda.
10. Dehastha Devatācakra Stotra.
11. Ghaṭa Karpara Kulaka Vivṛti.
12. Krama Stotra.
13. Mahopadeśa Viṁśatika.
14. Paramārtha Carcā.
15. Paramārtha Dvādaśikā.
16. S'ivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda. (now published)
17. Tantrāloka (It has partly been published)
18. Tantroccaya.
19. A Commentary on Parātriṁśikā by Rājānaka Lakṣmīrāma.

The book is divided into two parts, historical and philosophical. The former includes a chapter on the life of Abhinava. Its essential purpose is to show what light a careful study of Abhinava's works throws on two important branches of Sanskrit literature, namely, S'aiva Philosophy and Poetics. Abhinava's works are full of quotations from and references to the earlier writings, very often coupled with the names of the authors. They also record traditions concerning the preceptorial lines and the origin and development of these two branches of Sanskrit learning. A careful sifting of these quotations and traditions throws a considerable light on the history of the S'aiva and the Ālaṅkārika literature. Abhinava's works have not yet been used fully to elucidate the history of the above two branches. In the present volume they are being utilised for that purpose for the first time. This is the connecting thread of the material, brought together in the first

part, which at first sight might appear rather heterogeneous. The second part deals with the monistic S'aiva philosophy which is technically called "Trika" and which, in modern philosophic terminology, I have called *Realistic Idealism.*

I may state here very clearly that I am writing the second part as a pure Sanskritist. My work, therefore, is only to interpret the so far unhandled texts and to present the highly abstruse system, with the greatest possible amount of fidelity to the original. I may say in the words of the great commentator Mallinātha "I write nothing which is not based upon the authority of the original texts" (nāmūlaṁ likhyate kiñcit). It is to convince my learned critics of this fact and to make their task of fair criticism easy that I have burdened, as the reader will often feel, my work with extensive quotations ; and have given not only further references in the foot-notes but also full textual authority in Appendix A. The reader will not, therefore, find in these pages what typifies those of a close student of the western philosophy.

In presenting this part I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to avoid the use of technical terms and to state the views of Abhinava in such language as would be intelligible to the average reader. It is, however, not an easy task for a writer on philosophy, particularly when he attempts to present the views of an unknown system for the first time, as in my case, to escape the charge of obscurity, not because of any leaning towards the unintelligible, but because of the inherent difficulty of the subject-matter. When a person is reading a book on a familiar system he is helped by his memory in understanding the particular sense in which a certain expression is used by the writer. But such is not the case when one is reading a work on a new or unfamiliar system, particularly if it is presented in a language different from that in which it was originally

written. In such a case, the ideas being foreign to the language in which the presentation is attempted, the writer has to depend upon approximations. In the reader's mind, however, these approximations are associated with a number of different meanings in which they are ordinarily used. But he finds that none of the accepted meanings quite fits in the context and, therefore, naturally blames the writer for lack of clearness in exposition.

In order, however, to help my readers in easily understanding the system, I have put the original Sanskrit word within brackets when a certain English word is used in a technical sense for the first time and have explained it immediately in a sentence or phrase. I know that in spite of all this at places the idea will not be very clear. Such lack of clarity is due partly to the abstruseness of the subject and partly to the fact that many of the important works of Abhinava, such as Pūrva Pañcikā and Śivadṛṣṭyālocana, which would probably elucidate these obscure points, have not yet been discovered.

For the information of the reader I must add here the following few important notes :—

I. The Roman Figures, coming after the abbreviations, I. P. V. and T. A., unless otherwise indicated, stand for the number of volume. The number, coming immediately after the Roman figures, as in the above two cases, or after an abbreviation, as in most cases, indicates the number of the page.

II. In appendix A, I have given, in some cases, a few necessary textual authorities in addition to those indicated by the foot-notes and have not hesitated to repeat the same authority when necessary.

III. The lack of the right types has compelled me, at places, to violate the established practice of using S with

a vertical stroke at the top to represent the palatal sibilant of Devanāgarī and to use the stroke immediately after S as S'.

Here I feel in duty bound to acknowledge my indebtedness to the editors of the Kashmir Series, to Mr. J. C. Chatterji, the author of "Kashmir Śaivaism", and to Dr. Bühler, the discoverer of the Pratyabhijñā literature in Kashmir, but for whose labours probably I would not have taken up Abhinava for a special study.

Among the Professors of this University, I have to specially thank Dr. N. N. Sen Gupta, under whose able guidance I am writing "Indian Æsthetic Theory", for his carefully going through the philosophical portion of this work and for giving many valuable suggestions.

The chief difficulty in preparing this work lay in understanding the original texts, often without even so much as a commentary as in the cases of the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa and the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika. It was made exceptionally difficult by the incorrect texts both in MSS. and print. A great deal of time had to be spent in determining in some cases the beginning and the end of a sentence. It is not for me to say how far I have correctly understood the original texts; it is for my learned readers to decide. But let me state here that if I have achieved any success in my undertaking it is to a considerable extent due to the help that I was fortunate to get from the eminent Sanskritists in Kashmir and Benares. I must therefore, acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Pandit Harabhaṭṭa Śāstri, to Pandit Śivabhaṭṭa Śāstri and to Pandit Maheśvara Rājdān of Kashmir and to Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Gopīnātha Kavirāja to Pandit Dāmodara Lāla Gosvāmī and to his learned pupil Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Devīprasāda Śukla of Benares for taking special pains in removing

the textual difficulties. My deepest thanks, however, are due to Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, under whom I had the honour to work in this university, for his unwearied help, kind sympathy and steady encouragement. But for the assistance of his profound scholarship and exceptional capacity in interpreting the difficult Sanskrit texts the completion of this work would have been well nigh impossible for me.

I cannot close the introduction without apologising to the reader for a few obvious but unwelcome printing mistakes, particularly of the diacritical mark to represent the Devanāgarī palatal sibilant, which may have remained in spite of the utmost care that I took to remove them in the course of reading the proofs.

Lucknow University.
July, 1935.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A. Bh.	Abhinava Bhāratī. (Baroda)
Abhi.	Abhinavagupta.
Ah.	Āhnika.
A. K.	Ādhāra Kārikā. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
B. B.	Bāla Bodhinī. (Nirnaya Sagar)
Bh.	Bhāskarī. MS.
Bh. G.	Bhagavad Gītā.
Bh. G. S.	Bhagavad Gītārtha Saṅgraha. MS.
Bh. K.	Bhoga Kārikā. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
Bh. S.	Bhairava Stava. MS.
Bh. Su.	Bharata Sūtra. (Nirnaya Sagar)
B. P. V.	Bimba Pratibimba Vāda MS.
B. V.	Bṛhatī Vimarśinī. MS.
C. C.	Catalogus Catalogorum.
D. C.	Daśāvatāra Carita.
D. M. S.	Dakṣiṇā Mūrti Stotra. (Nirnaya Sagar)
D. S.	Devī S'ataka.
Dh. L.	Dhvanyāloka Locana. (Nirnaya Sagar)
E. H. I.	Early History of India.
Gh.	Ghaṭa Karpara Kāvya. (Nirnaya Sagar)
Gh. V.	Ghaṭa Karpara Kulaka Vivṛti. MS.
H. S. P.	History of Sanskrit Poetics.
I. Ph.	Indian Philosophy.
I. P. V.	Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. (Kashmir)
I. P. V. V.	Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī MS.
K. K. V.	Kāvya Kautuka Vivaraṇa.
K. S'.	Kashmir S'aivaism. (Kashmir)
K. S.	Krama Stotra. MS.
K. Sa.	Kāvyālaṅkāra Sārasaṅgraha.
M. Bh. M.	Mahā Bhārata Mañjarī.

M. K.	Mokṣa Kārikā. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
M. M.	Mahārtha Mañjarī. (Trivandrum)
M. V. V.	Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika. (Kashmir)
Mr. T.	Mṛgendra Tantra. (Devakoṭṭai)
Mr. V.	Mṛgendra Vṛtti. ,,
N. K.	Nāda Kārikā. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
P. H.	Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya. (Kashmir)
P, S.	Paramārtha Sāra. ,,
P. T. V.	Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa, ,,
R. T.	Rāja Taraṅgiṇī. (Stein's edition)
R. Tr.	Ratna Traya. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
S. Bh.	S'āṅkara Bhāṣya. (Nirnaya Sagar)
Ś. C.	Śabdārtha Cintāmaṇi. (Udayapur)
S. D.	Śaṅkara Digvijaya.
S. Dr.	Śiva Dṛṣṭi. MS.
S. S. V.	Śiva Sūtra Vārtika. (Kashmir)
S. S. Vi.	Śiva Sūtra Vimarśinī. ,,
S. C.	Stava Cintāmaṇi. ,,
S. D. S.	Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha. (Abhyankar)
S. N.	Spanda Nirṇaya. (Kashmir)
T. A.	Tantrāloka. ,,
T. C.	Tanjore Catalogue.
T. P.	Tattva Prakāśikā. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
T. S.	Tantra Sāra. (Kashmir)
T. San.	Tattva Saṅgraha. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
Ta. San. T. D.	Tarka Saṅgraha Tattva Dīpikā.
T. T. N.	Tattva Traya Nirṇaya. (Vāṇī Vilāsa)
T. V.	Traditional Verse.
T. V. Dh.	Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā. (Kashmir)
V. S. S. Bh.	Vedānta Sūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya. (Nirnaya Sagar)

PART I.

HISTORICAL.

CHAPTER I.

LIFE OF ABHINAVAGUPTA.

PRELIMINARY.

Abhinava, it appears, knew the importance of biographical information about a writer in understanding his works. He has, therefore, not remained silent about himself, like Kālidāsa, about whose date scholars differ by centuries, or like Bhāsa, whose very authorship of his own dramas is now a matter of keen controversy. He has given a sketch, though very brief, of his person, descent and the then social conditions in the concluding portions of his two works, the Tantrāloka and the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa. This sketch, when coupled with the information gathered from the stray references to his life in the vast literature that he, his pupils, his commentators and the followers of his theories have produced, gives us a more or less connected and a little detailed, though still incomplete, account of his life. It can be fairly completed but only with the help of an oral tradition which is current down to this day in a few learned Brāhmaṇa families as well as in a few muslim homes in Kashmir. But an oral tradition, though old and persistent, is after all an oral tradition,and as such cannot have the same value in the eyes of a historian as the evidence of inscriptions or literary works. However, in the case of Abhinava, it is possible for us to know exactly the forces and influences which produced such a mind, even if we confine ourselves to well-authenticated facts. For the purpose of understanding his writings we need no more.

Two Abhinavaguptas.

The Abhinavagupta, studied in the following pages, is a different person from his namesake who was a Śākta contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. The only source of information about the other Abhinavagupta is the Śaṅkara Digvijaya of Mādhava, which is noticed under a slightly different name "Sūkṣma Śaṅkara Vijayas" in Dr. Aufrecht's catalogue. It gives the following account of him :—

He[1] belonged to Kāmarūpa (Assam). He was a Śākta and wrote a Śāktabhāṣya, probably a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, from the Śākta point of view. He was a great opponent of the monistic theory of Śaṅkara. He engaged Śaṅkara in a controversial discussion (Śāstrārtha) when the latter reached Assam in the course of his Digvijaya. In that he was defeated and so, according to the then prevalent practice, became a disciple of the victor. Like our Kashmirian Abhinavagupta, his Śākta namesake also is referred to as an ācārya[2].

Our object in giving the above account is to point out that if Mādhava's testimony in reference to the Śākta Abhinavagupta is to be considered reliable, he should not be confused with the Śaiva Abhinavagupta of Kashmir. Their distance from each other is about two centuries. The former, if he was Śaṅkara's contemporary, must have lived in the last quarter of the 8th and the first half of the 9th century A. D., for, according to the generally accepted opinion, Śaṅkara lived from 788 to 820 A. D.; and the latter, on the evidence of the dates of composition of the Krama and the Bhairava Stotras and the Bṛahatī Vimarśinī, given by the author himself, belonged to the second

1. Ś. D., ch. XV Ś. 158.
2. Ś. D. comm., ch. XV Ś. 158.

half of the 10th and the first quarter of the 11th century A. D. In view of these facts we fail to understand why Dr. Aufrecht has included the Śāktabhāṣya in the list of Kashmirian Abhinavagupta's works in his Catalogus Catalogorum. This work, according to his own statement:— "Śāktabhāṣya, Quoted by Mādhava. Oxf 258b" (C. C., P. 25) is no other than the one, the authorship of which is attributed to the Śākta Abhinavagupta by Mādhava, as we have stated above. For, on page 258 of Catalogi Condicum Manuscriptum containing an extract from the Śaṅkara Digvijaya which is referred to by our learned Doctor in the above quotation from Catalogus Catalogorum P. 25, the same passage is given as that on which our own account of the Śākta Abhinavagupta is based. It runs as follows:—

Tadanantarameṣa Kāmarūpān
Adhigatyābhinavopaśabdaguptam
Ajayat kila śāktabhāṣyakāraṁ
Sa ca bhagno manasedamāluloce
Oxf 258b

We now leave it to our readers to form their own conclusion on this point.

HIS ANCESTRY.

The earliest ancestor of Abhinava, so far known to us, was Atrigupta. He lived in Antarvedi,[1] the region between the Ganges and Yamuna, in the reign of king Yaśovarman of Kannauj (Circa 730–740 A. D.*)). He attained a very great fame for erudition in all the branches of learning in general and in the Śaiva Śāstras in particular. King Lalitāditya of Kashmir (Circa 725-761) was so much

1. P. T. V., 280.
* E. H. I., 386.

impressed with his scholarship and so eager did he become to take him (Atrigupta) to his capital that soon after the conquest of King Yaśovarman he approached and requested Atrigupta to accompany him to Kashmir. And so earnest was the request that Atrigupta could not but accede to it[1].

Thus the family, which after about two centuries, was to produce the Śaiva Abhinavagupta, migrated from Kānyakubja to Kashmir. There[2] a spacious house was soon built by the king's order on a plot opposite the temple of Sitāṁśumaulin on the bank of river Vitastā (Jhelum) for the immigrant family to permanently settle, and a big jāgīr was granted for its proper maintenance. After Atrigupta, we know nothing of the family for about hundred and fifty years. Abhinava has evidently left a gap between his earliest known ancestor, who migrated to Kashmir very shortly after king Lalitāditya's victory over Yaśovarman of Kannauj about 740 A. D. and his grand father Varāhagupta, whom we cannot place earlier than the beginning of the 10th century A. D. The language of the text, on which our conclusion is based, leaves very little doubt on this point. To show the distance of time between Atrigupta and Varāhagupta there is used the word "anvaya" (family) [3]. In marked contrast with this, we find the word "ātmaja" used, to indicate the immediate descent of Cukhulaka, the father of Abhinava, from Varāhagupta. From the very brief description of the latter, it is evident that the successive generations had maintained the scholastic traditions of the learned family and that he (Varāhagupta) also was a great scholar and devout worshipper of Śiva.

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1. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)
2. T. A., Ah. 37 MS.
3. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

HIS PARENTS.

His father, Narasiṁhagupta, alias Cukhulaka, was of great intellectual calibre, had equal proficiency in all the Śāstras and was a great devotee of Śiva. The name of his mother was Vimalakalā [1]. She was a very pious and religious lady. They were a happy couple and attended to household duties not because of any worldly attachment to them but simply because they were enjoined by the scripture. The family atmosphere was thus thoroughly religious and scholarly.

In view of the facts stated above and supported by the authority of Abhinavagupta himself, quoted in full in Appendix (A), the statement of Pandit Madhusudan Kaul of the Kashmir Research Department in his introduction to the I. P. V., Vol. II, P. 7 about the name of Abhinava's father requires correction. His statement runs as follows :—

"He received instruction in the Pratyabhijñā Śāstra from his father Lakṣmaṇagupta, son of Narasiṁhagupta and pupil to Utpala"

Lakṣmaṇagupta, though undoubtedly a teacher of Abhinava in Pratyabhijñā was certainly not his father; nor was there a relation of father and son between Narasiṁhagupta and Lakṣmaṇagupta. The father of the latter, according to the following statement of Abhinava, was Utpalācārya :—

> "Traiyambakaprasarasāgaravīcisomā-
> nandātmajotpalajalakṣmaṇaguptanāthah."
>
> T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

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1. T. A. Comm., I. 14.

ABHINAVA AS A YOGINĪBHŪ.

In and about the 10th and the 11th centuries the atmosphere in Kashmir was thoroughly surcharged with the spirit of religion. The people then believed in the efficacy of religious observances. All that was great and good was believed to be attainable by some kind of religious performance or other. For each worldly gain there was prescribed a separate elaborate ceremony. A king wishing to enlarge his kingdom, a student anxious to widen his knowledge, a father aspiring for a worthy son and a merchant desirous of prosperity in his business, each had to perform some special rite to bring about the speedy realisation of his desire. When failure came inspite of these observances, it was attributed to some flaw in the performance of the prescribed rite. Abhinava's literary greatness also, therefore, was naturally attributed not so much to his own exceptional natural intelligence and great assiduity as to a certain religious frame of mind in which his parents had united for his birth[1]. It is enjoined in the Śaiva scripture that the parents, desirous of a son, who in Śaiva terminology is called Yoginībhū, should rise above all worldly ideas at the time of meeting and that the mother should identify herself with Śakti and the father with Śiva. And it is believed that only a Yoginībhū can properly understand and intelligibly propound the Śaiva monism. According to Jayaratha, the popular idea of Abhinava's being yognībhū was based upon Abhinava's own authority. For, he, as Jayaratha interprets, refers to this fact in the very first verse of the Tantrāloka.

PROBABLE TIME OF HIS BIRTH.

The era, used in the works of Kashmir writers from the earliest time, is known as Saptarṣi. It began 25 years

1. T. A. Comm., I, 14-5.

after the commecement of Kali era, as we learn from Abhinava's own statement in the concluding verse of the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī :—

"Iti navatitamesmin vatsarentye yugāṁśe
Tithiśaśijaladhisthe mārgaśīrṣāvasāne
Jagati vihitabodhām Īśvarapratyabhijñāṁ
Vyavṛṇuta paripūrṇām preritaḥ Śambhupādaiḥ".

It states that he finished the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī in the 90th year when 4115 years of Kali had elapsed. This year (1934) it is the 5035th year of the Kali and the 5010th year of the Saptarṣi era, as any almanac will show. If we deduct 25 out of the figures, which stand for the Kali era at present, they will show the Saptarṣi year. This shows that the word "navatitame" in the above quotation stands for 4090th of the Saptarṣi era just as 34th, used to-day, would naturally mean 1934th A. D.

There are two more works of Abhinava in which the dates of composition are given. One is the Bhairava Stava (appendix C) which was written on the 10th day of the darker half of Pauṣa[1] in the year 68. And the other is the Krama Stotra (Appendix C) which was composed in praise of Śiva on the 9th day of the darker half of Mārgaśīrṣa[2] in the year 66.

The years of composition of these Stotras refer to the Saptarṣi era. The dates, therefore, of the earliest and the latest known works of Abhinava clearly show that the period of his literary activity extended over a quarter of a century from 4066 to 4090 of the Saptarṣi era i. e. 990-1–1014-15 A. D.

1. Bh. S.
2. K. S.

There is no reason to believe that the Krama Stotra, though the earliest of the known dated works of Abhinava, was his first work. More on this point will be found in the chapter dealing with his works. It seems, therefore, that he began his literary career five years earlier i. e. in 985 A. D. And taking into consideration the extensive study that he made of various branches of learning, not privately but at the houses of so many teachers, and the maturity of style and judgment, found in his earliest work, it will be unreasonable to suppose that he began writing when he was only in his teens or early twenties. It will, therefore, not be wrong to say that he was born between 950 and 960 A. D.

HIS CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION.

As a child he was sent to a neighbouring Pāṭhaśālā, located in a second story. Even there he showed signs of his future greatness, and deeply impressed his teachers with his exceptional intellectual power and fluency in speech. His name is ample testimony to that. It is said that the name Abhinavaguptapāda, by which our great writer is known, is not that which was given him by his parents but that which he received from his teachers in early school days for no other reason than that he was an intellectual giant and as such was an object of terror, like a serpent, to his young school fellows. This is what, according to Vāmanācārya, the author of the Bālabodhinī, a commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa, Mammaṭa means to convey by referring to our Abhinava as Abhinavaguptapāda[1]" in his work. To this very fact Abhinava himself most probably refers in the following line :—

"Abhinavaguptasya kṛtiḥ seyaṁ yasyoditā gurubhirākhyā." T. A., I, 50.

1. B. B., 95.

ABHINAVAGUPTA, AN INCARNATION OF ŚEṢA.

In South India there is a tradition, current among those who even now dance in strict accordance with the rules, given by Bharata in his Nāṭya Śāstra, that Abhinavaguptapāda was an incarnation of Śeṣa. This tradition seems to be another and later interpretation of the name "Abhinavaguptapāda". It was most probably suggested by the great reputation that he enjoyed, like Patañjali alias Seṣa, for his thorough mastery of all the intricacies of grammar and his extraordinary skill and originality in dealing with the difficult grammatical problems. To his great proficiency in grammar he himself refers in the Tantrāloka as follows:—

"Pitrā sa śabdagahane kṛtasampraveśaḥ."

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

In this quotation the words "gahane" and "sam" are of special significance. This tradition found general acceptance among later generations, because it was imagined to have the support of his teachers also who gave him the epithet, Abhinavaguptapāda, which can, without the least fear of contradiction, be interpreted as "new Śeṣa."

HIS TEACHERS.

Great was his love of learning and endless and incessant was his endeavour for its acquisition. 'Knowledge for its own sake' was his motto. This he preached both by personal example and precept, as found in the T. A., VIII, 205-6. He held that even though one may be lucky enough to get a teacher who has attained perfection himself and can easily show the way to it to his disciple also, yet that is not sufficient reason for not approaching other teachers for the knowledge of other Āgamas and other paths. This he has given as the only reason for his waiting upon teachers of other religions such as Buddhism and Jainism. [1]

1. T. A., VIII, 206.

He approached the best teachers of his time in different subjects for the traditional and the most authoritative information. Such was his humility and devotion[1] to them that they, out of sheer love for him, told him all the secrets of learning in their possession, and so well did he learn and retain all that he was taught and so well did he impress his teachers with his extensive study that all of them unanimously declared him to be an all-round ācārya.

So insatiable was his thirst for learning that he found all its fountain heads in Kashmir insufficient to quench it. He, therefore, went outside the beautiful land of Kaśyapa in quest of a bigger fountain head. How many places outside the valley of Kashmir he visited and how many learned teachers he waited upon, there is no evidence just at present in hand to show. There is, however, no doubt that he went to Jalandhara[2] and learnt Kaulika[3] literature and practices from Śambhunātha. In fact it was through Śambhunātha's teaching that he got peace and attained self-realisation.[4]

The following is the list of his teachers with the subject or subjects, which they taught, shown against each name :—

1. Narasiṁhagupta[5] (his father)	Grammar
2. Vāmanātha[6]	Dvaitādvaita Tantras.
3. Bhūtirājatanaya[7]	Dualistic Śaivaism.
4. Bhūtirāja[8]	Brahmavidyā.

1. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)
2. T. A., Comm., I, 236.
3. T. A., Comm., I, 31.
4. T. A., I, 51.
5. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)
6.–8. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

5.	Lakṣmaṇagupta[1]	Krama and Trika Darśanas.
6.	Indurāja[2]	Dhvani.
7.	Bhaṭṭa Tota[3]	Dramaturgy.

Others in whose cases subjects are not specified :—

8. Śrīcandra.[4]
9. Bhakti Vilāsa.
10. Yogānanda.
11. Candravara.
12. Abhinanda.
13. Śivabhakti.
14. Vicitranātha.
15. Dharma.
16. Śiva.
17. Vāmana.
18. Udbhaṭa.
19. Bhūtīśa.
20. Bhāskara.

HIS FAMILY AND ITS ATMOSPHERE.

Besides his father and mother, his family consisted of an uncle, Vāmanagupta, a younger brother, Manoratha, and five cousins, Kṣema, Utpala, Abhinava, Cakraka and Padmagupta. His uncle's name is included in the list of his teachers. In the Abhinava Bhāratī,[5] Abhinava quotes his uncle who, therefore, seems to have written on poetics. His brother[6] was deeply learned in all Śāstras and was the first to be favoured by Abhinava by being accepted as his disciple. And if the name Kṣema be supposed to stand for Kṣemarāja, the author of the Spanda Nirṇaya and other works on Śaivaism, and the others, classed with him, be also supposed to have had more or less similar qualities, then his cousins also seem to have been very highly educated. Whatever may have been their education, there is no doubt that they prized devotion

1. T. A., Comm., III, 194.
2. Dh. L., I.
3. A. Bh., I.
4. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)
5. A. Bh., 297.
6. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

to[1] Siva above all things and considered all their wealth to be no better than a straw. Thus the whole family atmosphere was surcharged with the spirit of renunciation, zeal for advanced study and above all devotion to Śiva. There was left nothing to be desired in the atmosphere, in which he passed his childhood, for the development of a healthy brain and of a spirit necessary for the great work that he had before him.

Some events in the family and their effect on his young mind

His mother was extremely dear to him. It was she alone who made home sweet for him. But unfortunately, or, as Abhinava took it, fortunately, she was snatched away by the cruel hands of death when he was a mere child.[2] Home, therefore, lost most of its charm for him, but not all, because his father was still there. To him he was tied with a double cord of filial and pupilary love. But soon after the death of his mother, his father also, though still young, renounced the world and took to a life of asceticism[3]. These events seem to have taken place when he was studying literature (Sāhitya). They turned his mind from all worldly attachments to devotion to Śiva, so much so that he made up his mind never to marry[4]. That was the turning point in his life. That was the end of his literary study and life at home. Thenceforward, in order to feed his suddenly kindled flame of devótion with the oil of the āgamic lore, he spent his time in the houses of his āgamic teachers. His Tantrāloka is a living testimony of the great zeal with which he pursued the study of the āgamas and of the unparalleled proficiency which he acquired in them.

1. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)
2. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)
3. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)
4. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

HIS ASCETIC PERIOD.

The period of preparation was now over. The natural gifts and the favourable circumstances had immensely helped him in thoroughly equipping himself for the memorable work that he was destined to accomplish. The long and healthy scholastic and religious tradition of his family unbroken for over two hundred years, the noble and scholarly life of his father and the perfectly religious life of his mother, the harmony and the healthy atmosphere of his family, his high education, his practical training in various kinds of yogic practices, his never-broken vow of perfect celibacy and the consequent indefatigable energy, his drinking at so many fountain heads of learning both in and outside Kashmir, his untiring efforts and their fruition in scholastic attainments and above all his great sacrifice of all the comforts of wordly life, all combined, gave him such an intellectual and spiritual power and made his pen so powerful that even to day he is recognised as the highest authority on the monistic Śaivaism in respect both of its rituals and its philosophy, as well as on the poetical theories of Rasa and Dhvani.

Thus equipped he began his life's work at a sufficiently mature age. What he has contributed to the philosophical literature of India, though at present ordinary people know him only as a writer on poetics, is not a production of a mere imaginative mind in an easy chair in a beautiful and a little secluded place, as so many persons think, but a record of personal experience,[1] gained through continuous yogic experiments, carried on for years. If we carefully read even the few available works, out of so many that his extraordinarily powerful pen produced, we can trace out the successive stages in his spiritual attainment. Successively he worked

1. T. A., IV., 202.

on the three systems which are known in the Śaiva philosophical literature as the Krama, the Trika (of which Pratyabhijñā is only a branch) and the Kula.

When from the study of literature his mind suddenly turned to devotion to Śiva, it was Lakṣmaṇagupta who first gave him intellectual satisfaction by feeding him with intellectual food in the form of an exposition of the Pratyabhijñā[1]. He taught Abhinava Krama Darśana also. This fact Jayaratha has established after a long controvertial discussion in his commentary on the Tantrāloka.[2] There is circumstantial evidence enough to believe that he was taught Krama system first. In any case the earliest date of the Krama Stotra, to which reference has already been made, is a clear proof of his having first tried his spiritual experiments in accordance with the Kramic instructions. The attempt was not quite a failure, for, in the Kramakeli, which is probably Abhinava's first known work on the Krama system, he attributes his then spiritual greatness to his following the Kramic teachings.[3] But it did not yield the expected result. He then tried the Trika system, but to what result, there is not enough evidence just at present in hand to show. There is, however, no doubt about this that the result of that also did not perfectly satisfy him, for, it is from the Kula system alone that he affirms to have got perfect satisfaction and peace.[4] Because of this it is that we find in his works a more glowing tribute paid to Śambhunātha, his Kaulic teacher, than to any one else.[5] That before writing the Tantrāloka he had realised his identity with the Parama Śiva and that it was due to

1. M. V.V., 2.
2. T. A. Comm., III, 194.
3. T. A. Comm., III, 191-2.
4. T. A. Comm., I, 31.
5. T. A., I, 16.

following Sambhunātha's teaching, he himself says in his introduction to the Tantrāloka:—

"Bodhānyapāśaviṣanuttadupāsanottha—
Bodhojjvalobhinavagupta idaṁ karoti."

T. A., I, 16.

The concluding line of the Paramārthasāra and Yogarāja's commentary on it give a very clear idea of the spiritual greatness attained by Abhinava, before he began writing, at least, his more important works. The passage runs as follows:—

"Abhinavaguptena mayā śivacaraṇasmaraṇadīptena".

P. S., 198.

"Sivasya paraśreyaḥsvabhāvasya svātmasthasya cidānandaikamūrteḥ yāni caraṇāni cidraśmayaḥ teṣāṁ smaraṇaṁ śabdādiviṣayagrahaṇakāle nibhālanam pratikṣaṇaṁ svānubhavāpramoṣaḥ tena dīptaḥ parāhantācamatkārabhāsvaraḥ......................iti upadeṣṭuḥ samāviṣṭamaheśvara svabhāvonena uktaḥ syāt."

This seems to be the foundation of the traditional belief amongst Kashmirian Pandits that Abhinavagupta was Bhairava incarnate.

HIS MIRACULOUS POWERS.

Human nature is always the same everywhere. We should, therefore, not be surprised at the suspicious eye with which the present generation looks at all claims to individual spiritual greatness, particularly because there are so many impostors abroad now. In the time of Abhinavagupta also people did not very easily believe in any such claim. It was, therefore, not without any reason, as the literary tradition says, that they looked upon Abhinava as Bhairava incarnate. Just as the enlightened people of the present time would not admit any body's claim to realisation of

identity with the Almighty unless he should show himself to be almighty, so did not the contemporaries of Abhinava. Following the authority of the Śrīpūrva Śāstra he has himself given the five infallible signs of such a man[1] which can briefly be stated as follows :—

1. Unswerving devotion to Rudra.
2. Power of incantation (mantra siddhi)
3. Control over all the elements.
4. Capacity to accomplish the desired end.
5. Sudden dawning of the knowledge of all the Śāstras.

And we learn from Jayaratha, who also bases his statement on the authority of his teacher whose verse he quotes[2], that Abhinava's contemporaries found all the above signs unmistakably present in him. This was the secret of his great influence with his contemporaries and of the unparalleled success as a writer in the field of both the Śaiva philosophy and the poetics.

CENTRES OF HIS ACTIVITY.

We have had occasion to speak about the site of his ancestral home. In one of the MSS. of the T. A., belonging to Pandit Maheśvara Rājdān of Kashmir, a different reading of the passage, descriptive of the site where a house was built for Atrigupta, is found. It reads "Vaitasta mūrdhani" instead of "Vaitasta rodhasi" as in the MS. in the possession of the writer of these pages. The conclusion was easy and so once the exact spot of Abhinava's ancestral home was thought to have been discovered. The writer visited the place and found that there is a small village just above the source of Vitastā (Vaitasta mūrdhani) which even to this

1. T. A. Comm., VIII, 136.
2. T. A. Comm., VIII, 137.

day is called Guttar Gunda or Guttal Gunda. Gunda is a common Kashmiri word for village and Guttar or Guttal can easily be supposed to be a corruption of Gupta with local affix "r" or "l". But on a little more careful study of the text it was found that this interpretation does not suit the context. For, the word "tasmin" in the beginning of the verse[1] stands for "Pravarapura", described in the preceding lines, the site of which has been identified within modern Śrinagar. The source of Vitastā is at a distance of over thirty miles from there. It cannot, therefore, reasonably be supposed to have been within Pravarapura. The reading "Vaitasta rodhasi" (on the bank of Vitastā), therefore, seems to be correct. There is, however, a way in which the other reading also can be explained, that is, by taking "Vaitasta mūrdhani" with "parikalpitabhūmisampat" and not with "nivāsam". The passage then will mean that the king, having granted a jagir to him above the source of Vitastā, got a house constructed for him in that part of Pravarapura, which, because of its being situated opposite the temple of Sitāṁśumaulin, was, in point of sanctity, better than any other. This appears to be quite probable. The evidence in hand, however, is too insufficient for any definite statement on the question.

There being no evidence to the contrary, it is natural to suppose that he passed his childhood in his ancestral home. There is, however a definite statement regarding the place of composition of the Vārtika on the first verse of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra.[2] It was composed in Pravarapura East. It seems Pravarapura also was divided into different parts and was called Pravarapura East and

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1. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)
2. M. V. V., 135.

so on, just as the different parts of Simla at the present time are known as Simla East and Simla West. Was this the same place as his ancestral home? Nothing can be said definitely, but the probability is that it was. In any case, from the reason that prompted Mandra to request Abhinava to shift to the former's city[1] to write out a systematic guide to various paths to final emancipation, as found in the Trika literature, it is evident that it was not a fit place for undertaking such a great work as the writing of the Tantrāloka. Therefore, when the request was made and the necessity for a change was explained the latter agreed. The Tantrāloka was thus written not in the ancestral home of the author but in that of his loving disciple.

THE LAST SCENE OF HIS EARTHLY EXISTENCE.

Unlike what has been written so far, we have no other authority than that of a tradition for what we are going to write in the following few lines. We have not so far been able to trace any written authority on which this may have been originally based. The tradition, which, as we pointed out before, is current not only in old Pandit families but also in some of the old Muslim houses in the locality, says that on one day Abhinavagupta, after finishing his work, as he thought, along with twelve hundred disciples walked into the Bhairava cave and was never seen again. The cave is there even now. It is about five miles from Magam, a place midway between Srinagar and Gulmurg. A village in its neighbourhood and a brook, running down below the hill, wherein the cave is, both are known by the name of Bhiruva and so is the cave itself. The writer visited the locality and went into the cave also. Its mouth is at a sufficiently great height from the foot of the mountain and from below looks like a crevice in a rock.

1. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

It goes deep down into the earth. Its opening is very narrow so that a man cannot get into it very easily. At the sight of a small opening and a dark deep pit immediately one hesitates and fears to go in. One cannot walk but has to crawl into it and that too at places with great difficulty. It has several ways leading to places where one can sit undisturbed and meditate. One of these places is big enough conveniently to accommodate forty to fifty persons; it is round in shape and at a great height there is a chink towards the sky, but it does not allow the rays of the sun to penetrate so far into the cave as to be perceived by the persons within. Far into the cave a hole was pointed out, through which none but a child can find a passage, and it was said that Abhinavagupta went that way. It was also stated by the guide that the hole was said to have been much bigger in earlier times, but was slowly and imperceptibly getting smaller with the passing years. Outside this opening on the rock walls there seems to be inscribed something with a very sharp instrument, but it is not possible to say at present as to what it is. It is quite probable that the upper layer of the rock may have got so cracked as to look like inscribed figures. Down the hill was accidently seen a religious minded and long bearded Mohammedan, bent double with age, slowly walking reclining on his slender stick. He was approached and questioned if he knew or had heard any thing about the cave. The only information, that he could give, was "Hama ne hamārā dādā se sunā, Abnācārī bārā sau sāgirdoṁ ke sātha isa ke andara gayā bas phir pīchū nahīṁ lautā." (I heard from my grand father that Abnācārī went into it along with twelve hundred disciples but did never return). On being further questioned if he knew any thing more he said with great simplicity that that was all, he had heard, and that to add a word to it, his love of truth and religion did not permit him. This was

said in such a tone and with such an expression of sincerity and truthfulness on wrinkled face that the writer felt convinced that whatever may be the exaggeration in the number of followers, the fact that Abhinava went into the cave with some followers and was never seen again was perfectly true, for the simple reason that to retire from the din of the world to some inaccessible place to take Samādhi seems to be the natural termination of the earthly life of a person like Abhinavagupta.

A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF HIS LIFE.

He was born in a noble and learned Śaiva Brāhmaṇa family in Kashmir. His father was a religious minded person of scholastic attainments and mother a pious orthodox lady. He highly respected the former[1] and deeply loved the latter. He faithfully served his teachers and they lovingly revealed to him the secrets of learning in their possession. He was perseverant, industrious and exceptionaly intelligent and so his study was extensive and his command over various subjects was great. He tried innumerable experiments personally to ascertain the truth of what he had read or heard about spiritual matters, and unchallengeable is, therefore, the correctness and precision of his conclusions. Great was his spiritual power and his contemporaries had occasions to see its greatness in deeds. Clear was his head, powerful his memory[2] marvellous his intellectual capacity, wonderful his command over the language, shrewd his eye to see the real nature of a thing from different angles of vision and beautiful and convincing the way of putting his ideas; and every page of his available books is an unmistakable proof of it. He was devoutly served by his disciples and

1. M. V. V., I.
2. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

he has gratefully acknowledged and rewarded their services by mentioning them in some of his important works. Thus noble was his birth, loving and gentle his temper, honest and rigorous his life, strong and admirable his character, brilliant and highly useful his career, memorable and lasting his contribution to both poetics and philosophy, and glorious was the last scene of his earthly existence when like Tennyson's legendary king Arthur, he parted from his followers never to be seen again.

CHAPTER II.

HIS WORKS.

LIST OF HIS KNOWN WORKS.

1. Bodha Pañcadaśikā.
2. Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.
3. Parātriṁśikā Vivṛti.
4. Tantrāloka.
5. Tantrasāra.
6. Tantravaṭadhānikā.
7. Dhvanyāloka Locana.
8. Abhinava Bhāratī.
9. Bhagavadgītārtha Saṁgraha.
10. Paramārtha Sāra.
11. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.
12. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.
13. Krama Stotra.
14. Dehastha Devatā Cakra Stotra.
15. Bhairava Stotra.
16. Paramārtha Dvādaśikā.
17. Paramārtha Carcā.
18. Mahopadeśa Viṁśatika.
19. Anuttarāṣṭikā.
20. Anubhavanivedana.
21. Tantroccaya.
22. Ghaṭakarparakulaka Vivṛti.
23. Karmakeli.
24. Śivadṛṣṭyālocana.
25. Pūrva Pañcikā.
26. Padārthapraveśa Nirṇaya Ṭīkā.
27. Prakīrṇaka Vivaraṇa.
28. Prakaraṇa Vivaraṇa.
29. Kāvyakautuka Vivaraṇa.

30. Kathāmukha Tilaka.
31. Laghvī Prakriyā.
32. Bhedavādavidāraṇa
33. Devīstotra Vivaraṇa.
34. Tattvādhva Prakāśikā.
35. Śivaśaktyavinābhāva Stotra
36. Bimbapratibimba Vāda (Dr. Bühler's Kashmir Catalogue MS. No. 469.)
37. Paramārtha Saṅgraha (Do. 459.)
38. Anuttara S'ataka.
39. Prakaraṇa Stotra.
40. Nāṭyālocana.

(38–40: Introduction to the P. T. V., P. 15. It does not state any authority to substantiate the statement.)

41. Anuttaratattvavimarśinī Vṛtti (T. C. MS. No. 8219)

There is enough evidence to show that he wrote many other works besides the above. From the known references to them we get the idea of their titles and contents as follows :—

1. His commentaries on other Śaivāgamas than the Śrīpūrva Śāstra on the lines of the Pūrva Pañcikā. That he wrote such commentaries is evident from the following accidental remark in P. T. V., 147 :—

   "Pūrvaprabhṛtipañcikāsu".

2. His commentaries on other Stotras than those mentioned above. To them he refers in T. S., 31.

3. His stotras from which he often quotes in the available works with an introductory remark "mayaiva stotre" or something similar to it. Most of these quotations are not traceable in the above mentioned available stotras. The inference, therefore, is natural that he wrote some more stotras than those we have so far been able to discover.

4. His commentary on the Yogavāśiṣṭha. We have no other source of information about it than a tradition current among Kashmirian Pandits.

The Catalogus Catalogorum includes in its list of seventeen works of Abhinava the following three :—

1.	Paramārthasāra Saṅgraha.	Report XXX.
2.	Paramārthasāra Ṭīkā.	Oudh IX 22.
3.	Spanda.	Oudh XVI 124.

The first, in our opinion, is not a different work from that which has already been published by the Kashmir Research Department under the title of " Paramārthasāra ". It is the same as Paramārthasāra Oxf. 238 (C. C., 25). In fact the published text contains both the titles. Abhinava's colophon refers to it as " Paramārthasāra " only, but his commentator, Yogarāja, adds the word " Saṅgraha " to the title in the colophon of his commentary. The two colophons run as follows :—

" Iti śrīmahāmāheśvarācāryābhinavaguptaviracitaḥ Paramārthasāraḥ."

" Sampūrṇeyam Paramārthasārasaṅgrahavivṛtiḥ kṛtistatrabhavatparamamāheśvara Śrī Rājānaka Yogarājasya."

The Oudh Catalogue does not give any extracts from the MSS. It is, therefore, not possible for us to pronounce any opinion on the other two works which are included in Dr. Aufrecht's Catalogue on the authority of the former (Oudh Catalogue), though personally we are inclined to think that the Paramārthasāra Ṭīkā is the same work as the Paramārthasārasaṅgrahavivṛti.

EXPLANATION OF THE ARRANGEMENT.

In the above list the first eleven are the published works. They are arranged in their chronological order on which we shall soon write. From the 12th to the 22nd are

the MSS. in possession of the present writer. Out of these, 13th to 20th are given as appendix C to the present thesis. From the 23rd to the 35th are found referred to in the various available works in print or MSS. On the 36th we shall write towards the end of this chapter. The rest are known to us only from different catalogues and reports of searches for Sanskrit MSS.

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.

There is no difficulty in arranging in a chronological order those works which bear dates of their composition. Such works have already been pointed out in the preceding chapter. The difficulty lies in fixing the chronology of the rest. Our arrangement is based not on the mostly imaginary ground of maturity of style and ideas, but on the solid ground of references to earlier works in the later ones. Only in two cases, where inspite of all patient research such a firm ground has not been found, recourse has been had to other testimonies, which are certainly more reliable than those of style etc., for fixing their order.

One of these two cases refers to the question of the priority or the posteriority of the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika and the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa to each other. Both of them are referred to in the Tantrāloka as follows :—

> "Mayaitat srotasāṁ rūpam anuttarapadād dhruvāt
> Ārabhya vistareṇoktam mālinīślokavārtike."
>
> T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

> "Anuttaraprakriyāyāṁ vaitatyena pradarśitam
> Etat tasmāt tataḥ paśyed vistarārthī vivecakaḥ."
>
> T. A., VI, 249.

On this Jayaratha comments as follows :—

"Anuttaraprakriyāyāmiti parātrīśikāvivaraṇādāvityarthaḥ."

Thus though they are earlier than the Tantrāloka

yet no reference is found to one in the other so that the question of priority may be decided. Here, however, the M. V. V. has been placed before the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa :

Firstly, because the former was written at a period when of the family of Karṇa and Mandra, who were cousins, he knew nobody excepting the cousins themselves. In the P. T. V., however, he devotes three verses to describe their ancestry and refers in familiar terms to Vatsalikā, of whom he speaks so much later on in the Tantrāloka. The concluding passages of the Tantrāloka further inform us that with the lapse of time his familiarity with Karṇa-Mandra family grew so much that he agreed to put up with that family to write the encyclopaedic work on the Tantras.

Secondly, because it is mostly controversial in its contents and the controversial Tāntrika literature from the pen of Abhinava, as we shall soon show, belongs to the earlier part of his Tāntrika period.

And thirdly, because it is a detailed explanation of some passages of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra, also called Pūrva Śāstra.

("Vākyārthaṁ kathaye kiñcin Mālinyāṁ yat kvacit kvacit."
M. V. V., 2.)

And we know on the authority of the P. T. V. that he wrote a regular commentary on the Pūrva Śāstra, called Pūrva Pañcikā, before the former work :—

("Nirṇītañca etat mayaiva Śrīpūrvapañcikāyām."
P. T. V., 57.)

We also know from the following quotations from the Tantrasāra and the Bhāskarī, an unpublished commentary on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, that works on the

same subject, whether they are further expansions or brief resumes of the same, were written one after another :—

"Vitatas Tantrāloko vigāhituṁ naiva śakyate sarvaiḥ
Ṛjuvacanaviracitam idam Tantrasāraṁ tataḥ śṛṇuta."
T. S., 2.

"Tatra ca sarvajanahitārtham Bṛhatpratyabhijñākhyā bahuvistarā ṭīkā kṛtā, tadvicāraṇeca janam aśaktaṁ jñātvā tenaiva Pratyabhijñākārikāsūtreṣu saṁgrahamayī Vimarśinītiprasiddhā ṭīkā kṛtā." (Bhāskarī).

The M. V. V. also, therefore, has to be supposed to have come either immediately before or after his commentary on the Pūrva Śāstra, in any case before the Parātriṁśikāvivaraṇa.

The other case of a work of doubtful chronological position is that of the Paramārtha Sāra. It consists of only 105 verses and contains only one literary reference and that also is to the Kārikās of Śeṣa, of which it is an adaptation. This, however, has been placed between the Bhagavadgītārtha Saṁgraha and the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, because it is a philosophical work. We know of only four philosophical works of Abhinava. Of these, the chronological position of three is certain on the evidence of Abhinava himself. The Bhagavadgītārthasaṅgraha is the first and the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī is the last. The Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī or Bṛhatī Vimarśinī immediately preceded the latter. There is, therefore, no other position which we can assign to the Paramārthasāra than the one, given above.

THE TEXTUAL AUTHORITY.

The two doubtful cases having thus been settled, we now give for each work a textual authority in support of the chronological position that we have assigned to it.

1. Bodha Pañcadaśikā.

"Prabodhapañcadaśikāmadhye tādṛṅ mayā sphuṭamuktam". M. V. V., 36.

2. Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.
   Reasons have already been given.

3. Parātrimśikā Vivaraṇa.
   Reasons have already been stated.

4. Tantrāloka.
   "Anuttaraprakriyāyām vaitatyena pradarśitam
   Etat tasmāt tataḥ paśyed vistarārthī vivecakaḥ"
   T. A., VI, 249.

5. Tantra Sāra.
   "Vitatastantrāloko vigāhituṁ naiva śakyate sarvaiḥ
   Ṛjuvacanaviracitam idaṁ tu Tantrasāraṁ tataḥ
   śṛṇuta." T. S., 2.

6. Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā.
   Because it is a still briefer resume of the Tantrāloka than even the Tantra Sāra.

7. Dhvanyāloka Locana.
   "Taduttīrṇatve tu sarvam parameśvarādvayam brahmetyasmacchāstrānusāreṇa viditaṁ Tantrālokagranthaṁ vicāraya.
   Dh. L., 19.

8. Abhinava Bhāratī.
   "Tacca madīyādeva tadvivaraṇāt Sahṛdayāloka Locanād avadhāraṇīyam. A. Bh., 334.
   It is a well known fact that Sahṛdayāloka Locana is another name of the Dhvanyāloka Locana.

9. Bhagavadgītārtha Saṁgraha.
   "Vipañcitaṁ caitat asmadgurubhiḥ asmābhiścānyatra vitanyate itīha nātinirbandhaḥ kṛtaḥ."
   A. Bh., 337.

   A footnote on the word "anyatra" in the above quotation clears what it stands for by stating "Bhagavadgītāvyākhyāyām".

10. Paramārtha Sāra.
    The question has already been discussed.

11. Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.
    Because it came immediately after the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī which is his last known dated work on philosophy, on which he wrote last of all.

M. M. Mukundarāma Śāstrī on the chronology of Abhinava's works.

In view of the facts stated above, it is surprising to find that M. M. Mukundarāma Śāstrī in his two introductions to the Tantrasāra, the one in English (P. IX) and the other in Sanskrit (P. 5-6) has placed the Parātrīśikā Vivaraṇa, the Tantrāloka, and the Tantra Sāra chronologically after the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī saying :—

"As, in his great work Tantrāloka, he often quotes from Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, which, he himself says, was written by him in the year 4115 of the kali age corresponding to 1014 A. D., it follows that the former was composed after the year 1014. Now the date of composition of Tantra Sāra, which is an epitome of Tantrāloka must necessarily be some time later than 1014 A. D."

In his introduction in Sanskrit he makes an additional statement assigning to the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa an earlier chronological position than that of even the Tantrāloka :—

"Tadanu parātriṁśikāgranthavivaraṇam"

It is to be noted here that the learned Śāstrī has not given the passages which he considers to have been quoted in the Tantrāloka from the I. P. V. We have already quoted the authority of the Bhāskarī on the basis of which we have assigned to the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī an earlier position in the chronological order than that of the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. We have also given a quotation in justification of the

P. T. V. 's chronological position before the Tantrāloka. Here is another passage which has been found in I. P. V. actually referring to the Tantrāloka and the Tantra Sāra. This, in our opinion, is the most conclusive proof of the latter's having been written before the Iśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī :—

> "Etacca vistarataḥ tatpradhāneṣu Tantrālokasārādiṣu mayā nirṇītam itīhānupayogānna vitānitam."
> I. P. V., II, 214.

It seems that our Śāstrī mistook the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā for the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. The Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā is the original text of Utpalācārya and the Iśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī is the smaller of the two commentaries on the above by Abhinavagupta. Undoubtedly, there are quotations in the Tantrāloka from the former (Vide Appendix B). But in view of the above quoted statement of Abhinava himself about the earlier chronological position of the Tantrāloka it would indeed be very surprising if any quotation from the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī could be traced in the Tantrāloka.

WORKS KNOWN FROM REFERENCES.

1. Kramakeli.

It was a commentary on the Krama Stotra. It has to be noted here that this Krama Stotra was different from Abhinava's composition of the same name, given in appendix (C) to this thesis. It was a work on the Krama system of philosophy. It is very often quoted by Maheśvarānanda in his commentary, Parimalā, on the Mahārtha Mañjarī. It is referred to by Abhinava in his Vivaraṇa on the Parātriṁśikā :—

> "Vyākhyātaṁ caitat mayā taṭṭīkāyāṁ Kramakelau Vistarataḥ." P. T. V., 236.

2. S'ivadṛṣṭyālocana.

S'ivadṛṣṭi is a well known work on the Trika system, written by Somānanda, the great grand teacher of Abhinava. The Pratyabhijñā system is based on it. From its name and reference the Ālocana of Abhinava seems to have been a critical study of the original work :—

"Yathoktam mayaiva S'ivadṛṣṭyālocane
'Preṣopi sa bhaved yasya śaktatā nāma vidyate'"
P. T. V., 116.

3. Pūrva Pañcikā.

This was a commentary on the Pūrva Śāstra, also called Mālinī Vijaya, which, according to the following statement, is the most authoritative book on the Trika system of the S'aiva philosophy :—

"Daśāṣṭādaśavasvaṣṭabhinnaṁ yacchāsanaṁ vibhoḥ
Tatsāraṁ Trikaśāstraṁ nu tatsāram Mālinī-
matam." T. A., I, 35.

From its name, Pañcikā, which means a detailed exposition, and from the frequent references to it in most of Abhinava's writings it seems to have been a very big work. An idea of its size can be formed from the available part of the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika which is an exposition of only the first verse of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra, as he himself says in its concluding line :—

"Pravarapuranāmadheye pure pūrve Kāśmīriko-
bhinavaguptaḥ
Mālinyādimavākye vārtikam etad racayati sma."

What must have been the size of the detailed exposition of the whole of the above Tantra, it is not difficult to imagine. This work, however, seems to be irrecoverably lost. Its loss to S'aiva philosophical literature is irrepairable.

Other Pañcikās.

On the lines of the work, just mentioned, he wrote expositions on other Tantras also, as is clear from his reference to them in :—

"Nirṇītaṁ caitan mayaiva Śrī Pūrva prabhṛti Pañcikāsu." P. T. V., 147.

Here the use of the word "prabhṛti" can have no other meaning than the above.

4. Padārtha Praveśa Nirṇaya Ṭīkā.

Nothing more about this can be said than that, from its name and the nature of the context in which the following reference to it occurs, it appears to have been a work of psycho-philosophical interest :—

"Anusandhāyāḥ smṛtibhede tasyāśca anubhavopajīvitve anubhavābhāvāt; vitatya ca vicāritaṁ mayaitat Padārtha Praveśa Nirṇaya Ṭīkāyām."

P. T. V., 162.

5. Prakīrṇaka Vivaraṇa.

From the context, in which reference to it, as given below, occurs, this seems to have been a grammatico-philosophical work :—

"Itthaṁ jaḍena sambandhe na mukhyaṇyartha-saṅgatiḥ
Āstām anyatra vitatam etad vistarato mayā."

T. A., VII, 33.

In commenting upon the word "anyatra" Jayaratha says :—

"Anyatreti Prakīrṇaka Vivaraṇādau".

Here the use of the word "ādi" indicates that he wrote many other works of the same kind.

6. Prakaraṇa Vivaraṇa.

It was a commentary on the Prakaraṇa Stotra and is referred to in the T. S., 31.

7. Kāvyakautuka Vivaraṇa.

It was a commentary on Bhaṭṭa Tota's work on poetics, the Kāvyakautuka. It was perhaps the first work on poetics that Abhinava wrote, for, chronologically it comes before the Dhvanyāloka Locana as the following reference shows :—

> "Sa cāyam asmadupādhyāya Bhaṭṭa Tautena Kāvya Kautuke asmābhiśca tadvivaraṇe bahutarakṛtanirṇayaḥ pūrvapakṣasiddhāntaḥ ityalam bahunā."
>
> Dh. L., 178.

8. Kathāmukha Tilakam.

It is referred to as his own composition in the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī. Nothing at present can be said about its contents.

9. Laghvī Prakriyā.

It was a devotional Stotra as the following quotations therefrom in the Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha and the nature of the context clearly show :—

> "Yathā ca mayaiva Laghvyām Prakriyāyām uktam" :—
>
> "Na bhogyaṁ vyatiriktaṁ hi bhoktus tvatto vibhāvyate
> Eṣa eva hi bhogo yattādātmyam bhoktṛbhogayoḥ."
>
> Bh. G. S., ch. IV, Ś. 28.
>
> and
>
> "Ūnādhikam avijñātam................................
> Kṣantavyaṁ kṛpayā śambho yatastvaṁ karuṇākaraḥ
> Anena stotrayogena tavātmānaṁ nivedaye."
>
> Bh. G. S., ch. XII, Ś. 11.

10. Bhedavāda Vidāraṇa.

It is referred to in both the Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha and the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. It was a

controversial work chiefly meant to demolish the dualistic theory, as is apparent from the following quotation :—

"Kṛtapratānaścāyam prakṛtyarthaṇyarthaviveko mayaiva Bhedavāda Vidāraṇe iti tata evānveṣyaḥ."

I. P. V., II, 158.

11. Devī Stotra Vivaraṇa.

This was a commentary from the monistic view-point on Ānandavardhana's Devī Stotra. The Stotra has been published in the Kāvyamālā series. Our statement is based upon the following lines in the Bh. G. S. :—

"Sarvabhūteṣu ātmānaṁ grāhakatayā anupraviśantam bhāvayet, ātmani ca grāhyatājñānadvāreṇa sarvāṇi bhūtāni ekīkuryāt; ataśca samadarśanatvaṁ saṁjāyate yogaśceti saṁkṣepārthaḥ; vistarastu Bhedavāda Vidāraṇādi prakaraṇe Devīstotra Vivaraṇe ca mayaiva nirṇītaḥ."

Bh. G. S., ch. VI, S'. 30.

Here from the use of the word "ādi" after "Bhedavāda Vidāraṇa," it appears that he wrote very many books to controvert the dualistic theory.

12. Tattvādhva Prakāśikā.

In this the author discussed the nature and the number of Tattvas accepted by the Trika. It is referred to by Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka as follows :—

"Granthakṛtā ca Tattvādhvaprakāśanādau tatra tatra tanmatāvalambanam eva kṛtam."

T. A., Ah. XI, P. 19.

13. S'ivaśaktyavinābhāva Stotra.

In this Stotra, as the title indicates, Abhinava praises Śiva and Śakti as inseparable from each other. He quotes

two verses from this in his commentary on the 19th verse of the 15th chapter of the Bhagavadgītā.

DIVISION OF HIS WORKS INTO THREE PERIODS.

There are three clearly marked periods of his literary activity. His works, therefore, have to be classified accordingly.

1. TĀNTRIKA PERIOD.

From the dates of his two dated stotras, Krama and Bhairava, and from the chronological order of his works based on references and other indications it is clear that first of all he tried the power of his pen mainly in commenting on the then existing Tantras from the point of view of monistic S'aivaism. That the Krama was the first of the Tantric systems on which he worked, the earliest date of the Kramastotra clearly proves. His known contributions to it are his above stotra and the Kramakeli. The next Tantric system that drew his attention was the Trika. To this his chief contributions are his Pūrva and other Pañcikās. That it was the transitional period between his experimenting in and writing on the Krama, and his ultimately taking to Kaulism, is conclusively proved by the following statement of Jayaratha :—

> "Tantropāsannagurvabhimukhīkaraṇānantaraṁ vis'rāntisthānatayā kulaprakriyāgurumapi utkarṣayati."
>
> T. A., Comm., 1, 31.

His known contributions to the Kaulika literature are the Bhairavastava and the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa. To the last part of this very first period of literary activity belong also his encyclopaedic work, the Tantrāloka, which deals with all the allied schools of Kashmir S'aivaism, and its three summaries, the Tantra Sāra, the Tantroccaya and the Tantravaṭa Dhānikā, each briefer than the preceding.

II. Ālaṅkārika period.

In the concluding portion of the last chapter of the Tantrāloka we find that his taste is changing. We see him inclining more towards the angle of vision of an admiring poet than towards that of a dry spiritualist. His vivid description of colour, taste and pleasant after-effects of wine, the record of his observation of charming complexion, beautiful facial cut and sportive movements of the city ladies, his interest in the beauty of the fauna and the flaura of Kashmir, his description of the river Vitastā and repeated reference to the power of Cupid, are all unmistakable signs of a changed taste. The Ālaṅkārika period, therefore, followed. That this was the middle period we know on the unmistakable authority of the Dh. L. which contains a clear reference to T. A. (vide Dh. L., 19). There are four known works of this period, of which the K. K. V. was the first (vide Dh. L., 178) and the A. Bh. the last to come from his pen.

III. Philosophical period.

Again, at the time of writing the A. Bh., philosophical ideas are seen getting supremacy, so much so that his exposition of Rasa, which has held its ground to this day, is purely philosophical. Not only this, while commenting on Bharata's Nāṭya Sūtra he had already begun writing side by side a purely philosophical work, namely, his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, as we know from a reference in A. Bh. (vide A. Bh., 337). Thus last of all did come the philosophical period. To this belong his monumental works, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī. The latter is also known as Bṛhatī Vimarśinī or Aṣṭādaśa Sahasrī. Because of these two works it is that he is acknowledged to be the chief exponent of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, as the concluding portion of

Mādhavācārya's summary of the Pratyabhijñā Darśana in the Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha shows :—

"Abhinavaguptādibhirācāryaiḥ vihitapratānopyayamarthaḥ."

The Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī is the penultimate of his known works. There is only one work, namely, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, which, on the authority of the Bhāskarī, we know for certain as posterior to it. How many more works he wrote thereafter, or whether he wrote any at all, we have at present no authority to say.

A General Idea of his Available Works.

1. Bodha Pañcadaśikā.

It is a propagandistic pamphlet consisting of 16 verses. It is called Bodha Pañcadaśikā because in fifteen (Pañcadaśa) verses the basic principles of the monistic Śaivaism are summarized in it. The sixteenth verse simply explains the object of such a composition. It speaks of the Śaiva conception of Śiva and Śakti, their relation and consequent emanation of the universe; of the cause and the nature of the bondage and the way to freedom from it, and of their (bondage and freedom) being in reality non-different from the highest Lord. It was written, as the following quotation shows, with the expressed object of enabling the less intelligent pupils of his, easily to grasp the fundamental principles of the system propounded by him :—

"Sukumāramatīn śiṣyān prabodhayitum añjasā
Imebhinavaguptena ślokāḥ pañcadaśoditāḥ."

B. P., Ś. 16.

The eighth verse of this pamphlet is quoted in the M. V. V., with the introductory remark :—

"Prabodhapañcadaśikāmadhye tādṛṅ mayā sphuṭam."

M. V. V., 36.

2. Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.

It was an exposition of some of the very difficult verses of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra which is also called Śrīpūrva Śāstra. It was written at the earnest entreaty of his loving pupils Karṇa and Mandra[1]. On the former we have already spoken a little and shall speak more when dealing with the Tantrāloka. It is unfortunate that so far we have been able to get the Vārtika on the first verse only which was composed in the eastern part of Pravarapura[2]. That he wrote his Vārtika on more than one verse and that the published edition, consisting of only two chapters, is only a part of a very big work that he wrote, is clear from his repeated reference to the 18th chapter wherein he promises to deal exhaustively with the various points under discussion[3]. Though it is only the second in the chronological list of his published works yet it was not the second of his compositions. Before taking up this work he had written many others as references to them to be frequently met with in this work clearly prove[4]. The available portion contains a very scathing criticism of various important theories of Nyāya.

3. Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa.

The Text.

Amongst the eight numerically equal groups[5] of the sixty-four non-dualistic Tantras, Rudra[6] Yāmala Tantra is the seventh in the second i. e. Yāmala group. The verses constituting the text of the Parātriṁśikā form the concluding part of the same. They give a summary of the whole Tantra. This statement finds its support in the last verse of the text itself :—

1. M. V. V., 2.
2. M. V. V., 135.
3. M. V. V., 58, 104.
4. M. V. V., 33.
5. T. A., I, 42.
6. T. A., I, 42.

"Evam mantraphalāvāptirityetad Rudrayāmalam."
P. T. V., 277.

The Vivaraṇa is Abhinava's commentary on it.

Other commentators.

Parātriṁśikā seems to have been quite popular during the century that intervened between Somānanda and Abhinava. This supposition alone can explain the existence of so many commentaries on it. Abhinava refers with reverence to only three of these, written by Somānanda, Bhavabhūti and Kalyāṇa separately[1]. About the rest he had so bad an opinion that he considered it disgraceful even to criticise them[2]. In Kashmir the present writer found another commentary, which is both simpler and briefer. It was written by Rājānaka Lakṣmīrāma. The MS. was copied by Rājānaka Nīlakaṇṭha in the Saptarṣi year 4962. It is in the possession of his son Mahisar of Srinagar.

The title.

The title is very misleading. On seeing it, the reader naturally thinks that the word "Triṁśikā" is indicative of the number of verses constituting the original text, but it is not so,[3] because the text actually consists of more verses than thirty. The real title of the book is Parātrīśikā.[4] It means "Parā, the mistress of the three i. e. the three powers of will, knowledge and action." In fact Parā is an abbreviation of Parāsaṁvid, which is higher than these powers and is still identical with them. The book is so called because it deals with such a "Parā." No doubt, it was also called Parā Triṁśikā, but for no other reason than that of similarity of sound. The word "triṁśikā" does not imply number thirty. Another name of this book is Trika Sūtra, because it gives in brief outline the basic

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1. T. A., VIII, 96.
2. P. T. V., 93.
3. P. T. V., 17.
4. P. T. V., 16-7.

principles (Prameyas) of the Trika system.[1] The text with Abhinava's Vivaraṇa is also called Anuttara Prakriyā.[2]

There are frequent references in this book to a Tantra Sāra. But it has to be noted here that this Tantra Sāra is an Āgama and not the summary of Abhinava's great work, the Tantrāloka. We made a very thorough search for the quotations from the Tantrasāra, found in the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, in Abhinava's Tantrasāra, but could not trace any. We have, therefore, come to the natural conclusion that the Tantrasāra, quoted in the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, is different from the work of the same name which is merely one of Abhinava's own summaries of his great work, the Tantrāloka. The chronological position, therefore, that we have assigned to the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa, needs no change.

Śaiva conception of Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī.

According to the Ābhāsavādin the whole universe is a mere manifestation of the universal self or Parama Śiva, as the images of an imagination, the scenes of a dream or the creations of a person who has attained certain yogic powers (yoginirmāṇa) are those of the limited selves. Our experience tells us that the things of imagination, dream and yogic creation have no existence independent of or separate from the self which is responsible for their manifestation. Believing, therefore, the macrocosm to be the same in its nature and constitution as the microcosm, the Ābhāsavādin holds that the whole universe rises from, has its being within, is maintained by and again merges in the same universal consciousness or self. He also holds that it is in its essence the same as that from which it rises, just as the waves of the ocean are essentially the same as the ocean itself.

1. T. A., Ah. XII, P. 101. 2. T. A., VI, 249.

This Self, the ultimate reality, he conceives as "prakāśa vimarśamaya". The universe also he broadly divides into substance and speech (vācya and vācaka); speech not as a mere physical phenomenon but as that of which the words are mere symbols. In fact the word "vāk" (speech) is used for the immaterial part of the universe, because the grossest form of vimarśa is distinguished from its other forms by its association with the physical sound which is its symbol and has a different physical substratum as opposed to that of the purely intellectual substratum of the idea. The substance is the grossest manifestation of the prakāśa aspect of the universal consciousness and the speech is that of the vimarśa. Thus Parā is a distinctive name of the ultimate reality by which it is referred to when its vimarśa aspect is intended to be emphasized. The Parā is called speech (śabdana) not in its gross form in which we hear it, but in the most subtle one, like self-consciousness within. In this form it is independent of all conventions, rather, it is their very life in the condition of Māyā[1]. It is the background of the individual self-consciousness, which has no other reality than the identification of self with a body, an identification which finds expression in gross speech as "I am John". Thus substance and speech are one in their most subtle original form, though in the stage of Māyā both seem to have separate existence. This state of perfect unity of consciousness and its entitative contents (prakāśa-vimarśaikya) is called the *Parā* state.

"Citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā."
I. P. V., I. 203.

All that we hear and can possibly hear exists in the Parā state of speech exactly in the manner in which all that we determinately perceive exists in the state of

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1. I. P. V., I, 205.

indeterminate knowledge. But before it can find manifestation in gross speech, technically called Vaikharī, it passes through two intermediate stages, known as Paśyantī and Madhyamā. To give a clear idea of what these technical terms stand for, it is necessary to deal with them separately, avoiding, as far as possible, the use of philosophical jargon.

I Parā.

The Parā is pure consciousness. It is free from all limitations of time and place, and name and form. It can be called self-consciousness (Aham), not as associated with body, mind, or vital airs, but as identical with the universal self. It has to be noted here that the use of the word "self-consciousness" for the Parā state of speech is from the point of view of the limited perceiver, who in the Vaikharī stage recognizes the latter's origin from the former. The reason is that the Parā state is the state of absolute unity without even so much as the faintest rise of diversity. For, the first rise of diversity takes place only in the first stage in the manifestation of gross speech from Parā, called Paśyantī. It is the ultimate source of all power that is found in words, used in ordinary life. It is a state of perfect unity of all kinds of powers. It is ever present in all the limited perceivers as identical with their self-consciousness, not as associated with body etc., but as something above them all. It is present even in the state of deep sleep when there is no consciousness of the earthly existence.

II Paśyantī.

Taking Parā as the primordial state of speech, we can speak of Paśyantī as the first stage in the manifestation of gross speech. In it there is but an extremely faint rise of gross speech as distinct from pure consciousness, so much so that the distinction cannot at all be said to have

arisen. This rise of distinction is regulated by the desire which is its cause; just as in the case of remembrance, though its object is associated with a variety of ideas yet in the memory there arises only that idea for the revival of which there has been an immediate cause. As for instance, though a gold jar is associated with innumerable ideas yet there is no rise of all of them or any of them promiscuously at the time of remembrance. We know it from our own experience that when it is remembered at the time of prosperity the only ideas, which rise about it, are those which are associated with it as an article of decoration and luxury. But do not absolutely different ideas arise when the same is remembered at the time of adverse circumstances ? Is not then the idea of its salability prominently associated with it ? And what is it that controls the rise of these ideas ? Is it not the desire of the remembering individual ? The same, therefore, is the determining factor in the rise to distinction of certain forms of speech to the exclusion of the rest in the stage of Pasyántī, though there is no denying the fact that all of them are equally present within parā exactly as all the ideas, which can rise in remembrance, are within ourselves.

III MADHYAMĀ.

It is that stage which immediately precedes the articulate speech. In this although the distinction between idea and speech, preceding the utterance, is clear, yet, there is no difference in the substratum of the two exactly as in the case of a black jar in which, although we have the idea of jar as separate from that of its blackness, yet, the substratum of jar is non-different from that of the quality of blackness. This we can all feel when we are delivering a very thoughtful speech in which every idea and the words expressive of it are very carefully chosen before utterance. Although in such a case there is a very clear consciousness of the distinction

between the two, yet, experience tells us, there is no difference of substratum.

IV VAIKHARĪ.

It is that form of speech which we use in our daily transactions[1]. In it the idea and the articulate symbol, which represents it, have separate substrata.

The distinction of each one of the four forms of speech from the rest of them will become clear if we were to compare them with the four conditions of a seed before it sends out its sprout. The Parā is like that condition of a seed, in which all the future forms of the sprout, according to the Sāṅkhya conception, exist in the state of absolute unity. The Paśyantī is just like that condition in which there is just the rise of that state which is responsible for the first perceptible development. It is just like self-preparation on the part of a person before he makes any perceptible movement to stir or jump. The third i. e. Madhyamā is like the enlargement of seed in which though there is a perceptible change from the original condition yet the two (seed and sprout) cannot be pointed out as distinct from each other in point of substratum. The last i. e. Vaikharī is comparable to that condition in which the sprout has appeared as distinct from the seed and both are directly perceptible as distinct from each other in all respects not excluding that of the substratum.

The reader will, now, understand that Parā with the explanation of which the Parā Trīśikā is concerned is nothing but the Parā Saṁvid or Anuttara; and that the adjunct "Trīśikā", which forms a component part of the compound which stands as the title of the book, is meant to distinguish this Parā from the first of the four forms of speech involved

1. P. T. V., 4-5.

in the individual utterance in the condition of Māyā. This explains why the work was called Anuttara Sūtra also.

The Substance.

The text is in the form of a dialogue between Bhairava and Bhairavī; the latter questions what is that thing, called Anuttara, from the mere knowledge of which equilibrium of Khecarī i. e. liberation from all kinds of pains and sorrows (mokṣa) can be got[1]. The idea is similar to that of the Vedānta which also says "One who knows Brahman himself becomes Brahman." (Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati). What Bhairava says in reply on the essential nature of the Saṁvid and the way to know it we shall have occasion to speak of in the philosophical part of this work.

Biographical importance

This book, next to the Tantrāloka, is of very great biographical importance. In the concluding portion of this work he describes, for the first time, his as well as his favourite pupil Mandra's descent and gives some account of both the families and their atmosphere. All these points have already been dealt with at some length in the preceding chapter.

4. Tantrāloka.

This is the most voluminous of all the works of Abhinava discovered so far. It deals exhaustively with all the matters connected with the non-dualistic sixty-four Āgamas. It touches upon both the ritualistic and the philosophical matters alike. Although it is primarily concerned with the systematic presentation of the teachings of the Kula[2] and the Tantra systems only yet occasionally

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1. P. T. V., 3.
2. T. A., I, 24.

it gives authoritative information on others also[1] such as the Krama etc. It is the most authoritative book on the said subjects, because the statements made in it are not simply matters of opinion, but are based[2] on the authority of the S'aivāgama, as traditionally interpreted, and, what is more, on the personal experience of the author himself. It consists of thirty-seven[3] chapters, but only fourteen have so far been published. They, together with the valuable commentary of Jayaratha, cover eight volumes. Of these the first five, the ninth and the thirteenth chapters are of very great philosophical importance. The first gives in brief all that is to be dealt with later in detail. The following four deal successively with the four ways to the final emancipation, namely, (I) Anupāya, (II) Śāmbhava, (III) Śākta, (IV) and Āṇava. The ninth is interesting because it deals with the thirty six Tattvas of the Śaiva philosophy and the interest of the thirteenth lies in its giving us an idea of the S'aiva theory of Karma.

THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE TANTRĀLOKA.

1. The cause of bondage.
2. The way to freedom.
3. What is knowledge as distinct from ignorance.
4. What is Mokṣa according to the Trika.
5. Conceptions of Mokṣa of other schools.
6. What is the ultimate reality of the objective world.
7. The process of manifestation of the universe.
8. The ways to realisation of the ultimate reality.
9. The points of difference between one way and another.
10. Bimbapratibimba Vāda.

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1. T. A., Comm., I, 29.
2. T. A., I, 149.
3. T. A., I, 288.

11. Comparison of the Tattvas from Puruṣa to Pṛthvī with those of the Sāṅkhya.
12. The worlds in the universe as conceived by the S'aivas.
13. S'aiva rituals.
14. Autobiographical touches.

On most of these points we shall be speaking in the second part.

THE TITLE.

It is called Tantrāloka because it enlightens its reader on the path pointed out by the Tantras.

"Ālokam āsādya yadīyam eṣa

Lokaḥ sukhaṁ sañcaritā kriyāsu." T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

THE PLACE OF AND THE OCCASION FOR ITS COMPOSITION.

It was written at the house of Mandra[1]. And it was at the combined request of his younger brother, Manoratha[2], his dear pupil, Mandra, his loving cousins, and some other devotees of Śiva, such as Rāmagupta, that he undertook to write this work. As a matter of fact the idea of writing such a work was already in his mind. This combined request simply gave an additional impetus and so the work was taken up[3] immediately.

ITS AUTHORITY.

Although it is full of quotations in support of the various points, discussed therein, from ever so many Tantras, yet, according to Abhinava's own statement, it is primarily based upon the authority of the Mālinī[4] Vijaya Tantra. This Tantra is the most important of all the three, Siddhā, Nāmaka and Mālinī, which primarily contain the principles and teachings of the system called the Trika, and represents the essence of all the ninety-two Āgamas

1. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.) 2. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)
3. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.) 4. T. A., I, 35.

belonging to the three schools of S'aivaism, namely, Advaita, Dvaitādvaita and Dvaita.

5. TANTRASĀRA.

6. TANTRA VAṬA DHĀNIKĀ.

These two, as their names imply, are the summaries of the Tantrāloka. The last is a briefer summary than the first. It is like a seed of the huge tree of the Tantrāloka.

AUTHORSHIP OF THE TANTRA VAṬA DHĀNIKĀ.

Jayaratha quotes two verses from the Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā in his commentary on the Tantrāloka Ah. II, ś. 2, without mentioning the name of the author. This was thought by M. M. Mukundarāma S'āstrī to be sufficient reason to attribute this work to another Abhinava of the same name. He says in a foot note to his edition of the work under discussion :—

" 'Upāyairna śivo bhāti' ityādi padyadvayaṁ (Tantrāloka 2 Ah. 2 padyaṭīkāyām) yaduktam itīyatā granthakṛnnāmānuddiśya yat pramāṇarūpeṇopanyastam atonumīyate etadgranthakṛd Abhinavaguptaḥ prasiddha Abhinavaguptācāryād vibhinno Rājānaka Jayarathācāryāt paurvakālikaśca sambhavatīti." T. V. Dh., P., 5.

Even if there had been no other reason to the contrary, we would have considered the reason stated by the learned editor to be too insufficient for such a conclusion. But there is the sound evidence of Jayaratha himself, who, in his commentary on the Tantrāloka itself, clearly attributes the Tantra Vaṭa Dhānikā to our Abhinavagupta, saying "Yaduktam anenaivānyatra" and quotes verses thirty-six and thirty-seven giving the name also of this work in T. A., Comm., Ah. 13, P. 81. The supposition of difference in point of authorship of this work is, therefore, baseless.

7. DHVANYĀLOKA LOCANA.

It is the well known commentary of our author on Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka. On the commonness of the authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti; on the history of the theory of Dhvani, on its opponents and on other commentators of the Dhvanyāloka than our author, we shall speak at proper places in the following chapters. Here, therefore, we need not go into any detailed treatment of the work.

8. ABHINAVA BHĀRATĪ.

This is a commentary of Abhinavagupta on the Nāṭya S'āstra of Bharata. In this he mostly follows the interpretation of the text, as orally given by his teacher in this branch, Bhaṭṭa Tota.[1] On many important points, however, he differs from him (Bhaṭṭa Tota) as he does from Somānanda, whose commentary he follows and expands in the Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa. These differences he clearly states, as for instance, in regard to there being a possibility of the enjoyment of Rasa from the perusal of a poem (A. Bh., 292-3). His object in this commentary was not simply to prove that his predecessors' interpretations of Bharata's text were wrong but rather to modify them.[2]

THE PLAN.

According to his own statement, his plan in this work was to comment in detail, giving a full and clear explanation of all the intricacies to be met with in the important passages, to give the meaning of the difficult words in the case of the unimportant ones, to reconcile all the apparent contradictions in the text, to explain repetitions, to discuss at length the disputed points, to clear up doubts and to put together the opinions of the authoritative persons on the most salient[3] points. These are some of the distinctive

1. A. Bh., I. 2. A. Bh., 2. 3. A. Bh., 1-2.

features of the commentary. Space here does not permit us to illustrate all the points stated above. Two places in the commentary may, however, be pointed out as illustrative of most of them. One is that in which he deals with Bharata's definition of Rasa in the 6th chapter, and the other is the third chapter in which he contents himself with mostly giving the meanings of a few words here and there.

THE QUESTION OF THE JOINT AUTHORSHIP OF THE TEXT.

The question of the joint authorship of the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata is very old. On this scholars have differed right from the pre-Abhinava time. According to some, those portions in which sage Bharata is addressed in the second person, as for instance in Bh. Su., ch. I, Ś. 2-6, were from the pen of some of his pupils and the rest from that of Bharata himself[1]. But Abhinava considers the use of the second person alone to be too insufficient for such a conclusion and thinks that Bharata himself wrote those portions also, representing himself to be an interrogator. He substantiates his statement by giving the instances of the use of dialogic forms in the works of accepted single authorship. We reserve our opinion on this matter till the next chapter.

THE INTERPRETATION OF BHARATA'S MYTH ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF THE STAGE.

Abhinava puts a very intelligent interpretation on the mythical account, given by Bharata, of the origin of the stage in the first chapter. According to him, when Bharata speaks of his having been instructed by Brahmā to direct the dramatic performance because of his being a sage with hundred sons, of his having been given umbrella, crown and throne etc. by different gods, of the appointment of certain

1. A. Bh., 8.

divine beings to guard over certain parts of the theatre or certain actors and of the creation of fairies, he simply means to tell us the requirements of the stage and the way to manage it.

To state it briefly, the stage director should be a self-sacrificing, hardy,[1] industrious and influential[2] person of great intellectual[3] power; he should be capable of understanding[4] the idea of the poet at a glance; he should have a large number of men of receptive mind[5] and retentive memory, of quick judgment[6] and easy delivery; these men should be capable of identifying[7] themselves with the characters that they represent, so that not only their tone and facial expression may change with the changing scenes, but the colour[8] also, which is ordinarily not possible unless there be corresponding feeling[9] in the heart. Their height, complexion, facial cut, colour of the hair and eyes and general constitution of the body should be fit for the varying needs of the stage, as the hundred names of Bharata's sons enumerated in the text, imply[10]; and above all they should be free from all shyness[11] before the audience.

Women are indispensable for the stage. For, whatever be the nature of training, the characteristic differences in point of delicacy of body and sweetness of tongue, which are the gifts of nature alone, and the sudden or gradual change of colour and look which are caused by certain feelings natural to women alone under certain circumstances, cannot possibly be displayed by men; and the absence of these seriously interferes with the enjoyment of Rasa. Like men, women also,

1. A. Bh., 17.
2. A. Bh., 17.
3. A. Bh., 16.
4. A. Bh., 21.
5-6, A. Bh., 16.
7. A. Bh., 27.
8. A. Bh., 28.
9. A. Bh., 22.
10. A. Bh., 19.
11. A. Bh., 16.

as the names of the created fairies imply, should be of different kinds to suit the occasion.

There is also required a sympathetic, appreciative and liberal public to supply, like gods in the myth, the various scenic necessities to give the look of naturalness to all the scenes of the drama.

As regards the management, the general manager should be a person who in disposition, talk and look is exceptionally sweet like[1] the moon. But strong and strict should be the stage-manager[2]. The other executives also should be of such nature and power as characterise[3] the gods mentioned in the myth.

In this brief statement of a general idea of his works, we need not state what he has said in regard to those portions of Bharata's Nāṭya S'āstra which concern themselves with the details of construction of the stage and the arrangement of seating accommodation for the audience according to the class, rank and importance of each individual[4], with the narration of the orthodox religious rites to be performed before using a new stage, with the description of one hundred and eight postures (karaṇa) and thirty-two gestures (aṅgahāra) of dance and finally with the instructions as to how to stage the prologue. We, therefore, pass them over.

9. BHAGAVADGĪTĀRTHA SAṄGRAHA.

The Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha, as its name implies, is not a commentary in the strict sense of the word. It is simply a summary of the subject matter of the Bhagavadgītā. At some places, however, it has the look of a commentary inasmuch as it gives the meanings of certain words. In it

1. A. Bh., 31.
2. A. Bh., 31.
3. A. Bh., 31.
4. A. Bh., 32.

Abhinava gives the traditional interpretation from the Śaiva point of view, as learnt from his teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja, but not without using his[1] judgment. It was written at the repeated request of a certain pious Brāhmaṇa, Loṭaka,[2] who, it appears, was Abhinava's relative.[3] It fills a gap left by other commentators, inasmuch as it gives the hidden true import of the Bhagavadgītā.[4] Its proper understanding presupposes a tolerably good knowledge of the undisputed parts of the text as well as that of the basic principles of the Trika philosophy. A person, who is qualified in both these respects, will certainly find it very informing, particularly on those passages about which doubt is not removed by the commentaries of his predecessors. The following verses illustrate the point :—

II, 12, 69 ; III, 11 ; IV, 18, 24 ; V, 14 ; VI, 5-7.

The text on which Abhinava comments, differs at many places from the one published by the Nirnaya Sagar Press, which, along with other commentaries, includes Abhinava's Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha also. In the printed text, for instance, we find that the well known verse

"yadā yadā hi dharmasya"

etc. reads in the concluding portion as

"tadātmānaṁ sṛjāmyaham".

But Abhinava's text reads as

"tadātmāṁśaṁ sṛjāmyaham".

The variation, though apparently slight, implies a greatly different meaning as the following extract from the commentary shows :—

"Śrī Bhagavān kila pūrṇaṣāḍguṇyatvāt śarīrasamparkamātra-rahitopi sthitikāritvāt kāruṇikatayā ātmāṁśaṁ sṛjati ;

1. Bh. G. S. Introd. Ś. 6. 2. Bh. G. S. concl. Ś. 2.
3. Bh. G. S. concl. Ś. 3. 4. Bh. G. S. Introd. Ś. 5.

Ātmā pūrṇaṣāḍguṇyaḥ, aṁśaḥ upakārakatvena apradhāna-bhūto yatra tat atmāṁśam, śarīraṁ gṛhṇāti ityarthaḥ."

Bh. G. S., Ch. IV, 7.

Numbers of a few more verses with this kind of difference are given below :—

1st Chapter : 1, 6, 18, 28, 33.

2nd Chapter : 1, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 30, 32, 43, 47, 48, 58, 60, 63.

3rd Chapter : 23, 26, 35.

Further, it has very many verses in addition to those found in the published text. Take for instance verses forty to forty-five in the third chapter.

"Eṣa sūkṣmaḥ paraḥ śatrur dehinām indriyaiḥ saha
Sukhatantra ivāsīno mohayan pārtha tiṣṭhati
Kāmakrodhamayo ghoraḥ stambhaharṣasamudbhavaḥ
Ahaṅkārobhimānātmā dustaraḥ pāpakarmabhiḥ
Harṣam asya nivartyaiṣa śokam asya dadāti ca
Bhayañcāsya karotyeṣa mohayaṁstu muhur muhuḥ
Sa eṣa kaluṣaḥ kṣudrachidraprekṣī Dhanañjaya
Rajaḥpravṛtto mohātmā mānuṣāṇām upadravaḥ."

On this Abhinava comments as follows :—

"Eṣa tāvat sūkṣma utpattisamaye alakṣya indriyeṣu" etc.

IMPORTANCE OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ IN THE EYES OF THE S'AIVAS.

Several teachers of S'aivaism from the time of Vasugupta down to that of Abhinava commented upon the Bhagavad-gītā. In the writings of our author there are very many quotations from it and often they are coupled with reference to Kṛṣṇa as Guru[1]. It is, therefore, necessary to state here how Kṛṣṇa is connected with the Trika S'aivaism, and

1. T. A., I, 162.

consequently what position the Gītā does occupy in the S'aiva literature.

Here we may state by the way that in this and similar other cases our object in these pages is simply to explain why orthodox S'aivas had a certain view about this or similar other matters. Whether they were right or wrong in these respects is altogether a different matter with which we are not concerned immediately.

Although the S'aivāgama had its origin between the third and the fourth centuries A. D., as we shall show in the next chapter, yet the orthodox S'aivas regarded it as of very high antiquity, indeed of eternal existence like the Vedas. This view we find recorded by Abhinava in the 35th Āhnika of the Tantrāloka in which he traces the origin of the S'aivāgama from Bhairava and represents Rāmacandra also to have studied it partly. In the Harivaṁśa Purāṇa we are told that Kṛṣṇa was taught the sixty-four monistic S'aivāgamas by sage Durvāsas, the revealer of all of them in Kali age. Similarly, in the Mahābhārata, Mokṣa Parva, it is stated that he got instruction in the Dvaita and the Dvaitādvaita S'aivāgamas, twenty-eight in number, from Upamanyu. It seems that it was because of the above statements that Kṛṣṇa was thought by the S'aivas to have been himself a follower of the Trika. Perhaps for this very reason the Bhagavadgītā is classed with the Āgamas.

10. Paramārtha Sāra.

The Title.

This work is called Paramārtha Sāra, because it briefly states the most essential principles of the Trika philosophy.

" Āryāśatena tad idaṁ saṁkṣiptaṁ
śāstrasāram atigūḍham."

P. S., 198.

THE SOURCE

According to Abhinava's own statement, it is an adaptation of the Ādhāra Kārikās of S'eṣa Muni who is also referred to as Ādhāra Bhagavān or Ananta Nātha. These Kārikās also were known as "Paramārtha Sāra". They gave in brief the most essential principles of the Sāṅkhya philosophy and taught that the final emancipation could be attained by discriminating between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The original with a few omissions, additions and alterations was adapted to serve as a medium of teaching the most essential principles of the Trika. The adaptation consists of one hundred and five verses, though Abhinava's own statement as regards the number of its verses is:—
"In hundred Āryā verses I have summarised the essential principles of the Trika system which are so difficult to understand." P. S., 198.

This, however, does not mean that Abhinava wrote only hundred verses and that the rest were subsequently added to them by some other hands. The fact is that the number refers to the verses concerned with the statement of the principles and not to all which constitute the existing text. Therefore, if we leave aside the first three verses, in the first of which he offers prayer and in the following two states the source and nature of his composition, and also the concluding two, we find the verses dealing with the subject matter to be only one hundred. This seems to have been his way of giving the number of verses in a particular work, as is testified by his Bodhapañcadaśikā. Although this work actually consists of sixteen verses yet it is called Pañcadaśikā (consisting of 15 verses) bceause only in the first fifteen verses the Bodha is dealt with. The last is simply a concluding verse similar to the last two in the work under discussion.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SOURCE AND THE ADAPTATION.

There is a difference of opinion among scholars as regards the text which was the source of Abhinava's adaptation. Dr. Barnett, who was perhaps the first scholar to study the philosophical works of Abhinavagupta, remarks in J. R. A. S. (1910) P. 708 :—

"Our Paramārtha Sāra must be distinguished from another little work of the same name, of which an edition was published in 1907 at Madras, with a Telugu paraphrase by Pattisapu Venkateshvaradu. The latter consists of seventy-nine Āryā verses; a considerable number of these are borrowed directly from our Paramārtha Sāra and with them have been incorporated others, the whole work being painted over with Vaiṣṇava colours. Needless to say, it is valueless for the criticism of our book."

Supposing the text of the Paramārtha Sāra, referred to by the learned Doctor, to be the same as that of the one published in the S'abda Kalpadruma, Mr. J. C. Chatterji holds, on the contrary, that the very work, referred to by Dr. Barnett in the above paragraph, was adapted by Abhinava to suit his needs. He further adds in the same connection :— "A comparison of the two texts would prove, to my mind, interesting and I propose to make it on another occasion."

K. S'., P. 12.

After a careful study of the available material on the subject, we are inclined to support the latter view. We also, like Mr. Chatterji, have not had access to the Madras edition of the Paramārtha Sāra, with a Telugu paraphrase. Our information about the supposed adapted Paramārtha Sāra is based on two editions. One of these forms a part of the S'abda Kalpadruma and the other has been published in the Trivendrum Sanskrit Series. Like Mr. Chatterji,

we also feel little doubt that the text presented by these two editions is the same as that of the edition referred to by Dr. Barnett, because it fully answers the description of the Madras publication. This also consists of seventy-nine Āryā verses. It may be noted here that the concluding line of the text appearing in the S'abda Kalpadruma states the number of verses to be 85. The Trivendrum publication does have 85 verses. But the additional six verses have got nothing to do with the subject matter. They constitute a sort of introduction and were, therefore, perhaps, dropped by the scribes of the MSS. on which the two editions, the one included in the S'abda Kalpadruma and the other published at Madras, referred to by Dr. Barnett, are based. A considerable number of verses in the common text of the two publications is the same as that found in Abhinava's Paramārtha Sāra, and the whole of the original work is painted over with Vaiṣṇava colours. Consult, for instance, the verses 25 and 59 of the Śabda Kalpadruma.

This work was held to be very sacred, so much so that Abhinava in his Bh. G. S. quotes from it as from a S'ruti the following verse :—

"Tīrthe śvapacagṛhe vā naṣṭasmṛtirapi parityajan deham
Jñānasamakālamuktaḥ kaivalyaṁ yāti hataśokaḥ."

Bh. G. S., Ch. VIII, 7.

It may be pointed out here that this verse is found without the least difference in Abhinava's Paramārtha Sāra also. But it cannot be supposed to be a quotation from that; firstly, because, as we have already said, Bh. G. S. comes before the Paramārtha Sāra in the chronological order of his works; secondly, because it is given as a quotation from S'ruti, as the context given below shows :—

"Evaṁ hi sati jñāninopi yāvaccharīrabhāvidhātudoṣa—
vikalitacittavṛtter jaḍatāprāptasya tāmasasyeva gatiḥ

syāt na cābhyupagamotra yuktaḥ pramāṇabhūtaśruti-virodhāt asti hi 'tīrthe śvapaca" etc ;

Bh. G. S., Ch. VIII, 7.

thirdly, because, had the quotation been from his own work he would have stated so, as it is his clearly marked practice in this and other works ; and fourthly and lastly, because of Mr. Chatterji's reason in support of the earlier date of the adapted text than that of our author, namely, that a verse from it is quoted in the Spanda Pradīpikā by Utpala Vaiṣṇava, who was an older contemporary of Abhinava, if not his predecessor, as we shall show in the next chapter (K. S., P. 13). Thus the supposition of the earlier existence of the work accessible to us does not seem to be unreasonable. We, therefore, are of opinion that the Paramārtha Sāra of Abhinava is an adaptation of the work published in the S'abdakalpadruma and in the Trivendrum series.

We attempt below to compare briefly the language of the two to further strengthen our opinion :—

"Nānāvidhavarṇānāṁ varṇān dhatte yathāmalaḥ sphaṭikaḥ,
Tadvadupādher guṇabhāvitasya bhāvaṁ vibhur dhatte."

A. K., S'. 7.

and

"Nānāvidhavarṇānāṁ rūpān dhatte yathāmalaḥ sphaṭikaḥ
Suramānuṣapaśupādaparūpatvaṁ tadvadīśopi."

P. S., S'. 6.

Here the difference of principle will be apparent to any one familiar with the ideas of the two systems. According to the Sāṅkhya, limitation is the result of the nearness of its cause with what is limited and the two have separate independent existence. But, according to the Trika, it is simply a result of the free will of the one who is all-powerful and independent of whom nothing has or can have an existence. However, because of the commonness

of the idea that this limitation is only apparent and that the pure being is in reality as little affected by these varying conditions as a crystal is by the various things which cast their reflections on it, Abhinava has retained in his adaptation so much of the language of the original that any one having the two verses before him can confidently say that one is an adaptation of the other.

But when there is no such difference of principles, we find the very language of the original without the alteration of even a letter, as in the following instance :—

"Puṇyāya tīrthasevā nirayāya śvapacasadananidhanagatiḥ
Puṇyāpuṇyakalaṅkasparśābhāve tu kiṁ tena."

These lines constitute the 74th verse of the original and the 84th of the adaptation.

Further, we find certain portions of the original altogether omitted, because they deal with matters in which the two systems fundamentally differ, as for instance, that part in which the original deals with the effect of the mere presence of Puruṣa in bringing about all activity in the insentient senses :—

"Yadvadacetanam api sannikaṭasthe bhrāmake bhramati loham
Tadvat karaṇasamūhaś ceṣṭati cidadhiṣṭhite dehe."

A. K., S'. 3.

We also find in the adaptation certain verses which cannot at all be traced in the original. These are mainly those which deal with the ideas peculiar to Trika S'aivaism, as for instance, those which describe the eleven Tattvas in which this system believes in addition to those which it has in common, at least in point of names, with the Sāṅkhya system :—

"Śivaśaktisadāśivatām īśvaravidyāmayīṁ ca tattvadaśām
Saktīnām pañcānāṁ vibhaktabhāvena bhāsayati."

P. S., S'. 14.

For a detailed comparative study we give below the numbers of the verses in the adaptation showing against them those of the verses in the Ādhāra Kārikās, as found in the S'abda Kalpadruma, of which the former are adaptations.

P. S.	A. K.	P. S.	A. K.
7	8	60	65
8	9	61	64
9	10	69	68
26	18	70	69
27	19	71	70
28	20	81	71
30	21	82	72
32	22	83	73
36	27	84	74
37	28	100	76
51	49	101	77
52	50	102	78
53	54		

11. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.

This is Abhinava's commentary, called Vimarśinī, on Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Sūtras. This is called Laghvī Vimarśinī also, because of its being a comparatively less detailed commentary than the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī. According to the old method of calculation, in which a group of thirty-two syllables was counted as one Śloka, the former work consists of four thousand and the latter of eighteen thousand Ślokas and, therefore, they are also known as Catussahasrī and Aṣṭādaśasahasrī respectively. The contents of this work will be dealt with in the second part.

12. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.

It is an unpublished commentary of Abhinava on Utpalācārya's commentary called "Vivṛti" on his own Pratyabhijñā

Sūtras, as Abhinava himself states in one of the introductory verses to this book :—

"S'rīmal Lakṣmaṇagupta darśitapathaḥ
śrīpratyabhijñāvidhau

Ṭīkārthapravimarśinīṁ racayate vṛttim praśiṣyo guroḥ."

This is the penultimate work of Abhinava. It clears up most of the points which are not very clear in the Laghvī Vimarśinī. But the readers will be pained to know that Utpalācārya's Ṭīkā, on which it is a commentary, has not so far been found inspite of vigorous searches made by so many enthusiasts. Perhaps, unfortunately, it is irrecoverably lost.

The eight smaller works of Abhinava, which we are giving in Appendix (B) to this thesis, can be divided into two classes : (I) propagandistic booklets or leaflets on the Trika S'aivaism and (II) Stotras. To the former belong :

13. Anuttarāṣṭikā,
14. Paramārtha Dvādaśikā,
15. Paramārtha Carcā and
16. Mahopadeśa Viṁśatika.

And to the latter class belong

17. Krama Stotra,
18. Bhairava Stava,
19. Dehastha Devatā Cakra Stotra and
20. Anubhava Nivedana.

All the four pamphlets are concerned with the explanation of the phenomenon of the universe as non-different from the highest reality, which is spoken of as "Anuttara" in the first, "Paramārtha" in the second and the third and "Prapañcottīrṇa" and "Viśvamūrti" in the last of the first group. They state that the realisation of the highest reality, as they represent it, is the only way to salvation.

The first line of the second verse of the Anuttarāṣṭikā :—

"Saṁsārosti na tattvatas tanubhṛtām bandhasya
vārtaiva kā"

is quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka III, 99. Although in this work we find some of the similes very commonly used by the Vedāntins to explain the unreality of the universe, for instance :—

"Mithyāmohakṛdeṣa rajjubhujagacchāyāpiśācabhramaḥ,"

yet it would be a mistake to think that the Trika conception of the universe is the same as that of the Vedānta. For, the former is Ābhāsavāda and the latter is Vivartavāda. For fuller information on this refer to the 2nd chapter in the 2nd part.

Paramārtha Dvādaśikā was known as Advaya Dvādaśikā also, because the second verse :—

"Yadyatattvaparihārapūrvakaṁ tattvam eṣi
tadatattvam eva hi
Yadyatattvam atha tattvam eva vā tat tvam eva
nanu tattvam īdṛśam."
P. D., Ś. 2.

is quoted by Ramyadevācārya in his commentary on Cakrapāṇinātha's Bhāvopahāra, Ś. 45, with the introductory remark "Advayadvādaśikāyāmapi."

As regards Stotras, about the first two, viz., the Krama and the Bhairava, we have already spoken in discussing the date of Abhinavagupta. Here it may be added in connection with the latter that in old Pandit families of Kashmir there is still current a tradition which says that Abhinava, while entering the Bhairava cave for his last Samādhi, was reciting this Stotra.

In the Dehastha Devatā Cakra Stotra Abhinava shows that the attendant deities of Śiva, mentioned in the Purāṇas,

are found associated with him even when he is in the body as a limited self (S'iva eva gṛhītapaśubhāvaḥ). Though in the latter case their names and forms are different yet their functions are the same. For instance, in the Purāṇas he is said to have got two door-keepers, Gaṇeśa and Baṭuka. They accompany him even when he assumes limitations as an individual (Paśupramātā) to guard two of the nine doors of the body. Of course, in this case, they are called Prāṇa and Apāna. Jayaratha echoes this very idea when in his commentary on the Tantrāloka I, 6, he says the following with regard to Gaṇeśa and Baṭuka:—

"Asya hi prāṇavyāptirasti ityevaṁ nirdiśanti guravaḥ"
and
"Vastuto hi apānavyāptirasyāsti ityevaṁ nirdeśaḥ", respectively.

Regarding the Anubhava Nivedana it may be stated here that we attribute it to Abhinava on the authority of a tradition only. We have so far not been able to find any internal or external literary evidence to support it. The colophon says nothing about its authorship and no quotation from it have we, so far, discovered anywhere. We are, therefore, not quite sure that the tradition is well founded. We have, however, included it in the list of Abhinava's works, because we found it in an old collection of Abhinava's Stotras in the possession of Harabhatt Shastri of Kashmir.

21. TANTROCCAYA.

This is another summary of the great work, Tantrāloka, smaller than the Tantrasāra but bigger than the Tantravaṭadhānikā. Although both the introductory and the concluding verses speak of its being a work of Abhinava, yet the language, the style and the method of treatment of the subject matter, give rise to grave doubt about its being from the pen of Abhinava.

22. GHAṬAKARPARAKULAKA VIVṚTI.

Ghaṭakarpara is an interesting poem of twenty one verses. It is of the type of the famous Meghadūta. There is just one point of difference: while Meghadūta is from the lips of the lover, here it is the separated beloved that mostly speaks, only a few lines being from others such as her friend and messenger etc.[1] It is interesting to note in this connection that according to the published commentary of Pandit Ramcharit Sharma, a modern scholar, the whole of the poem is from the beloved. Its author, according to the tradition inherited and recorded by Abhinava, was Kālidāsa.[2] Its title was probably suggested by the word "Ghaṭakarpara" occurring in the last line of the poem in which the author, being extremely confident of his all-surpassing skill in writing Yamakas, humorously vows to carry water in a potsherd for him who can defeat him in writing Yamakas.[3]

The Vivṛti is Abhinava's learned and interesting commentary on the work under discussion.[4] According to him the 20th verse is not from the pen of Kālidāsa; it is a later interpolation.[5] The belief, therefore, in some quarters that this poem is a composition of the poet, Ghaṭakarpara, who, according to a literary tradition[6] was one of the nine gems in the court of King Vikramāditya, is evidently ill-founded.

In addition to the twenty-one verses commented upon by Abhinava, there is a benedictory verse in the beginning. The MS. gives number one to this verse and two to the following. The question, therefore, naturally arises "Is it a part of the poem?" For the following reasons our opinion on this point is that it is a benedictory verse of Abhinava

1. Gh. V. (MS.) 2. Gh. V. (MS.) 3. Gh., p. 26.
4. Gh. V. (MS.) 5. Gh. V. (MS.) 6. T. V.

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at the commencement of the commentary and not the first verse of the poem. Its wrong place and the wrong number of the first introductory verse of the poem are due to scribal mistakes :—

(I) Had it been a part of the poem Abhinava would not have left it uncommented.

(II) While Kālidāsa often, particularly in minor poems, does not offer benediction, Meghadūta and Śrutabodha for instance, we have not so far discovered any work of Abhinava without a benedictory verse in the beginning,

(III) This verse is not found ln the Nirnaya Sagar edition.

It may be pointed out here that the published text differs from that of the MS., on which our study is based, on the following points. For convenient reference we call the former "A" and the latter "B".

(I) The first five verses of "A" occur as verses from the I5th to the 19th in "B".

(II) The verses 15th and 21st of "A" are not found in "B".

(III) Similarly the 10th verse of "B" is not found in "A".

23. BIMBAPRATIBIMBA VĀDA

This work is noticed in two catalogues (1) Dr. Bühler's Kashmir catalogue and (2) Dr. Bhandarkar's Report of the collection of Sanskrit MSS. in 1875-76. A careful study of a copy of the MS. of the work in question, kindly supplied by the curator of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, tells us that this work, though noticed as a separate work of Abhinava, is in reality only a part of the 3rd Āhnika of the Tantrāloka in which he refutes the Bimbapratibimba theory of the Naiyāyikas and establishes that of the Śaivas.

A comparison of the verses 1 to 23 of the third Āhnika and the commentary thereon with the MS. No. 469 of 1875-76 in the B. O. R. I. will convince anybody. In fact the colophon very clearly states that the Bimbapratibimba Vāda is only an extract from the Tantrāloka.[1]

24. ANUTTARA TATTVA VIMARŚINĪ VṚTTI

Prof. P. P. S. Shastri's descriptive catalogue of the MSS. in the Tanjore Palace Library informs us that there are two MSS. of this work in the said Library; but unfortunately both of them are incomplete. The extracts given by the learned Professor leave no doubt about Abhinava's authorship of the work[2]. It may be pointed out here that there is no foundation for Prof. P. P. S. Shastri's guess:—

"The work under notice is perhaps his (Abhinava's) commentary on Utpalācārya's Īśvarapratyabhijñā, a metrical summary of Śaivaism."

A careful comparison of the extracts from the MS. on pages 6360-1 with the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa of Abhinavagupta, published by the Research Department of Kashmir, leaves no doubt about its being another and smaller commentary of Abhinava on the Parātriṁśikā, an extract from the Rudrayāmala Tantra. Compare, for instance, the following:—

"Iha khalu svātmadevataiva pramathyamānāvasthāyām ātmānaṁ parāmarśenānavaratam pṛcchatītyata ucyate:—

"Śrīdevyuvāca"
Kim pṛcchatītyata āha:—
"Anuttaram" iti
"Anuttaraṁ svātmadeva
Sadyaḥ kā......ra siddhidam

---

1. B. P. V. (MS.)
2. T. C., P. 6361.

Yena vijñānamātreṇa
Khecarīsamatāṁ vrajet"

T. C., 6360—I

and

"S'rīdevyuvāca"
"Anuttaraṁ kathaṁ deva
Sadyaḥ kaulika siddhidam
Yena vijñātamātreṇa
Khecarīsamatāṁ vrajet."

P. T. V., 3.

The few small differences between the two texts can be explained as due to either scribal mistakes or local variations in reading.

A set of his works dealing with the Anuttara, Abhinava used to refer to as "Anuttaraprakriyā". This fact we learn from Jayaratha's following comment on the above word :—

"Anuttaraprakriyāyāmiti parātriṁśikā-vivaraṇādāvityarthaḥ."

T. A., Comm., VI, 249.

The two works under discussion are apparently of the said set. It was a common practice among the Kashmir-writers of the 10th and the 11th centuries to write more than one commentary on the same work. Utpalācārya, the grand teacher of Abhinava, for instance, has written two commentaries on his own Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, namely, the Vṛtti and the Vivṛti, the first being the smaller of the two.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HIS THOUGHT

In the last chapter we have divided the literary activity of Abhinava into three periods and have placed the Tantric period first of all. In this chapter we propose to trace the historical background of his Tantric, philosophic and ālaṅkārika thoughts. We may state at the very outset that our subject being "A Study of Abhinavagupta", we do not mean to follow the traditional method of tracing the origin of the three subjects, on which he worked, to some ideas found in the Vedas and their development through the later literature till they got the respective names by which they are now known. We shall strictly confine ourselves to stating what idea of their history we get from the writings of Abhinava himself, and of his immediate predecessors, to whom he often refers, to enable the reader to picture to himself the stages in the development of these ideas at which Abhinava took them up and the modifications which he introduced into them. We may further add that certain statements in the following pages will appear more mythical than historical, particularly in the part, dealing with the history of the Tantric literature. But they have been given a place here, partly to let the reader know the orthodox belief in its high antiquity and partly for a grain of historical truth that we find therein.

I Historical Background of his Tantric Ideas

The belief among the orthodox S'aivas even today is that the S'aivāgamas are of eternal existence like the Vedas. To this belief Abhinava has given a philosophical explanation in the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika which can be briefly put as follows :—

"Creation, or, to be more exact, manifestation, is,

according to the Trika, of two kinds. One relates to speech and the other to substance (vācyavācakātmaka). Speech also is represented to be of two kinds, divine and human. The S'aivāgamas are the divine speech and as such are the grossest manifestation of the supreme vimarśa, as different from the individual vimarśa which is the cause of the ordinary human speech. Speech, as we have already shown in the course of our treatment of the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, has an eternal existence in a state of identity with the Parā. The āgamas are but divine speech, and as such they also have similar eternal existence. According to the Trika, therefore, there can be nothing like an origin of the S'aivāgamas. There is only appearance or reappearance of them at the divine will."

These Āgamas originally consisted of nine crores of verses. Bhairava alone knew them all. This āgamic lore, however, considerably lost in bulk as it was handed down by one divine being to the next after him. Literary tradition definitely says that the number of known verses decreased by one crore in the case of each of the remaining eight divine beings according to the order of their succession, shown below :—

1. Bhairava.
2. Bhairavī Devī.
3. Svacchanda.
4. Lākula.
5. Aṇurāṭ.
6. Gahaneśa.
7. Abjaja.
8. Śakra.
9. Guru.

The last mentioned, namely, Guru, taught the known

portion of the Āgamas in parts to the following eight, according to their individual receptive power :—

1. Dakṣa etc.
2. Saṁvarta etc.
3. Vāmana etc.
4. Bhārgava.
5. Bali.
6. Siṁha.
7. Vinatābhū.
8. Vāsukināga.

Out of the part of the Āgamas in heaven (in the possession of S'akra ?) Rāvaṇa took one-half, which was partly handed down from generation to generation in the following order :—

1. Bibhīṣaṇa.
2. Rāma.
3. Lakṣmaṇa.
4. Siddhas.
5. Dānavas.
6. Guhyakas.
7. Yogins.

This, in brief, is the orthodox history of the S'aivāgamas from the time of Satyayuga to our age (Kaliyuga) as given by Abhinava in the 35th Āhnika of the Tantrāloka. It is based on the authority of the Siddhā Tantra and the tradition that he heard from his teachers[1].

But when the iron age (Kaliyuga) was sufficiently advanced, the sages, who were in possession of the S'aiva tantric traditions, retired to places inaccessible to ordinary mortals. The S'aiva tantric tradition, therefore, disappeared from the ordinary society and spiritual darkness

1. T. A., Ah. 35. (MS.)

prevailed. Once S'rīkaṇṭha, (this is one of the names of S'iva) while roaming over the mountain Kailāsa, was touched with pity for the suffering humanity, which was then immersed in spiritual darkness caused by the disappearance of the S'aivāgamas. He, therefore, instructed the sage, Durvāsas, to revive the S'aivāgamic teaching. The sage accordingly divided all the S'aivāgamas into three classes according as they taught monism, dualism or monism-cum-dualism, imparted their knowledge to his three mind-born sons, Tryambaka, Amardaka and S'rīnātha respectively, and charged each one of them separately with the mission of spreading the knowledge of their respective āgamas. Thus there came into existence three S'aiva Tantric Schools, each known by the name of the first earthly propagator. It may be noted here that there is one more āgamic school which is known as 'half-Tryambaka' (ardhatryambaka) because it was founded by a descendant of Tryambaka on the side of his daughter.

We have not made any considerable attempt up to this time to search for the preceptorial lines of the Dvaita and the Dvaitādvaita Tantras. Whatever information, however, we have been able to collect from the available sources on the teachers of these two schools and their contributions to the S'aiva literature, to which there are repeated references in Abhinava's works, we shall put in the middle of this very chapter. As regards the successive teachers of the Advaita Tantras, we find a tolerably good account in the closing chapter of the S'ivadṛṣṭi of Somānanda, the great grand teacher of Abhinava. In that he represents himself to be the 19th descendant of Tryambaka, the founder of the Advaita Tantric School. Of the first fourteen ancestors after Tryambaka he did not know much. His account of the fifteenth is a little definite. According to this, his name was Saṁgamāditya; he married a Brāhmaṇa girl, came

not [illegible], who broke the tradition of celibacy and married a Brahmin girl. The son born of them was [illegible]. of [illegible], at the close of it.

to Kashmir in the course of his roaming and settled down there. The names of the three descendants between Saṁgamāditya and Somānanda are given below in the order of their succession :—

1. Varṣāditya.
2. Aruṇāditya.
3. Ānanda[1].

In the foregoing account of the origin of the system in the hoary past, its long propagation, gradual decay, temporary disappearance and reappearance at the time from which the history now is traceable, there is nothing extraordinary. This seems to have been the traditional method of describing the high antiquity of a system. Leaving other books of lesser importance aside, if we take up such an important book as the Bhagavadgītā we find that there too Kṛṣṇa similarly speaks of the antiquity of the Karmayoga in the following lines in the beginning of the 4th Chapter :—

"Imaṁ vivasvate yogam proktavān aham avyayam
Vivasvān manave prāha manurikṣvākavebravīt
Evam paramparāprāptam idaṁ rājarṣayo viduḥ
Sa kāleneha mahatā yogo naṣṭaḥ Parantapa
Sa evāyam mayā tedya yogaḥ proktaḥ purātanaḥ."

Bh. G., ch. IV, Ś. 1-2.

All this, however, is not without any historical importance. Here also the shrewd eye of a researcher can find a few grains of historical truth. And what our not very much trained eyes have been able to find in the above account we state as follows :—

Somānanda speaks of himself as the 19th descendant of Tryambaka. He was a great grand teacher of Abhinava

1. Ś. Dr., Ch. 7. (MS.)

whose date of birth we have fixed at about the middle of the 10th century A. D. It is, therefore, very probable that he was a contemporary of Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, who, as we know from the Rājataraṅgiṇī, lived in the reign of king Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-883 A. D.) In fact Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa also was a great grand teacher of Abhinava from the side of Bhaṭṭendurāja, who was Abhinava's teacher in the Bhagavadgītā. For, Bhaṭṭendurāja was a pupil of Mukula, son of Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa. This statement is based on the combined authority of Bhaṭṭendurāja's commentary on the Kāvyālaṅkāra Sāra and Mukula's Abhidhāvṛtti Mātṛkā in which the following lines occur :—

"S'rutvā saujanyasindhor dvijavara Mukulāt"

and

"Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa putreṇa Mukulena nirūpitā
Sūri prabodhanāyeyam Abhidhāvṛtti Mātṛkā."

If, therefore, Somānanda belonged to the later half of the 9th century A. D., it would not be wrong to say that the monistic, the dualistic and the dualistic-cum-monistic schools of Śaivaism arose in the last quarter of the 4th century A. D. For, if we follow the traditional method of allowing 25 years for each generation we will have to admit that a period of four hundred and fifty years intervened between Tryambaka, the founder of the monistic school of S'aivaism, and Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school ; because, the latter was the 19th descendant of the former.

Thus, if different philosophical schools of S'aivaism arose towards the end of the 4th century A. D. it naturally follows that before that time there was no such distinction. This conclusion finds support in Abhinava's account of early Śaivaism, because in that no difference of any kind is stated or indicated to have existed. Perhaps before that time

Śaivaism was simply a form of worship of the particular deity after which the faith was called and the introduction of the philosophical element came much later as a result of the influence of Buddhism.

It is not possible for us to state the time of composition of the different Tantras, because very few of them are so far available. How can any correct conclusion be possible unless all of them or at least a respectable number of them be carefully read? As regards their division into the three Śaiva schools, there seems to have existed a difference of opinion a little before the time of Abhinava; for, there is the evidence of Kṣemarāja that the Svacchanda Tantra, on which he has commented from the point of view of Śaiva monism, was before his time explained in accordance with the principles of dualism.

("Nāmnaiva bhedadṛṣṭir vidhutā yenāsvatantratātattvā
Śrīmat Svatantra Tantram bhedavyākhyāṁ na tat sahate.")

Abhinavagupta, however, has made a clear cut division of these in his Tantrāloka as follows:—

"Daśāṣṭādaśavasvaṣṭabhinnaṁ yacchāsanaṁ vibhoḥ."

T. A., I, 35.

And Jayaratha in his commentary on the above verse has given the list of the Tantras as follows:—

DVAITA TANTRAS.

1. Kāmaja.
2. Yogaja.
3. Cintya.
4. Maukuṭa.
5. Aṁśumat.
6. Dīpta.
7. Kāraṇa.

8. Ajita.
9. Sūkṣma.
10. Sahasra.

This division, according to his own statement is based on the authority of the Śrī Śrīkaṇṭhī.

(Etacca Śrī Śrīkaṇṭhyām abhidhānapūrvakaṁ vistarata uktam. T. A., Comm., I, 39.)

This authority was probably a recent one, and, therefore, was perhaps disputed. This supposition alone can justify the existence of a dualistic interpretation of the Svacchanda Tantra.

In the introduction to the Mṛgendra Tantra occurs the following quotation, giving the names of the ten Śiva Tantras. This authority is different from that quoted by Jayaratha :—

"Kāmikaṁ Yogajaṁ vātha tathā Cintyaśca Kāraṇam
Ajitaṁ Dīpta Sūkṣmau ca Sahasraśca tathāṁśumān
Suprabhedastathā hyete śaivāḥ samparikīrtitāḥ."

Introd., Mr. T., P. 2.

It may be noted here that the MS. with the help of which the present edition of the Tantrāloka was brought out, was, perhaps, mutilated in that part which states the names of the dualistic Tantras and, therefore, there is left a gap after giving six-names. We have, however, completed the list with the help of Dr. Farquhar's Outline of Religious Literature in India P. 193, in which he gives all the ten names. It may be pointed out in this connection that this list instead of Maukuṭa and Kāmaja, gives Suprabha and Kāmika. At present we have not got sufficient material at our disposal to explain this difference.

DVAITĀDVAITA TANTRAS.

1. Vijaya.
2. Niśvāsa.
3. Madgīta.
4. Pārameśvara.
5. Mukhabimba.
6. Siddha
7. Santāna
8. Nārasiṁhaka
9. Candrāṁśu
10. Vīrabhadra
11. Āgneya
12. Svayambhuva
13. Visara
14. Raurava
15. Vimala
16. Kiraṇa
17. Lalita
18. Saurabheya

It is interesting to note here that Abhinava in his Tantrāloka has given quotations from some of these Tantras also in support of certain views propounded therein. For the list of these and the contexts in which references to them occur consult appendix (B)

ADVAITA TANTRAS.

The advaita Tantras consist of eight groups, each comprising eight Tantras and having a separate name as shown below :—

(I) BHAIRAVA TANTRAS.

1. Svacchanda
2. Bhairava
3. Caṇḍa

4. Krodha
5. Unmatta Bhairava
6. Asitāṅga
7. Mahocchuṣma
8. Kapālīśa

(II) Yāmala Tantras

9. Brahmayāmala
10. Viṣṇuyāmala
11. Svacchanda (Yāmala)
12. Ruru
13. ....?
14. Ātharvaṇa
15. Rudra
16. Vetāla

(III) Mata.

17. Rakta
18. Lampaṭa
19. Lakṣmīmata
20. Mata
21. Cālikā
22. Piṅgala
23. Utphullaka
24. Viśvādya

(IV) Maṅgala

25. Picu Bhairavī
26. Tantra Bhairavī
27. Tata
28. Brāhmī Kalā
29. Vijayā
30. Candrā
31. Maṅgalā
32. Sarvamaṅgalā

(V) CAKRĀṢṬAKA

33. Mantracakra
34. Varṇacakra
35. S'akticakra
36. Kalācakra
37. Binducakra
38. Nādacakra
39. Guhyacakra
40. Khacakra

(VI) BAHURŪPA.

41. Andhaka
42. Rurubheda
43. Aja
44. Mūla
45. Varṇabhaṇṭha
46. Viḍaṅga
47. Mātṛrodana
48. Jvālin

(VII) VĀGĪŚA

49. Bhairavī
50. Citrikā
51. Haṁsā
52. Kadambikā
53. Hṛllekhā
54. Candralekhā
55. Vidyullekhā
56. Vidyumat

(VIII) ŚIKHĀṢṬAKA

57. Bhairavī Śikhā
58. Vīṇā
59. Vīṇāmaṇi
60. Sammoha

61. Ḍāmara
62. Atharvaka
63. Kabandha
64. Śiraścheda

This list of sixty-four monistic Tantras is based on the authority of the Srīkaṇṭhī, a Saiva work quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, I, 42—3. We may add here that the above list of 64 Tantras is different from the one given in the Sabdārtha Cintāmaṇi under "Tantra" on page 1048. The latter is based on the authority of the Siddhi Sārasvata and has certain names of Tantras in common with the former, e. g. Svatantra and Rudra Yāmala etc. and mentions the names of certain others which are quoted by Abhinava in the Tantrāloka, though not included in Jayaratha's list.

THE FOURTH SAIVA TANTRIC SCHOOL.

The fourth school of Saivaism owed its existence to a descendant of Tryambaka on his daughter's side and, therefore, was called Ardha-Tryambaka. The evidence which we have been able to collect so far leads us to think that it is the same system as that which is referred to in the Tantrāloka as Kula-Prakriyā. For, acccording to the statement of Jayaratha in the introduction to T. A., Ah. I, Ś. 7, Abhinava deals with the teachings of both the Tantra and the Kula in his Tantrāloka. Abhinava also pays his homage to his teachers in both the schools, as the following quotation shows :—

"Evañca tantraprakriyopāsannagurvabhimukhīkaraṇānantaraṁ viśrāntisthānatayā kulaprakriyāgurum api utkarṣayati." T. A., Comm., I, 31.

If we read the following verse with the introduction to it,

given above, it becomes evident that Śambhunātha was his teacher in the Kula system :—

"Jayatāt jagaduddhṛtikṣamosau
Bhagavatyā saha Śambhunātha ekaḥ.

T. A., I, 31.

Now in the concluding portion of the Tantrāloka Ah. 37, the author, while enumerating his teachers in different branches, refers to this very Śambhunātha not only as his teacher in the fourth school

("Turyākhyasantatimahodadhipūrṇacandraḥ
Śrī Somataḥ sakalavit kila Śambhunāthaḥ."

T. A., Ah. 37, S'. 61. (MS.)

but also as a pupil of Soma, which is an abbreviated form of Somadeva, who was S'ambhunātha's teacher in Atimārga or Kulamārga, as the following statement of Jayaratha in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, I, 213, coupled with a quotation makes clear :—

"S'rī Sumatināthasya Somadevaḥ S'iṣyaḥ tasya S'rī S'ambhunāthaḥ yad vakṣyati 'S'rī Somataḥ sakalavit kila S'ambhunāthaḥ"

yattu

"Kaścid dakṣiṇabhūmipīṭhavasatiḥ śrīmān vibhur Bhairavaḥ
Pañcasrotasi sātimārgavibhave śāstre vidhātā ca yaḥ
Lokebhūt Sumatis tataḥ samudabhūt tasyaiva śiṣyāgraṇīḥ
S'rīmāñchambhuriti prasiddhim agamaj-Jālandharāt pīṭhataḥ'
ityanyatroktaṁ tat paramagurvabhiprāyeṇa yojyam."

We, therefore, hold that the words "atinaya", "kulamārga", "kālīnaya" and "ardhatryambakamaṭhikā" stand for the same school of S'aivaism.

THE TRACEABLE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH SCHOOL.

We learn from the following quotation in T. A., Comm. that it had its origin in Kāmarūpa (Assam) and that its founder was the great sage, Mīna alias Macchanda Vibhu :—

"Bhairavyā Bhairavāt prāptaṁ yogaṁ vyāpya tataḥ priye
Tatsakāśāttu siddhena Mīnākhyena varānane
Kāmarūpe mahāpīṭhe Macchandena mahātmanā."

T. A., Comm., I., 24.

The commentator has cleared the point that Macchanda was the founder of the fourth school by describing him as "Turyanātha" in the introduction to that Sloka of the 1st Āhnika of the Tantrāloka in which the author offers his salutation to him (Macchanda Vibhu). Here the word "turya" stands for "Turyākhyasantati" referred to in a quotation given above.

We know nothing at this stage of the names or number of the successive teachers of this school till we come to Sumati, the great grand teacher of Abhinava in this branch. He belonged to Southern Pīṭha (Dakṣiṇabhūmipīṭhavasatiḥ). The names of the teachers who came after him are given below in the order of their succession :—

1. Somadeva.
2. Sambhunātha.
3. Abhinavagupta.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HIS PHILOSOPHIC IDEAS

The rise of the monistic Śaiva philosophy in Kashmir.

In the preceding few pages we have tried to trace the history of the monistic Tantras, on which the monistic Saiva philosophy is based, from the earliest time down to that of

Somānanda (circa 850). It was about this time that the monistic S'aiva philosophy arose in Kashmir.

THE CAUSES OF ITS RISE.

The rise of a system presupposes the existence of the material out of which it is to be built, of the capable men who can give it the required shape and of the immediate public necessity which it has to satisfy. A century or so before the time of the actual rise of this system, men, material and need for any such thing as the monistic S'aiva philosophy were all lacking in Kashmir. For, we have shown above how monistic Tantras, on which this system is based, had their origin outside the valley of Kashmir; how the traditional Tantric lore was brought to Kashmir only about the middle of the 8th century by the fourth ancestor of Somānanda and how Atrigupta, the renowned S'aiva philosopher of Kannauj and the earliest known ancestor of Abhinava, the greatest authority on the Pratyabhijñā, was brought to Kashmir by king Lalitāditya sometime after 740 A. D. And we know from the following quotation :—

"Sūtraṁ vṛttir vivṛtir Laghvī Bṛhatītyubhe Vimarśinyau
Prakaraṇavivaraṇapañcakam iti śāstram
Pratyabhijñāyāḥ,"

given by Mādhava in his Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha that the Pratyabhijñā literature is a mere exposition of the principles laid down by Somānanda in his S'ivadṛṣṭi, which was called by him "Prakaraṇa" and that the authoritative books on this are the following :—

1.	Pratyabhijñā Sūtra.	Utpala.
2.	" " Vṛtti.	
3.	" " Vivṛti.	
4.	" " Vimarśinī.	Abhinava
5.	" " Vivṛti Vimarśinī.	

We know also that all these three writers belonged to the two learned immigrant families, namely, of Somānanda and of Abhinava, referred to above.

Thus a century before the rise of the monistic system Kashmir was lacking both in men and material for building up its own school of philosophy. As for the public necessity, there is evidence to show that there was none. In support of this statement we would content ourselves here with simply quoting Dr. Stein's remark which endorses our view that the general public were quite satisfied with the then existing religious conditions and did not require any philosophical system to satisfy their spiritual needs :—

"The contrast, which this (Kalhaṇa's) partiality for Buddhist cult and traditions presents to avowed Śaivaism of Kalhaṇa, is more apparent than real. For centuries before Kalhaṇa's time Buddhism and the orthodox creeds had existed peacefully side by side in Kashmir. As far as the laity was concerned they had to a great extent amalgamated. His own narrative from the point where it reaches historical ground gives ample proof of this. Of almost all royal and private individuals, who are credited with the foundation of Buddhist Stūpas and Vihāras, it is recorded that they, or at least members of their family, with equal zeal endowed also shrines of Śiva or Viṣṇu." R. T., Introd., P. 9

Ancient faith of Kashmir.

One question will naturally arise here in the reader's mind, viz., if Tantric Śaivaism is a thing of later introduction in Kashmir, what was its religion before that ? Before attempting to answer this question we may state here that for our answer we have primarily to depend upon what little historical truth we find in Kalhaṇa's mostly legendary account of the earlier kings of Kashmir. After this introduc-

tory remark we may at once say that it was a polytheistic religion, as described in the Nīlamata Purāṇa and that S'iva, as associated with his spouse, was its most popular god. Because, when a religious point arises after the coronation of Yaśovatī, the 3rd of Gonanda line of Kashmir, Kṛṣṇa quotes the authority of the Nīlamata Purāṇa in support of his view (R. T., ch. I, 71-72.) Similarly, when the religion of the land is represented to have suffered at the hands of the Bauddhas with Nāgārjuna as their head, the reference is to nothing else than the ritualistic performances prescribed in the Nīla Purāṇa :—

"Kriyāṁ Nīlapurāṇoktām ācchindan āgamadviṣaḥ."
R. T., ch. I, 178.

Further, when Candra, a descendant of Kaśyapa, propitiated Nīla, the lord of the (Kashmir) Nāgas, who being angry at the suspension of the customary oblation because of Buddhistic influence, had sent down the destructive snow-fall, the religion that was revealed to him anew was no other than that of the Nīla Purāṇa. (R. T., ch. I, 183.)

Whatever opinion we may hold about Kalhaṇa's account of the kings and their administration in the earlier part of his chronicle, in view of the fact that Tantric S'aivaism was of as late introduction into Kashmir as the 8th century A. D. and that when Buddhism entered Kashmir at the time of Aśoka there was already a religion there, the prominent feature of which was the worship of Ardhanārī Naṭeśvara, it will not be unreasonable to suppose that Kalhaṇa at least in his statement in regard to the ancient faith or religion of the land is generally not wrong.

SOIL FOR THE GROWTH OF TANTRIC S'AIVAISM.

It has been pointed out in the preceding two paragraphs that the old religion of the land of Kaśyapa was polytheistic

with a special inclination towards ritualistic S'aivaism. It was purely a traditional faith and had no literature of its own at the time of the advent of Buddhism in Kashmir in the reign of Aśoka (273-232 B. C.). But so wise was then the way in which Buddhism was spread, so non-interfering was the religious policy and so judicious was the royal patronage of different religions that Brāhmaṇas did not very much feel the advent of the new religion. Antagonism of Brāhmaṇas, however, was aroused when in consequence of Kaniṣka's gift (125-60 A. D.) of Kashmir to Buddhistic Church*, Nāgārjuna came to power and began to use his power of both learning and position to spread Buddhism. The fact that this was the time when the struggle between Buddhism and S'aivaism began seems to find support in the tradition recorded by Varadarāja in the following introductory verse to his Vārtika on Vasugupta's S'iva Sūtras:—

> "Nāgabodhyādibhiḥ siddhair nāstikānām puraḥsaraiḥ
> Ākrānte jīvalokesmin ātmeśvaranirāsakaiḥ."

Ś. S. V., I.

Here we take "Nāgabodhi" to stand for "Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva," on the following authority:—

> "Nāgārjunena sudhiyā bodhisattvena pālitāḥ."

R. T., I, 175.

The immediate effect of this was that the teachings of the local religion, which were till then simply a matter of floating traditions, were systematised for the first time by a pious Brāhmaṇa ascetic, Candradeva. This in our opinion is the one historical truth in Kalhaṇa's story of the destructive snow-fall sent by Nīla, enraged at the abeyance of religious rights prescribed in the Nīla Purāṇa in consequence

* R. T., Ch. I, 177-8.

of Nāgārjuna's propaganda (R. T., I, 177-184). The story is, otherwise, as pointed out by Dr. Stein, (R. T., Introd. P. 77) "but the réchauffé of an ancient legend told in the Nīlamata Purāṇa, which relates the deliverance of Kashmir from the plague of the Piśācas through the rites revealed by Nīla Nāga."

What important events took place in the following six hundred years in the history of the local faith of Kashmir we do not know anything about. The only thing that we can say is that the local religion being polytheistic accepted Buddha also as one of its gods. Therefore, whatever conflict of views may have existed among the priests of both Buddhism and S'aivaism regarding religious matters, common people, as has already been stated, followed a mixed faith. That both influenced each other was a matter of course. Thus there developed a religion which was neither purely Buddhistic nor purely S'aivaite, but was a harmonious mixture of the meditative and philosophical aspect of the one and the ritualistic aspect of the other; but as such it had no scriptural authority to support it. Thus, there was already the soil congenial for the growth of Tantric S'aivaism which gives ritual and philosophy more or less the same place as was probably given them by the then popular faith, so that when it came with all the scriptural support at its back, it was accepted by the common people of Kashmir as their ancestral faith. Even today Tantric Śaivaism is the faith of Kashmir Hindus, though now it is considerably mixed with Vedic rituals.

INFLUENCE OF S'AṄKARĀCĀRYA.

For over nine centuries the local faith had been influenced by Buddhism. For about the same period the people of

प्रत्यभिज्ञा theories as is shown below. Whether शंकर came to Kashmir or not, it does not matter so much as his attempting a 'प्रत्यभिज्ञा' work. शंकर flourished two centuries before अभिनव. Since शंकर did not belong to any Kashmir school, his knowledge of the प्रत्यभिज्ञा must

Kashmir had professed a mixed faith and had heard enough of the idealistic philosophy and perhaps thought also over it. Their minds, therefore, were sufficiently trained to receive and to retain philosophical ideas. For about a century they had seen the Tantric Śaiva rituals practised by the two great S'aiva families which had migrated into Kashmir and had heard their philosophical ideas. Perhaps many families, not finding any fundamental difference between this and the religion that they and their predecessors had professed for centuries, had also accepted it. The decline of Buddhism had come. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (about 750 A. D.) had shaken its roots. Such was the opportune time when S'aṅkarācārya visited Kashmir some time in the second decade of the 9th century after giving his final blow to Buddhism in the rest of India (S'aṅkara Digvijaya, ch. XVI, 54-80). Let us state here very clearly that our statement about S'aṅkārācārya's visit to Kashmir has no other authority than that of the S'aṅkara Digvijaya, quoted above. Let us, however, add that it does not appear to be altogether baseless : firstly, because it is supported by a local tradition which is still current in Kashmir and secondly, because the influence of S'aṅkara's Tantric philosophy on the Trika is so great that the supposition of a personal touch of its founder-writers with S'aṅkara seems to be necessary to explain it at such an early time. If we compare the philosophical ideas of S'aṅkara, as contained in his Dakṣiṇā Mūrti Stotra and explained by his pupil Sureśvarācārya in his commentary on the above stotra, we find that S'aṅkara's conception of the ultimate reality is the same as that of the Pratyabhijñā. In fact he uses all the important technical expressions in the same sense in which they are used in the Pratyabhijñā. Compare for instance :—

(I) "Bījasyāntarivāṅkuro jagadidam prāṅnirvikalpam punar
Māyākalpitadeśakālakalanāvaicitryacitrīkṛtam

came from different quarters other than [illegible] [illegible]'s [illegible] indicate, that the tradition was well handed down to his pupils as well. This is strange that [illegible] also reflects its influence. Thus it

Māyāvīva vijṛmbhayatyapi mahāyogīva yaḥ svecchayā
Tasmai śrī gurumūrtaye nama idaṁ śrī Dakṣiṇāmūrtaye."
D. M. S., S'. 2.

and

"Cidātmaiva hi devontaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ
Yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam prakāśayet."
I. P. V., I, 182.

(II) "Jñānakriye jagatkḷptau dṛśyete cetanāśraye."
D. M. S., Comm. (2), S'. 13.

and

"Jñānaṁ kriyā ca bhūtānāṁ jīvatāṁ jīvanam matam."
I. P. V., I, 39.

(III) "Tasmāt sattā sphurattā ca sarvatrāpyanuvartate."
D. M. S., Comm. (2), S'. 13.

and

"Sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī."
I. P. V., I, 207.

(IV) "Jñātṛtvam api kartṛtvaṁ svātantryaṁ tasya kevalam."
D. M. S., Comm. (2), S'. 50.

and

"Kartari jñātari svātmanyādisiddhe maheśvare."
I. P. V., I, 29.

We, therefore, feel that, whatever be the amount of fiction with which Mādhava may have coloured S'aṅkara's visit to Kashmir, it is not without a grain of truth inasmuch as the said visit was a fact. Further, we are of opinion that S'aṅkara believed in the monistic Tantras, as the epithet "sarvatantrasvatantra" in his virudāvalī indicates; that the Tantras, the authority of which he accepted, were sixty-four in number, as his reference to them in his own Saundarya Laharī in the following line :—

"Catuḥṣaṣṭyā tantraiḥ sakalam abhisandhāya bhuvanam"
clearly shows; that he had a special inclination towards

seems tenable to hold that [illegible] and [illegible] although spatially remote had access to one source.

the Tantric practices of Kashmir, as his establishing S'rīcakra in some of his Maṭhas testifies; and that in his exposition of the Vedānta he was greatly influenced by the philosophical parts of the aforesaid Tantras, as we shall point out at different places in the philosophical portion of this thesis.

The visit of such a great person, particularly after uprooting Buddhism in the course of his Digvijaya, (if this be taken to be an historical fact) was of no little importance to the philosophical system that was soon to come into existence. This visit purged the local faith of its Buddhistic element, strengthened the position of the new Tantric creed, which was brought by the two immigrant families and had already begun to be accepted by the populace, and aroused their curiosity to know more about the new creed.

THE RISE OF KASHMIR S'AIVAISM.

Thus men and material being already there in the two immigrant families and those that followed them, as for instance, that to which Vasugupta, the author of the S'iva Sūtra, belonged, and the need for a systematic presentation of the new faith in both its philosophical and ritualistic aspects having been created by the visit of S'aṅkarācārya, the Kashmir S'aivaism made its appearance without much delay.

Our object in these pages, we may state here, is not to trace the history of the divine S'aiva literature so much as to give an idea of the human literature that had been written before Abhinava on the subject of Kashmir S'aivaism so as to clearly show what our great writer contributed to it. In this chapter, therefore, we shall deal with the writings of his predecessors only. We shall speak on his successors in the next chapter and shall show how far he influenced their ideas.

1. has given a systematic form to the practical ideas as taught in the Tantras. He did not attempt a systematic presentation of Philosophy acc. to Prof. Pandit.

THE SPANDA BRANCH.

(I). Vasugupta and his S'iva Sūtra.

On the authority of the Rājataraṅgiṇī (ch. V, 66) we know that Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, the pupil of Vasugupta was a contemporary of Avantivarman, King of Kashmir (855-883 A.D.). There he is referred to as "siddha". It is, therefore, evident that at that time he was an old man of established reputation. Vasugupta, the teacher of Kallaṭa, therefore, it is natural to suppose, belongedt o the preceding scholastic generation extending from about 825 to 850 A. D. We shall, therefore, not be wrong if we say that Vasugupta gave a systematic 1.
form to the philosophical ideas of the monistic Tantras in his S'iva Sūtras in the next decade after S'aṅkarācārya's visit to Kashmir towards the end of the second decade of the 9th century A. D.

Kṣemarāja, in his introduction to the S'iva Sūtra Vimarśinī, records a tradition which says that Vasugupta was not the writer but simply the publisher of the Sūtras which he had found inscribed on a boulder to which he had gone, as instructed by S'iva in a dream, and which turned bottom upward at the mere touch of his hand. Whatever we may think of this tradition, it was believed in by his immediate successors, who refer to the S'iva Sūtras as of divine authorship. They are divided into three chapters dealing in succession with the three ways to final emancipation pointed out by the monistic Tantras.

OTHER WORKS OF VASUGUPTA.

2. Spanda Kārikā.

There is a difference of opinion about the authorship of the Spanda Kārikā. Utpala Vaiṣṇava on the strength of the 53rd Verse :—

"Vasuguptād avāpyedaṁ guros tattvārthadarśinaḥ
Rahasyaṁ ślokayāmāsa samyak śrī Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭaḥ."

Also cf. Sp. Sandoha, opening line.

attributes its authorship to Kallaṭa. But it has to be noted in this connection that this verse is not found in the recension of Kṣemarāja, who attributes the Kārikā to Vasugupta himself probably on the authority of the following verse, found in his recension :—

> "Labdhvāpyalabhyam etaj jñānadhanaṁ hṛdguhāntaḥ-
> kṛtanihiteḥ
> Vasuguptavacchivāya hi bhavati sadā sarvalokasya."
> S. N., 16.

About this quotation also it has to be pointed out that as the former is not found in the recension of Kṣemarāja so the latter is not traceable in that of Utpala Vaiṣṇava. We, however, follow Kṣemarāja because he is supported by Maheśvarānanda who quotes this verse, as found in Kṣemarāja's recension, in his commentary on the very first verse of his own Mahārtha Mañjarī.

The Spanda Kārikā is simply an amplification of the fundamental principles of S'aivaism, as aphoristically given in the S'iva Sūtras. It was also called Spanda Sūtra. Kṣemarāja in one of his introductory verses to the Spanda Nirṇaya refers to it as such :—

> "Samyak sūtrasamanvayam parigatiṁ tattve parasmin
> parām............
> S'rī Spanda śāstrasya." S. N., I.

This work has to be distinguished from "Spanda Sūtra" nos. 518-19 of Dr. Bühler's report; for, there the name stands for "S'iva Sūtra" (consult his extracts from MSS.).

3. SPANDĀMṚTA.

It is mentioned as a separate work of Vasugupta by Mr. J. C. Chatterji in his Kashmir S'aivaism P. 37. He does not state any authority on this point. But our opinion is

that it is the same as the Spanda Kārikā. In fact the word "Spandāmṛta" does not stand for the title of a work. It is simply a metaphorical expression used for the fundamental principles of the Spanda system, as is clear from the use of this very word by Kṣemarāja in one of the introductory verses to his Spanda Nirṇaya :—

"Spandāmṛte carvite tu Spandasandohato manāk"

We know that the Spanda Sandoha is Ksemarāja's commentary on the first verse of the Spanda Kārikā. Another place where this word has been found is the concluding verse of Kallaṭa's Spanda Sarvasva :

"Dṛbdham mahādevagirau maheśasvapnopadiṣṭācchiva-sūtrasindhoḥ
Spandāmṛtaṁ yad Vasuguptapādaiḥ S'rī Kallaṭas tat prakaṭīcakāra."

Here also the word, if at all it stands for the title of a work, cannot refer to any other than the Spanda Kārikā itself on which the Spanda Sarvasva is a commentary.

This verse seems to solve the riddle of the authorship of the Spanda Kārikā. Here Kallaṭa himself represents Vasugupta to be the writer of the Spanda Kārikā ; mark the words "Spandāmṛtaṁ dṛbdham" ("Dṛbhī granthe" Pāṇini's Dhātupāṭha) and clearly states his work in connection with the Kārikās to be simply that of a publisher :—

"S'rī Kallaṭas tat prakaṭīcakāra".

Perhaps this is a posthumous work of Vasugupta. If this explanation be taken to be correct there will remain no difficulty in harmoniously interpreting the two verses given above in this connection. For, "Rahasyaṁ ślokayāmāsa samyak", occurring in the Spanda Pradīpikā, can, without stretching the language, be interpreted as "well published the sacred doctrine."

4. VĀSAVĪ ṬĪKĀ ON THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

No complete MS. of this work has so far been discovered.

5. SIDDHĀNTA CANDRIKĀ.

Noticed in Bühler's catalogue as MS. No. 501.

(II) KALLAṬA (855 A. D.)

What little we know about his person we have already stated while discussing the date of Vasugupta. Here, therefore, we confine ourselves to giving an account of his works only.

1. SPANDA SARVASVA.

It is a commentary on the Spanda Kārikā.

2. TATTVĀRTHA CINTĀMAṆI.

This was a commentary on the last quarter of Vasugupta's S'iva Sūtra, as we learn from the 5th introductory verse of Bhāskarācārya to his Vārtika on the same S'iva Sūtra :—

"Vyākarot trikam ete (ke) bhyaḥ *Spandasūtraiḥ svakaistathā*
Tattavārthacintāmaṇyākhyaṭīkayā khaṇḍam antimam".

3. SPANDA SŪTRA.

From the portion italicized in the above quotation it appears that he wrote his own Spanda Sūtras also.

4. MADHUVĀHINĪ.

We have not been able to trace any reference to it ourselves ; we are mentioning it here on the authority of Mr. J. C. Chatterji's Kashmir S'aivaism P. 37.

(III) RĀMA KAṆṬHA.

In the colophon to his commentary on the Spanda Kārikā he speaks of himself as Utpaladeva's pupil :

"Kṛtiḥ śrīmad-Utpaladevapādapadmopajīvinaḥ S'rīmad Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭhasya."

We know that Utpala was Abhinava's grand teacher and, therefore, belonged to the first half of the 10th century A. D. We shall, therefore, not be very wrong if we say that he (Rāma Kaṇṭha) lived in the second and the third quarters of the 10th century A. D. (925 – 975 A.D.)

His Works.

1. SPANDA VIVARAṆA SĀRAMĀTRA.

This is the name of his above-mentioned commentary as is apparent from the colophon :—

"Iti Spanda Vivaraṇa Sāramātraṁ samāptam."

Two more works of this author are noted in K. Ś. with an interrogation mark against each.

2. Commentary on the Mataṅga Tantra ?
3. Commentary on the Bhagavadgītā from the S'aiva point of view ?

(IV) BHĀSKARĀCĀRYA.

Four generations intervened between Kallaṭa and Bhāskarācārya. The latter belonged to the fifth generation from the former. The following are the names of his predecessors in the order of their succession[1] :—

1. Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa.
2. Prajñārjuna.
3. Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa.
4. S'rīkaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa.

Abhinavagupta quotes in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī from the Vivekāñjana of Divākaravatsa with the following remark :—

"Yadāha Bhaṭṭa Divākaravatso Vivekāñjane"

I. P. V., I, 10.

If we take the word "Divākaravatsa" to mean "son of Divākara" as we have reason to do in view of his referring

1. Ś. S. V., Introd.

to himself as "Daivākariḥ" in Ś. S. V. referred to above, there does not remain much difficulty in fixing his date. Abhinavagupta's Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī is the last of his available works and came after his Bṛhatī Vimarśinī which was completed in 1015, as we have already shown in the chronological order of his works. And Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, we know, was king Avanti Varman's contemporary (855). Allowing, therefore, a period of about a century for the intervening four generations it will not be wrong, in our opinion, to say that he was an older contemporary of Abhinava, if not a predecessor.

HIS WORKS.

1. ŚIVA SŪTRA VĀRTIKA (published)
2. VIVEKĀÑJANA (known from reference)
3. KAKṢYĀ STOTRA.

The last mentioned work is attributed to Bhaṭṭadivākaravatsa by Yogarāja in his commentary on Abhinava's Paramārtha Sāra P. 103, as the following quotation shows:—

"Yathāha Bhaṭṭa Divākaravatsaḥ
'Jāte dehapratyayadvīpabhaṅge
Prāptaikadhye nirmale bodhasindhau
Avyāvartya tvindriyagrāmam antar
Viśvātmā tvaṁ nitya ekovabhāsi'
iti Kakṣyā Stotre."

THE PRATYABHIJÑĀ BRANCH.

It may be pointed out at the very outset that the Pratyabhijñā" also, like the Spanda, is based on the monistic Śaiva Tantras and that in point of the philosophical conception of the universe and its cause, and of the nature of the individual self and that of the highest reality there is no difference between the two. The only point where the two differ is the means of realising the Highest Reality. The

Spanda showed the three well known paths to the said realisation, namely, Śāmbhava, Śākta and Āṇava, as is clear from the three chapters of the Śiva Sūtra called after the above three means. But the Pratyabhijñā, according to the statement of the author of the Pratyabhijñā Sūtra or Kārikā, showed an easier path to it which was not known before and which was, for the first time, pointed out by Somānanda in his Śivadṛṣṭi[1].

(I) SOMĀNANDA.

We have already pointed out that two teachers of Abhinava, namely, Lakṣmaṇagupta and Bhaṭṭendurāja, belong to two different preceptorial lines. The distance of both, Somānanda and Kallaṭa, from Abhinava is only two intervening generations as the following table shows :—

1. Somānanda[2]	1. Kallaṭa
2. Utpaladeva	2. Mukula
3. Lakṣmaṇagupta	3. Bhaṭṭendurāja
4. Abhinavagupta	4. Abhinavagupta

We can, therefore, safely say that Somānanda was Kallaṭa's contemporary, perhaps older, and belonged to the close of the first and the beginning of the second half of the 9th century A. D.

HIS WORKS

In the next generation after the so called discovery of the Śiva Sūtras by Vasugupta and a sort of running commentary thereon in the form of the Spanda Kārikās by the same, but perhaps before a commentary on the latter by Kallaṭa, Somānanda wrote his Śivadṛṣṭi.

1. I. P. V., II, 271.
2. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

1. S'IVADṚṢṬI.

While the works on the Spanda branch just mentioned are mere dogmatic statements of the S'aiva doctrines, the Śivadṛṣṭi is an attempt to present the S'aiva idealistic monism or monistic idealism in a systematic philosophical form coupled with the necessary reasoning. It consists of about 700 verses in seven chapters. Somānanda also, like Vasugupta, claims to have been inspired by Śiva in a dream, but not simply to go to a boulder to find inscribed what was to be propagated, but to systematise the philosophical contents of the monistic Tantras.[1] He clearly states that what he has given in the Śivadṛṣṭi, is not simply a creation of his own mind, but is based on the Śāstra "S'ivo dātā śivo bhoktā."[2] We have not so far been able to trace this quotation in any one of the Āgamas to which we have had access. But the verse given below, of which the above quotation constitutes a part, is very well known and is daily recited in the Pandit families of Kashmir :—

"S'ivo dātā śivo bhoktā śivaḥ sarvam idaṁ jagat
S'ivo yajati yajñaśca yaḥ śivaḥ soham eva hi."

We may, however, state that Abhinavagupta, while dealing with the Anupāyamārga, in the second Āhnika of his Tantrāloka, declares that he follows the authority of the Ūrmimahāśāstra. He further adds that this subject has been dwelt upon by earlier teachers beginning with Somānanda.[3] The above-mentioned Tantra, therefore, was perhaps the authority which Somānanda followed. The quotation also may be from the same.

1. Ś. Dr., (MS.) ch. 7.
2. Ś. Dr., (MS.) ch. 7.
3. T. A., Ah. II. P. 39.

2. Vivṛti,

This is supposed to have been Somānanda's commentary on his own Śivadṛṣṭi. Dr. Stein, however, is of opinion that no such work was written by him (Introd. XLII Jammu Cat.)

3. Parātriṁśikā Vivṛti.

This, as the name implies, was his commentary on the Parātriṁśikā. Abhinava, according to his own statement[1], follows it in his own commentary on the same (Parātriṁśikā). In fact his object was to discuss the points which were left doubtful by Somānanda.

(II) Utpaladeva.

He was both son and pupil of Somānanda.

("Somānandātmajotpalaja-Lakṣmaṇaguptanāthaḥ."
T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.))

He, therefore, seems to have lived towards the end of the 9th and the first half of the 10th century A. D.

His Works.

1. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā.

This was the first work on the Pratyabhijñā system as such. In fact the system owes the name Pratyabhijñā to this book. Its importance, however, is due to two commentaries of Abhinava, the Vimarśinī and the Vivṛti Vimarśinī.

2. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vṛtti.

It is a brief commentary mostly concerned with clarifying the ideas given in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā.

3. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Ṭīkā.

Unfortunately it seems to be irrecoverably lost. It was a detailed commentary on his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā

1. P. T. V., 282.

Kārikā. According to the old way of counting thirty-two syllables of a prose book as one verse, it consisted of six thousand verses. It is to this that Abhinava refers as Ṭīkā in one of his introductory verses to the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.[1] It is one of the five books of accepted authority on the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, referred to by Mādhava in his summary of the Pratyabhijñā system in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha.[2] It was on this that Abhinava wrote his famous commentary, Bṛhatī Vimarśinī.

4. STOTRĀVALI.

It has a commentary of Kṣemarāja.

5. AJAḌA PRAMĀTṚ SIDDHI
6. ĪŚVARA SIDDHI,
7. " " VṚTTI.
8. SAMBANDHA SIDDHI.
9. " " VṚTTI.
10. VṚTTI ON SOMĀNANDA'S ŚIVADṚṢṬI.

It was written at the request of his own son Vibhramākara and a Brahmacārī Padmānanda by name. That it was Utpaladeva's work is made clear both by an introductory verse and colophon given as an extract from the MS. No. 4178 in Jammu Cat[3]. On this point there is the additional evidence of the Bhāskarī, which not only attributes a commentary on the Śivadṛṣṭi to Utpala but also places it before the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā in the chronological order, as the following extract shows :—

> S'rīmān Utpaladevaḥ svagurunirmitaṁ
> S'ivadṛṣṭyākhyam mahāśāstraṁ vyākhyāya

1. I. P. V., I, 3.
2. S. D. S., P. 191.
3. Jammu Cat., MS. 4178.

tatpratibimbakalpaṁ kārikāmayam Īśvara
Pratyabhijñākhyam mahāśāstram praṇīya."

All these works are very frequently quoted by Abhinava in his works (for illustration vide Appendix (B).

11. PARAMEŚA STOTRĀVALĪ.

It is noticed by Dr. Bühler in his Kashmir Report
MS. No. 458.

(III) LAKṢMAṆAGUPTA.

On the authority of Abhinava, quoted above, he was both son and pupil of Utpaladeva. We have already shown that he was our great writer's teacher in both the Darśanas, the Pratyabhijñā and the Krama. His period of literary activity must have extended over the close of the second and practically the whole of the third quarter of the 10th century A. D. It is indeed very strange that no work of his has so far been discovered; nor any quotation from or reference to his works even in the writtings of Abhinava has so far been found. The only passage where there seems to be a reference to his writing is to be met with in one of the concluding verses of Abhinava's Bṛhatī Vimarśinī[1]. In this he is spoken of as "Śrīśāstrakṛt". We have got no information about the nature of the contents of this book.

DUALIST ŚAIVA WRITERS.

Here it will not be out of place to speak a little on the literary activity of the Śaiva dualists, particularly because Abhinava himself frequently refers to them. These writers we divide into two periods, viz., pre-Abhinavagupta and post-Abhinavagupta. And because we are mentioning them only by the way to show the relation of other Śaiva schools with the one under discussion, we shall, therefore, finish

1. B. V. (conclusion)

with the writers of both the periods right here, without postponing the treatment of the post-Abhinava dualists till we come to the next chapter as in the case of the monists.

AMALGAMATION OF THE DVAITA AND THE DVAITĀDVAITA SCHOOLS.

It appears that while the monistic S'aiva School was doing its work, as described above, the dualistic school was not idle. The probability is that the latter began its work earlier. For, Kṣemarāja, as has already been pointed out, speaks of even the admittedly monistic Tantras, as for instance, the Svacchanda, having been interpreted in the dualistic light: and Abhinavagupta also quotes some dualist writers giving their names.

Our work at present is confined to the monistic school. We have not made enough search for the material to build up the history of the dualistic school. It is, therefore, not possible for us to say when and how this school came to Kashmir, who were its earliest writers and what were the circumstances responsible for its rise. We can, however, definitely state that long before Abhinava's time the two S'aiva Schools, namely, the Dvaita and the Dvaitādvaita, had amalgamated and as such had one common name "Siddhānta". Pauṣkara Saṁhitā, for instance, calls the group of twenty-eight Āgamas, consisting of ten Dvaita and eighteen Dvaitādvaita āgamas, as stated before, by the name of "Siddhānta".[1] Abhinava also uses this very word to refer to the teachings of these twenty-eight Āgamas as a whole[2], and his commentators refer to the writers of this school as the followers of the Siddhānta[3] (Saiddhāntikas).

1. Mr. T., Introd. 2.
2. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)
3. T A., Comm., VI, 221.

THE POSITION OF THIS SCHOOL IN ABHINAVA'S TIME.

In the time of Abhinava the position of this school was already well established. It had produced great writers like Sadyojyoti, Bṛhaspati and S'aṅkaranandana. The leaders of this school had written learned commentaries on the Tantras, not only of the admittedly dualistic school but also on those which were known to belong to the monistic school such as the Svacchanda. They had also written such popular works as the Bhoga Kārikā and the S'iva Tanu S'āstra, which presented the fundamental principles of the school in a very simple and appealing language. In the eyes of Abhinava, however, this school was to be shunned; because it was dominated by ritualism, the observance of which meant much trouble but little religious merit in return; because it could not show the right way to final emancipation and because its principles were not at all in harmony with common experience[1]. It was to demolish the theories of this school that he wrote such works as the Bhedavāda Vidāraṇa. In the Tantrāloka, in which he has dealt with almost all the points connected with his monistic school, he has drawn attention to the points of difference between the Siddhānta school and the Trika and has tried his best to refute the theories of the former. This is not the place to illustrate these differences. We, therefore, content ourselves with quoting the following verse of Jayaratha in support of our view :—

"S'aṅkaranandana-Sadyojyoti-Devabala-Kaṇabhugādimatam
Pratyākhyāsyan navamaṁ vyācakhyāvāhnikaṁ Jayarathaḥ."

T. A., Comm., VI, 250.

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1. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

Lakulīśa Pāśupata.

The Siddhānta school, referred to in the preceding paragraph, is not to be confused with another Tāntrika S'aiva school, known as Lakulīśa Pāśupata. The latter follows only the eighteen Tantras of the Dvaitādvaita school, and not the twenty-eight Tantras, as interpreted in the light of the dualistic teaching. According to Abhinava, while the Siddhānta school is simply to be shunned, the Pāśupata school occupies a position next only to his own monistic school as a sure guide on the way to final emancipation. The superiority of the latter lies only in the fact that it is a sure means of realisation of the worldly desires also.[1]

Its Writers and their Works.

(I) Sadyojyoti S'iva.

He was a dualist S'aiva and was spoken of as Siddhaguru. He was also called Kheṭapāla[2]. As regards his time, we can authoritatively say only this much that he was Abhinava's predecessor. About the place of his birth we have no evidence at present to say any thing at all. His teacher was Ugrajyoti[3].

His Works.

1. Bhoga Kārikā.

It deals with Bhoga in accordance with the teaching of the Raurava Tantra. There is a quotation from this in T. A., Comm., VI, 132.

2. Mokṣa Kārikā.
3. Paramokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā.

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1. T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)
2. T. A., Comm., VI, 211.
3. M. K., 63.

4. TATTVA TRAYA NIRṆAYA.
5. RAURAVA TANTRA VṚTTI.

He considered this Vṛtti to be so important a work of his that he refers to himself as "Vṛttikṛt" (the writer of the Vṛtti[1].) To us it is known only from references to it by his commentator, Aghora S'ivācārya[2].

6. TATTVA SAṄGRAHA.

(II) BṚHASPATI.

He appears to have been accepted to be as great an authority as Sadyojyoti himself, not only from the frequent references to him in the writings of Abhinava (consult Appendix B) but also from the fact that he is quoted as an authority by the post-Abhinava dualist S'aiva writers such as Aghora S'ivācārya and Bhaṭṭa Rāma Kaṇṭha. The latter in the introduction to his commentary on Sadyojyoti's Mokṣa Kārikā, couples the name of Bṛhaspati with that of Sadyojyoti as follows :—

"Yābhyām prakāśitaṁ vartma siddhānte siddhabhāvataḥ
Gurūṇām api tau vandyau Sadyojyoti-Bṛhaspatī."

1. S'IVA TANU S'ĀSTRA.

This is the only known work of this writer. The only source of our information about it, is Abhinava's reference to it in the following quotation :—

"Iti nirvacanaiḥ S'ivatanuśāstre gurubhiḥ smṛto devaḥ."
T. A., I, 146.

Jayaratha, commenting on this, says :—
"Gurubhiḥ iti Bṛhaspatipādaiḥ."

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1. T. T. N., Comm., 2.
2. T. San., Comm., 52.

(III) S'AṄKARANANDANA.

He also was one of the dualist Śaiva writers whose views Jayaratha controverts, as he himself says in the concluding line of his commentary on the Tantrāloka Āhnika IX. Abhinava also refers to him in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, I, 181.

1. PRAJÑĀLAṄKĀRA.

This is the only known work of S'aṅkaranandana. Our source of information about it, is Abhinava's reference to it in I. P. V., I, 181. From the nature of the context in which the reference occurs, it seems to have been written with the object of exploding the atomic theory of the Naiyāyikas.

(IV) VIDYĀPATI.

Two works of his

1. ANUBHAVA STOTRA T. S., 31.
2. MĀNA STOTRA T. A., Ah. XIV, 9.

are known from Abhinava's references to them, as shown above. He is quoted in Bhaṭṭa Rāma Kaṇṭha's commentary on the Mokṣa Kārikā, P. 21. The evidence in hand is not conclusive to show whether he was a dualist or not. But it is very probable that he was. We have, therefore, given him a place here.

(V) DEVABALA.

Him we know as a dualist writer only from a reference to him made by Jayaratha in T. A., Comm., VI, 250.

SAIVA DUALISTS OF THE POST-ABHINAVA PERIOD.

For reasons already stated we briefly deal with the S'aiva dualists of even the post-Abhinava period right here.

(I) King Bhojadeva.

Mr. Smith in his Early History of India speaks of two Bhojas (1) Mihira, son of Rāmabhadra, usually known by his title Bhoja (840—90 A. D.) and (II) Bhojadeva of Dhārā (1018-60 A. D.) Of these only the latter is known to have been a patron of learning and a great writer. He is quoted by Mādhava in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, in his summary of the S'aiva Darśana, and by Vidyāraṇya Yatīndra (Mādhava himself so called when he became a Sanyāsin ?) in his commentary on the Sūta Saṁhitā. He is referred to by Aghora S'ivācārya (1158 A. D.) in his Paddhati[1] and is represented to have been a pupil of Uttuṅga S'ivācārya or his brother. He is, therefore, probably identical with Bhojadeva of Dhārā. His known S'aivaite work is

1. Tattva Prakāśikā.

(II) Rāma Kaṇṭha.

His identity.

The author, with whom we are dealing here, was different from his namesake, the son of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha and the author of the Nāda Kārikā. The former was the grand teacher of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha, the father of the latter. This is evident from an introductory verse in the Mṛgendra Vṛtti of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha which gives the names of the successive teachers as follows :—

1. Rāma Kaṇṭha.
2. Vidyā Kaṇṭha.
3. Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha.[2]

His Date.

Aghora S'ivācārya, the author of the Dīpikā on the Mṛgendra Vṛtti of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha, according to his own

1. T. P., Introd., 4.
2. Mr. T., 456.

statement in his Paddhati, quoted by S'rīkṛṣṇa Śāstrī in his introduction to Aṣṭa Prakaraṇa, finished his Paddhati in the S'āka year 1080 i. e. 1158 A. D. For, according to the orthodox view the S'āka era began 78 years after the commencement of the Christian era. He speaks of Rāmakaṇṭha as one of his teachers.[1] We have already shown that Rāma Kaṇṭha, the author of the Nāda Kārikā on which Aghora S'iva commented, was a different person from the grand teacher of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha of the same name and that the author of the Nāda Kārikā was the son of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha. In the list below the names of the teachers are given in their order of succession with the probable time of their literary activities :—

1.	Rāma Kaṇṭha I	1025-1050.
2.	Vidyā Kaṇṭha.	1050-75.
3.	Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha.	1075-1100.
4.	Rāma Kaṇṭha II	1100-30.
5.	Aghora S'iva.	1130-58.

HIS WORK.

1. SADVṚTTI.

This is the only work of Rāmakaṇṭha I that we know and this also is known only from a reference to it in the concluding line of the Ratna Traya by his pupil, Śrīkaṇṭha[2].

(III) SRIKAṆṬHA.

He speaks of himself as a pupil of Rāma Kaṇṭha I in one of the concluding verses of his Ratna Traya[3]. His literary activity, therefore, probably fell between 1050 and 1075 A. D. The only work of this author that we know of is

1. Ratna Traya.

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1. N. K., 24.
2. R. Tr., 107.
3. R. Tr., 107.

(IV) NĀRĀYAṆA KAṆṬHA.

HIS IDENTITY.

Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha is a different person from Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, the author of the Stava Cintāmaṇi, whom Abhinava quotes in the Parātriṁśikā Vivaraṇa, page 69. The former, according to his own statement in the concluding line of his commentary on the Mṛgendra Tantra, was the grandson of S'aṅkara and the son of Vidyākaṇṭha, but the latter, according to the statement of Kṣemarāja in his commentary on Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa's Stava Cintāmaṇi, was the grandson of Parameśvara and the son of Aparājita[1]. He was the grand teacher of Aghora S'iva. His works, therefore, must have been written in the last quarter of the 11th century A. D.

HIS WORKS.

1. MṚGENDRA VṚTTI.

It is a commentary on the Mṛgendra Tantra.

2. S'ARANNIŚĀ[2] or BṚHAṬṬĪKĀ

This we know only from a reference to it by Aghora S'iva in the introduction to his commentary on the Tattva Saṅgraha of Sadyojyoti.

(V) RĀMA KAṆṬHA (II)

He was the teacher of Aghora Śiva and the son of Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha. We can, therefore, safely say that he wrote in the first quarter of the 12th century A. D.

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1. S. C., Comm., 10.
2. T. San., I.

His Works.

In the colophons of all his works he speaks of himself as the son of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa Kaṇṭha. There is, therefore, no room for any difference of opinion on his authorship of the following works, because the question as to whether a particular work was written by one Rāma Kaṇṭha or the other, cannot arise :—

1. Nāda Kārikā.
2. Vṛtti on Paramokṣa Nirāsa Kārikā.
3. Vṛtti on Mokṣa Kārikā.

Works known from reference only :—

4. Mantra Vārtika Ṭikā.
M. K., P. 4.
5. Āgama Viveka.
P. M. N. K., P. 49.

In the concluding verse of the Nāda Kārikā there is a statement that Rāma Kaṇṭha II belonged to Kashmir. It is, therefore, probable that all the other writers also of the post-Abhinava period of whom we have spoken above, excepting, of course, Bhojadeva, belonged to the same place. The fact that 'Kaṇṭha" is a common family name in Kashmir even to day lends additional support to this probability.

6. Aghora Siva (1130-58 A. D.)

We have discussed his date above. He was an inhabitant of Kuṇḍina Kula in Cola[1]. His teacher was Sarvātma Śiva. In the colophon to his commentary on the Tattva Prakāśikā he represents himself to be a teacher of two lacs of pupils.

1. T. T. N., 22.

HIS WORKS.

He commented on the following works :—

1. TATTVA PRAKĀŚIKĀ.
2. TATTVA SAṄGRAHA.
3. TATTVA TRAYA NIRṆAYA.
4. RATNA TRAYA.
5. BHOGA KĀRIKĀ.
6. NĀDA KĀRIKĀ.
7. MṚGENDRA VṚTTI.

He wrote the following independent works, but we know them only from his own reference to them in the concluding lines of his commentary on the Ratna Traya in which he calls himself a Kavīśvara [1] :—

8. ĀŚCARYA SĀRA.
9. PĀKHAṆḌĀPAJAPA.
10. BHAKTA PRAKĀŚA.
11. ABHYUDAYA NĀṬAKA.

IDENTITY OF THE SIDDHĀNTA SCHOOL with THE SAIVA DARŚANA OF MĀDHAVA.

Leaving aside the similarity of the philosophical conceptions with which we shall, space permitting, deal in the second part, if we were to compare the authorities of the Siddhānta School, about whom we have spoken in the last few pages, with those quoted by Mādhava in the summary of the Saiva Darśana in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, we shall have very little doubt left in our minds about the identity of the Sidhānta School with the Saiva School of Mādhava's S. D. S. The former follows

1. R. Tr. 108.

the mixed authority of twenty-eight Tantras, ten of the Saiva group and eighteen of the Rudra group. The latter also does the same. It quotes as authorities the Mṛgendra Tantra of the first and the Saurabheya and the Kiraṇa Tantras of the second group. We may point out here that the Mṛgendra is a part of the Kāmika Tantra. As regards human authorities, with the exception of only two (I) Bahudaivatya and (II) Soma Śambhu, which have not so far been accessible to us, all are out of those which have been given above. The following are the names of the authors and books quoted as authorities by Mādhava, which are common to the Siddhānta School, described above:—

1. TATTVA SAṄGRAHA.
2. TATTVA PRAKĀŚA.
3. BHOJARĀJA.
4. SIDDHA GURU.
5. BṚHASPATI.
6. RĀMA KAṆṬHA.

To show the identity of the two was one of the reasons for our dealing here with the writers of the Siddhānta School of the post-Abhinava period. It is interesting to note that Mādhava himself uses the word "Siddhānta" when he speaks of the followers of this school as distinguished from those of the other Śaivāgamic Schools[1].

III. *Historical background of his poetic ideas.*

THE WRITERS ON DRAMATURGY KNOWN TO ABHINAVA AND THEIR HISTORICAL POSITION.

Bharata is admitted by all to be the first known writer on Sanskrit Dramaturgy whose work is available. On his

1. S. D. S.

Sūtras Abhinava has commented. We can, therefore, give a clear idea of Abhinava's contribution to Sanskrit dramaturgy only if we trace its history from the time of the writer of the original to that of the commentator. But the limited space at our disposal in the present thesis does not permit us to undertake it. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with showing what light a careful study of Abhinava's works throws on some of the important problems.

INTERPOLATION IN BHARATA'S NĀṬYA SĀSTRA.

The question of Bharata's Nāṭya Sāstra being a work of many hands is very old. In fact, as we have already pointed out, even before the time of Abhinava, there were some who considered at least those portions, in which Bharata is spoken of as a third person, to have been from the pen of some of his pupils. How in Abhinava's opinion such a view was wrong we have already shown. In recent times two places in the published text of the Nāṭya S'āstra have been pointed out as indicative of its later rehandling and recasting. One is the colophon at the end in the Kāvyamālā edition :—

"Samāptaścāyaṁ (granthaḥ) Nandi-Bharatasaṅgītapustakam"

and the other is a sort of prediction, contained in the last chapter, that the rest of the topics will be treated in detail by Kohala. In addition to this a work on music called "Nandi Bharata" noticed by Rice in his Mysore and Coorg Catalogue and a chapter referred to as "Nandi Bharatokta saṅkara hastādhyāya" from a "work on the art of dancing accompanied by the different kinds of movements of the hand etc." noticed in the Madras Catalogue are mentioned; and it is stated "these works, probably late compilations, refer to Nandi or Nandikeśvara, whom tradition acknowledges as an ancient authority on music and histrionic art." It is

further added "This designation of the later part of Bharata's text, a part of which deals, among other things, with music, probably implies that it was compiled and recast at some later period in accordance with the views of Nandikeśvara." Similarly the prediction about the continuation of Bharata's work referred to above has been supposed to indicate "that the rewriting of the portion in question was done some time after Kohala as well as Nandikeśvara had spoken on the subject." (H. S. P., P. 24-5)

It is apparent from what has been stated above that the theory of the later interpolation is based upon the supposition of the later chronological position of Nandi and Kohala due to the ignorance of the relation of these two accepted authorities to Bharata, so that unless we are able to fix the exact chronological position of these two persons we cannot either accept or reject the theory. Let us, therefore, see what light the text of the Nāṭya S'āstra itself and the commentary of Abhinava thereon throw on this point.

Bharata is very frank in stating that all the information that he gives on gesticulation was got from Taṇḍu :—

"Tato ye Taṇḍunā proktās tvaṅgahārā mahātmanā.
Nānākaraṇasaṁyuktān vyākhyāsyāmi sarecakān."

Bh. Sū., Ch. IV, 18-9.

On this there is a very important comment of Abhinavagupta, which explains the identity of Taṇḍu. According to this, Taṇḍu is another name of Nandi as Muni is that of Bharata :—

"Taṇḍu-Muniśabdau Nandi-Bharatayoḥ aparanāmanī."

A. Bh., 90.

Thus it is clear that Nandi was Bharata's contemporary, perhaps older, or a predecessor, but not his distant successor. If we accept the identity of Nandi with Bharata's teacher

or collaborator, Taṇḍu, there remains no difficulty in explaining the colophon at the end of the last chapter of the Bharata Sūtra in the Kāvyamālā edition, "Nandibharata". It may mean Bharata instructed by Nandi.

(Nandyupadiṣṭo Bharataḥ—Nandi Bharataḥ;

"Śākapārthivādīnāṁ siddhaye uttarapadalopasyopasaṅkhyānam.")

Similarly the colophon of the MS. No. 13009 noticed in the Madras Catalogue, referred to above, can also be easily explained.

KOHALA.

That he is an ancient authority on dramaturgy, nobody doubts. That he wrote some works on that subject is made abundantly clear by Abhinava (consult A. Bh., PP. 25, 48, 173, 182, 266, 272) Many other later writers also frequently refer to him and quote from his works. That he had established his reputation as an authority on dramaturgy so as to be referred to by Bharata himself is also made clear by Abhinava in A. Bh. For, according to his statement on page 266, the 10th verse of the 6th chapter of the Nāṭya S'āstra contains the opinion of Kohala and not that of Bharata on the question of the number of the essential constituents of Nāṭya, because the Nāṭya S'āstra states the views of Kohala also on some important points. Further, at some places, according to Abhinava's interpretation, Bharata rejects the view of Kohala, as for instance, in regard to the nature of Suṣira, as the following comment on Bharata's verse "Suṣiro vaṁśa eva ca" clearly shows :—

"Evakāraḥ Kohalādivyudāsāya"

How can the acceptance of some views of Kohala and rejection of others by Bharata be possible but for their contemporaneity ?

The question is only about his exact position in relation to Bharata, and on this also Abhinava, though indirectly and incidentally, has spoken in terms not easily to be mistaken. Bharata, while speaking on Nāndi in Ch. I., Ś. 56, uses the word "vicitrā" and Abhinava, commenting on this word, says :—

"Ata eva vicitretyuktam...
Ityeṣāpi bhāratīyatvena prasiddhā Kohalapradarśitā nāndyupapannā bhavati." A. Bh., 25.

Here the word "Bhāratīya" is of very great importance in giving us a clue to the relation, we are trying to find out. This word means "propounded by the son of Bharata". It cannot mean "of Bharata" because according to Pāṇini's rule "Vṛddhācchaḥ" (Pā. 4-2-14.) the affix "Cha" which changes into "īya", cannot be added to a word with a short initial syllable.

"Vṛddhiryasyācāmādis tad vṛddham."

Therefore, the initial has to be prolonged before this affix can rightly be added. But how can it be done unless at first the affix "Aṇ" expressive of the sense of "offspring" (apatya) ("Tasyāpatyam". Pā. 4-1-92.) be affixed to the word "Bharata" ? "Bhāratīya" therfore, literally means "of the son of Bharata." The meaning of the word having been settled the next quesion that naturally arises is "who was this son of Bharata". To this also Abhinava gives a reply in the same line by saying "Kohalapradarśitā". Thus it is evident that Kohala was Bharata's son, at least this is Abhinava's view. It may be interesting to note in this connection that Kohala is included in the list of the hundred sons of Bharata enumerated in Bh. Sū., Ch. I, ś. 26-39.

It may be pointed out here that the word "Bhāratīya", on the interpretation of which our conclusion on the exact

relation of Kohala to Bharata is based, occurs also in the colophon of each chapter of the Nāṭya S'āstra :

"Iti Bhāratīye Nāṭya S'āstre"

But there the word has a quite different meaning from that in which it is used in the passage under discussion. For, if we take it to mean the same there as here, against all traditions and authorities we will have to accept Kohala to be the author of the Nāṭya S'āstra. The question, therefore, naturally arises: in what sense is the word used in the colophons ?

The following three interpretations suggest themselves to us, but, we confess, none satisfactorily explains the long "ā" in the initial syllable :—

(I) "Handed down by Bharata." This meaning we get by affixing "cha" to the word "Bharata" ("Tena proktam" 4-3-101) after affixing "aṇ" in svārtha ("Prajñādibhyaśca" 5-4-38).

(II) "Concerning the pupils of Bharata, that is the actors in general." The word yields this sense if we take it to have been formed from the word "Bharata" according to Pāṇini's Sūtra "Adhikṛtya kṛte granthe" (4-3-87) after affixing "aṇ" in the sense of pupil by "Kaṇvādibhyo gotre". (4-2-111).

(III) "Beneficial to the actors." To get this meaning we have to form "Bhārata" as in the preceding case, and then affix "cha" in the sense of "beneficial" by "Tasmai hitam" (5-1-5). This interpretation seems to have the support of Abhinava as the following quotation shows :—

"Naṭajanasvakapravṛttiviśeṣopadeśaparam, ata eva tadgatasiddhasadupāyopadeśanaparam idaṁ śāstram

iti naṭasya tāvannānena kiñcidupadiśyate taṁ pratyupakārād ṛte" A. Bh., 4.

The extracts discussed above can very easily be interpreted by the exponents of the later interpolation theory as supporting their own position. But this is possible only on the presumption of the later date of Kohala, which has yet to be proved to be based upon sound literary evidence. We have, at least, the support of such a great authority as Abhinavagupta for the view maintained here.

Now, taking Abhinava's testimony in this matter to be correct, let us see how this explains the prediction referred to above. It is evident that Bharata wrote his Nāṭya S'āstra when he was very old, because he is spoken of as a Muni. Therefore, it will not be wrong to suppose that at the time when the sage was writing the above work, his son, or younger contemporary, Kohala, was already of sufficiently advanced age and held certain views on some dramaturgic points, which, though different from those of Bharata, were not to be ignored. The latter, therefore, at some places purposely uses expressions, as Abhinava interprets, to indicate the acceptability of Kohala's views, as in the instance discussed above. Taking all these facts into consideration it seems very probable that by the time the present Bharata Sūtra reached its completion the sage had grown too old and feeble to continue writing on the remaining points of dramaturgy which were of equal importance with those already treated. By this time Kohala also had established his reputation as an authority on dramaturgy and had become quite able to continue the work. Bharata, therefore, entrusted the future work on the subject to his worthy son or contemporary and closed his work with the so-called prediction, on which the present controversy is partly based[1]. Thus the two grounds on which the conclusion

1. Bh. Su. ch. 37, ś. 18.

of later interpolation and recasting is based do not appear to be sound. The third is simply a tradition that the original work of Bharata was in the Sūtra form. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss it here.

BHARATA'S DATE.

Both his style and the method of dealing with the subject are apparently Purāṇic, and we know that Purāṇas assumed their final form, roughly speaking, in the fourth century A. D. But, as in the case of Purāṇas so in that of Bharata, whose date we can at present find out only with the help of the style and the language, the upper limit cannot be precisely fixed. The lower limit, however, is not so uncertain. For, we have positive proof of the existence of his Nāṭya S'āstra in the present form in the 6th century A. D., because there is a Vārtika on it of King Harṣa of Kannauj (606-47 A. D.) which is quoted by Abhinava in his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Sāstra with the remark "iti Harṣa Vārtikam" (consult PP. 67, 172, 174, 207, 211, 212). Bharata's Nāṭya S'āstra must have, therefore, existed and become of accepted authority long before King Harṣa's time to prompt him to write a Vārtika on it. It may be noted that in the case of Bharata's text, on which Harṣa wrote his Vārtika, Abhinava does not point out any difference in reading as he does in the case of that (text of Bharata) on which others have commented, as for instance, on page 226 of A. Bh. The intervening period between Bharata and Harṣa, therefore, does not seem to have been very long. Nor was it very short, because the necessity for a sort of commentary, Vārtika, had arisen. It will, therefore, not be wrong to suppose that Bharata lived sometime between the 4th and the 5th century A. D. There is, however, no denying the fact that oral traditions about dramaturgy, which are embodied by Bharata, were current from much earlier time than the 4th century.

BHARATA'S COMMENTATORS AND WRITERS ON SUBJECTS ALLIED TO DRAMATURGY REFERRED TO BY ABHINAVA.

(I) DATTILĀCĀRYA.

From the nature of the context in which he is referred to as well as from a quotation in A. Bh., P. 205, he appears to have been an old authority on Tāla, because he is spoken of as 'Ācārya' by Abhinava as also because his name is mentioned in the list of hundred sons of Bharata. (We do not attach more than due importance to the latter argument.)

(II) RĀHULA.

There are two quotations attributed to him in A. Bh., PP. 115, 172. They show that he wrote on dramaturgy in general. For, the former concerns dancing and the latter the way in which a female character should address her loving husband or friend. He acknowledges the authority of Bharata even in one of these quotations[1].

(III) BHAṬṬA YANTRA.

He seems to have written a commentary on the Bharata Sūtra, because a quotation is given apparently from his commentary to state his opinion on the meaning of the word "evam" which constitutes a part of Bharata's verse 331, ch. IV, as Abhinava clearly states :—

"Etacca svamatānusāreṇa "evam" śabdārthamāhuḥ."

A. Bh., 208.

(IV) KĪRTIDHARĀCĀRYA.

He is spoken of as vyākhyātā along with the known commentators of Bharata and his opinon also is quoted on the meaning of the same word "evam" as pointed out above. He also, therefore, seems to have commented upon the Bharata Sūtra.

1. A. Bh., 172.

It may be pointed out here that Dr. De, in his History of Sanskrit Poetics, represents this Kīrtidharācārya to have been Abhinava's successor, probably because in the quotation that he gives in the foot note on page 27, H.S.P., Kīrtidhara is mentioned after Abhinava. But, in view of the fact that he is quoted by Abhinava himself, as shown above, Dr. De's opinion, we think, requires revision[1].

(V) NĀNYADEVA.

He was the writer of a commentary on the Bharata Sūtra, called Bharata Bhāṣya. He is quoted by Abhinava in A. Bh., P. 255.

HIS TIME

Nānyadeva is a familiar name to indologists. Four eminent scholars have written on him. Professor Sylvain Lévi was the first to deal with the question of Nānya's date in Le Népāl, Vol. II. According to him, Nānyadeva's accession fell in 1097 A.D. This date, according to Dr. R. C. Majumdar, because it is "confirmed by a memorial verse preserved in Vidyāpati's Puruṣaparīkṣā and corroborated by a MS. written in 1097 in the reign of king Nānyadeva" (I. H. Q., Vol. VII, P. 680) may be regarded as finally settled. According to Mr. Jayaswal, however, the year of accession was 1093 A. D. and that of death 1133 A. D.

All these scholars, for some reason or other, allow Nānyadeva a reign of about fifty years. This Nānyadeva, who is supposed to have lived from sometime in the later half of the 11th century to 1133 or 1147 A. D., we would have altogether ignored, but for the article of Mr. Ramakṛishna Kavi in the Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, October, 1926, P. 55-63, in which he

1. H. S. P., Vol. I, 27.

gives an account of Nānya's commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Sāstra (Chs. XXVII to XXXIV, dealing with music).

The available portion of the commentary gives the following details about the identity of the author :—

1. Mahāsāmantādhipati-dharmāvaloka-Śrīmān Nānyapati.
2. Mithileśvara.
3. Karṇāṭakulabhūṣaṇa.
4. Dharmādhārabhūpati
5. Rājanārāyaṇa
6. Nṛpamalla.
7. Mohanamurāri.
8. Pratyagravāṇīpati.
9. Extinguisher of the fame of the king of Mālava.
10. Conqueror of the heroes of Sauvīra.
11. Breaker of the powers of Vaṅga and Gauḍa.

Dr. Majumdar has tried to explain some of the above attributes as referring to Nānyadeva of the 11th and the 12th centuries A. D. According to him naturally, therefore, the commentator of the Nāṭya Sāstra is identical with the king of Mithilā who reigned from 1097 to 1147.

Our careful study of Abhinava presents the following difficulty in accepting the said identification :—

Abhinavagupta, in his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Sāstra, refers to Nānyadeva and quotes from his Bharatabhāṣya, a commentary on the Nāṭya Sāstra, as follows :—

"Uktaṁ Nānyadevena sva-Bharatabhāṣye :—

'Atra varṇaśabdena gītirabhidhīyate nākṣaraviśeṣaḥ, nāpi ṣaḍjādisaptasvarāḥ padagrāme tvaniyamādeva

svecchayā prayujyante, ṣaḍjādisvarāntānām apyaviśeṣeṇa vāvarohādidharmāṇam pratyeva samupalambhate. Ato varṇa eva gītirityavasthitam, sopi caturdhā māgadhyādiḥ" A. Bh., 255.

But, on the evidence of the dates of composition of three of his important works, (vide ch. I) given by himself, Abhinava is known to have lived from about the middle of the 10th century A. D. to about the close of the first quarter of the 11th century. Further, on the solid ground of the references to the earlier works in the later, his writings are separately assigned to the following three periods :—

1. Tāntrika
2. Ālaṅkārika
3. Philosophical

The date of completion of the biggest philosophical work of Abhinava, so far known, namely, the Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī, is definitely known to be 1014-15 A. D. The time of writing of the Abhinava Bhāratī, therefore, can safely be stated to be the beginning of the 11th century A. D. Nānyadeva, therefore, in order to explain his being quoted by Abhinava in the beginning of the 11th century A. D., has to be supposed to be an older contemporary, if not a predecessor, of Abhinava. In any case, it has got to be admitted that Nānyadeva finished his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra before the close of the 10th century A. D. He has, therefore, to be supposed to have been thirty to forty years of age at that time. For, it would not be reasonable to suppose that he finished such a work in his teens or early twenties. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, it would not be wrong to say that he was born early in the later half of the 10th century A. D.

Now, Nānyadeva, king of Mithilā, is represented to have ascended the throne in 1097 A. D. and to have ruled for

fifty years. If we accept the conclusions of the scholars, who have specialized in the history of Nānya's time, the following questions will naturally arise :—

1. Did Nānyadeva come to the throne when he was about one hundred and thirty years of age ?

2. Did he live for about two hundred years and continue ruling till the very end of his life ? For, such a supposition alone can explain his reign from 1097 to 1147 A. D.

3. If not, how then can the identity of the commentator Nānyadeva, quoted by Abhinava in the beginning of the 11th century, with a king of Mithilā of the same name but belonging to the 12th century A. D. be accepted ?

The other alternative, namely, that Nānyadeva, quoted by Abhinava, is a different person from his namesake, the 12th century king of Mithilā, is no better. For, we have ascertained from Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi that the passage, quoted by Abhinava from Nānya's commentary, given above, is actually found in the seventh chapter, called Rāgādhyāya, of the MS. of Nānya's commentary. The stray remarks, therefore, made by Nānya about himself in the course of his commentary, stated above, make the aforesaid view wholly untenable.

Two questions arise here.

1. Is king Nānyadeva, who, according to Dr. Majumdar, played an important part in north Indian politics in the first half of the 12th century A. D., a different person from his namesake king of Mithilā and commentator on Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra, who is quoted by Abhinava and, therefore, must belong to the 10th and early 11th century A. D. ?

2. Or, is it that scholars, who have written on Nānya, in attempting to explain the political references to him with

the available political data of that period, have assigned to him a much later than the real date ?

It may be suggested here that if Gaṅgādeva, the successor of Nānyadeva, be identical with Gāṅgeyadeva, as Dr. Majumdar suggests, then the colophon of a book, noticed by Mr. Bendall, which refers to Tirhut being ruled over by "Mahārājādhirāja Puṇyāvaloka Somavaṁśodbhava Gauḍa-dhvaja Śrīmad Gāṅgeyadeva" and is dated Saṁvat 1076, puts Nānyadeva at a time which satisfactorily explains the fact of his having been quoted by Abhinava early in the 11th century A. D. Of course, in this case we would follow Mr. Bendall, according to whom Saṁvat refers to the Vikrama era, and not Dr. Majumdar who holds it to refer to the Śāka era. For, in that case, Nānya shall have to be supposed to have died before 1020 A. D. when, according to the above colophon, his son was on the throne.

In our opinion the question of Nānya's time requires further study in the light of the facts, stated here, and cannot be regarded as finally settled.

THE COMMENTATORS WHOSE DATE CAN BE FIXED.

(VI) HARṢA.

Abhinava quotes a commentary, called "Vārtika," written by Harṣa, apparently on the Bharata Sūtra, as we have already said. In the history of Sanskrit literature, we know only of two Harṣas. One, the famous King of Kannauj (606-47 A. D.) and the other, poet Harṣa, the author of the Naiṣadhīya Carita, who is invariably called Śrīharṣa. As the latter belonged to the later half of the 12th century A. D., it would not be wrong to identify the author of the Vārtika with the former. It is probable that the work was written by his famous court poet Bāṇa and attributed to his patron like so many others.

(VII) UDBHAṬA.

The followers of Udbhaṭa (Audbhaṭas) are represented to hold that the 11th verse of the sixth chapter of the Bharata Sūtra states that, according to Kohala, Nāṭya Saṅgraha consists of eleven parts. Does this mean that he also wrote a commentary on the Bharata Sūtra ? In any case, it is apparent that he interpreted Bharata's text in a way which considerably differed from other interpretations of the same and that these differences, though they may have been simply matters of oral tradition, were so many and had been accepted by so many that those who followed his interpretation were called Audbhaṭas.

HIS DATE.

There is no controversy about his date. He is taken to be identical with Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, whom Kalhaṇa in his Rājataraṅgiṇī, Ch. IV, 495, represents as the Sabhāpati of King Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir (779-813 A. D.). He is very well known for his works on Alaṅkāra e. g. Kāvyālaṅkārasāra-saṅgraha.

(VIII) BHAṬṬA LOLLAṬA.

That he commented upon the Bharata Sūtra is clear not so much from his opinion on Rasa, quoted by Abhinava, as from the quotation which points out the difference of his interpretation of the word "evam" in Bh. Sū. ch. IV, Ś. 331, from those of Bhaṭṭa Yantra and Kīrtidharācārya.

HIS DATE.

From the manner in which reference has been made to his theory of Rasa by Abhinava in his A. Bh., p. 274, there remains little doubt about the fact that he was Śrīśaṅkuka's older contemporary. Not only is his exposition of Rasa given

first of all but his view also is represented to be in common with that of the ancients (Cirantanas), such as Daṇḍin. Further, Śrīśaṅkuka is represented to be his first opponent; and the word (etanna), with which the statement of the opponent's view begins, shows that the latter was Lollaṭa's contemporary. We know that the word "etat" in Sanskrit stands for what is present before; in fact this is the only difference in idea conveyed by this word as distinguished from "tat". The time of Śaṅkuka is accepted to be the middle of the 9th century A. D., because he is taken to be identical with the poet Śaṅkuka, who, according to Kalhaṇa's statement, (R. T., ch. IV, 705) was King Ajitāpīḍa's contemporary (circa 850) and had written a poem, called Bhuvanābhyudaya. The view that Lollaṭa was a contemporary of Śrīśaṅkuka is supported by the following fact :—

Kṣemarāja, who was a pupil of Abhinava, refers in his Spanda Nirṇaya to Lollaṭa's commentary, called Vivṛti, on Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa's Spanda Kārikā in the following words :—

"Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭenāpi 'tadādyanta' iti evameva vyākhyāyi sva Vivṛtau" S. N., 34.

Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, as already stated before, is referred to as a Siddha and, therefore, must have been a very old man in the time of King Avanti Varman (856 A. D.) He, therefore, must have written his Spanda Kārikā or rather given publicity to Vasugupta's posthumous work so called, as we have explained before, some time in the middle of the second quarter of the 9th century; and Lollaṭa, his younger contemporary, commented upon the same towards the end of the same quarter of that century. It is probable that Lollaṭa also like Kallaṭa was Vasugupta's pupil. The fact that Lollaṭa wrote some philosophical works also is further supported by Abhinava's referring to him as a

writer of a philosophical work in the Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika ch. I, S'. 777.

Thus it is evident that Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and S'rīśaṅkuka were contemporaries and that the first was the oldest and the last the youngest of them. It will, therefore, not be wrong to say that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa lived in the second and the third quarters of the 9th century A. D.

(IX) S'RĪŚAṄKUKA.

From frequent references to and criticism of S'rīśaṅkuka's interpretation of the Bharata Sūtra by Abhinava in his commentary (pp. 67, 75, 104) as also from the fact that he points out differences between his original of the Bharata Sūtra and that of S'rīśaṅkuka, (A. Bh. 216, 217) it is apparent that the latter also commented upon the Bharata Sūtra. That he belonged to Kashmir and was a contemporary of King Ajitāpīḍa (850) we have already stated in the foregoing pages.

(X) BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA.

Did he comment on Bharata's Nāṭya S'āstra ? Dr. De answers this question in the following words in his History of Sanskrit Poetics :—

"No doubt, Abhinava in his own commentary on Bharata, as well as numerous other later writers taking their cue from Abhinava, criticise at some length Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory of Rasa, along with those of Lollaṭa and S'aṅkuka, and with special reference to Bharata's particular Sūtra on the subject : yet Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is nowhere mentioned directly as a commentator on the same text."

The following few lines contain our opinion on the subject with the available data on which it is based :—

Abhinava in his commentary on the very first verse of Bharata, while discussing the meaning of the last part of

the same "Brahmaṇā yadudāhṛtam" quotes the following passage from the Sahṛadaya Darpaṇa :—

"(Bhaṭṭa Nāyakastu) Brahmaṇā paramātmanā yadudāhṛtam avidyāviracitaṁ nissārabhedagrahe yadudāharaṇīkṛtam tannāṭyaṁ tad vakṣyāmi: yathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṁ tata evānavasthitaikarūpaṁ kṣaṇena kalpanāśata.................... lokottaraparamapuruṣārthasūcanena śāntarasopakṣepoyam bhaviṣyati :— "svaṁ svaṁ nimittam ādāya śāntādyutpadyate rasaḥ" iti tadanena pāramārthikam prayojanam uktam (iti vyākhyāṁ sahṛdayadarpaṇe paryagrahīt)"

The portions within brackets, at the beginning and in the end are Abhinava's own remarks. This makes the following three points clear :—

(1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka wrote a work called Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa.

(2) That work dealt with the text of Bharata's Nāṭya Śāstra.

(3) At many places it interpreted the Bharata Sūtra in a way which differed from that of the other commentators.

Explanation of the remark of Mahima Bhaṭṭa's Commentator.

Here one question may very pertinently be asked. If Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's commentary on the Bharata Sūtra what about the remark of "Mahima Bhaṭṭa's commentator", who in the words of Dr. De "tells us that this Hṛdaya Darpaṇa, like the Vyakti Viveka, was composed with the special object of demolishing the Dhvani theory, formulated by Ānanda Vardhana". The answer is simple and we propose to give it by putting

another question "Is there any difference between "Hṛdaya" and "Sahṛdaya"? If the reply be "Yes" we would request the reader to see if there is not the same difference between the titles of the works referred to by Abhinava and Mahima Bhaṭṭa's commentator in their respective commentaries. One is Hṛdaya Darpaṇa and the other is Sahṛdaya Darpaṇa. The former is concerned with the demolition of the Dhvani theory of Ananda Vardhana and the latter with the interpretation of Bharata's text. This conclusion is based upon the wording of the text, quoted above in full, and the quotation :—

> "Darpaṇaḥ......................Hṛdayadarpaṇākhyo dhvani dhvaṁsa granthaḥ."

given by Dr. De in his H. S. P., in a foot note on page 40.

HIS DATE.

From what has been stated above it is clear that he lived some time after Ānanda Vardhana, a contemporary of King Avanti Varman, 856-883, (R. T., ch. V, 34,) and a little before Abhinava (second half of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A. D.). Therefore, probably it will not be wrong to identify him with Nāyaka whom Kalhaṇa represents as King S'aṅkara Varman's contemporary, 883-902 A. D., (R. T., ch. V, S'. 159).

EXPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI.

The men of letters, of whom we have to speak here, can, according to Ānanda Vardhana, the first known exponent of the theory of Dhvani, be divided into three classes: (I) the supporters of the theory; (II) its opponents; and (III) those who considered it to be identical with

Lakṣaṇā.[1] Among those of the first class are included also those, who believed that there was something like Dhvani, though they could not properly define it. Before the writer of the Dhvani Kārikā, there was no book presenting the views of either the exponents or the opponents.[2] This, however, does not mean that the earlier thinkers of Sanskrit poetics had no idea of Dhvani. The fact, on the contrary, is that the theory was well formulated and had its opponents too, long before the time of the Kārikā, but all that was simply a matter of oral tradition handed down from generation to generation.[3] The thinkers of the third school, in marked contrast with the above two, more or less, recorded their views in the books, which we still possess. To this class belong such early writers on poetics as Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, and Vāmana.[4] The view of the school of opponents also had begun to be systematised before Ānanda Vardhana wrote his work, as is apparent from a quotation attributed to a poet, Manoratha, who, according to Abhinava, was Ānanda Vardhana's contemporary.[5] But it appears from Abhinava's wording that only stray verses were written by one writer here and another there, and that there was no book presenting the opponents' views systematically, for, he seems to have purposely used the word "Sloka". It was only after Ānanda Vardhana's learned exposition of Dhvani in his Dhvanyāloka, that there appeared two books of the opponents' school, one from the pen of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, whom Abhinava so much criticises, and the other from that of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who was probably Abhinava's successor or younger contemporary.

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1. Dh. L., 3.
2. Dh. L., 3.
3. Dh. L., 3.
4. Dh. L., 10.
5. Dh. L., 8.

WHO WAS THE AUTHOR OF THE DHVANI KĀRIKĀ ?

But before we begin speaking on these writers in their chronological order, let us take up the much disputed question of the authorship of the Dhvani Kārikā, and see what light a careful study of Abhinava's Locana throws on it. There is no doubt, as was first pointed out by Dr. Bühler, that Abhinava uses the two words "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra" with a distinction. There is also no doubt that Abhinava means two different works by "Vṛttigrantha" and "Kārikā". But let us state here that he does not oppose them, if by the word "oppose" the idea meant to be conveyed is that one contradicts the view of the other. But we have complete agreement if it is meant to denote that the contents of the works, referred to by the words "Kārikā" and "Vṛtti" which form component parts of "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra," differ in certain respects, i. e. certain points are dealt with in greater detail in the latter than in the former and certain others are given exhaustive treatment in the latter, which, though very closely connected with the subject-matter of the former, have not very clearly been touched upon in it. That there is nothing like contradiction between the two is made clear by those very three instances which are stated in the History of Sanskrit Poetics (P. 107-8) and on two of which the learned author himself speaks a little later in the following words :—

"In one place, for instance (P. 123) Abhinavagupta clearly points out that the classification of Dhvani according to Vastu, Alaṅkāra, and Rasādi is not expressedly taught in any Kārikā; while at another place in ch. IV Abhinavagupta states that the question as to the source of the endless variety of Artha in poetry is mentioned by the Vṛttikāra but not touched upon by the Kārikākāra."

But we do not agree with Dr. Jacobi and Dr. De who, "relying on Abhinavagupta's testimony put forward the

suggestion that Dhvanikāra, the supposed author of the Kārikā, was a different and older writer, who should be distinguished from Ānanda Vardhana, the author of the Vṛtti." The arguments of the scholars who hold that the Kārikā and the Vṛtti are of different authorship may be briefly stated as follows :—

1. There is difference in respect of the points dealt with in the Kārikā and the Vṛtti.
2. The ideas of the Kārikā are expanded, revised and modified in the Vṛtti.
3. A sufficiently long time must elapse before the need for a commentary is felt.
4. Abhinavagupta uses the two words "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra" and means two distinct authors thereby.

We have already stated in the preceding paragraph that whatever be the number of the points dealt with in the Vṛtti, in addition to those expressedly stated in the Kārikā, none of the former contradicts any one of the latter ; and here we might add that though there is considerable expansion, revision and modification of the views of the Kārikā in the Vṛtti, yet all that is of the nature of an addition to clear the ideas of the former, for, that is the one purpose that the commentary is intended to serve.

Having thus disposed of the first two points stated above, we take up the third. It is not always that a commentary is written only after the lapse of a sufficiently long time. It may have been so, long before or after the time of Ānanda Vardhana, but was not certainly so in or about his time, as the history of Sanskrit Literature, particularly of that part of India to which Ānanda Vardhana himself belonged, shows. We know on the accepted

authority of Kalhaṇa on this particular point that Ānanda Vardhana was King Avanti Varman's contemporary (856-883 A. D.) and that Kallaṭa also lived at the same time. We also know that Vasugupta, the author of the Śiva Sūtra, was a teacher of Kallaṭa and that the latter wrote a commentary on the Spanda Kārikā called "Spanda Sarvasva". Although there is difference of opinion as regards the authorship of the Spanda Kārikā which, in itself is a sort of running commentary on the Śiva Sūtra, yet, whether the authorship of the Spanda Kārikā be attributed to Vasugupta or to Kallaṭa, our position is not affected. What we intend to show here is that in or about the 9th century A. D. in Kashmir there are instances of the same person, writing both the text and the commentary. So that if we take Vasugupta to be the author of the Spanda Kārikā, then, it is his own commentary on his own S'iva Sūtra; but if Kallaṭa be accepted to be the author, then, he also has written a commentary on it, called Spanda Sarvasva, as pointed out above. This is not a solitary instance; about the same time Somānanda also is said to have written a commentary upon his own S'ivadṛṣṭi, though we have not so far been able to discover it; and, in the next generation Utpalācārya wrote the Vṛtti and the Vivṛti on his own Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā to which Abhinava makes a reference in one of the introductory verses in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.[1] Thus the third argument also does not appear to be very sound.

As regards the fourth argument that Abhinava uses two words, Kārikākāra and Vṛttikāra, and means to imply distinction, we may point out that this also does not necessarily mean difference in point of the authorship of the works so referred to. Our study of Abhinava's works tells

1. I. P. V., I, 3.

us that it is his practice to refer to the same person as the writer of one work or another, if he has written more than one work, according as he refers to him in one capacity or another. Leaving aside other instances, if we take up that of Utpalācārya himself, we find that he is referred to both as Vṛttikāra and Ṭīkākāra in one passage. On reading it, a person, not knowing the truth, is likely to fall into the error of thinking that there are two different writers referred to by these two words. The passage in question occurs in Abhinava's commentary, called Vimarśinī, on the first verse of Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā-Kārikā or Sūtra. It runs as follows :—

> "Iyati vyākhyāne vṛttikṛtā bharo na kṛtaḥ tātparya-vyākhyānāt yaduktam :—
>
> 'Saṁvṛtasautranirdeśavivṛtimātravyāpārāyām' iti :
> Ṭīkākāreṇāpi vṛttimātraṁ vyākhyātum udyatena nedaṁ spṛṣṭam." I. P. V., I, 22-3.

We have stated above that Utpalācārya himself was the writer of both the Vṛtti and the Ṭīkā and have also given a quotation in support of our statement.

Here it may be asked "Is there any justification to suppose that the use of the two words "Kārikākāra" and "Vṛttikāra" by Abhinava in his Locana is of the same kind as that of Vṛttikāra and Ṭīkākāra in the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī ?" To answer this question we state the following few facts, gathered from the three works, the Kārikā, the Vṛtti and the Locana :—

I. As a rule, Sanskrit writers do not begin their work without first writing at least one verse in praise of the deity to which they are devoted or using some such expression in the beginning as is interpreted to be what is technically called Maṅgalācaraṇa. If, therefore, the Dhvani Kārikā and the Vṛtti had been written by two different writers there would

have been two separate benedictory verses, at least one at the beginning of each. But there is only one such verse in the present case and this seems to form the beginning of the Dhvani Kārikā. What are we to infer from this ?

II. When we read the Vṛtti we find at the conclusion of the introductions to some Kārikās here and there the word "ucyate" and we feel that if we could know the subject of the passive form we shall have some light thrown on the question of authorship. Abhinava, as if knowing the mind of the future generations, has cleared this point. Commenting on "iyat punarucyate eva" which comes as a sort of introduction to the 28th verse of the Second Chapter of the Dhvani Kārikā, he says "asmābhiriti vākya śeṣaḥ". Does not this mean that Abhinava considered the writer of the introductory words, given above, to be the same as that of the verse that comes after ?

III. There is another statement in the Locana at the beginning of the second chapter wherein also Abhinava similarly states the understood subject of a passive form of verb.

(Vṛtti) "Dhvanir dviprakāraḥ prakāśitaḥ."

(Locana) "Prakāśita iti, mayā vṛttikāreṇa sateti bhāvaḥ." Does not the use of the word "satā" imply that the writer of the Vṛtti is the writer of the Kārikā also ?

IV. At another place he seems to be clearly representing Vṛttikāra as the author of the Kārikā. Commenting upon the word 'tathā ca' Abhinava says :—

"Prakrāntaprakāradvayopasaṁhāraṁ tṛtīyaprakāra sūcanaṁ ca ekenaiva yatnena karomītyāśayena sādhāraṇam avataraṇapadam prakṣipati vṛttikṛt".

Dh. L., 104.

Here the words "ekenaiva yatnena" apparently refer to the following verse. They constitute a part of the sentence the finite verb of which is "karomi". This sentence is attributed to the Vṛttikṛt, He has, therefore, to be naturally supposed to be the subject of "karomi". Does not this show that Abhinava considered the same person to be the author of both the Vṛtti and the Kārikā ? The limited space does not permit us similarly to dwell upon some more instances of this kind. We, therefore, simply give below the numbers of the pages where similar passages are to be found :—

82-83, 85, 105, 223,246.

V. And last of all let us add the evidence of Abhinava's colophon to support our opinion on the identity of the authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti. There can be no difference of opinion in respect of Ānanda Vardhana's authorship of the Dhvanyāloka, because the colophons to different chapters make it clear beyond doubt. Abhinava's professed object in his Locana is to comment upon the Dhvanyāloka. Let us, therefore, try to find out what he means when he uses the above title in the colophon of each chapter of his commentary. Does he thereby refer to the Vṛtti alone or to the Kārikā also ? For, if the case be the latter it would mean that the title "Dhvanyāloka" stands for both. And if so, how can then there arise the question of difference in the authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti ? It is an indisputable fact that Abhinava means the Kārikā and the Vṛtti both when he uses the above title in his colophons, because he comments on both. Take, for instance, the third and the sixth verses of the first chapter. The Locana on them runs as follows :—

"Tatreti dvyaṁśatve satyapītyarthaḥ, prasiddha iti vanitāvadanodyānendūdayādivallaukika evetyarthaḥ,

upamādibhiḥ prakāraiḥ sa vyākṛto bahudheti saṅgatiḥ."
Dh. L., 14.

and

"Sarasvatīti·vāgrūpā bhagavatītyarthaḥ." Dh. L., 29.

Taking, therefore, all the above stated facts into consideration, we feel that the theory of different authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti is untenable.

PRECURSORS OF DHVANI.

From what has been stated before it is clear that there was no book systematically presenting the ideas of either the exponents or the opponents of the theory of Dhvani before Ānanda Vardhana.

(I) UDBHAṬA.

Among those, who included Dhvani in Lakṣaṇā, according to Abhinava's own statement, Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa was the first just indirectly to touch upon Dhvani without even using this word in his exposition of Bhāmaha's verse,

"S'abdaś chandobhidhānārthaḥ."

in his commentary on the latter's Kāvyālaṅkāra. About him we have already spoken before.

(II) VĀMANA.

In connection with Dhvani, Vāmana is placed in the same category as Udbhaṭa. From the manner in which Abhinava refers to him it appears that Vāmana was Udbhaṭa's successor, for he mentions the former after the latter in giving the names of the writers who include Dhvani in Lakṣanā. This alone cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence. We can, therefore, reasonably take him, as Dr. De points out, and as the tradition also says, to be identical with King Jayāpīḍa's minister of the same name (779-813 A. D.)

OTHER VĀMANAS.

It may be pointed out here that Abhinava refers to two other Vāmanas, one is Vāmanagupta and the other is Vāmanadattācārya. In fixing the date of the former there is no difficulty, for Abhinava, in his Abhinava Bhāratī, page 297, where the reference occurs, calls him his own uncle, (asmat pitṛvya). He, therefore, without much fear of contradiction, may be said to belong to the second and the third quarters of the 10th century A. D. There is only one verse attributed to him there. It is, therefore, not clear as to whether he did or did not write any work.

About the other we cannot, at this stage, say anything definitely, excepting that he wrote a philosophical work, the Saṁvit Prakāśa, to which Abhinava refers in the Tantrāloka, Ah. V, S'. 155, as his commentator explains :—

"Gurubhirbhāṣitaṁ tasmād upāyeṣu vicitratā"
T. A., Ah. V, S'. 155.

"Gurubhiḥ" Vāmanadattācār eṇa, "bhāṣitam" iti Saṁvitprakāśe."
T. A., Comm.

This work is quoted by Maheśvarāna da in his commentary, Parimalā, on the Mahārtha Ma ari, PP. 21, 23, 26. From the nature of the quotation found in the Spanda Nirṇaya of Kṣemarāja, p. 48, att ibuted to Bhaṭṭa S'rī Vāmana, it appears that he is the s ne person as Vāmanadattācārya of Abhinava's quotatio because the quotation is about the Saṁvid. He may be lentical with Vāmana, the minister of King Jayāpīḍa of K shmir.

The founder of the Theory of Dhvani.

ĀNANDA VARDHANA.

He was the first person to give a systematic exposition to the theory of Dhvani in his Dhvanyāloka, which is also called Kāvyāloka or Sahṛdayāloka, and finally to

establish it. About his date we have already spoken before. His own contribution as compared to that of his predecessors in connection with Dhvani was that he established it as the principal meaning (aṅgī) in marked contrast with its conception as a subordinate figure or mere ornament (alaṅkāra).

HIS OTHER WORKS.

Like Lollaṭa and other writers in or about his time, he also wrote both on poetics and philosophy.

1. TATTVĀLOKA.

He, the author of the Kāvyāloka or Dhvanyāloka, is spoken of as the writer of another work, called Tattvāloka, by Maheśvarānanda in his commentary, Parimalā, on his own Mahārtha Mañjarī, P. 149.

"yaduktaṁ Tattvālokakṛtā Kāvyāloke.'

From its title it appeai ; to have been a philosophical work.

2. VIVṚTI ON TH.: VINIŚCAYA ṬIKĀ DHARMOTTAMĀ

In this work, as e himself says in his Vṛtti on the Dhvanyāloka Kārıkā, h criticised various Bauddha theories :

"Yattu anirdeśyat aṁ sarvasvalakṣaṇaviṣayaṁ
Bauddhānām pras ldhaṁ tat tanmataparīkṣāyāṁ
granthāntare nirūp yiṣyāmaḥ." Dh. L., 233.

Abhinava, commenting u)n the word "granthāntare", says :—

"Viniścayaṭīkāyām)harmottamāyāṁ yā vivṛti-
ramunā granthakṛtā kṛtā tatraiva tadvyākhyātam."

3. DEVĪ S'ATAKA.

It is a philosophical Stotra in praise of Devī. There is a commentary on it by Kayyaṭa. This Kayyaṭa was a different person from his nai iesake, the author of a commentary on Patañjali's Mahābhā ya and the son of Jayyaṭa. He,

according to his own statement at the conclusion of his commentary, was the son of Candrāditya and finished the work in question in 978 A. D. [1]

4. VIṢAMAVĀṆA LĪLĀ.

From a quotation in the Vṛtti on the Dhvani Kārikā, P. 62, it appears to have been a poetical work of his in Prākṛta.

5. ARJUNA CARITA.

From the nature of the context in which reference to this work occurs in the Dhvanyāloka, p. 176, it appears to have been a drama.

COMMENTATORS ON THE DHVANYĀLOKA BEFORE ABHINAVA.

There was a regular commentary on the Dhvanyāloka written by one of Abhinava's ancestors whose name we have not been able to trace[2]. It was called Candrikā.[3] It was probably written towards the close of the 9th or the beginning of the 10th century A. D., for, the writer does not seem to have been seen by Abhinava, who refers to him as living in the distant past. ("Pūrvavaṁśyaiḥ.")

Abhinava refers to other opinions also on the interpretation of Ānanda Vardhana's text on PP. 22, 36, 44, 50, 123, 131, 206, 208, 213, 215. But it is not clear as to whether thereby he means some regular commentaries or simply the opinions of the traditional oral exponents.

OPPONENT OF DHVANI.

BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA.

We have already spoken about him; but his mention again here is necessary, because he is the chief opponent of

1. D. S., Comm.
2. Dh. L., 185.
3. Dh. L., 233.

Dhvani, whom Abhinava so frequently criticises in his Locana. He wrote

1. Hṛdaya Darpaṇa

with the avowed object of demolishing Ānanda Vardhana's theory of Dhvani.

ABHINAVA'S TEACHER IN DHVANI.

BHAṬṬA INDURĀJA.

Abhinava refers to him as his teacher in the introduction to his Locana. The high opinion, that he had about his teacher's great literary attainments, finds expression in Dh. L., P. 100, wherein he says :—

"Vidvatkavisahṛdayacakravartino Bhaṭṭendurājasya."

Although there are so many quotations attributed to him, yet, unfortunately, they are not coupled with the names of the works wherefrom they were taken. There is, therefore, a difference of opinion among the scholars about his being identical with Srī Indurāja, the commentator of Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṅkāra Sāra Saṅgraha. Taking into consideration the fact that Bhaṭṭa and Śrī are generally found indiscriminately prefixed to the ordinary name and also that the chronological position of the supposed two Indurājas is the same, we are inclined to think them to be identical. The opinion that in the present case Bhaṭṭa or Śrī, as found in different places prefixed to Indurāja's name, is simply an honorific prefix is supported by Abhinava's referring to him without either of these prefixes in his commentary on the Ghaṭakarparakulaka as follows :—

Kavīndorindurājasya te saccittavikāśakāḥ
Bodhāṁśavo vigāhantām bhūrbhuvaḥsvastrayīmapi.
Gh. V. (MS.)

In the concluding line of the aforesaid commentary Srī Indurāja refers to Mukula as his teacher. And Mukula

represents Kallaṭa to be his father in his Abhidhā Vṛtti Mātṛkā. We have already shown above that Somānanda was Kallaṭa's contemporary. There is, therefore, only one generation between Abhinava's teacher in Dhvani, Indurāja, and Kallaṭa on the one hand and his teacher in philosophy, Lakṣmaṇagupta, and Somānanda on the other. Thus the chronological position of Srī Indurāja coupled with the fact that we do not know of any other person of so great literary attainments belonging to that period and that Abhinava was not a person either not to have approached such a person for education in that particular branch of learning or to have extolled an insignificant person in the manner in which he has praised Indurāja, very strongly support the supposition that Abhinava's teacher was the same as the commentator on the Kāvyālaṅkāra Sāra Saṅgraha.

Bhūti Rāja Tanaya.

Abhinava refers to Bhaṭṭendurāja in the Tantrāloka, Ah. 37, S. 60, as Bhūti Rāja Tanaya :

"Srī Bhūtirājatanayaḥ svapitṛprasādaḥ."

And Helārāja also in the colophon of his commentary on the Vākyapadīya represents himself as the son of Bhūti Rāja. The two have, therefore, to be distinguished from each other. We cannot say if they were brothers. The genealogy of Indurāja is given in the concluding lines of Abhinava's commentary on the Bhagavadgītā as follows[1] :—

1. Kātyāyana (distant ancestor ?)
2. Sauśuka.
3. Bhūti Rāja.
4. Bhaṭṭendu Rāja.

1. Bh. G. S.

CHAPTER IV.

HIS IMPORTANCE AND INFLUENCE.

In the preceding chapter we have tried to trace the historical background of Abhinava's tantric, poetic and philosophic thoughts to give a clear idea of the material on which he worked and of the advance that his thoughts present on those of his predecessors. In this chapter we propose to deal with some of the important writers, who succeeded him, to show his importance in the eyes of the later generations and to indicate how far he influenced the ideas of the future writers and how his work was carried on by his immediate successors. We, therefore, for the sake of convenience, divide the writers on whom we have to speak here into two classes:—

1. His commentators.
2. Other writers who were directly influenced by him.

(I) Kṣemarāja.

Among his commentators first of all comes Kṣemarāja in the chronological order, which, as before, we propose to follow in this chapter also. In the colophons of all his works he represents himself to be a pupil of Abhinavaguptapādācārya. There is, therefore, no difficulty in fixing his time. Abhinava's last available dated work was completed in 1014-15 A. D. We can, therefore, easily assign Kṣemarāja's literary activities to the close of the first and practically the whole of the second quarter of the eleventh century A. D. We have not so far been able to find any passage in Kṣemarāja's works which could give us an idea of his parentage. But Abhinava in the 37th chapter of his Tantrāloka, includes "kṣema" in the list of the names of

his pupils. In another list, which gives the names of his cousins, this very name is mentioned as that of the first of them. They also were his pupils[1]. The indications of a very close contact of himself with Abhinava that Kṣemarāja gives by using some such expression as "Pādapadmopajīvin" in every work of his, and the important place that he occupies among Abhinava's pupil-writers seem to support the probability that Kṣema of the Tantrāloka stands for Kṣemarāja, the author of the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya and other philosophical works. In fact, in the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya he refers to himself as Kṣema :

"Kṣemeṇoddhriyate sāraḥ saṁsāra viṣa śāntaye."

P. H., 1.

If this probability be accepted we would suggest the name of Kṣemarāja's father also. In the last chapter we have spoken about one Vāmanagupta, whom Abhinava represents as his uncle.[2] As he is the only uncle of Abhinava, of whom we know, will it be wrong to say that he was Kṣemarāja's father ?

HIS WORKS.

Kṣemarāja also, like his great teacher, Abhinavagupta, has written on all the three subjects i. e. Tantra, poetics and Śaiva philosophy. His work on poetics, viz. the commentary, called Udyota, on Abhinava's Locana has not so far been accessible to us. It is, therefore, not possible at this stage to assign any chronological position to it. However, on the strength of what we have read we can say that he also worked on the lines of his great teacher. He also, like Abhinava, first of all, used the power of his pen in commenting upon the monistic Saiva Tantras, then perhaps upon his teacher's work on poetics, the Locana,

1. T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)
2. A. Bh., 297.

and last of all on the philosophical works, like the Spanda Kārikā. Thus he carried on the work of his teacher. The students of the Trika philosophy owe a special debt of gratitude to Kṣemarāja for a systematic presentation of the views of Abhinava on the Spanda branch, on which the latter,[1] not liking to be classed with the common herd of commentators, did not write.

1. SVACCHANDODYOTA.

It is his commentary on the Svacchanda Tantra. This seems to be the first in the chronology of his available works. It is referred to in his commentaries on Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa's Stava Cintāmaṇi, P. 226, on the Śiva Sūtra, P. 12, and on the Netra Tantra, P. 226.

2. NETRODYOTA.

Netrodyota is a commentary on the Netra Tantra.

3. VIJÑĀNA BHAIRAVODYOTA.

4. DHVANYĀLOKA LOCANODYOTA.

5. SPANDA SANDOHA.

Spanda Sandoha is, as has already been pointed out, Kṣemarāja's commentary on the first verse of the Spanda Kārikā in which he deals with practically the whole of the Spanda system. In the chronological order of his works this comes before his Spanda Nirṇaya[2] in which he refers to it at more than one place.[3]

6. SPANDA NIRṆAYA.

It is a commentary on the whole of the Spanda Kārikā. It may be pointed out here that Dr. Bühler in his Kashmir Catalogue has thrown some doubt on the point of the authorship of the last two works by showing them as the works of Kṣemendra (consult P. XXXIII, MSS. 511 and 517) though he says on page 79 :—

1. S. N., 77. 2. S. N., 1. 3. S. N., 7.

"Kṣemendra, the author of Spanda Nirṇaya, No. 511, and of Spanda Sandoha 517 appears to be identical with Kṣemarāja, the pupil of Abhinava".

We do not know the learned Doctor's reasons for assigning these works to Kṣemendra, perhaps he found this name in the colophons of the works in question. But our careful study shows that they are the works of Kṣemarāja and that if in the colophons of some MSS. the name of Kṣemendra is found, it must have been simply due to the mistake of the scribes. In the Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya and in the S'iva Sūtra Vimarśinī, which are accepted by all to be of Kṣemarāja's authorship, these two works are referred to by him as his own, as the following quotations therefrom show :—

"Tathā mayā vitatya Spanda Sandohe nirṇītam." P.H.,P.24.
"Yathā caitat tathā asmadīyāt Spanda Nirṇayād avaboddhavyam." S. S. Vi., P. 14.

"Etat Spanda Nirṇaye nirākāṅkṣam mayaiva nirṇītam."
S. S. Vi., P. 129.

7. PRATYABHIJÑĀ HṚDAYA.
8. COMMENTARY ON THE ABOVE.
9. S'IVA SŪTRA VIMARŚINI.
10. VIVṚTI ON THE STAVA CINTĀMAṆI.
11. UTPALA STOTRĀVALI ṬIKĀ.
12. PARĀ PRAVEŚIKĀ.
13. ṬIKĀ ON SĀMBA PAÑCĀŚIKĀ
14. A COMMENTARY ON THE KRAMA SŪTRA.

Of this we know only from the following reference in Maheśvarānanda's commentary on his own Mahārtha Mañjarī, P. 166 :—

"Yaduktaṁ S'rī Kramasūtreṣu..................
Yathā ca vyākhyātaṁ S'rīmat Kṣemarājena."

15. A STOTRA.

This is known only from the following reference in his own commentary on the Stava Cintāmaṇi, P. 64 :—

"Taduktam mayāpi svastotre."

16. BHAIRAVĀNUKARAṆA STOTRA.

It is mentioned as one of his works in the introduction to the Sāmba Pañcāśikā Ṭīkā.

17. PARAMĀRTHA SAṄGRAHA VIVṚTI.

It is noticed in Dr. Bühler's Kashmir Catalogue (MS. No. 459.) The text is attributed to Abhinavagupta.

18. VṚTTI ON PARAMEŚA STOTRĀVALI OF UTPALA.

(Bühler's Kashmir Catalogue MS. 458.)

(II.) YOGARĀJA.

The commentator who came next after Kṣemarāja was Yogarāja. According to his own statement in the concluding lines of his commentary, Vivṛti, on the Paramārtha Sāra of Abhinavagupta, he was a pupil of Kṣemarāja[1] who was in possession of the tradition. We shall, therefore, not be wrong if we say that he belonged to the second half of the eleventh century A. D. At the time when he wrote the said commentary he had already renounced the world and was living as an ascetic at Vitastāpurī in Kashmir. This commentary, according to its author, is from the point of view of pure monism.

(III.) SUBHAṬA DATTA.

He is the first known commentator of Abhinava's Tantrāloka. The only source of information about him is Jayaratha's Viveka[2]. According to this, he was the preceptor of Rājarāja, whom we cannot definitely identify with

1. P. S., Comm., 199.
2. T. A., Comm., Ah. 37 (MS.)

any King of Kashmir. There is, however, no difficulty in approximately fixing his time. Jayaratha says that his initiation (into S'aivaism ?) was performed by Subhaṭa. The former's time of literary activity, as we shall just show, was the close of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century A. D. We can, therefore, safely say that Subhaṭa lived in the later half of the 12th century. His father's name was Tribhuvana[1] Datta and that of his grand-father, Viśvadatta. It is probably to this commentary that Jayaratha refers in his commentary on the Tantrāloka, Ah. I, PP. 15-16, where he says that he refrains from criticising different interpretations put upon the first verse by others, because his object is only to take out whatever substance is to be found in their writings and not to criticise them[2]. This commentary was called

VIVṚTI.

No trace of it has so far been found.

(IV.) JAYARATHA.

He was the author of the Viveka, the famous commentary on the Tantrāloka. He was a younger contemporary of a certain Kashmirian King, Rājarāja, who was probably the same as Jaya Siṁha (Circa 1200 A. D.) It was because of the encouragement received from this King that he studied the Tantrāloka.[3] His initiation was performed, as stated above, by Subhaṭa Datta.[4] His teacher in Śaivaism was Kalyāṇa[5] and so was Śaṅkhadhara in other branches of learning.[6] He had a younger brother named Jayadratha.[7] Śṛṅgāraratha was the name of his father who was a minister to King Rājarāja.[8]

1. T. A., Comm., Ah. 37 (MS.)
2. T. A., Comm., Ah. I, 15-16.
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. T. A., Comm., Ah. 37 (MS.)

HIS DATE.

He has given the genealogy of his family since the time of Pūrṇamanoratha who was a minister to King Yaśaskara[1] of Kashmir (930 A. D.) Eight generations are shown to intervene between the first ancestor of this list, Pūrṇamanoratha, and our commentator, Jayaratha. Of these the fifth ancestor also, viz. Utpalaratha,[2] who was a minister to King Ananta of Kashmir (1028-1063 A. D.), is of known date. Thus if we allow, according to the ordinary practice of scholars, about a quarter of a century for each generation Jayaratha's time comes to be about the close of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century A. D. The names of his direct ancestors are given below in the order of their succession :—

1. Pūrṇamanoratha (930 A. D.)
2. Utpalaratha I.
3. Prakāśaratha.
4. Sūryaratha.
5. Utpalaratha II. (circa 1028-63)
6. Samaratha.
7. Guṇaratha.
8. Guṅgaratha.
9. Śṛṅgāraratha.
10. Jayaratha.

Like Abhinavagupta and others, he also wrote both on Śaivaism and poetics. At present we know of only the following three works of his :—

1. TANTRĀLOKA VIVEKA.
2. ALAṄKĀRA VIMARŚINI.

It is a commentary on Ruyyaka's Alaṅkāra Sarvasva.

3. ALAṄKĀRODĀHARAṆA

1, 2. T. A., Comm., Ah. 37 (MS.)

(V.) ŚOBHĀKARAGUPTA.

He commented upon Abhinava's famous Bhairava Stotra, giving it a Vaiṣṇavaite interpretation. The manner in which he splits the words and the uncommon meaning that he attributes to them make it clear that the interpretation is forced and was not intended by the writer of the original. A copy of the MS. of this commentary is in the possession of the present writer. The commentator interprets the last verse in such a way as to make it indicate the date of his commentary. According to this interpretation, it was written on the day of Sivarātri i. e. the 13th day of the brighter half of the lunar month of Phālguna, in the fifty-third year of Kali[1]. He has not stated the century: it is, therefore, not possible to fix his time. He does not appear to be a very old writer.

(VI.) BHĀSKARA KAṆṬHA.

He is the little known writer of the only available commentary on Abhinava's Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, called Bhāskarī. It is a very learned commentary and gives the traditional interpretation of Abhinava's text. Although it presupposes sufficient previous study of the Śaiva literature of Kashmir on the part of the reader in order that he may be able to understand it and needs elaboration, yet, in view of the fact that the tradition about the pratyabhijñā literature is well-nigh dead, a proper understanding of Abhinava's Vimarśinī is extremely difficult without its help. This difficulty the writer of these pages himself felt for a very long time when he had to struggle with the text before the discovery of the commentary. Many points would have remained doubtful and many more would have been misunderstood but for the help that could

1. Bh. S., Comm., (MS.)

be got from this at the last stage. A copy of it is in the possession of the present writer. It has been edited and will soon be published along with translation, in English, of Abhinava's Vimarśinī, which is practically ready. The author of the Bhāskarī tried, in his own way, to make it as simple as possible so much so that he felt the necessity of explaining the particular method of exposition that he had adopted, by stating in his introduction "Svasutādi-bodhanārtham."

He was of the Dhaumyāyana Gotra.[1] The names of his grand-father and father were Vaiḍūrya Kaṇṭha and Avatāra Kaṇṭha respectively. He married and had a son, Jagannātha Kaṇṭha. His teacher's name was Kaula[2] Narottama.

HIS DATE.

He does not say anything about the time of his life or that of the composition of his works. On enquiry, however, from his living descendants, it has been found that he was six generations removed from the present. We can, therefore, safely say that he belonged to the later half of the 18th century A. D.

HIS WORKS.

Besides his commentary on the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī which he called "Bhāskarī" after his own name, he wrote the following works :—

1. Sanskrit Translation of LALLĀ VĀK.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the Lallā Vāk was a Saivaite work in the old Kashmiri written by a woman in about the 14th century A. D.

1., 2., Bh. (MS.)

2. Commentary on YOGA VĀŚIṢṬHA.

It consisted of one lac and ten thousand verses, according to his own statement in his introduction to the Bhāskarī. But only a few fragments of it are now left with his present descendants. This presents a Saivaite interpretation of the text.

3. HARṢEŚVARA STAVA.

It was written by him, as the tradition says, on the occasion of his visit to the temple of Harṣeśvara in Kashmir.

The names of his successors are given below in the order of their succession :—

1. (Bhāskara Kaṇṭha).
2. Jagannātha.
3. Maṇi Kaṇṭha.
4. Somānanda.
5. Gaṇa Kaṇṭha.
6. Mahānanda.
7. Viśveśvara.

The writers directly influenced by Abhinava.

(I.) KṢEMENDRA.

Is he identical with Kṣemarāja ? The only reason for identifying the one with the other is probably a scribal mistake which gives the name of Kṣemendra instead of that of Kṣemarāja in the colophons of the Spanda Sandoha and the Spanda Nirṇaya. These works have now been published and their colophons have the name of the latter (Kṣemarāja) and not that of the former. The colophon of the Spanda Nirṇaya, for instance, reads as follows :—

"Kṛtiḥ Śrī Pratyabhijñākāra praśiṣya Mahāmaheśvarācārya Śrīmad Abhinavaguptanāthadattopadeśasya Śrī Kṣemarājasyeti śivam."

A careful study of the works of Abhinava and those of Kṣemarāja gives a sufficiently clear idea of the personality of Kṣemarāja as separate from that of his younger contemporary Kṣemendra. We have represented the Tantrāloka to be a production of the first period of Abhinava's literary activity to which the Krama Stotra belongs. It must have, therefore, been written in about 990 A. D. At that time Kṣemarāja, the first-mentioned cousin of Abhinava, was sufficiently educated to understand the intricacies of the monistic Tantras so as to be prompted to join others in requesting Abhinava to write the Tantrāloka :—

"Anye pitṛvyatanayāḥ śivaśaktiśubhrāḥ
Kṣemotpalābhinava-Cakraka-Padmaguptāḥ.

... ...

Anyopi kaścana janaḥ śivaśaktipāta-
Sampreraṇāparavaśaḥ svakaśaktisārthaḥ
Abhyarthanāvimukhabhāvamaśikṣitena
Tenāpyanugrahapadaṁ kṛta eṣa vargaḥ

... ...

Ācāryam abhyarthayate sma gāḍham
Sampūrṇa tantrādhigamāya samyak

T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

And the circumstantial evidence is clear enough to show that he began his literary activity either during the last years of his teacher's social life or immediately after the latter's entering into the cave sometime after the year 1015. The period of his literary activity, therefore, falls between 1015 and 1040. But if we identify the two we shall have to allow a period of half a century for the literary activity of one person, because the last dated work of Kṣemendra, Daśāvatāra Carita, was finished, as he states,[1] in 1066 A. D.

[1] D. C., Conclusion.

Kṣemendra, not only bears a different name but has another name also "Vyāsadāsa" which he almost invariably gives along with the former, but which is never to be found coupled with Kṣemarāja's name. His connection also with Abhinava cannot at all be said to have been so close as that of Kṣemarāja, for, he refers to Abhinava, so far as we know, only once i. e. in the Mahābhārata Mañjarī, wherein he speaks of having heard Abhinava's lectures on poetics :—

"Ācāryaśekharamaṇer vidyāvivṛtikāriṇaḥ
Śrutvābhinavaguptākhyāt sāhityam bodhavāridheḥ."

We know that even today there is a marked difference between Śiṣya and Śrotā. The difference may be said to be similar to that which exists in the present-day colleges between a registered and a casual student. Further, Kṣemarāja probably used to live in Bijbihāra (Vijayeśvara) which he mentions as the place of composition of his commentary on the Stava Cintāmaṇi :—

"Tenārthipraṇayād dinaistricaturair yāṁ Kṣemarājo vyadhāt
Kṣetre Śrī Vijayeśvarasya vimale saiṣā śivārādhanī."

But Kṣemendra states Tripureśaśaila as his place of residence in one of the concluding lines in his Mahābhārata Mañjarī :—

"Prakhyātātiśayasya tasya tanayaḥ Kṣemendra-nāmā-bhavat
Tena Śrī Tripureśa-śailaśikhare viśrāntisantoṣiṇā."

In the opinion of Dr. Bühler, referred to by Dr. De in H. S. P., P. 141, the only thing that can finally settle the question, under discussion, is the discovery of the name of Kṣemarāja's father. We may, therefore, add here what little information we have been able to collect on this point. We have already shown how Kṣemarāja is identical with

Kṣema, mentioned in the Tantrāloka, as one of the cousins (pitṛvyatanaya) of Abhinava, for, he refers to himself by the abbreviated form, found in the Tantrāloka, in his own Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya. We know the name of one uncle (pitṛvya) of Abhinava referred to in A. Bh., P. 297. We cannot, however, definitely say that he was the father of Kṣemarāja. For, there can be pointed out a possibility of Abhinava's having had more than one uncle, and therefore, of the name of Kṣemarāja's father having been different from that of Abhinava's uncle who is referred to in A. Bh. But there cannot be any such possibility about Kṣemaraja's grand-father, who also had a different name from that of Kṣemendra's grand-father. We have stated in the 1st chapter that the name of Abhinava's grand-father was Varāhagupta. Therefore, if Kṣemarāja was Abhinava's cousin, as we have shown before that he was, it naturally follows that Vārahagupta was the grand-father of Kṣemarāja also. But Kṣemendra's grand-father, according to the Mahābhārata Mañjarī, was Nimnāśaya :—

"Kaśmīreṣu babhūva sindhuradhikaḥ sindhośca nimnāśayaḥ
Prāptastasya guṇaprakarṣayaśasaḥ putraḥ Prakāśendratām
....
Prakhyātātiśayasya tasya tanayaḥ Kṣemendra-nāmābhavat."

M. B. M.

After stating the above arguments we leave it now to the reader to pronounce the final verdict.

HIS DATE.

There cannot be two opinions about the time of his literary activity, because two of his works are dated. The year of completion of Samaya Mātṛkā is stated to be 1050 A. D. in the reign of King Ananta of Kashmir and that of the Daśāvatāra Carita 1066 A. D. when King Kalaśa was occupying the throne of Kashmir.

HIS WORKS.

1. NṚPĀVALĪ. (R. T., I, 13)
2. MAHĀBHĀRATA MAÑJARĪ.
3. RĀMĀYAṆA KATHĀ SĀRA.
4. CĀRUCARYĀ. (Kashmir Cat. MS. No. 347)
5. NĪTI KALPA TARU. Do. 351.
6. DAŚĀVATĀRA CARITA.
7. SAMAYA MĀTṚKĀ.
8. SUVṚTTA TILAKA.
9. BṚHATKATHĀ MAÑJARĪ (J. Cat. MS. No. 81)
10. AUCITYA VICĀRA CARCĀ.

(For complete list consult H. S. P., P. 142).

ABHINAVA'S INFLUENCE IN POETICS.

We are not writing a history of Sanskrit poetics. Our object is only to explain the importance of the author who is studied in these pages. It is, therefore, unnecessary to deal with the later writers on poetics separately. Suffice it to say that with perhaps the only exception of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who was probably Abhinava's younger contemporary and who, in his Vyakti Viveka, has tried to explode the theory of Dhvani, all the writers on poetics, who came after Abhinava, for instance, Mammaṭa in his Kāvyaprakāśa, Hema Chandra in his Kāvyānuśāsana, Viśvanātha in his Sāhitya Darpaṇa, Śāradā Tanaya in his Bhāva Prakāśa, Appayya Dīkṣita in his Kuvalayānanda etc., Pandit Jagannātha in his Rasagaṅgādhara, and Mahāmahopādhyāya Govinda in his Kāvya Pradīpa, follow Abhinava's theory of Rasa and Dhvani and most of them extensively quote him, and that the Saṅgīta Ratnākara and the Śṛṅgāra Ratnākara are more or less simply versifications of parts of Abhinava's commentary on Bharata's Nāṭya S āstra.

His influence in Pratyabhijñā Philosophy and Tantric Ritualism.

Pratyabhijña philosophy may be said to be practically dead, for, even in Kashmir there are to be found only three or four Pandits who, to some extent, are still in possession of the old tradition; but they too, for want of both, encouragement and enthusiastic and hard-working students, can, with difficulty, remember what was handed down to them. When the writer of these pages approached them for information on some of Abhinava's texts, one of them very frankly said that he was approached for the first time in his life for such information. The case with Śaiva rituals, however, is different. Such of them as are connected with the householder's life are still performed in many Brāhmaṇa families: and in regard to them Abhinava's Tantrāloka is supposed to be (shall we say ?) the final court of appeal. In earlier times, however, Pratyabhijñā philosophy had its powerful exponents and staunch followers not only in Kashmir but also in as far distant places as Cola country; and all of them acknowledged Abhinavagupta to be the chief authority on it. Mādhava, for instance, who was so closely connected with his contemporary King of Vijayanagar, in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, acknowledges Abhinava to be the chief exponent of and authority on the Pratyabhijñā.

We cannot close the chapter without substantiating our statement in the preceding paragraph, by speaking a little on two writers on the Trika philosophy to show Abhinava's influence in places far distant from Kashmir and on the continuity of the literary productions on his lines for several centuries.

(I) Maheśvarānanda.

Maheśvarānanda, son of Mādhava, belonged to Cola.[1]

(1) M. M., 202.

He was a pupil of Mahāprakāśa[1] and was an avowed follower of Abhinava, whom he so frequently quotes, and whose method of writing he follows.[2] He attributes his proficiency in poetics to his careful study of the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana and his knowledge of the Self to his following the path of Pratyabhijñā.[3] His teacher and grand teacher also belonged to the same country and wrote on philosophical subjects on which Abhinava himself had written. Abhinava was interested in and made important contributions to the Krama system, such as the Kramakeli, as we pointed out in the second chapter. Maheśvarānanda's Parama Guru was also similarly interested in and contributed to the aforesaid system at least two known works, the Krama Vāsanā and the Ṛjuvimarśinī, of which we know from references to them in the Mahārtha Mañjarī, pages 115 and 178 respectively. His teacher also, like Abhinava, was interested in the Pratyabhijñā and wrote the Ānanda Tāṇḍava Vilāsa Stotra in which the Pratyabhjñā conception of the universe is embodied, as is clear both from the quotation and the context :—

"Yadabhipretya Srī Pratyabhijñāyām uktam :—
Viśvarūpoham idam ityakhaṇḍānanda bṛṁhitaḥ' iti'.

"Yaccoktam asmadgurubhiḥ Ānanda Tāṇḍava Vilāsa Stotre :—

Vayaṁ tvimām viśvatayāvabhānam
Bahirmukhasyāsya tavonmukhasya
Svasaṁhitaṁ viśvavilāpanodyat
Svatantratānandamayīm manāmaḥ."

M. M., 166.

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(1) M. M., 1.
(2) M. M., 202.
(3) M. M., 202.

According to him, Mahārtha, Mahānaya or Krama Darśana is not very much different from the Trika Darśana:

"Anena Srī Mahārtha Trika-darśanayoḥ anyonyaṁ nātyantam bhedapratheti vyākhyātam."

M.M., 96.

Mahārtha Mañjarī with his own commentary, Parimalā, is the only work of his that is available so far. About other works, we know only from references in the above-mentioned commentary. The following is the list of his known works:—

1.	MAHĀRTHA MAÑJARĪ.		
2.	PARIMALĀ.		
3.	SAṀVIDULLĀSA (Referred to in M. M., P. 78).		
4.	PĀDUKODAYA.	Do.	118.
5.	MAHĀRTHODAYA.	Do.	132.
6.	SŪKTA.	Do.	59.
7.	PARĀ STOTRA.	Do.	77.
8.	KUṆḌALĀBHARAṆA.	Do.	73.
9.	MUKUNDA KELI.		
10.	KOMALA VALLĪ.		
11.	NAKHA PRATĀPA.		

It may be pointed out here that like Abhinava he also gives the gist of the subject-matter in the introduction to his available commentary.

(II) VARADA RĀJA *alias* KṚṢṆADĀSA.

He is perhaps the latest known writer on the Kashmir Saiva philosophy. We have not so far been able to find any internal or external evidence to fix his date and place. But from his style and method of treatment of the subject he does not appear to have come very soon after the eminent Saiva writers, of whom we have given an account in the

preceding pages. The only work of this writer that we have known is

Siva Sūtra Vārtika.

It is a Vārtika on the famous Siva Sūtra of Vasugupta. There is nothing original in it. It is a mere versification of Kṣemarāja's commentary, the Vimarśinī. The author also very frankly says that he follows Kṣemarāja's commentary on the Siva Sūtra[1] and incorporates much of what was found in an earlier Vārtika. The little, that he says about himself, is that he was the youngest son of Madhurāja and that his family followed Śaivaism[2].

1. S. S. V., 1-2. 2. S. S. V., 48.

PART II.

PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.

Abhinava wrote on a number of subjects and was recognized to be a reliable authority on each one of them. He worked on poetics, only during the short period of transition from the Tāntrika to the Philosophical period. The number of his works on poetics is, therefore, much smaller than that of his philosophical treatises. The value, however, attributed to the former, has overweighed that which scholars in general have attached to the latter. Hence he is better known as an able exponent of the theories of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* than as the greatest authority on the "Realistic Idealism" or "*Trika*" as the system is technically called.

The reason is not far to seek. The system of philosophy, he has attempted to formulate and to elaborate, is non-vedic; not because its doctrines are fundamentally opposed to those of the vedic systems, but because it does not recognize the *Veda* as the final authority. It was, therefore, ignored by the Brāhmaṇa community, which alone has kept alive the literary traditions connected with various schools of Indian thought as a matter of religious duty.

This non-vedic trend of thought, however, was very popular among the Brāhmaṇas of Kashmir who had the opportunity of knowing it better than those elsewhere. It had a succession of learned writers about whom we have already given the necessary information in the first part. But, for more than a century, it has been neglected even in the land of its birth. Its literary tradition is, therefore, practically dead in Kashmir too, where it primarily existed.

The local Sanskrit scholars, however, even to-day, hold a very high opinion of it. In fact they, without knowing why, declare it to be the best of all systems of Indian Philosophy.

Our attempt, therefore, in the following pages is to present this system of *Śaiva* philosophy as clearly as it is possible with the help of the material available at present. Fidelity to the original text is our guiding principle. Our attempt is not to present the system in terms of modern philosophy, but simply to give an exposition to Abhinava's ideas about some of the persistent philosophical problems, and to explain, so far as possible, how he came to form them. Let us, therefore, not be misunderstood if some of the arguments, stated in these pages, do not appeal to the modern minds and some of the views, set forth here, are not in consonance with the doctrines of modern science.

ABHINAVA'S CONTRIBUTION.

Indian philosophers, however original their works, have never claimed originality for themselves; their attempt has always been to show that whatever they say is based upon an ancient authority. This holds good in the case of both the Vedic and the non-vedic systems. Saṅkara declares in unmistakable terms that the only test of correctness of a view is its harmony with the teachings of the Veda and that the argument has value and is to be relied upon only in so far as it supports the principles laid down in the Veda.[1] Similarly, Somānanda, the author of the Śivadṛṣṭi and so the real founder of the Pratyabhijñā School, emphatically states that his Śivadṛṣṭi is not a pure creation of his mind but is based upon Śāstra, though his pupil, Utpalācārya, holds that it shows a new path to final emancipation.[2] A

1. S. Bh., 8. 2. I. P. V., II, 271.

1. Pragmatic ~~Realism~~ Idealism would be better acc. Prof. Pandit's view.
2. तुरीय should be 'pure' and 'transcendental' should rather be तुरीयातीत. तुरीय should better be called 'intuitive' i.e. "state of realisation". Prof. Pandit.

study of Abhinava's works shows that he also, in this respect, followed the tradition of his learned predecessors.

If we take into consideration, for instance, three of his most important works, on which his reputation chiefly rests, we find that two of them, the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī, are simply commentaries on Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā[1] and Ṭīkā respectively[2], and the third, the Tantrāloka, professedly follows the authority of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra[3]. It is, therefore, not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel. This, however, does not mean that he did not contribute anything to the "Realistic Idealism" of Kashmir. The fact, on the contrary, is that the philosophical system of Kashmir, with Abhinava's contribution to it, left out of consideration, loses most of its importance. His contribution to the "Realistic Idealism" is of the same nature as that of the great Saṅkara to the monistic Idealism of the Vedānta.

The aim of philosophy all over the world at all times has been to explain the what, the why and the wherefrom of the phenomena of knowledge. The chief distinctive feature of Indian philosophy in general and of this system in particular is that it deals not only with the experiences of wakeful, dream and deep sleep states but also with those of the transcendental (Turīya) and the pure (Turīyātīta) states: i. e. it tries to explain not only those experiences which are due to the working of the mind, the intellect and the sense-organs collectively or severally, but also those in which they are perfectly at rest and in which, therefore, consciousness is free from all kinds of affections.

1. I. P. V., I. 3.
2. I. P. V. V., (MS.)
3. T. A., I, 35.

1. This is not perhaps the correct interpretation of the verse referred to.

To Indian philosophers the two states, the transcendental and the pure, are not mere myths. They are realisable truths. In fact, the aim of the higher systems of Indian philosophy is to point out an easy way to the realisation of these states. The importance of a philosophical work to the Indian mind, therefore, is commensurate with the degree to which the author is believed to have personally realised them through spiritual experiments. For, he alone can be a sure guide, who is familiar with the path. Abhinava's philosophical works are considered to be very important, because people have reason to believe that the statements on supersensuous matters, contained therein, are based upon the author's personal experience, gained through spiritual experiments, which he carried on for years, as we have attempted to show in his biography. To personal experience he gives the first, to reason the second and to ancient authority only the third place as the basis of his views on supersensuous matters[1], the revelations of the Turīya and the Turīyātīta states. In fact the charm that this system had for his contemporaries and successors, the popularity that it enjoyed and the high esteem in which it is held even now by the Kashmir Pandits was and is due mostly to the labours of Abhinava both as a scholar and as a spiritualist (yogin).

The writers of this system, who flourished before Abhinava, wrote only minor treatises, dealing with certain aspects or branches of the system. The books, for instance, which include the word "Spanda" in their titles, deal with what is referred to as "Caitanya" or "Vimarśa" (consciousness) in the Siva[2] Sūtra and the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā respectively[3], and point out three ways to the realisation of the ultimate reality, the Sāmbhava, the Sākta

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1. T. A., 149. 2. I. P. V., I, 200. 3. I. P. V., I, 208-9.

and the Āṇava. They are mere dogmatic statements of the fundamental principles of the Spanda branch of the Trika. They do not enter into an exposition of the reasonings which can be adduced in their support; nor do they cite any accepted scriptural authority on which they are based. They are, therefore, so brief that all of them taken together would cover hardly more than fifty pages of a printed book. Similarly, those books, which are named after Pratyabhijñā, attempt to establish the existence of an all-including universal Self and point out a fourth way to freedom from worldly troubles, through Pratyabhijñā or recognition. Although they are argumentative and expository and consequently twenty times more voluminous than the former, yet, being concerned with only a branch, they could not bring out the full importance of the Trika system as a whole. Moreover, the literature on both the branches, referred to above, is equally silent on the rituals of the system. It was Abhinava, who, for the first time, took up the system as a whole[1] for a rational and exhaustive treatment in his great work, the Tantrāloka; gave the philosophical conceptions of the different branches a proper place in the whole; showed the comparative merit of all the four means of Mokṣa, Anupāya, Sāmbhava, Sākta and Āṇava; exhaustively dealt with the monistic Śaiva rituals; supported the philosophical and the psychological theories of the system with strong and convincing arguments as well as with extensive quotations from the āgamas of accepted authority and elucidated the existing texts with learned commentaries, like the Śivadṛṣṭyālocana and the two Vimarśinīs.

EXPLANATIONS OF THE NAMES OF THE SYSTEM.

It is a misnomer to call this system of philosophy "Pratyabhijñā" or "Spanda" as much as it would be to call

1. T. A., I, 50.

India "Calcutta" or "Bombay". They are parts and very important parts, but severally they do not present the whole. The word Trika refers both to the authority on which the system is based and to the subject-matter which forms the distinctive feature of this system. It is called Trika for the following reasons :—

(I) In all, there are ninety-two Āgamas recognised by this system. Of these the triad, (Trika) consisting of the Siddhā, the Nāmaka and the Mālinī, is the most important. The system is called Trika because its chief authority is this triad (Trika).[1]

(II) According to this system, there are three triads, the higher, the lower and the combined (Para, Apara and Parāpara). The first consists of S'iva, S'akti and their union ; the second of S'iva, S'akti and Nara ; and the third of three godesses Parā, Aparā and Parāparā. It is called Trika because it deals with all the three triads.[2]

(III) It is called so for another reason also, namely, that it explains all the three aspects of knowledge, viz. absolute oneness (abheda), predominent oneness (bhedābheda), and duality (bheda) in the light of its monistic theory (abhedavāda).

It is also called Ṣaḍardha S'āstra,[3] (literally, the school of half of the six) for the following reason :—

This system holds that the Devanāgarī or the Sāradā alphabet represents the process of manifestation of ideas (Parāmarśodayakrama). The first six vowels, a ā i ī u ū, for instance, represent the order of succession in which the powers of Anuttara, Ānanda, Icchā, Īśana, Unmeṣa and

1. T. A., I, 35.
2. T. A., I, 7-21.
3. T. A., I, 3.

Ūrmi arose from the Highest Reality. Of the above, those, represented by long vowels, are due either to the association of those, represented by short ones, with their respective objects, as in the cases of Īśana and Ūrmi, or to the union of two, as in that of Ānanda[1]. The former, therefore, are dependent upon the latter and hence are not considered to be of equal importance with them[2]. Thus it is called Ṣaḍardha Sāstra, because it counts as 'principal' only three of the six powers shown above, namely, Anuttara, Icchā, and Unmeṣa, which are also referred to as Cit, Icchā and Jñāna[3].

It has been given the name of Kashmir Śaivaism, because almost all the writers of the available literature on this monistic school of S'aivaism belonged to Kashmir.

FOR WHOM IS THE SYSTEM MEANT ?

Unlike the Vedic systems, this school of thought knows no caste restriction.[4] It is meant for all in whom desire for knowledge and liberation has arisen. A distinction, however, is drawn between following the teachings of the system in life and getting its fruit on the one hand and studying the system and understanding its philosophical intricacies on the other. Any one with a firm determination can follow the teachings : no literary qualification of any kind was, therefore, considered necessary for following it by its early authorities. The case with study, however, is different. It requires a trained and well-informed mind. This system criticises almost all the important schools of thought which came before it. Its proper understanding, therefore, presupposes, according to the learned tradition, contained in the

1. T. A., II, 81-6.
2. T. A., II, 186.
3. T. A., II, 233.
4. I. P. V., II, 276.

following verse, the knowledge of the six vedic systems of philosophy and of the Veda with its six branches of learning as an antecedent condition :—

"Ṣaṭśāstravid yo vedasya ṣaḍaṅgajñaśca vedavit
sa eva śrīpratyabhijñādhyayanedhikṛto bhavet."

It requires also a previous study of all the Āgamas, a knowledge of the arguments of other dualistic and monistic systems and a command over grammar :—

"Yodhītī nikhilāgameṣu padavid yo yogaśāstraśramī
Yo vākyārthasamanvaye kṛtaratiḥ śrīpratyabhijñāmṛte
Yastarkāntaraviśrutaśrutatayā dvaitādvayajñānavit
Sosmin syādadhikāravān kalakalaprāyaḥ pareṣāṁ ravaḥ."

THE AIM.

The aim of this system, like that of the Vedānta, is to help the individual in self-realisation: and the means also, by which this end is to be achieved, is the same as that of the Vedānta, viz., removing the veil of ignorance[1]. But they differ in their conception of self-realisation, because their ideas of the apparent, (ābhāsa) the universe, are different. While the Vedānta holds that the universe (jagat) is unreal, the Realistic Idealism maintains it to be real, because it is a manifestation of the Ultimate. Therefore, while, according to the former, all that we know disappears at the time of self-realisation exactly as, in the case of an illusion, the snake vanishes when the rope is perceived as a fact: according to the latter, the objective universe stands even when the Self is realised, but is known in its true perspective or in all its aspects or bearings. This kind of realisation is spoken of as 'Recognition' (Pratyabhijñā).

1. I. P. V., I, 35.

Thus, for the Vedānta, the realisation of the Self is coincidental with the negation of facts of experience in the same way as the perception of the rope as a fact is with that of the snake in the well known illusion. For the Trika, on the other hand, self-realisation brings with it an understanding of the world of experience in its true relations and perspective. There is no negation of the Universe but a new interpretation and appreciation. For this system, therefore, self-realisation is nothing but self-recognition (Pratyabhijñā).

WHAT IS RECOGNITION ?

Recognition is an act by which we endeavour to recall and reunite the former states of consciousness and is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former one. It differs from remembrance but slightly. Remembrance is a knowledge which is born of mental impression (saṁskāra) alone. But in recognition, though the mental impression is an important factor yet it is not the only factor as in the case of remembrance ; it is necessarily always coupled with the direct perception of the object which serves as an operating cause. Suppose, for instance, that a certain person was, on one occasion, very much impressed by the sight of a king riding an elephant : and suppose also that some time later he sees the elephant alone ; naturally at such a time, because of the law of association, his former impression of the king will be revived and there would arise a picture of the king before his mind's eye. Remembrance is thus nothing but a purely mental perception of a former object of sense-perception. But recognition is not a purely mental perception due to the revival of a past impression. In it the object recollected is actually present before the eyes and the novelty of perception consists in identifying the object, now perceived, with the one, seen before. When a person, for instance, on seeing

Devadatta, recollects the previous perception of him and identifies the mental image with the one present before his eyes in the judgment:—"it is the same Devadatta as I saw on that occasion," the actual perception of the object is as much a cause of knowledge as the impression left on the mind by the former perception of the same. Recognition, thus, requires not only previous perception of the object but also its presence at the time when it takes place.

The previous knowledge of the object, which is an essential condition of recognition, is, in some cases, as of one collocation of the object and its attributes, while in others they (the object and its attributes) are known separately. Thus, while in the former case, there is only one mental image of the object with all its qualities, in the latter, side by side with one, caused by the direct ocular perception, there is another also, which is a vague creation of mind and as such is hardly anything more than a mere embodiment of the heard qualities. To illustrate the latter case, which seems to be rather a complicated one, let us suppose that a lady, on hearing the excellent qualities of a certain gallant, fell in love with him even before she had an occasion to see him; and suppose also that that person chanced to pass incognito before her many a time so as to be noticed well enough and to leave the impression of his person on her mind. In such a case, the mind naturally draws a picture of the object of love, which is hardly anything more than a mere embodiment of the previously heard excellences which were responsible for the rise of the passion of love. This image, of course, will be distinct from that, left by the real object of love who passed incognito so many times before her. It will thus be clear that recognition in this case is not so simple an act as in that in which the object and its attributes are known as one collocation, as in the illustration of Devadatta, given above. In the present case recognition

is not at all possible unless the veil be removed and the real qualities of the person be revealed so as to make the identification of the imaginary object of love with the person present before her possible. Thus, in the former case the failure to recognise is simply due to forgetfulness on the part of the perceiver. For instance, it is often seen that a big man, like a king, fails to recognise an ordinary person, who was properly introduced to him on a former occasion and who, even now, in all respects, is the same as he then was. To enable the king to recognise the person before him does not require any thing more than reminding him of the past occasion. But in the latter case the failure to recognise is due not to forgetfulness, for, then the passion of love would disappear, but partly to the veil and partly to the existence of a vague mental image, which, as has been said before, is hardly any thing more than a mere embodiment of the previously heard qualities, as distinct from the image of the known object who is really their possessor. Thus in this case recognition requires not only the removal of the veil but also the identification of both the mental images with the unveiled object.

To illustrate this point let us suppose that a person, while in India, hears of the excellences of a certain lord. He goes to England and there often sees that lord, without knowing him as such, walking like an ordinary man in a garden. He then, on one occasion, goes to the House of Lords, sees that person among the members and recognises him to be the same person as he had so often met in the garden. And let us also suppose that this lord is the same as he had heard about in India and that the former shows many of the qualities of the person, he was so anxious to see. Now, the question, that we have to ask ourselves, is, whether, under these circumstances, the lord will be recognised as such and if not, why not ? The answer is

simple. He has failed to recognise the ord as the one about whom he had heard, because the latter has not yet been pointed out as such by any responsible person.

There are other minor distinctions between one kind of recognition and another, but we are not immediately concerned with them. We have drawn the above distinction to show what part the present system of philosophy has got to play in self-recognition.

As in the case of the recognition of the lord so in that of the Self, there are two distinct images in the mind of the recogniser (pratyabhijñātṛ). In the former case one is caused by the reports, heard in India, and the other by the sight of the lord in a garden in England. In the latter case also similarly, one, that is, of one's own limited self, is due to intuitive knowledge that every body has of himself[1] and the other is created by the descriptions of the Maheśvara or the universal Self that one reads in the sacred books such as the Purāṇas and the Āgamas[2]. When one studies philosophy, there arises the third image, which is different from both the previous mental images. This third image one identifies with one's own self. much as the gentleman of the above illustration identifies the person, whom he frequently saw in the garden, with the lord in the House of Lords. The other image, in both the cases, however, i. e. the image caused by reports heard in India in the one and that created by the description given in the sacred books in the other, will still remain unidentified. Thus, just as the identification of this image in the illustration, as we have just pointed out, depends upon a word from a responsible quarter, so, that of the universal Self as revealed by the study of philosophy, depends upon

1. I. P. V., I, 20.
2. I. P. V., I, 21.

spiritual instruction. The intellectual knowledge, got through the study of philosophy, is called Bauddhajñāna and the spiritual knowledge, that comes from preceptorial instruction, (Dīkṣā) is called Pauruṣajñāna. Of these the former is more important, because it is this that qualifies a person for the latter[1].

To make the point a little clearer let us add here that the limited self also is a manifestation. It is characterised not only by obscuration of its perfect Will Power (Svātantrya śakti) but also by ignorance thereof. That is, the innate limitation of the individual self is twofold. Not only is its perfect power of will hidden from it, but it is also ignorant of the fact that that power really belongs to it, though obscured, for the time being, by Māyā, the principle of obscuration[2]. In order that there may take place a perfect self-recognition, there is the necessity of the removal of both, of the veil which hides the perfect power of will and of the ignorance which is responsible for the imaginary distinction between the individual and the supreme Self and which stands in the way of recognition even when the veil is removed. The work of philosophy is simply to remove the veil and to expose what it hides, and thus make self-recognition possible, as does the appearance of the lord of the above illustration in his lordly form and place. But this alone does not make the recognition an accomplished fact. Therefore, just as in the case of the illustration of the lord a word from a responsible quarter is needed, so in the present case there is the necessity of Dīkṣā to remove the imaginary distinction and to bring about the identification of the individual with the universal Self.

1. T. A., I, 83.
2. T. A., I, 55.

Here it may be asked : if the individual self is really identical with the Supreme, how can recognition or non-recognition of this fact affect its causal efficiency ? Does the recognition of a seed as such or the absence thereof affect its causal efficiency to develop into a sprout ? The reply is that the causal efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritva) is of two kinds :—

(i) External, which does not affect the mind in any way ; for example, the development of a seed into a plant.

(ii) Internal, which does affect the mind ; for instance, the causal efficiency to give delight.

The former does not presuppose recognition but the latter does. To illustrate this point we give below Professor Cowell's translation of Utpala's passage in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā, quoted in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha :—

"A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him even before she had seen him, and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing, wrote to him a love letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to her, but when she saw him, she did not recognise in him the qualities, she had heard about, he appeared much the same as any other person, and she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she recognised those qualities, as her companion now pointed them out, she was fully gratified." Similarly though the individual self is identical with the Supreme, yet we cannot get the happiness of this identity unless we are conscious of it.

WHAT IS DĪKṢĀ ?

Dīkṣā does not mean, as ignorant people think, simply getting a certain religious formula (mantra) whispered into

one's ear by a certain religious man. It is rather an act whereby spiritual knowledge is imparted and the bondage of innate ignorance is removed[1].

One more point is worthy of note in this connection, viz., that, according to this system, Dīkṣā, the spiritual instruction which makes self-recognition an accomplished fact, is not indispensable for mokṣa. It is a matter of common experience that even when recognition is due to the removal of the veil and consequent exposure of the hidden qualities and identification of both the mental images with the object present before, it does not always require a word from an authoritative person, as for instance, when the object of recognition reveals some such unmistakable sign[2] as makes identification of the imaginary vague image with the object present before possible. S'aiva writers had observed this and had given the name of Prātibhajñāna to that faculty which enables a person to attain self-recognition without the help of Dīkṣā[3].

Śaktipāta.

That divine will which leads a person on to the path of spiritual knowledge is called Śaktipāta. It may be spoken of as divine grace. It is independent of human action[4] and is the only cause of self-recognition[5]. On this point there is complete agreement between this system and the Vedānta. The latter also says that the Self cannot be realised by means of intellectual power or through the

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1. T. A., I., 80.
2. I. P. V., II, 275.
3. T. A., VIII, 107.
4. T. A., VIII, 173.
5. T. A., VIII, 163.

study of the Vedas or even through spiritual instruction. It can be realised by him alone whom He favours and to whom He reveals himself :—

"Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo
Na medhayā na bahunā śrutena
Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyo
Yasmai vivṛṇute tanuṁ svām.'

THE CAUSE AND THE NATURE OF BONDAGE.

It is a common belief of all the schools of Indian philosophy that ignorance is the cause of bondage and that knowledge is the only means to liberation. The opinions, however, greatly differ in regard to the exact nature of both. Abhinava has tried to explain and harmonise this difference in his comprehensive study of the system. How he has done so, we shall show as we proceed. Let us first state his, or more correctly, the Saiva, view of these.

When in the Saiva literature "ignorance" is spoken of as the cause of bondage,[1] it does not mean a total absence of knowledge. For, such a state is to be found only in insentient objects,[2] such as bricks and stones, which, because of the absence of life and feeling, cannot at all be represented to be in bondage. It means simply imperfect knowledge, such as is found in ordinary mortals. It may further be pointed out that in such a context it stands not for the intellectual (bauddha) but for the innate (pauruṣa) ignorance which is technically called āṇavamala[3] (innate impurity). As such it is represented to be the cause of another impurity, called kārmamala (impurity of Karma). (For details on

1. T. S., 5.
2. T. A., I, 58.
3. T. A., I, 56.

this the reader is requested to refer to the 5th chapter). The latter also, in its turn, is said to be the cause of still another, namely, impurity of transmigratory existence[1] (Māyīya mala). The self is covered with these three impurities [of innate ignorance, of Karma and of transmigratory existence (Āṇava, Kārma and Māyīya malas)] exactly in the manner in which[2] an ovule (kaṇa) is with nucellus (kambuka), integument (kiṁśāruka) and husk (tuṣa). These covers are responsible for the transmigration of the individual self as nucellus, integument and husk are for the development of ovule. Although these impurities are said to be related with one another by causal relation, yet no idea of succession in their coming into being is intended to be implied. For instance, when the innate ignorance is spoken of as the cause of the impurity of Karma, and the latter of transmigratory existence it does not mean that one follows the existence of the other. It simply means that without one the other cannot exist, i. e., the existence of each of the preceding in the above list is an indispensable condition for that of the following. The existence of the body presupposes that of the Karma[3]; and the effectiveness of the latter depends upon the existence of the innate ignorance[4]. Thus if there be no innate ignorance the other impurities will automatically disappear. It is because of this that at one place the innate ignorance is spoken of as the greatest and innermost cover; the six sheaths, consisting of Māyā, Kalā, Niyati, Rāga, Vidyā and Kāla, as the inner and subtle cover; and the body as the gross and outer cover.

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1. T. A., I, 54.
2. P. S., 55, 57.
3. T. A., VI, 111.
4. T. A., VI, 82-3.

MALAS OR IMPURITIES DEFINED.

1 ĀṆAVAMALA OR INNATE IGNORANCE.

Innate ignorance is one of the manifestations brought about by the universal Will[1] Power (Svātantrya śakti). It conceals the real nature of the Self. It is a mere consciousness of the supposed imperfection and limitation which is responsible for the rise of countless individual selves[2]. It is beginningless though destructible. It is the instrumental cause of the impurity, called Kārma mala, inasmuch as the power of Karma, to affect the soul, depends upon its presence.

ITS DISTINCTION FROM INTELLECTUAL IGNORANCE

We have already pointed out that the word "ignorance", whether used in reference to the individual self or the intellect, refers not to a total absence of knowledge but to a limited knowledge which is the same thing as determinate knowledge, i. e. consciousness of something as such to the exclusion of all other things (Sarvo vikalpaḥ saṁsārah). The intellectual ignorance (bauddha ajñāna) is an affection of the limited self caused by a stimulus. The stimulus is of two kinds, internal and external. The former is due to the revival of old impressions. But the latter arises from the contact of a certain sense with a certain external object. The spiritual ignorance is altogether different from it[3]. It is simply a consciousness of self-limitation, not as associated with the body, the mind or the intellect, but above all of them ; a consciousness which is present in the

1. T. A., VI, 61.
2. T. A., VI, 60.
3. T. A., VI, 76.

transcendental state of the individual self, a state in which the self rises above the material body and all that is connected with it, so that there is no experience of any thing that happens to the body; a state in which there is no experience of pain of any kind even if the body be cut; a state in which not only the senses and the mind cease to work but the vital airs also suspend animation. It is that element in the consciousness, which is responsible for the automatic break of that state (svato vyutthāna). It is not always that there is conscious association of this limitation with the self. It can remain even in a sub-conscious state. That state of the individual self in which this innate ignorance or limitation is in a sub-conscious state is technically known as the state of purity (Turīyātīta). This[1] state does not automatically cease. It requires some external agency to break it. But when the self is perfectly free from it, there is no break or resumption of connection with the body etc.

It will thus be clear that the intellectual ignorance is dependent upon the connection of the individual self with the body, with which it co-exists, but the spiritual ignorance is independent of it. It is because of this difference that this system holds that liberation (Mukti) cannot be got through the intellectual knowledge only. The intellectual knowledge can effect salvation only if it is accompanied by the spiritual knowledge.

This innate ignorance is different from "Rāga", which, according to the Sāṅkhya, is the cause of bondage. For, while the latter is simply a quality of Buddhi responsible for the attachment of the individual to certain object or objects, the former is a mere consciousness of an imperfection

1. Ś. C., 455, (Bhūmikā.)

because of which the self is subjected to all kinds of later limitations. Rāga Tattva, on which we shall speak in the third chapter, is still a different thing. It is a desire for something undefined. Both of these, the Rāga of the Sāṅkhyas and the Rāga Tattva of the S'aivas, are further manifestations of the innate ignorance.[1]

This impurity of innate ignorance is independent of the other two impurities. It continues to exist even after they have been destroyed. It passes through four states before reaching that of total annihilation. And it is the association of one of these states with each of the five classes of beings of pure creation that constitutes the chief point of difference of each one of them from the rest.

It may briefly be stated here that, according to this system, creation is of two kinds, the pure and the impure.[2] From Māyā down to Earth, the creation is impure inasmuch as the knowledge of duality predominates in it. And from S'iva to S'uddha Vidyā the creation is called pure, because the experiencing entities of this creation are the universal beings who realise themselves actually as such and have for their experience the whole of the universe in different forms, but free from all limitations which characterize the determinate knowledge.

There are eight kinds of experiencers. Five belong to the pure creation, two to the impure and one to the transitional stage between the two. It is the association of one or more of these impurities with the individual self which distinguishes each one of the eight experiencers from the rest. Two, Sakala and Pralayākala, belong to

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1. T. A., VI, 57-9.
2. T. A., VI, 56.

the impure creation. Every mortal in the state of creation (sṛṣṭi-daśā) is Sakala, because there are all the three impurities in him. These very mortals in the state of dissolution (Pralaya) are called Pralayākalas, because at that time they have no mortal coils, the body, which, with all that it can be associated with, is called the impurity of Māyā. Thus Pralayākalas have only two impurities. The experiencers of the transitional stage between the impure and the pure creations are known as Vijñānākalas.

(Māyordhve S'uddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ).

These possess only one impurity,[1] that of innate ignorance, which is inclining towards destruction in their case.

This impurity of innate ignorance passes, according to S'aiva view, through four states before reaching that of total annihilation. Hence the remaining five subjects, who belong to the pure creation, Śāmbhava, Śaktija, Mantramaheśa, Mantreśa and Mantra, are represented to have the distinguishing mark of having the same perishing impurity but each in a different state[2] ; in S'iva, for instance, it is in the state of non-existence (Dhvasta). Abhinava has given a large number of synonyms of Mala, each indicative of one of its functions in T. A., VI, 73-9.

2. Kārma Mala.

It has to be distinguished from karma-saṁskāra, which is simply an effect left on the self by various kinds of mental and physical actions. It is essentially a mere objectless desire which is responsible for the countless associations of the self with other creations of Māyā.

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1. T. A., VI, 77, 81.
2. T. A., VI, 80.

Its effectability and even its very existence depends on the innate ignorance. We shall revert to this topic in dealing with the Śaiva theory of Karma.

3. Māyīya Mala.

All that the self is associated with because of both, the Kārma-mala and the karma-saṁskāra, is called Māyīya-mala[1].

The means of liberation from bondage.

The perfect knowledge, not intellectual but spiritual, of the Ultimate Reality of the knowable (jñeya), the knowledge which is free from all limitations[2] and from the idea of duality in any form, is the means of liberation.

The intellectual and the spiritual knowledge.

A distinction has to be drawn here between the intellectual and the spiritual knowledge (Bauddha and Pauruṣa jñāna) similar to that as has already been pointed out between the intellectual and the innate ignorance. The spiritual knowledge is that perfect knowledge which dawns upon a person, who has reached the highest stage in the spiritual development through the total annihilation of the innate ignorance[3]. It transcends the limit of language and is, therefore, to be known only through experience. Similarly, intellectual knowledge is that perfect knowledge by virtue of which a person transcends the difference between this and that, and sees only one whole and that too, as a manifestation of himself. The former comes from the Dīkṣā[4] and the latter from the study of the monistic

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1. T. A., I, 56. 2. T. A., I, 72. 3. T. A., I, 78-9.
4. T. A., I, 79.

philosophy[1]. The latter is more important than the former, not so much because it can liberate a person right in his life time, as because the Dīkṣā is inefficacious in bringing about salvation without the assistance of the Bauddha-jñāna[2].

There are four ways to liberation, Anupāya, S'āmbhava, S'ākta and Āṇava.[3] Each of these does not directly lead to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality.[4] Each of the succeeding, in the above order, leads to that which immediately precedes. It is the first alone which can be called the direct means.[5] The difference, however, between the first and the second i. e. Anupāya and S'āmbhava, is very slight. The former, therefore, is not counted as a separate way in some authoritative books of the system. In fact it is regarded as the highest stage of the latter (S'āmbhava).[6]

At some places the word 'Samāveśa' is found substituted for "Upāya" It is defined as a merging into its ultimate form, the highest reality[7] of that which, being apparently separate from the Ultimate, is limited. This gives us some idea of the chief point of distinction between one of the ways and the rest. The word "Samāveśa" literally means "complete or perfect immersion". There are four such immersions. Beginning from the last, each one leads to the preceding one, up to the first, which alone is considered to be the direct way to salvation i. e. the realisation or the recognition of the Ultimate Reality. This process of immersion appears to be a complete reversal of that of emergence. Or, to put it more clearly, the process involved in Mokṣa is the complete reverse of

1. T. A., I, 81-2. 2. T. A., I, 83. 3. T. A., I, 258.
4. T. A., I, 255-6. 5. T. A., I, 203. 6. T. A., I, 182.
7. T. A., I, 205.

that of Ābhāsa or manifestation. We know that, according to the Trika, creation is nothing but manifestation *without* of what is *within*; that, in the order of sucession in manifestation, Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna, and Kriyā follow one another in their respective order; and that these stand for successive states of the universal consciousness in the process of manifestation. We also know that, corresponding to these very states in manifestation or emergence, there are four states leading to complete immersion (samāveśa) as stated above. In fact two of these, namely, the Śākta and the Āṇava, are also called Jñānopāya and Kriyopāya respectively,[1] because they are mostly concerned with the manifestations of the powers of Jñāna and Kriyā respectively And from the nature of description of the remaining two it is clear that Abhinava meant them also to be called Ānandopāya and Icchopāya respectively. Thus, just as in the course of successive manifestation of Ānanda, Icchā, Jñāna and Kriyā, each of the preceding leads to that which immediately follows, so in the course of the gradual immersion (krama-samāveśa or mukti) these very powers similarly merge into one another in the reverse order. For, mokṣa is nothing but, broadly speaking, an individual dissolution and, therefore, the opposite of manifestation.

The various stages in manifestation from Cit to Kriyā are admitted to correspond to those from the state of deep sleep to that of action. It would not, therefore, be wrong to say that the four stages leading from the mundane existence to the complete immersion in the Highest Reality, similarly correspond to those which are experienced in falling into sleep from the state of activity. If we carefully analyse our successive experiences from the time when we

1. T. A., I, 186-7.

attempt to sleep to that when we actually fall asleep, we find that ordinarily there are four well definable stages. The first three are marked by the suspension of the physical, the mental and the volitional activities respectively and the fourth by the loss of distinct individual self-consciousness. If the distinctive features of the above four stages be kept in mind there will be very little difficulty in understanding the nature of the activity involved in and the result reached by, the four successive means to the final emancipation.

KRIYOPĀYA OR ĀṆAVOPĀYA.

Kriyopāya is that path in which the external things, such as repetition of a certain religious formula[1] (Mantra), which are nothing but creations of imagination (Kalpanā), are used as means to self-realisation. It is called Kriyopāya, firstly because to the follower of this path both the consciousness of self and that of the objective universe are equally prominent as in the characteristic experience "I am this" of the Sadvidyā[2] (Kriyā) stage of universal manifestation, and secondly, because the physical activities, such as repetition of a mantra, as said above, play an important part in it. Shall we say that the repetition of a religious formula plays the same part in bringing about the liberation as does a lullaby in putting a child to sleep, a state of physical quiescence ?

JÑĀNOPĀYA OR ŚĀKTOPĀYA.

Jñānopāya is the second of the four ways in which repeated attempts have to be made to rise from the stage of the Knowledge of duality to that of unity. When, for instance, a man begins with thinking "The self alone is all this" (Ātmaivedaṁ sarvam), and by the repeated attempt at

1. T. A., I, 235. 2. T. A., I, 186.

elimination is able to rise to the unshakable knowledge of oneness (Nirvikalpa Jñāna) in the form "the self", he is said to follow the path of knowledge. It is called Jñānopāya because the mental activities of meditation are the most important factors in it. The activity involved in this may be compared to our autosuggestion in our attempt to sleep which brings mental quiescence.

Śāmbhava Mārga or Icchopāya.

It is a path in which the perfect knowledge, the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality[1], comes through mere exercise of the will power, without any serious mental effort at unification (Anusandhi) of ideas or elimination thereof; much in the same manner in which the knowledge of the real worth of a gem comes to an expert jeweller[2] at the very first moment of its sight without any great careful examination. It is called Śāmbhava mārga or the path of Icchā, because in it the exercise of will power is the important factor. The stage reached by this means is the one in which the world of experiences loses its definiteness and, therefore, may be compared to that which immediately precedes sleep and is marked by the presence of only vague ideas such as are conceived in desire.

Anupāya-Mārga or Ānandopāya.

It is the same as we have discussed above under "Pratyabhijñā"[3]. It is called Anupāya, not because there is no use of any means whatsoever[4], but because the elaborate means are but of little importance. It is that path by following which the Ultimate is realised even without Bhāvanā. The realisation of the Ultimate comes to the

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1. T. A., I, 235.
2. T. A., I, 186.
3. T. A., Ah. II, 39-40.
4. T. A., Ah. II, 3.

follower of this path in consequence of just a word from a responsible quarter as in the case of complex recognition described above. The stage attained by this way may be compared to deep sleep, in which consciousness is free from all affections.

TRIKA CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA.

Mokṣa, according to the Trika, is nothing but the state of perfect purity of consciousness.[1] It is the realisation of the Self, the Parā Saṁvit or the Supreme[2] Consciousness, which is beyond the reach of both thought and language and is the ultimate source not only of both of them but also of all that they imply or involve. It is purely subjective and, therefore, is both unilluminable (aprakāśya) by any external light and unknowable (ajñeya) by any means of knowledge. It transcends all ; it surpasses all ; it is the ultimate aim of all aims. It may be called consciousness, not such as we ordinarily have, but that which is a matter of experience of the Yogins in the pure or post-transcendental state of consciousness.

OTHER CONCEPTIONS OF MOKṢA FROM THE TRIKA POINT OF VIEW.

This system believes in 36 categories or Tattvas. We shall deal with them in the third chapter and shall explain why only thirty six, neither more nor less, are accepted. Here we are concerned only with pointing out the view of the Trika about the conceptions of Mokṣa of other systems and with stating as to which of the 36 categories some of the prominent ones among them reach because of their peculiar philosophical conceptions. In the 1st Āhnika of his Tantrāloka, Abhinava criticises the conceptions of Mokṣa

1. T. A., I, 62. 2. T. A., I, 192.

of three systems, the Idealistic and the Nihilistic schools of Buddhism and the Sāṅkhya, as follows :—

Vijñānavādin's conception of Mokṣa.

The Citta (mind or self ?), the Vijñānavādins hold, is extremely pure by nature. Because of the beginningless ignorance, however, it is covered up with adventitious impurities which are the cause of the appearance of the transitory world phenomena. And because all the experiences of the phenomenal world are entirely due to the impurities, the former, therefore, automatically cease with the cessation of the latter[1]. Thus the nirvāṇa is nothing but freedom from the impurities. It is to be attained through constant deep meditation and other practices enjoined in the Buddhist scripture.

Its refutation.

The defects of the above conception of nirvāṇa are apparent. It conflicts with the well known Bauddha theory of momentariness. If all that exists, is momentary, so also must be the mind. And if so, it cannot have existence long enough to be affected by Bhāvanā and, therefore, there can be no possibility of Mokṣa which is simply its effect. Moreover, according to the Idealistic Buddhism, each moment (kṣaṇa) gives birth to another which is similar to it in all respects. How can then the veiled original moment produce one which is dissimilar to it, i.e., free from the veil ?

Nihilist's theory of Mokṣa and its refutation.

According to the Nihilistic Buddhism (Śūnyavāda), even the Vijñāna of the Idealists has no existence: and Mokṣa is nothing but the realisation[2] of this nihility. But this is

1. T. A., I, 64. 2. T. A., I, 66.

an impossible position. For, if nothing exists what can be realised and by whom ? But if, in order to get out of this difficulty, the existence of the 'realiser' be admitted, that would mean the abandonment of the fundamental principle. The Nihilist's conception of Mokṣa is thus as inconsistent with his fundamental principle as that of the idealist.

SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA AND ITS CRITICISM.

The Sāṅkhya conception of Mokṣa is no better. The Sāṅkhya holds that the whole universe is an evolute of an eternal principle, called Prakṛti ; that Puruṣa, the self, is altogether passive and simply looks indifferently on the work of the former ; and that freedom from worldly bondage can be attained through the correct knowledge of the twenty-four categories of the Sāṅkhya system as distinct from the self. But the question, that the Trika raises against this theory, is, how and where can this knowledge of distinction take place ? The Prakṛti is insentient and, therefore, no knowledge such as "I have been seen and, therefore, let me not work for him" can reasonably be attributed to her. The case of puruṣa is no better. He is perfectly passive (nirlepa). The supposition, therefore, of any such affection in puruṣa as that involved in knowing the distinction between himself and the twenty-four Tattvas would mean selfcontradiction.

These systems have thus failed to render a coherent account of the position they have attempted to maintain. Their founders and exponents have not been able to understand the true nature of the Ultimate Reality They are not, however, as far away from the truth as the materialists. They have made approaches to it with varying degrees of success, some being a little nearer it than others. Each one of them has been able to grasp the real nature of

some one or the other of the higher Tattvas which he has taken to be the ultimate reality. The Bauddha, for instance, has understood the real nature of the Buddhi Tattva, the Sāṅkhya that of the Puruṣa[1] Tattva, and the Pātañjala that of the Niyati Tattva.[2] These systems, therefore, can surely help in the attainment of the respective Tattvas which they fully explain. But none of them can bring about the complete self-realisation, the full recognition of the Ultimate Reality.

The followers of these systems however, do rise above the level of the common man inasmuch as they get liberation, though partial, from the impurity, called Māyīyamala. But they cannot be spoken of as liberated (mukta) in the real sense of the term, because the remaining two impurities, namely, the kārma and the āṇava malas, remain associated with them even after the realisation of what they consider to be the ultimate reality. The perfect freedom, therefore, the Trika holds, can be got only through the Pratyabhijñā.

1. T. A., I, 69.
2. T. A., I, 70.

CHAPTER II.

ĀBHĀSAVĀDA.

or

"REALISTIC IDEALISM."

The aim of every system of philosophy is to explain the why, the what and the wherefrom of the knowable. Every system bases its conclusions on a careful study of facts of experience and the comparative importance of each depends upon how far it satisfactorily accounts for these facts. Abhinava claims this basis of facts for his system, the Trika. To the facts of experience, as has already been stated, he gives the first, to reason the second, and to a scriptural authority only the last place as the basis of his theories[1].

Abhinava differs in his explanation of the world of experience from both the realistic and the idealistic schools of Indian Thought. From the logical realism of the Nyāya and from the atomistic pluralism of the Vaiśesika he completely differs both in details and in fundamentals. From the realistic dualism of the Sāṅkhya, from the subjective idealism of the Bauddha and from the monistic idealism of the Vedānta, however, his difference is confined mostly to the fundamentals only. Because the Trika system, on which his explanation is based, accepts, with some modifications of course, the twenty four categories together with the Puruṣa concept of the Sāṅkhya, the principle of momentariness of the Bauddha and the Māyā of the Vedāntin.

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1. T. A., I, 149

The world of experience, according to him, therefore, is not a creation the God, who is simply an active agent and brings the experienceables into being with the help of some such material cause as the atoms; nor is it an evolute of the Prakṛti, as the Sāṅkhya conceives; nor a purely subjective experience, as the Vijñānavādin represents: nor even a mere illusion, as the Vedāntin believes it to be. It is, he holds, real, because it is a manifestation of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness or Self exactly as a creation of a yogin is a manifestation of an individual self, But it is ideal, because it is nothing but an experience of the Self and has its being in the Self exactly as our own ideas have theirs within us. Hence the Trika, because of its theory of *Ābhāsavāda*, presented in these pages, is called the "*Realistic Idealism*".

ĀBHĀSA DEFINED.

All[1] that appears; all that forms the object of perception or conception; all that is within the reach of the external senses or the internal mind: all that we are conscious of when the senses and the mind cease to work, as in the state of trance or deep sleep; all that human consciousness, limited as it is, cannot ordinarily be conscious of and, therefore, is simply an object of self-realisation; in short, all that is i. e. all that can be said to exist in any way and with regard to which the use of any kind of language is possible, be it the subject, the object or the means of knowledge or the knowledge itself, is Ābhāsa.

THE COMMON BASIS OF ĀBHĀSAS.

The explanations of the phenomenon of knowledge, as given by the dualists and the pluralists, have been declared unsatisfactory, because they present an insurmountable

1. I. P. V., I., 35-6.

difficulty in bridging the gulf that divides the self from the not-self. If the subject and the object are completely cut off from each other, have exclusive and independent existence, and are of opposite nature, like light and darkness, (Tamaḥprakāśavad viruddhadharmiṇoḥ, Ś. Bh.) how can there be any connection between the two, which is so very necessary for the production of the phenomenon of knowledge. The meeting of the self and the not-self, in this case, seems to be as difficult as that of the two logs which are carried by two different currents which separately lose themselves in the sands.

> Na hi pṛthak pṛthak parikṣīṇeṣu srotaḥsu taduhyamānāḥ tṛṇolapādayaḥ samanvayaṁ kaṁcid yānti,
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> I. P. V., I, 283.

The realistic idealism therefore, puts forth its theory of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness or Self.

ANUTTARA.

This All-inclusive Universal Consciousness, this logical necessity to satisfactorily account for the phenomena of knowledge, is called Anuttara[1] (the Highest Reality) or Parā or Pūrṇā Saṁvid (Supreme or perfect consciousness) in this system. As the word Anuttara implies, it is a reality beyond which there is nothing : it is, therefore, free from all limitations. It is undefinable in terms of ordinary every day life

> Na vidyate uttaram praśnaprativacorūpaṁ yatra
>
> P. T. V. 19.

It[2] cannot be spoken of as 'this' or 'that' nor as "not this" or "not that". It is "all", but not in the sense in which "all" is apprehended by the limited human mind. The mind cannot grasp it, and, therefore, no talk

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1. P. T. V., 19. 2. P. T. V., 21.

about it is possible. It is not a thing to be perceived or conceived but simply to be realised. Whatever word or words we may use to indicate it, we fail to convey the idea of its real nature ; because the words stand for a certain definite idea but it is indefinite, not in the sense that it is a shadowy nothing or nihility, but that it is much more than is signified by some word or words. All the statements to define it are like those of the proverbial four blind men who described an elephant to be something like a table, a broom stick, a rough pillor, or a winnowing brsket, according as each of them could know it by feeling the back, the tail, the leg or the ear only respectively. Who can say that the conception of an elephant of each one of them was altogether wrong ? Because nobody can deny that an elephant is partly like what each one of them separately described it to be. Nor can the conception be said to be wholly correct, because the elephant is not only as described by each one of them separately or even collectively but something more also. The Highest Reality is similarly all that which can possibly be conceived by those who possess the power of conception ; but it is not that much only. It is much more than the limited human mind can imagine it to be.

The ideas of unity and multiformity, of time and space, and of name and form, are based upon certain ways and forms in which the Ultimate appears. The transitory world represents an insignificantly small part of the whole of the manifestation. It is, therefore, as unreasonable to apply these ideas to the Anuttara as such, as it would be to apply the ideas formed by each blind man separately to the elephant as such :—

"Uttaraṁ ca śabdanam, tat sarvathā 'īdṛśaṁ tādṛśam' iti vyavacchedaṁ kuryāt tad yatra na bhavati, avyavacchinnam idam anuttaram." P. T. V., 21.

This concept of the Anuttara is very much similar to that of the pure (śuddha) Brahman of the Vedāntin. Compare for instance the following quotation from the Tavalakāro-paniṣad :—

"Na tatra cakṣur gacchati no vāg gacchati no mano
na vidmo na vijānīmo yathaitad anuśiṣyād anyadeva
viditād atho aviditād adhi." T. U., Ch. I, 3.

After the admission that the Ultimate Reality is beyond the reach of thought and language, the attempt of the Ābhāsavādin to speak on it is similar to that of the Vedāntin, who, as we have just pointed out, agrees to a very large measure with the former on this point. Both attempt to give an idea of the Ultimate in its relation to us as the Creator. Both admit that no definition of the Ultimate can be perfect and still both attempt to define it in words, which, according to them, express the reality in the best possible way.

THE ULTIMATE AS PRAKĀŚA VIMARŚAMAYA.

The Ultimate, according to the Ābhāsavāda, has two aspects, the transcendental[1] (viśvottīrṇa) and the immanent (viśvamaya). The latter is described as "prakāśavimarśa-maya". The conception of macrocosm of this system is based on a careful study of microcosm. In order, therefore, to show clearly as to what these two words really stand for, it is necessary to point out their import when they are applied to the individual self.

Each of the two words represents an aspect of the individual self. The prakāśa is conceived to be very much like a mirror. In this aspect, the self is simply a substratum of the psychic images, which are merely its modes or forms due to the stimulus received either from

1. T. A., I. 104.

external objects, as at the time of direct perception, or from internal factors, the revived residual traces, as at the time of imagination or dream. These images have very great similarity with those, cast by external objects on a mirror, which shows them as one with itself without losing its purity or separate entity. The difference, however, between this aspect of the individual self and a mirror is that the latter, in order that it may receive reflection, requires an external light to illumine it. A mirror in darkness does not reflect any image. But the self shines independent of all external lights and does not need an illuminator, in order that it may receive reflection.

The word "prakāśa" implies the residual traces also which are essentially the same as their substratum. The reason is obvious. The reflections are essentially the same as their substratum. The psychic images, because of their being of the nature of reflection, are, admitted to be essentially the same as prakāśa. And because these very psychic images, existing under a sort of cover, are called residual traces or saṁskāras, they too, therefore, are not regarded as different from prakāśa.

The prakāśa aspect, however, is not the most distinctive aspect of the individual self, because it is to a large extent common to other things also, such as mirror, crystal, and maṇi, If, therefore, the individual self had been only prakāśamaya it would have been no better than a substance capable of receiving reflection. The word vimarśa explains what other distinctive features it possesses and why it does not belong to the same category as that to which a maṇi or a crystal does.

"Vimarśa" stands for the distinctive aspect of the self. It signifies the capacity of the self to know itself in all its purity in the state of perfect freedom from all kinds of

affections; to analyse all its states of varying affections due either to the internal or the external causes; to retain these affections in the form of residual traces (saṁskāras); to take out, at will, at any time, any thing out of the existing stock of the saṁskāras and bring back an old affected state of itself as in the case of remembrance; and to create an altogether new state of self-affection by making a judicious selection from the existing stock and displaying the material so selected on the back-ground of its prakāśa aspect as at the time of free imagination. The word "Vimarśa" stands for all this and much more. At times "āmarśa" and "pratyavamarśa" also are used as substitutes of "vimarśa"; but they always do not connote all that "vimarśa" does. It represents the distinctive aspect of the individual self and differentiates it from mirror, maṇi, crystal and similar other substances capable of receiving reflection. The point has very clearly been stated by Abhinava in his Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī as follows:—

> "Atha anyenāpi satā ghaṭena, yatovabhāsasya pratibimbarūpā chāyā dattā, tām asau avabhāso bibhrad ghaṭasya prakāśa ityucyate, tataśca ajaḍaḥ, tarhi sphaṭikasalilamukurādiḥ api evambhūta eva iti ajaḍaḥ syāt. Atha tathābhūtam api ātmānaṁ taṁ ca ghaṭādikaṁ sphaṭikādiḥ na parāmṛṣṭuṁ samarthaḥ iti jaḍaḥ. tathā parāmarśanam eva ajāḍyajīvitam antarvahiṣkaraṇasvātantryarūpam" I. P. V., I, 198.

Thus when the Trika speaks of the individual self as "Prakāśa vimarśamaya" it means that the self is self-luminous, and contains residual traces within and that it is capable of receiving reflection, of knowing itself and others, of controlling what it contains within and of giving rise to new psychic phenomena with the residual traces which are essentially the same with itself.

Let us now see what does the expression "Prakāśa-vimarśamaya" mean when it is used with reference to the Universal Self. According to the Trika, as said before, the creation of the universe by the Universal Self is a manifestation without of what is already within on the back-ground of itself (svātmabhitti). The manifested universe is only apparently separate from the Self much as reflected external object is from a mirror.[1] It is in its essential nature exactly like the limited manifestation of an individual at the time of dream, remembrance, imagination or yogic creation.[2] Its substratum is, as in the case of the limited manifestation, the prakāśa aspect of the Self which is affected in the same manner as the individual Buddhi (the self itself so called at the time of affection) is at the time of dream. The reasons, therefore, which justify the use of the word "prakāśa" in reference to the individual self hold good in the case of the Universal Self also. For, both 'shine' (prakāśate) and are capable of receiving reflection, of shining as one with the cause of affection and of making it one with themselves.

One point of difference, however, between the individual prakāśa and the universal, as substrata of what is reflected on them, has to be noted here; namely, that the affection of the former is caused not only by the internal causes, as in the case of dream or imagination, but by the external also, as at the time of a direct perception. But, since the latter is universal and all-inclusive, its affection by any external cause is out of question.

But the manifestation is a systematic action and requires a selection to be made out of the existing stock within. Therefore, it presupposes knowledge, will and self-consciousness (ānanda) Each of the above three

1. T. A., II, 3-4. 2. I. P. V., I, 182.

attributes depends upon that which immediately follows; because without self-consciousness, as our experience tells us, there can be no desire; similarly without desire no knowledge is possible: and how can any systematic action be possible unless there be knowledge of the object, towards the accomplishment of which a particular activity is to be directed, and of the means by which the said object is to be achieved? The word "vimarśa" therefore, when used with reference to the Universal Self stands for that power which gives rise to self-consciousness, will, knowledge and action in succession.

SVĀTANTRYA S'AKTA

This very "vimarśa" is spoken of as "Svātantrya," because its existence does not depend upon any thing else, as does that of will, knowledge and action, each of which depends for its existence upon what immediately precedes. This represents the principal power of the Highest Lord (Maheśvara) as the Self is often called. This includes all other powers which are attributed to the Ultimate as the following quotations show:—

"Citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parāvāk svarasoditā
Svātantryam etat mukhyaṁ tad aiśvaryam parameśituḥ."
I. P. V., I, 204.

"Eka evāsya dharmosau sarvākṣepeṇa vidyate
Tena svātantryaśaktyaiva yukta ityāñjaso vidhiḥ."
T. A., I, 107.

"Vastutaḥ punarapyahampratyavamarśātmā svātantrya-śaktirevāsyāsti." T. A., Comm., I, 108.

For the conception of the principal power of the Parama S'iva as Svātantrya, the Trika seems to be indebted to Pāṇini; because it is Pāṇini, who, so far as we know at

present, first conceived the svātantrya to be the chief characteristic of an agent.

"Svatantraḥ kartā." Pā.. I, 4, 54.

For, according to the Trika, the relation between the Parama S'iva and the universe is that of the manifestor and the manifested or manifestable, that is, of the subject and the object; and because it is the power of "Vimarśa" which gives rise to self-consciousness etc. and distinguishes the subject, and because, unlike the will etc., it does not depend for its being and causal efficiency on any thing else, therefore, the word "svātantrya" has at places been substituted for "Vimarśa." The word "Svātantrya" does not imply capriciousness, wantonness or self-willedness. The ultimate power, is not wanton, capricious or self-willed, according to the Trika, as a superficial reader of its literature often thinks. The simple implication of this expression, when used with reference to Parama S'iva, firstly is, that He has the same independent power over what He contains within, as we ourselves, as limited conscious beings, have over our saṁskāras which lie within us before their rise, much as the universe lies within Him before its manifestation; and secondly, that just as in our case it is the power of consciousness (vimarśa) which is responsible for bringing the subconscious ideas into conscious state at the time of remembrance and imagination etc. so it is the svātantrya śakti which manifests without what lies within the Ultimate. The assumption of the svātantrya śakti will thus appear to be simple, natural and based on the fact of common experience and not a preposterous conception without any other basis than a theological prejudice, as some critics have opined.

"Svātantrya śakti" is a very comprehensive expression of the Trika terminology. It is used with reference to the

Universal Self when all the possible powers, which can be attributed to it (Self), are intended to be implied[1]. It is so often to be met with in the Trika literature and the idea, implied by it, is so characteristic of this system that it is often called the Svātantryavāda.

OTHER NAMES OF SVĀTANTRYA ŚAKTI.

The Śaiva writers on the various branches of the Trika, looking at the Svātantrya aspect of the Universal Consciousness from different points of view have given it different names. In the Śiva Sūtra of Vasugupta it is called 'Caitanya' for the simple reason that it has the power of uniting and separating and dealing in multifarious other ways with what is within[2]. It is called Sphurattā or Spanda in Spanda literature, because it represents that essential nature of the Universal Consciousness which is responsible for its apparent change[3] from the state of absolute unity. It is also called Mahāsattā, because[4] it is the cause of all that can be said to exist in any way. Another name by which it is referred to at some places is Parāvāk[5], because it represents the speech in its most subtle form.

PRAKĀŚA AND VIMARŚA EXPLAINED.

From what has been stated above two points become clear, namely, (I) that the word "prakāśa" is used for that aspect of the immanent Ultimate, which serves as a substratum for all that it manifests, exactly as the Buddhi does for the images that an individual builds up at the time of imagination ; and (II) that similarly the word "vimarśa" stands for that aspect which is simply a power, which, for

1. I. P. V., I, 214.
2. I. P. V., I, 200.
3. I. P. V., I, 208-9.
4. I. P. V., I, 209.
5. I. P. V., I, 203.

want of a better word, we call here "consciousness"; a power, which, by giving rise to self-consciousness, will, knowledge and action in succession, is responsible for selection from what is already within and manifestation of the so selected material as apparently separate from itself. The self-consciousness, and the powers of will, knowledge and action, may be said to be different aspects of this very "vimarśa".

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE MANIFESTED AND THE MANIFESTABLE.

But now the question arises: if the power which is ultimately responsible for manifestation is "Vimarśa" and the substratum of manifestation is "prakāśa" what about the manifested and the manifestable? Are they different from both "prakāśa" and "vimarśa" and so something separate from the Ultimate? The reply of the Trika to this question is that the manifestable and so naturally the manifested are prakāśa.

(Prakāśātmā prakāśyortho nāprakāśaśca siddhyati).
I. P. V., I, 159.

The reason is not far to seek. This system holds that the manifested universe is brought about by the Ultimate exactly as are the objects of a dream by an individual and that the relation of the Ultimate with the manifested universe is the same as that which exists between the objects of a dream and the dreaming self. The objects of a dream and the residual traces of the former experiences, which are responsible for the rise of the appearances of a dream, are accepted to be essentially the same as the prakāśa aspect of the dreaming self. Believing, therefore, that what is true in the case of the mircocosm is no less so in that of the macrocosm, the Trika holds that the manifestable and the manifested are essentially prakāśa.

THE IMPLICATION OF "PRAKĀŚA-VIMARŚAMAYA" SUMMARIZED.

Thus it appears that the word prakāśa stands not only for the common substratum of all the manifestables and the manifested but also for the manifestables and manifested themselves. Therefore, when the Trika speaks of the Ultimate as "prakāśa vimarśamaya" it means to imply that the Ultimate, in its aspect of prakāśa, is both the universe, in either manifested or unmanifested state, and its permanent substratum ; and that in its aspect of Vimarśa, it is that power which is ultimately responsible for keeping the universe in the state of perfect identity with itself, as at the time of Mahāpralaya, and for manifesting it as apparently separate from itself, as at the time of Creation.

THE NAMES OF THE ULTIMATE AND THEIR DISTINCTIVE IMPLICATIONS.

The Ultimate in its immanent aspect is referred to by three names with a distinctive implication in each case. The implied distinction refers to the relation of the Universal Consciousness with the manifestable. It is called Anuttara when the manifestable is in the state of absolute unity with it, as, for instance, at the time of the total universal dissolution (mahāpralaya). When the relation of absolute unity is substituted by predominant unity (bhedābheda) it is spoken of as S'iva, as at the time of pure creation. The term Maheśvara, however, is applied only when the manifestable assumes distinct existence within the Universal Consciousness much as our thought currents or ideas do within ourselves, when we are about to deliver a very thoughtful speech. For a clear conception of the different relations of the manifestable with the Universal Consciousness, as implied by the words Anuttara, S'iva and Maheśvara, their comparison with the relations of speech

with consciousness (self) in the states of Parā Paśyantī and Madhyamā respectively, as described in the second chapter of the first part, will be useful.

The available literature does not speak much on the former two, perhaps, because the first represents a state of absolute unity of all and, therefore, has not got much that calls for an explanation, and the second is related to a creation to which the perceptual and the inferential means of right knowledge do not apply: it is known only from the Āgamas It is only the last with which the Trika literature deals in detail. In fact, the Pratyabhijñā branch of the Trika, which expounds the highest philosophy of the system, is primarily concerned with proving or establishing the existence of, Maheśvara. The two Ādhikāras, Jñāna and Kriyā, which cover more than four-fifths of the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, give simply an exposition of Maheśvara's two powers, after which the above mentioned Adhikāras are called. The following verses make it abundantly clear that the word "Maheśvara, in the Śaiva terminology, means the manifestor of the impure creation, on which all the worldly transactions depend :—

"Evamanyonyabhinnānām
Aparasparavedinām
Jñānānāmanusandhāna-
Janmā naśyejjanasthitiḥ
Na cedantaḥkṛtānanta-
Visvarūpo maheśvaraḥ
Syādekaścidvapur jñāna-
Smṛtyapohanaśaktimān."[1]

1. P. V., I, 103-6.

Our object in these pages, as set forth in the very beginning, is to explain the phenomena of knowledge of every day life. After discussing, therefore, a few questions which more or less relate to all the three aspects of the

Universal Consciousness and the ābhāsas in general, we shall mostly confine ourselves to the impure creation and the Maheśvara.

How are the Ābhāsas related to the Universal Consciousness ?

The Trika conception of the macrocosm, as we have just pointed out, is based on a very careful study of the microcosm. It holds that what is true in the case of the individual self is equally so in that of the Universal Self, for, both are identical ; and that the Self is nothing but consciousness (Caitanya). We shall, therefore, be best able to answer the above question by pointing out how the individual manifestations are connected with the individual consciousness. We know of five states of the individual consciousness, the waking, the dreaming, the deep sleep, the transcendental and the pure, which are technically called Jāgrat, Svapna, Suṣupti, Turīya and Turīyātīta. The first three are well known. The last two refer to two kinds of concentrated states (Samādhi avasthās), The varying experiences of these states may be spoken of as the experiences of the unaffected (Śuddha) and the affected (Parimlāna) states of consciousness. The latter is not always due to the external stimulus. At the time of imagination and dream there is no such external stimulus as there is at that of the direct perception ; but in the former case the consciousness is no less affected than in the latter.

If we analyse our consciousness as affected by imagination, we find two elements in it, the subjective and the objective, i. e. the imagining consciousness which is responsible for the rise of the images, of which it is itself both the back-ground and the perceiver, and the images themselves which have no other basis than the consciousness

itself and are due to internal factors. These factors, in order that they may affect the consciousness in a certain order and not promiscuously all at once, have to be supposed to be within the control of some intelligent power. This controlling power is nothing else than the consciousness itself, which may also be called self, because, as has already been pointed out, according to this system, self is nothing else than consciousness.

Now the question is how these factors are connected with the self, or rather, where and how do they exist before their rise? Our experience tells us that they rise at our will from our consciousness independently of all external help and appear on the back-ground of consciousness and again merge in the same, much in the manner of waves in the ocean. If so, the answer to the above question is that just as the waves exist in the ocean before they rise, so do the images, which affect the purity of consciousness at the time of imagination, in the self, before they appear on the back-ground of its prakāśa aspect. This is exactly what Abhinava says in regard to the relation of Ābhāsas with the Universal Self in the course of discussion on the several meanings of the word "Anuttara" in the Parātriṁśikā vivaraṇa:—

"Tattvāntarāṇi ṣaṭtriṁśat anāśritaśivaparyantāni
parabhairavānupraveśāsāditatathābhāvasiddhīni."

Thus, according to this system, all that has existentiality, from the S'iva down to the earth, exists within the Ultimate much in the same way as do our ideas within ourselves at the time when the self is in an unaffected state and so also all is externally manifested, at will, independently of all external causes. This explains why all that exists is called Ābhāsa. It is Ābhāsa because it is manifested (Ābhāsyate) by the Universal Self or because it is manifest (Ābhāsate).

THE 'WHY' OF THE MANIFESTATION EXPLAINED.

Here it may be asked "Why does the Self manifest these Ābhāsas ?" Abhinava answers this question by saying that the nature of a thing cannot be questioned. It is absurd to ask why fire burns. To burn is the very nature of fire and so to manifest without what lies within is the very nature of the Self. It is natural for consciousness to assume a variety of forms. In fact, it is this that differentiates self from not-self. A jar, for instance, cannot change itself independently of external causes, but the self can and does:—

"Asthāsyadekarūpeṇa vapuṣā cenmaheśvaraḥ
Maheśvaratvaṁ saṁvittvaṁ tadatyakṣyad ghaṭādivat."

Our study of the microcosm fully supports the fact that such is the nature of the Ultimate Reality. Can we attribute the individual manifestation of dream or imagination to anything else than the very nature of the individual self ?

DOES THE ULTIMATE REALITY CHANGE ?

Here it may be asked if the Ultimate Reality appears in all the perceptible forms it must be admitted to be changing ; how then can its eternal character be maintained ? In every day life the changeability and the destructibilty are found universally concomitant. In fact, our idea of destructibility of such things as the sun and the moon is simply a matter of inference drawn from the change that we perceive them undergo. Therefore, if the Highest Reality also changes, as it must, in order to appear in a variety of forms, it must also be transitory like momentary things of the world. Moreover, if the Highest Reality contains within all that it manifests how can it be represented to be one ?

To take up these questions in their respective order, let us find out what is meant by change. When a thing is seen with some additions, it is said to have changed. When, for instance, we visit a certain place after a very long time and see very many things in addition to those which we saw on a former occasion, we say "the place is changed". Further, when the case is the reverse i. e. when we do not find many things which attracted our attention before, we say the same. The former kind of change is called "Āgama" (literally, coming in) or addition, and the latter "Apāya" (going out) or loss. There are two more kinds of change, known as transformation (Pariṇāma) and modification (Vikāra). When milk changes into curd it is said to have been transformed (Pariṇata) but when clay is changed into a jar, or gold into an ear-ring, it is said to have been modified (Vikāraṁ gamitaḥ), The chief distinction between the above two kinds of change is that while in the former case the thing cannot recover its former condition, milk, for instance, once it changes into curd, cannot again become milk in any way ; in the latter case such a recovery is very common. A lump of gold, for instance, after having assumed a variety of forms, such as those of ear-ring and bangle etc., can again recover its old form of lump. It is thus clear that, while the first three kinds of change involve addition to or loss of the existing constituents, as in the first two, and irrecoverable loss of quality, as in the third, in the last there is simply a difference in the arrangement of the constituents. It is because of this that, while destructibility is admitted to be universally concomitant with the former three kinds of change, it is not so with the last one. How[1] else could the Vaiśeṣika, who holds the atoms to be eternal, maintain their indestructibility ? Because, according to him, these very atoms, being stirred by the Lord's wish at the

1. Ta. San., T. D., 9.

time of creation and getting united with one another, form the various objects of the world, through the intervening stages of the 'binary' and the 'tertiary'. This is[1] what the Vedāntins also imply, when they say that the eternal Brahman is both the material and the operative cause of the world exactly as clay and gold and the potter and the goldsmith are of the earthen wares and gold ornaments.

If we analyse the idea a little further we find that such a change, as is always concomitant with destruction, presupposes the changing thing to be limited and so the existence of something apart from it, something that it becomes. A seed, for instance, changes into a tree and so is destructible, because it is limited in its nature and becomes, what originally it was not, by assimilating with itself what has a separate existence from it. The Highest Reality, according to the Trika, as we have already shown, contains all within[2]. There is nothing apart from it which it can be represented to become. What takes place, when a thing is said to have been manifested, is simply this, that out of the unlimited mass of things, which lies within, it manifests certain things, at will, as separate from itself[3], much as we do our own ideas at the time of imagination or dream. At all times, i. e. before, after and at the time of manifestation, the Ābhāsas are within the Absolute, as the waves are within the sea ; and just as nothing goes out of or comes in the sea in consequence of the rise of waves so there is no substantial loss or gain to the Universal Consciousness because of the manifestation of Ābhāsas. Thus, the change, if we so prefer to call it, in the Absolute, according to Ābhāsavādin, is simply a different arrangement of the ever existing material, much

1. Ś. Bh., 337. 2. I. P. V., I, 106.
3. I. P. V., I, 108.

as that of atoms, according to the atomists, or, as that of entitative contents of the Brahman as the material cause of the universe, according to the Vedāntins. Therefore, just as the atomists and the Vedāntins maintain the eternality of their ultimate realities inspite of such a change so do the Ābhāsavādins.

MONISM EXPLAINED.

As to the question "how can the Ultimate Reality be said to be one, if it contains within all the Ābhāsas ?" the Trika replies that that alone[1] can be said to be truly existent which exists independent of others. As all these Ābhāsas shine only on the background of the Absolute, much in the same manner as do the reflections in a mirror, so they cannot be said to have independent existence. And as this common basis of all the knowables is the only being that exists perfectly independent of others, so, this alone can be said to be truly existent (Sat). The system is held to be monistic, because, according to it, the Anuttara alone really exists. The Ābhāsas are mere transitory appearances.

ARE ĀBHĀSAS REAL ?

No language is perfect. We cannot find a conventional expression for each shade of difference in our ideas, in any language. We have to depend upon approximations to convey the idea of subtle differences. We have, therefore, to clearly understand the implication of each word of a question regarding a philosophical problem. In fact, much of the confusion that we find in the writings of the later commentators on the ancient philosophical authorities is due to the fight over words. Let us, therefore, find out what is

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1. I. P. V., I, 42-3.

meant when the question of reality is raised about Ābhāsa, or rather, what do we mean when we ordinarily use the word "real". A thing is ordinarily considered to be real if it bears verification, if the experience of it is uncontradicted. The appearances of a dream are unreal because our experiences of them are contradicted in the wakeful state and much more so is the appearance of silver at the sight of a mother-of-pearl ; for, while the dream silver does not disappear as soon as we approach it and can be used for all practical purposes so long as the dream lasts, the illusory silver does disappear at our approach. Thus, when we use the word "unreal" with regard to the things of the above instances, we do not mean that they are unreal exactly in the sense in which the sky-flower is unreal. What we mean is that they are not as lasting as those of the ordinary wakeful state : we, however, do not deny their existence and their having been the objects of cognition ; because to say so would be a self-contradiction. In an illusion or a dream we do see a separate object and our experience also, concerning the sight of the object as such, remains uncontradicted ever afterwards ; for, nobody ever feels that he did not have such an experience. But still, if that object is called unreal it is because of its not conforming to the conventional standard of reality in the wakeful state.

It may be asked here what is it that we see in an illusion or a dream ? Why does it last for so short a time, and why is its knowledge called erroneous, or rather, where does the error lie ? Leaving aside for the present the explanation of dream, if we take up only the illusion of silver and look at it from the point of view of the Ātmākhyātivādin, we get an explanation that it is nothing but a form that the limited self assumes at the sight of a mother-of-pearl because of the sudden and forceful revival of the Vāsanā : it is short lived, like a flash of lightning, because, there is nothing

behind it to support its existence, as in the case of the illustration of lightning-flash. The mistake lies in considering what is purely subjective to be essentially objective in the ordinary accepted sense of the word. This explains also why the silver of an illusion is not perceptible to all like lightning-flash, though both of them are equally momentary. What we mean to point out is that what is really meant by unreal is not that the thing has no existence, for, if it were not existent nothing would have been seen; but what is meant is that it is an individual subjective manifestation and as such it is of a different kind from the objective one on which all worldly transactions depend.

We have seen above that the word Ābhāsa in this system is used in a very wide sense. It denotes all that appears in any way or form. Therefore, if the word "real" in the above question means "existent", or in other words, if the question is "Have the Ābhāsas got existentiality (Sattā) ?" the reply, of the Ābhāsavāda would be "Yes". But, on the other hand, if the question is "whether the Ābhāsas have subjective or objective existence?", the answer would be that this difference is purely conventional and is assumed for practical purposes; it is, therefore, of the same nature as we feel between the objects of[1] a dream and those of a dream within another dream. It is a matter of common experience that at times, when we are dreaming, we dream a dream, and make exactly the same distinction between the objects of the continuous long dream and those of the shorter one, which ends within the longer, as we do in practical life between the objects of the wakeful and those of the dreaming state. The essential nature of the Ābhāsa is the same in both the cases, so that if one is called real the other is also real. In fact, the question,

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1. I. P. V., II, 114.

whether an appearance is subjective or objective, is not of much value, because the object of philosophy is not so much to point out the difference between one phenomenon, which is responsible for a certain kind of cognition, and another, as to explain in general why there is this cognitive change at all in the self and what it is that causes such a change. To say that one change is like another or that one cause of change is like another, as the Vedāntins always say that the external world is an illusion like the appearance of silver at the sight of a mother-of-pearl, is to avoid the real philosophical issue. We find that there are things which are external to self, it is another matter whether they are subjective or objective or more lasting or less ; and that they seem to so affect the self as to cause a variety of cognitions. The question, that philosophy has to answer, is, what are these things ? How have they come into being and how are they connected with the self which they seem to affect ? This leads us to the treatment of Maheśvara. We have not so far been able to find much about Śiva in the available literature.

MAHEŚVARA.

Maheśvara represents that state of the All-inclusive Universal Self in which, as said above, the Ābhāsas have a distinct existence from the Self, though no less within the Self than in the state of unity, exactly as our thoughts have within ourselves at the time when we are about to deliver a thoughtful speech. As such the Universal Self is beginningless and endless, because the universe itself is such. It is omnipotent[1] and perfectly independent in the use[2] of its powers. It contains within all that is 'entitative' and 'illuminable'. It forms the permanent substratum of all

1. T.A., I, 98-9. 2. I. P. V., I, 32.

that is objective. The object can have no more existence apart from and independent of the Mahesvara than a reflection can from a mirror. I is beyond the limitation of time, place and form. It is[1] a self-shining entity with which all the manifestations are connected exactly as the spreading rays are with a flame. It is perfectly free, because it does not require any prompting from without[2] to set about and accomplish its work. It is perfectly independent of both the external material and the instruments. It is spoken of as 'light;' but it is neither the recipient of light from the ordinarily known source, the sun, nor even is identical[3] with him or any other that can be thought of. It is perfectly independent of them. It is the ultimate source of all the sources of all lights.

KNOWABILITY OF THE UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

The Universal Consciousness is purely subjective. Objectivity cannot be[4] attributed to it, because such an attribution presupposes the existence of another knower, as different from and independent of it, and therefore, is inconsistent with the original hypothesis of the universality of the Universal Consciousness. Its existence cannot be denied, because the very[5] act of denial presupposes a conscious being and that also similarly, in its turn, the Universal Consciousness to make the relation of the deniability possible. The individual selves are mere manifestations of it and their acts of knowledge are wholly dependent upon it. It is this very Universal Self, which sees and knows through the[6] innumer-

1. T. A., I, 98.
2. I. P. V., I. 118.
3. I. P. V., I, 277.
4. I. P. V., I, 29.
5. T. A., I, 95-6
6. I. P. V. I., 111.

able bodies and as such is called the individual. It is the very life of the means of right knowledge through which the existence of the external objects as such is established. How can the sword cut itself? On this point there is perfect agreement between the Trika and the Vedānta. Like Utpalācārya's famous Kārikā :—

"Kartari jñātari svātmanyādisiddhe maheśvare
Ajaḍātmā niṣedhaṁ vā siddhiṁ vā vidadhīta kaḥ."
1. P. V., I, 29.

the Vedānta also says :—

"Vijñātāramare kena vijānīyāt." Br. U., 2-5-19.

THE POWERS OF THE UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

The Trika conception of power is different from that of the Naiyāyikas. According to the latter, it is a quality which cannot exist without a substratum and, therefore, presupposes a possessor. The knower, therefore, according to them, is different from the power of knowledge. But the former holds that the power is the very being of the possessor. The distinction between them is imaginary. It is just like giving a name to a collocation of a certain number of things and calling each constituent a possession of what is indicated by the said name. Take, for instance, a chair. It is a collocation of a certain number of pieces of wood arranged in a certain way. Each piece is called by a separate name, indicative of its peculiar function, and all these taken together are given a different name "chair". We speak of the leg, the arm and the back of a chair, as if chair had a separate existence from the legs etc. The difference between the Universal Consciousness and its powers is[1], therefore, according to the Ābhāsavādin, not real but purely imaginary and conventional.

1. T. A., I, 109.

Similar is the case with the difference between one power and another. It is assumed because of the variety of its effects. It is of the same kind as is imagined between[1] the fire's power of burning and that of baking. In reality, however, all the powers, as we have already pointed out above, which are attributed to Maheśvara, are mere aspects of the one all-inclusive power, the Vimarśa, or the Svātantrya Śakti.

THE KARTṚTVA AND THE JÑĀTṚTVA S'AKTIS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS.

The Trika speaks of two kinds of manifestation, the external and the internal. For a clear understanding of the idea of internality and externality of ābhāsas let us suppose that each ābhāsa is constituted by a separate current in the sea of the Universal Self. These currents always flow throughout the state of creation underneath the surface of the sea, and as such represent internal ābhāsas. To bring about their internal separate manifestation and to maintain them in the state of the internal separateness, is the work of Kartṛtva Śakti, omnipotence. At times, however, these currents are, for a moment, brought over the surface, as waves, and are put in such a position that that wave, which is capable of receiving reflection, can be affected by those which cast reflections. This is the work of the omniscience or power of knower (jñātṛtva śakti) and the affection of that wave which is capable of receiving reflection is the phenomenon of knowledge.

THE ASPECTS OF THE JÑĀTṚTVA S'AKTI.

The Jñātṛtva S'akti has the following three aspects :—

1. The power of knowledge (Jñāna Śakti)
2. The power of remembrance (Smṛti S'akti) and
3. The power of differentiation (Apohana Śakti).

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1. T. A., I, 110.

THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE.

The first[1] is that aspect of the power of the Universal Consciousness by virtue of which it takes out for separate manifestation only certain things from the unlimited mass which lies merged in it (svarūpād unmagnam ābhāsayati). The difference between the phenomenon of knowledge and the power thereof is, that the former is the effect and the latter is the cause.

According[2] to this system, the subject is no less a manifestation than the object and both are momentary collocations of a certain number of ābhāsas or manifestations. A phenomenon of knowledge is, therefore, like the rise of two waves in the sea of the Universal Consciousness. One of these has nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection, and the other is without it. The former is called Jīvābhāsa (limited sentient manifestation) and the latter, Jaḍābhāsa (insentient manifestation). When the rising sentient wave is affected by the insentient which rises simultaneously with the former, as a mirror is by the objects, placed before, the phenomenon of knowledge is said to have taken place. Thus, knowledge is simply the affected sentient wave of consciousness ; but the power of knowledge is that capacity of the Universal Consciousness which is responsible for the rise of both the waves necessary for the phenomenon of knowledge. This problem we propose to take up for a detailed discussion in the section, dealing with the Trika theory of perception.

THE POWER OF REMEMBRANCE.

But if both the sentient and the insentient ābhāsas are momentary so must be the knowledge also ; and if so, even

1. I. P. V., I, 108.
2. I. P. V., I, 215.

the postulate of the power of knowledge fails to explain the "why" of all the worldly transactions. Our experience tells us that our decision to try to gain or shun an object is reached after a sufficiently elaborate psychological process. The first thing that we do is to place, as it were, the experience of the present object by the side of that of a similar one in the past. Then we compare the two, draw a sort of inference as to the useful or harmful nature of what is present before us and accordingly decide to try to gain or shun it. The knowledge is momentary. It is destroyed in the very next moment after its production, but the comparison of experiences, necessary for motor response, requires its continued existence in some form till the comparison is done. The theory of momentary knowledge, therefore, cannot satisfactorily account for the togetherness of experiences of different times on which all worldly transactions depend. Therefore, in order to explain the psychological phenomenon of the above description, the ābhāsavādins postulate another aspect of the omniscience, *'the power of remembrance'*.

The power of remembrance is that power of the Universal Consciousness by virtue of which it manifests itself in the form of such an individual self as can retain the effects of the external stimuli, received at the time of perception, and is able to revive them at that of a subsequent perception of a similar thing so as to make the unification of the experiences of both the present and the past times possible. The fact is that the sentient[1] wave is like a momentary wave of light emanating from a permanent source. It is this source that retains in a sub-conscious state the idea of having sent out a wave towards a certain object and that of having received a stimulus of a certain

1. I. P. V., I, 109.

kind therefrom. The point in question will become clear if in this case also, as we did in that of knowledge, we draw a distinction between the power and the phenomenon of remembrance. The former is that power which is the cause of such a limited perceiver as is the immediate permanent source of the emanating sentient wave and the latter is the effect thereof[1]. We take up the problem of remembrance for an exhaustive treatment in the 4th chapter.

Apohana Śakti

or

The power of differentiation.

It has been stated above that all that is, i. e., all that can be said to exist in any way or form, is within the Universal Self. For, consistently with the idea of its perfection we cannot admit the existence of any thing outside it. But both the psychic phenomena, the perception and the remembrance, presuppose the existence of both the cognisor and the cognised not only as separate from the Universal Self but also (as separate) from each other. In fact, in our daily life we do not feel, as described above, that the subject and the object are like waves On the contrary our experience is that they have independent and mutually exclusive existence. The Trika accounts for this fact by postulating the third aspect of the omniscience, the Apohana S'akti. It is that aspect of the omniscience which manifests each ābhāsa, whether subjective (jīva) or objective (jaḍa), as apparently completely cut off both from the Universal Consciousness and from one another, though in reality[2] even at the time of such a manifestation they are one with their common substratum. Thus[3], it is that

1. I. P. V., I, 109 F. N. 2. I. P. V., I, 111.
3. I. P. V., I, 110 F. N.

power which is the cause of all the determinate knowledge of the limited self. This Trika concept of the Universal Consciousness as the cause of all the psychological phenomena is in complete accord with the one, contained in the following line of the Bhagavadgītā.

"Mattaḥ smṛtirjñānamapohanañca."

Bh. G., XV, 15.

KARTṚTVA ŚAKTI.

It may be stated at the very outset that the word Kartṛtva śakti is used in more than one sense. It is used in the sense of the creative power or power of manifestation in general: as such it means the same thing as Svātantrya śakti. Therefore, if we take Kartṛtva śakti in this wider sense the omniscience or jñātṛtva śakti will be simply an aspect of it. Abhinava has made this point very clear in the following words :—

> "Sa cāyaṁ svatantraḥ..............................tadevāsya pārameśvaryam mukhyamānandamayaṁ rūpam iti pūrvamupāttaṁ 'kartari' iti. Tadeva svātantryaṁ vibhajya vaktuṁ 'jñatari' iti paścānnirdiṣṭam"
>
> I. P. V., I, 31-2.

It is also used to denote that aspect of the Svātantrya śakti which is responsible for the innumerable varieties of the internal limited manifestation. These varieties, as the Jñātṛtva śakti reveals them, are manifested in two ways, viz., (1) by a simultaneous manifestation of many forms, each of which is substantially different and apparently separate from the rest, for instance, when we see a beautiful landscape with all its trees and creepers; and (II) by successive manifestation of a large number of forms which so resemble one another that they are recognised to be the various forms of the same thing, as when we see a fawn

frisking about. The former is called[1] Deśakramābhāsa due to Mūrtivaicitrya and the latter Kālakramābhāsa caused by Kriyāvaicitrya. Thus "Kartṛtva śakti" in its limited sense, the sense in which we are using the expression here, means that aspect of the Svātantrya śakti which is responsible for the innumerable varieties of the internal limited manifestation. It has two aspects, the Kriyā śakti and the Kāla śakti.

KRIYĀ ŚAKTI.

Kriyā or action[2], according to this system, is nothing but an appearance of a long series of closely similar physical forms in so quick a succession as to produce a persistence of vision. Let us take, for instance, the hero of a drama represented in a cinematographic film, and suppose that we are seeing that part of the film in which he is represented alone in a solitary place in a fit of anger, tearing his hair, grinding his teeth, rushing forward with a jerk, stopping suddenly and looking round wildly. At such a sight we use different expressions "tearing" etc., expressive of different kinds of the so called action, with reference to the hero. But let us ask "why?" Is it not simply because of the appearance of a series of pictures, each of which, though different from the rest of the series, has yet enough common element to be identified with both the preceding and the the following; and does not each one of the expressions expressive of an action stand for the established convention which calls a certain number of similar successive pictures by one word? For instance, when we say "the hero is rushing", does not the word "rushing" denote a set of pictures beginning with the one that represents the hero's first movement to raise one of his feet: and do we not use that word simply because of production of persistence of

1. I. P. V., II, 13. 2. I. P. V., II, 14.

vision and consequent consciousness that the same figure is doing all the movements indicated by the particular word ?

To make the idea clear let us state here briefly that, just like the Bauddha, the Trika also holds that the Ābhāsas are momentary and that the apparent continuity of a thing is due to the proportionately long series of similar ābhāsas, which follow one another in so quick a succession that we think that the same is having continuous existence. In the case of the flame of an oil lamp, for instance, the flame, as the scientists tell us, is changing every moment. But as the old flame disappears the fresh energy comes in its place and is transformed into a new one with such quickness that we feel that the same flame is having continuous existence. The Trika, therefore, holds that an action is noting but an appearance of the Universal Consciousness in those multifarious forms, a group of which is conventionally referred to by a single expression, much as the word "running" in the above illustration of the cinematographic film, is used for a large number of pictures beginning with the one showing the first attempt at lifting of the foot and ending with that which immediately precedes the first of the next group to be expressed by a similar word.

To make the point a little clearer let us take, for instance, a dream in which we see a person running and try to explain it psychologically. We know that a dream is nothing but a certain arrangement of the residual traces (saṁskāras) now revived owing to some unknown cause. Now the question is "does the running man of the dream represent one revived impression or more ?" The natural answer to this is "more" i. e. as many as there are pictures required to represent this movement in a cinema-show. According to the Trika, the universe is simply a manifestation of the

Universal Consciousness very much similar to the individual manifestation of dream or the common lasting creation of a Yogin. Therefore, just as a running person is represented by a series of revived impressions in a dream and by a series of pictures in a cinema show, so in ordinary worldly life each activity is represented by a series of ābhāsas. Kriya śakti, therefore, is that aspect of the Kartṛtva śakti, which is responsible for such internal ābhāsas as, being externally manifested by the power of knowledge (jñāna śakti) give rise to the idea of action. These ābhāsas are connected or disconnected with one another[1] exactly as are the mental impressions in the case[2] of a dream or the various pictures in the case of a cinema show. This[3] very power is responsible for such manifestations also as give rise to concepts of conjunction (Sambandha), generality (Sāmānya), place (deśa), space (Dik) and time etc.[4]

KĀLA ŚAKTI.

Kāla śakti is another aspect of the Kartṛtva śakti, which is responsible for the manifestation of each constituent of the series of ābhāsas, on which the concept of action is based, as cut off from the rest, exactly as the Apohana aspect of the Jñātṛtva śakti manifests each constituent of the block of images formed on the mirror of Buddhi as separate from the rest.

We may add here that the Universal Consciousness with the powers described in the foregoing pages is called Maheśvara on the analogy of a king. A person is called Īśa, Īśvara or lord because of his having control over a part of

1. I. P. V., II, 174-5.
2. I. P. V., II, 12.
3. I. P. V., II, 24.
4. I. P. V., II, 42.

the world.[1] The Universal Consciousness is called Maheśvara because it controls, in every way, not only all that we can conceive but also all that which is beyond the conception of our limited power.

1. I. P. V., I, 44.

CHAPTER III.

THE CATEGORIES OF THE ĀBHĀSAVĀDA.

In the preceding chapter we have dealt with the Ābhāsavādin's concept of the Universal Consciousness as the manifestor. In this chapter, therefore, we propose to give a brief exposition of the Manifested.

The Ābhāsavāda divides the manifested into thirtysix categories. This division, as Abhinava very clearly states, is based, neither wholly on the scientific observation, nor purely or exclusively on the logical inference. The authority of the Āgamas[1] is its sole basis. This, however, does not mean that it has no support of the facts of experience and that it is simply a matter of belief. It means only this that it is not within the reach of the ordinary means of perceptional or inferential knowledge to fully reveal the essential nature and the full implication of each one of the tattvas. It does not deny that it is a result partly of long intuitive (yogic) experiments and partly of a careful study of mind and matter.

Of the thirty-six categories twenty-five i. e., from the puruṣa to the earth are taken from the Sāṅkhya, with some slight modifications in some cases, as we shall point out, while dealing with them separately; and one, namely, the māyā, is adopted from the Vedānta. The remaining ten are common to both the dualistic and the nondualistic schools of the Śaivāgama. Of these ten, which represent the first ten of the thirty-six categories, the first five represent five powers or to be more accurate, five aspects of the Ultimate Reality. The remaining five, which are placed between the

1. I. P. V., II, 186.

māyā and the puruṣa in the order of manifestation, represent the limitations of an individual self.

These tattvas can be classed as pure or impure, according as they belong to the pure or the impure creation. The first five are said to belong to the pure creation inasmuch as they are manifested by the S'iva himself by the sheer force of his will, independently of any prompting cause, like karma, or material cause, like māyā[1]. The rest, i. e., from the kalā to the earth, are created by Aghora or Ananta, with the help of māyā. This is called impure creation because it is of limited nature. It is controlled by the law of karma, because its purpose is to supply the necessary stimuli for the varying experiences of the countless souls, the experiences which these souls must undergo according to their karmas. These categories can also broadly be divided into two groups, the self-luminous, consisting of the sentient categories constituted by various kinds of subject (Pramātṛ), and the illuminable, consisting of the insentient categories such as the earth etc.

The categories are mere manifestations of the Ultimate, and as such are essentially the same as their source, and so are all the knowables, because they are mere collocations of some of the tattvas. A collocation is said to belong to one category or another, according as a particular tattva forms its basis by being the chief constituent of it. A jar, for instance, is said to be earthy, not because it is exclusively made up of earth, but because earth is its chief constituent.

PRALAYA AND MAHĀPRALAYA.

The universal dissolution (pralaya) is of two kinds, the 'small' and the 'great'. In the former every thing gets dissolved into its primordial substances and qualities. It is a state in which, according to the Sāṅkhya, the qualities

1. T. A., VI, 55.

(guṇas), namely, sattva, rajas and tamas, are in a state of perfect equality; and, according to the Vaiśeṣika, every thing is reduced to atoms. The individual souls in this state are, as it were, in a deep sleep, though still in the bondage of their past individual karmas. Such a dissolution is referred to by the word "Pralaya".

We have not so far discovered any thing which might give us the Trika idea of the condition of the tattvas in the state of "small dissolution". There is, however, the following statement in the Tantrāloka :—

"Īśvarecchāvaśa kṣubdha bhoga lolika cidgaṇān
Saṁvibhaṅktum aghoreśaḥ sṛjatīha sitetaram"

which shows that in regard to the condition of the individual there is a complete agreement between the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika on the one hand and the Trika on the other. The Trika view, however, on the mahāpralaya is sufficiently clear in the existing literature. According to the available information, it is a state of perfect annihilation of all that is manifested. In this state the collocations and their constituents, the tattvas, suffer the same fate, and the individual selves, their bondages, āṇava, kārma and māyīya, having been snapped, lose their individuality and are completely merged in the Universal Self, the Ultimate Reality. The Trika believes in both kinds of dissolution. How this belief does not conflict with the theory of karma, and, how creation of all kinds of limited selves does not make the Parama S'iva cruel or partial, we shall explain in the course of our treatment of the theory of Karma in the fifth chapter.

The creation of the physical universe is not wanton but purposeful. It is meant for supplying the necessary stimuli for varying experiences which the innumerable souls must enjoy or suffer according to their individual karmas. Hence it presupposes karma as its prompting cause. At the

time of "pralaya" the souls with their individual karmas, are, as it were, in a state of deep sleep. Therefore, when they wake up from the sleep of pralaya, the prompting cause, the karma, being there, the creation can begin. The case with the mahāpralaya, however, is different. In that the individual souls are not merely in deep sleep. On the contrary, they then completely lose their individuality and are perfectly one with the Ultimate. Their waking up, as after pralaya, is, therefore, out of question. The prompting cause being absent, how can the creation take place? It is because of this that the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins[1] etc. do not admit the Mahāpralaya.

The Trika, however, believes in the Mahāpralaya and reconciles this belief with its theory of dependence of the creation of the physical universe on the karmas of the individual selves by attributing a wider meaning to the word "karma" than that in which it is ordinarily used. In the non-Trika literature it means a certain effect that is produced on the limited self by the personal conviction of the potentiality of a particular action to lead to a certain experience at the time of maturation. But in the Trika literature it is used in another sense also, namely, the limited objectless desire, which, according to this system, arises in a newly manifested limited self, just before the creation of a new physical world which follows a mahāpralaya. This desire is without any objective reference, because it precedes the creation of object. It may, therefore, be spoken of as a mere eagerness on the part of the limited self to use its limited power. When the distinction of one from the other is tried to be emphasised, the former is referred to as "karmasaṁskāra" and the latter as "kārmamala". Ordinarily, however, the simple word "karma" is used for both.

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1. V. S. S. Bh., 407.

To make the point clear let us add here that, according to this system, the creation, maintenance and destruction are governed by the law of karma; but the obscuration and the grace (tirodhāna and anugraha) depend entirely upon the will of the Lord. The obscuration is nothing else than the Lord's appearing in the form of the innumerable limited selves whose limitedness consists in their ignorance of their identity with the Universal Self, in mere consciousness of imperfection and in consequent limitation of their powers of knowledge and action. This limitation is technically called āṇavamala. The powers of knowledge and action being limited, limitation in desire naturally follows. The above described assumption of the multifarious forms by the Universal Self precedes the new creation of the physical universe after a mahāpralaya. The desire, therefore, that arises in the limited self, is naturally without objective reference. It is a mere eagerness to use the powers of knowledge and action, and as they are limited so the desire also has naturally to be so. This desire is called kārmamala.

Therefore, when the Trika says that the karma is the prompting cause in the creation of the physical universe which follows mahāpralaya, by the word "karma" it means kārmamala. For, how can there be any karmasaṁskāra before that creation which comes after a total universal dissolution (mahāpralayānantarā sṛṣṭi) in which the souls having been made free from all kinds of bondages and limitations become one with the Universal Self ? Thus, according to the Trika, the grace is responsible for the total universal dissolution and the obscuration for the ordered creation that follows mahāpralaya. The power of obscuration, comes into play after a mahāpralaya only, to supply the prompting cause for the new creation to proceed,

In the case of the physical creation which follows pralaya, the prompting cause in the form of karma, as associated with the innumerable individual selves, being already there, the use of the power of obscuration is unnecessary. Both, the Mahāpralaya and the creation that follows, are, therefore, not possible, according to those systems which hold the karma to be merely karmasaṁskāra, and do not believe in the two independent functions of the Maheśvara, the obscuration and the grace. For, according to them, one of the most essential antecedent conditions of the creation is the karmasaṁskāra, as the prompting cause. Therefore, if there be Mahāpralaya, i. e. if all were to completely merge in the Ultimate, if the individual souls were to lose their individuality and were to become free from karma, there being no prompting cause, the fresh creation would not take place. The Trika theory of karma receives more detailed treatment in the fifth chapter.

TATTVA DEFINED.

A Tattva is that which lasts through the 'small dissolution' of the universe and is always present in its effects, in its collocations, or in the beings marked by certain characteristics peculiar to itself. It is pervasive in so far as it forms the basis of all the collocations belonging to that creation of which it is the chief constituent. This world, in which we live, move and have our being, is called earthly (pārthiva) not because it is made up of earth alone, but because earth is its chief constituent.[1] The definition, however, seems to be a little complicated. It is not equally applicable in all its parts to all the *tattvas*. For, though all are pervasive in the above sense, yet because of the difference in the essential nature of certain groups of the *tattvas* from others and so of the things belonging to them,

1. T. A., VI, 3.

there is difference in the manner of pervasion. The earth, for instance, pervades what is earthly, as a material cause does its effects. Similarly the *prakṛti* pervades its evolutes, according to the Sāṅkhya terminology, as qualities do their collocations, and the sentient *tattvas*, from *puruṣa* to Śiva,' pervade those which have common characteristics with them, as a genus does the individual things. It is this fact which the words "the effect," "the collocation" and "the beings with common characteristics" are meant to indicate, as the following quotation shows :—

"Svasmin kāryetha dharmaughe
Yadvāpi sva sadṛg guṇe
Āste sāmānya kalpena
Tananād vyāptṛ bhāvataḥ
Tattattvaṁ kramaśaḥ pṛthvī
Pradhānaṁ puṁ śivādayaḥ."

T. A., VI, 4-5.

THE ORDER OF MANIFESTATION OF THE PURE CREATION

The pure creation is a supersensuous creation. Just as the Naiyāyikas believe in the earthly, the watery, the airy, the fiery and the etherial beings and classify them according as any one of the five elements is the chief constituent of their bodies, so the Trika believes in five kinds of the super-sensuous and super-natural beings, who are in no way connected with body, senses, vital airs, intellect or mind, and classifies them as Sāmbhava Saktija, Mantra maheśvara, Mantreśvara, and Mantra,[1] according as any one of the five powers of the Universal Self (Parama Siva), being (Cit), consciousness (ānand), will (icchā), knowledge (jñāna) and action (kriyā) predominates in them. The predominance of any one of these powers,[2] in the

1. T. A., VI, 52.
2. T. A., VI, 49.

absence of all connections with the material world, results only in a certain state of consciousness or an affection of the purity of self. These states very closely correspond to the successive states through which a person rises to the ordinary consciousness of the wakeful state from that of perfect senselessness, in which even breathing stops. These states can also be spoken of as similar to those, through which a yogin descends from the transcendental state (Turīyāvasthā) to that of the ordinary worldly experience.

Leaving aside, for the present, the consideration of purely super-sensuous spiritual states, if we analyse the psychological movements which precede an ordinary action of daily occurrence we come to the following two conclusions :—(I) that an individual, who is, after all, only an epitome of the Universal Self, possesses all the five powers attributed to the latter, and (II) that, in the former's activity, these powers, because of the dependence of each of the following, in the above order on what immediately precedes, necessarily come into play in the same order in which they are supposed to be manifested in the pure creation Imagine, for instance, an artist, sitting bent over his canvas. At one time he picks up a brush, dips it in a paint and takes it so near the canvas that an on-looker feels sure that he would give some artistic strokes to it : but suddenly he stops his hand, thinks a little, and then places the brush back again in its place. What is it that controls his activity ? Is it not an idea or mental image, which he is trying to produce, or rather, reproduce on the canvas, that does so ? And what is this idea after all ? Is it not an affection of the self ? If it is, will it be wrong to call it knowledge ? If not, does it not prove that the production of a new thing presupposes its knowledge which controls the productive activity ?

Now the next thing to be found out is as to why does a particular idea control at a particular time, or rather, why does a particular idea arise at a certain time to the exclusion of all the rest ? Is it not because of the artist's will ? Is it not the power of will that gives rise to and maintains a certain idea for a certain time ? Has it not often been found that, when the control of the will weakens, other ideas rush in and spoil the work ? Does it not often happen that after a long sitting without any appreciable progress in the work, when he loses his patience, he spoils his own work by giving some random strokes and then in sheer disgust, as if in a fit of madness, tears his canvas to pieces ? Let it, however, be remembered that even these random strokes and the tearing of the canvas are not without a precedent idea for so doing; nor is the idea without the prompting of the will. For, before these acts of madness are done, this will, often finds expression in such words as "It is a hopeless task."

The invariable precedence of will to knowledge is thus undeniable. But is this will absolutely independent ? Can all the created will ? Or, can any limited creation always will ? If not, why ? A log of wood can never will nor can a person in an utterly senseless condition. The will, therefore, apparently presupposes and depends upon consciousness.

This consciousness is inseparably connected with the 'being', as the power of germination is with a seed. This 'being' represents the ego, the entity, for which the word "self" stands in "self-consciousness" or the word "aham" in "aham asmi".

Thus a careful study of microcosm proves that both, the attribution of the five powers to Parama Śiva, the manifestor,[1] and the order of their manifestation, as conceived

1. T. A., VI, 48.

by the Trika, are based on the facts of experience and are not matters of purely religious belief.

The conception of these powers or aspects of the Universal Self and their coming into play in the same order as shown above, is not altogether foreign to the Upaniṣad literature. For instance, compare the following:—

"Sadeva saumyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam...... ......tadaikṣata, bahu syām, prajāyeya, iti, tattejo asṛjata."
Ch. U. 6, 2, 1-3.

This passage is quoted by Śaṅkara to point out the distinction between the insentient creator, the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya, and the sentient creator, the Brahman of the Vedānta. While discussing this passage, Śaṅkara admits that the "being" (sat) aspect is common to both, the Pradhāna and the Brahman, but it is the consciousness (īkṣatikarma) that constitutes the point of difference between them and that "being" precedes "consciousness."

But Śaṅkara's object in quoting and discussing the passage in question was simply to interpret the text of Bādarāyaṇa and to refute the Sāṅkhya theory of creation. He has, therefore, not discussed other points connected with the remaining two clauses. A careful study of the passage as a whole, however, shows that the Upaniṣad states all the five aspects of the Universal Self in which the Trika believes, and that there is perfect agreement between the two in regard to the order of their manifestation. Even Śaṅkara admits that the 'being' is the first and the action is the last of the five aspects and that consciousness follows 'being. We have, therefore, got to consider only the remaining two, indicated by the two clauses "bahu syām" and "prajāyeya" (may I be many, may I grow forth). It will be apparent even to a superficial reader that they express desire; for,

the finite verbs of both the clauses are put in the potential mood. But the question is as to whether there is any distinctive implication of each of the two. In our humble opinion the first simply states the rise of will (desire) to become many, but the second the rise of an idea which controls the activity whereby the desire is to be realised, exactly as the mental image in the case of an artist, described in a preceding paragraph, controls his productive activities. One can become many in at least two ways, by dividing one's self into many, as a flame does into rays, or by growing itself into many, as a seed does through successive stages. The control of the idea of growth over the activity wherewith the desire to become many is realised consists in its directing the activity of the Universal Self into the channel of creation as opposed to that of self-division. It would, therefore, not be wrong to say that "prajāyeya" indicates the rise of the controlling idea (knowledge) precedent to the act of creation. Thus the Vedānta and the Trika appear to agree on the number, the nature and the order of manifestation of the five aspects of the Universal Self.

S'IVA TATTVA.

Like the Sāṅkhya, which believes that in every evolute of the prakṛti all the three qualities are present and that the distinction of one evolute from another depends upon the difference in the proportion of the constituent qualities of an individual evolute, the Trika also holds that in every manifestation of the pure creation all the five powers of the Universal Self are essentially present and that the difference of one manifestation from another is due to the predominance of one of the powers in a particular manifestation. S'iva tattva is the first manifestation and the power of "being" (Cit) predominates in it. It is purely subjective, and has no objective or predicative reference. It is free not only

from the impurities of karma and māyā but also from that impurity which is technically called āṇavamala. The experience[1] of this state, if the use of such a word be permissible, is pure "I". This experience may be compared to that of nirvikalpa-samādhi. It is wrong to use even such a predicate as "am" in reference to it; because "am" also implies some kind of relation of identity, which presupposes both the self-consciousness and the consciousness, howsoever vague or indefinite, of something apart from the self. Both the self-consciousness and the object are, however, later manifestations. How can, therefore, any talk of them in reference to Śiva be justifiable? It may be said to represent that entity the idea of which is conveyed by the word "self" in the compound "self-consciousness", when it is not used to refer to body, vital air, mind or Buddhi.

ŚAKTI.

The next category, the manifestation of which follows that of the Śiva, is the Śakti. This can scarcely be called the second tattva. Its manifestation takes place almost simultaneously with the first, for, unless there be consciousness of what is manifested how can it be said to have been manifested at all? It is, however, spoken of as the second, because the consciousness presupposes the "being" as the rays do a flame. Just as there can be no rays without a flame so there can be no consciousness without "being". But still just as in the succesive manifestations of the light energy, flame undeniably precedes the rays, so, in those of the Universal Self, "being" precedes consciousness. Though the experience of the beings belonging to this state, like that of the preceding, is without any objective reference, yet it is not altogether without predicative reference. The experience

1. I. P. V., I, 1.

of the Śaktijas is marked by the additional element of "am" to the "I" as "I am" In this the Ānanda Śakti predominates.

SADĀŚIVA.

This is the third category and the power of will predominates in it. The will, as our experience tells us, is not altogether without any objective reference, nor is its object so distinct as that of knowledge. This tattva, therefore, represents a very faintly affected state of the Self. It is a transitional stage between the unaffected state of the Śiva and the Śakti and the distinctly affected state of the Īśvara tattva. The affection of the Universal Self at this stage may be compared to that of the limited self of an artist when the desire to produce a master-piece first arises within him[1]. It may also be compared to the extremely faint outline of an intended artistic production on a canvas.

The experience of the beings of this tattva may be represented as "I am this". It has, however, to be remembered that the "this" which represents the universe, the cause of affection, is so indistinct that it can be said to affect the universal beings of this tattva as little as a picture does a canvas when it is represented by extremely faint outlining dots only.

The experiencing entities belonging to this category are called Mantramaheśas. They are universal beings and because they are not perfectly free from the impurity, called āṇavamala, their experience, therefore, is not without any objective reference. The object, however, is not of limited nature as in the case of the ordinary mortals. The whole universe constitutes their object and is conceived by them as identical with themselves (sarvasya avyatirekeṇa, I. P. V., I. 36).

1. I. P. V., II, 192-3.

Īśvara tattva.

This is the fourth category. The power of knowledge predominates in it. It is marked by the rise into prominence of the "this" element of the Universal Self which had but very faintly begun affecting the Self in the Sadāśiva state. It is but natural, that the objective element should predominate in it, because knowledge is nothing but an affection of the self due to internal or external causes, and the distinction of the state of volition from that of knowledge is only this that the affection of the self in the former case is very faint but in the latter it is so very clear that the element of the self which predominates in the former case is thrown into the back-ground in the latter. The difference between these two states of the Universal Self may be compared to those of a canvas; the former to the one in which the intended picture is faintly outlined in hardly perceptible dots; and the latter to the other in which the picture is fully drawn and the canvas is thrown so much in the background that ordinary people instead of calling it canvas call it picture.

The idea of the predominance of the objective[1] element in the experience of the Īśvara state is conveyed in the Trika literature by giving the first position not to "I" as in the case of the experience of the Sadāśiva state "I am this" but to "this" as "this I am". It is perhaps to imply the idea of predominance of the objective element that this category is called "Īśvara tattva", because lordliness of a lord consists in his holding what constitutes his lordliness, to be more important than his self.

Sadvidyā.

It is the fifth category and is marked by the predominance of the power of action. In this the objective element

1. I. P. V., II, 191.

is neither so obscure as in the Sadāśiva nor so predominant as in the Īśvara, but it is, like the two pans of an evenly held balance, (samadhṛta tulā puṭa nyāyena), in a state of perfect equality with the subjective[1]. The experience of this state may be expressed as "I am this".

The Sadvidyā tattva is a distinct tattva from the Vidyā tattva, which represents one of the limited powers of a limited self. Although the experience of the Universal Self in the state of the Sadvidyā is to be expressed in the same words "I am this" as those required to state that of a limited individual self under the influence of the vidyā, yet the implication in each case is fundamentally different. In the former, both, "I" and "this", refer to the same thing i. e. both have sāmānādhikaraṇya; there is no consciousness of the subject as quite distinct from that of the object; but in the latter case "I" refers to the limited subject and "this" to the limited object[2].

The order, in which the Tattvas of the pure creation are given here, represents the one in which they rise from the Universal Self. The order of merging of these tattvas back into the Universal Self, is the reverse of it. The self-recognition (ātma pratyabhijñāna) is nothing but merging of individual self in the universal. It is, therefore, held by the Trika that an individual self, in order that it may get completely merged in the Universal Self[3], has to pass through the successive states represented by the universal beings belonging to the (I) sadvidyā, (II) īśvara, (III) sadāśiva and (IV) śiva-śakti tattvas, which are classed as (I) mantra, (II) mantreśa, (III) mantramaheśa, and (IV) śiva. The chief

1. I. P. V., II, 196.
2. I. P. V., II, 196-7.
3. T. A., VI, 78.

point of distinction of one class from another is constituted by the association of each with one of the four states of āṇavamala in the course of its destruction[1] i. e. (I) kiñcit-dhvasyamāna, (II) dhvasyamāna. (III) kinciddhvasta, and (IV) dhvasta, respectively.

In the above manifestations of the Universal Self the objective universe is purely ideal and is realised as it is in reality. Their experiencing entities realise themselves as universal beings, which they really are, and their experiences also are free from all kinds of limitation. They, therefore, represent the sphere of true knowledge and are spoken of as pure creation which is characterised by freedom from limitation as opposed to the impure which is the work of the Māyā and as such is distinctively limited.

MĀYĀ.

We have just pointed out the distinction of the experience of the beings belonging to the Sadvidyā from that of a limited individual under the influence of the Vidyā. In the former case "I" and "this" refer to the same entity, but in the latter to two separate things, i. e. in the former case the subject and the object are identical but in the latter they are different. In the former the idea of unity predominates, but in the latter that of duality or plurality preponderates. This may be considered to be a typical point of distinction between the pure and the impure creations. The first manifestation of the impure creation is Māyā. It is this Tattva, the manifestation of which, first of all, apparently breaks the unity of the Universal Self. It is the most distinctive power of the Universal Self in its creative aspect. It manifests diversity independently of any external helper or prompter[2]. It is conceived both as

1. T. A., VI, 80-1.
2. T. A., VI, 116.

the power of obscuration and as the primary cause of all the limited manifestations. In its former aspect it is often referred to as "Moha"[1] and in the latter as "parāniśā"[2]. Its effect also, by transference of epithet, (upacāra) is spoken of as "māyā". As such, Māyā is limited; for, whatever is manifested as apparently separate from the Universal Self is essentially so. It is pervasive, because it is the cause of the universe. It is subtle, because it passes ordinary comprehension. As an aspect of the Universal Self it is eternal[3].

The impure creation consists of two kinds of limited manifestations, the sentient and the insentient. The māyā, as the force of obscuration, is responsible for the appearance of the one Universal Self as innumerable individual selves, whose distinguishing feature is the ignorance of their real nature (svarūpākhyāti) and consequent imperfection of their powers of knowledge and action :

> "Mohayati anena śakti viśeṣeṇa iti moho māyā śaktiḥ tasyāḥ vaśaḥ sāmarthyam mohana kāryam prati avirāmaḥ yathoktam 'Māyā vimohinī nāma'......... ".
>
> I. P. V., I, 35.

But Māyā Tattva as the primary cause of all the insentient limited manifestations i. e. as parāniśā, contains all the manifestables within:

> "Kāryaṁ cāsyāṁ sadevahi kalādi dharaṇī prāntam"
>
> T. A., VIII, 4.

Its manifestative activities are controlled by the Maheśvara's will.

The supposition of Māyā as a principle of obscuration is both necessary and logical. For, if the Ultimate Reality is possessed of all the five powers, cit, ānanda, icchā,

1. I. P. V., I, 35.
2. T. A., VI, 116.
3. T. A., VI, 117.

jñāna and kriyā, and so is perfect in every way, and the universe is identical with it, it has to be explained: where does the plurality of selves with all their limitations come from; and what is the cause of the limited creation which forms the object of experience of the limited beings? To account for these facts, or rather, to answer these questions it is that the māyā is supposed to be the force of obscuration. As such, Māyā Tattva hides the true nature of the Self so that not only all its five powers are obscured but the universe also, which was in relation of identity with it, disappears. Thus there arises the occasion for the other aspect of māyā, viz, as the cause of the limited universe, to come into play and produce the limited universe in all its parts almost simultaneously much as emblic myrobalan (āmalakī), being forcefully struck with a staff, lets fall its fruits[1]. Different authorities, however, have differently fixed the order of precedence and succession of the manifestations of māyā and have accordingly represented them to be related by the relation of cause and effect to one another. Abhinava follows the authority of the Mālinī Vijaya Tantra in his statement of the order of manifestation of the things belonging to the limited creation[2].

KALĀ.

This is the first product of māyā. The obscuration by māyā of the Universal Self leads to the affection of the latter by the impurity, called āṇavamala, in an innumerable variety of forms and so to the appearance of the Universal Self in the form of multifarious limited selves.

"Māyā svīkāra pāratantryāt sarvajñatva sarvakatṛtvamayopi bodhaḥ sarvajñatvādi guṇāpahastanena akhyāti rūpam āṇavam malam āpannaḥ yena

1. T. A., VI, 128.
2. T. A., VI, 129.

ghaṭākāśavat pūrṇa rūpāt cidākāśāt avacchedya parimitīkṛtaḥ san tadeva puṁstvam ucyate."

P. S., Comm. 45-6.

Kalā, therefore, is that Tattva, which, being associated with the self, whose powers of knowledge and action have been obscured, partly restores[1] to it the power of action. It is related to a limited self not as an instrument to an agent, as the vidyā and other limited powers are, but as its causal agent[2]. It is the knowledge of this tattva, and not of the prakṛti as distinct from the Puruṣa, that brings about the freedom from the bondage of karma and places an individual in the higher category of beings, called the Vijñānākala, who are beyond the sphere of Māyā[3]. The knowledge of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa, as got through following the teachings of the Sāṅkhya, saves a soul only from going lower than the pradhāna[4]. The kalā is admitted to be an independent Tattva because of its independent function of bringing limited power of action to a subject, a function which is quite distinct from, nay, opposite to that of obscuration which is the characteristic function of the māyā.

But here it may be objected that action, in order that it may lead to a tangible result, presupposes knowledge of the object which is intended to be accomplished and towards which the agent's activity has to be directed. The power of knowledge having been obscured by the obscuring māyā, how can the limited power of action, restored to the limited self by the kalā, function? The Trika, therefore, believes in another tattva.

1. T. A., VI, 136.
2. T. A., VI, 142.
3. T. A., VI, 143.
4. T. A., VI, 144-5.

VIDYĀ.

It is a tattva the association of which with the subject brings to the latter a limited power of knowledge. This may, more correctly, be spoken of as the power of discrimination, because its distinctive function is to know the various objects, reflected on the Buddhi, as distinct from one another. The assumption of the vidyā as a different tattva from the Buddhi is necessary; for, although the latter, being predominantly made up of sattva, can receive reflection, yet, being simply a product of guṇas and, therefore, insentient, it cannot know[1] either itself or that which is reflected on it.

Another question may be raised here, namely, that if the limited powers of knowledge and action are common to all the subjects, what is it that is responsible for the choice by each individual of different objects of his respective activities? The Trika postulates the following tattva to answer this question.

RĀGA.

Rāga (attachment ?) is that power which is responsible for an individual's choice of a certain thing as an object of a particular activity, to the exclusion of all the rest that he knows[2]. It is not a mere absence of indifference (avairāgya) which is conceived to be a quality of the buddhi by the Sāṅkhya. It is rather that power which is responsible for the indifference (vairāgya) itself. What is vairāgya after all ? Is it not indifference ? And as such has it not got an object of its own ? How then can it take place without the assistance of the Rāga as conceived by the Trika ?

KĀLA.

The Kāla tattva (time) forms another limiting condition of the limited self.

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1. T. A., VI, 151-2.
2. T. A. VI, 157

NIYATI.

It is that power which limits the causal efficiency of every thing. It is because of this that fire only burns and the sesame sprout comes out of the sesame seed only. This also is one of the limiting conditions of an individual, because he is controlled in his activities by this power[1].

The last mentioned four, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati are the effects of kalā tattva[2].

PURUṢA.

We have stated above how the Universal Self under the influence of its power, called māyā, assumes the innumerable forms of limited selves whose limitation consists in ignorance of their essential nature and consequent deprivation of the powers of knowledge and action. Such a sentient limited manifestation, when possessed of the five attributes kalā etc., is spoken of as puruṣa. The above five attributes together with māyā, which is the cause of self-forgetfulness, as it were, of the Self, are at times spoken of as six covers. The deprivation of the Self of its powers of knowledge and action consequent upon the obscuration of its real nature is spoken of as "āṇavamala". And the objectless desire to use the limited powers is called "kārma mala" to which its future associations with insentient objects are due. The puruṣa, therefore, is often described briefly as the Self affected by two impurities, the āṇava and the kārma malas, but free from the third, the māyīya mala. It represents[3] purely the subjective element in the midst of the body, the senses, the vital airs, the mind and the Buddhi. It constitutes the 25th category. It is often referred to

1. T. A., VI, 160. 2. T. A., VI, 161.
3. T. A., VI, 164—5.

as pumān pudgala or aṇu. It represents the permanent aspect of the individual, retains residual traces (saṁskāras) and passes through innumerable births and deaths. There is a marked similarity between the Trika and the Sāṅkhya concepts of puruṣa. The former also like the latter believes that there is no limit to the number of the puruṣas and that the creation of the prakṛti is for supplying the necessary stimuli for the varying experiences which these puruṣas must enjoy or suffer according to their individual karma. The conception of malas and six covers, however, is peculiar to the Trika.

This very puruṣa, when it momentarily identifies itself with body etc., is spoken of as the dehapramātā and so on. Further, being entirely free from all kinds of association with the gross world at the time of the dissolution and lying in a state of deep sleep as it were, it is called pralayākala. And when it is freed from the kārma mala and consequently from the limited experiences, which are peculiar to souls in the bondage of karma, it is called Vijñānākala. As such it represents the transitional stage through which an individual self has to pass before reaching the state of the universal experiencer of the S'uddha vidyā tattva which is also called Mahāmāyā.[1]

Two points have to be specially noted in this connection viz., the word "karma" in the above statement does not stand for the sum total of the effects, produced on an individual by his personal conviction that the deeds done by him would, at the time of maturation, lead to a certain result ; it means simply an objectless desire, which is responsible for the association of the Self with the effects of māyā, as we shall explain in the course of our treatment of

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1. I. P. V., II, 200.

the Trika theory of karma in the fifth chapter. Similarly the word "māyīya" stands for the gross body with all its gross constituents and associations (śarīra-bhuvanākāro māyīyaḥ parikīrtitaḥ). In our above statement we are following the authority of Abhinava. Yogarāja holds a slightly different view.

THE SĀṄKHYA AND THE TRIKA CONCEPTS OF PURUṢA COMPARED.

According to the Sāṅkhya, the innumerable puruṣas are independent entities ; but, according to the Trika, they are the manifestations of the same Ultimate Reality. Further, Puruṣa, according to the former, remains always unaffected : it is a pure sentient entity (Puruṣastu puṣkara palāśavat nirlepaḥ kintu cetanaḥ). But, according to the latter, Puruṣa, though equally sentient, yet it does not remain entirely unaffected under all circumstances.

PRAKṚTI OR PRADHĀNA.

In the order of manifestation, the Prakṛti is the first objective manifestation. According to the Trika concept of causality, it is the first purely objective (vedyamātra) effect of the kalā[1]. It represents the state of perfect equilibrium of the three qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas. Taking the variety of its future effects into consideration (bhāvi vedya viśeṣāpekṣayā), it is spoken of as the generic object (vedya sāmānyātmakam). It is as countless as the puruṣa, because each puruṣa has a separate pradhāna, (tacca prati pum niyatatvāt anekam T. A., Comm., VI, 172). It is stirred to productive activity for the sake of puruṣa by the Svatantreśa or Ananta.[2]

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1. T. A., VI, 171.
2. T. A. VI, 180.

COMPARISON OF THE SĀṄKHYA AND THE TRIKA CONCEPTS OF THE PRADHĀNA.

While both agree on the question of the Pradhāna being a state of equilibrium of all the three qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas, and on that of its working for the sake of puruṣa, they fundamentally differ on the following points :—

I. It is independent in its action according to the Sāṅkhya ; but, according to the Trika, it works only when it is stirred to activity by Ananta.

II. It is one according to the former, but many according to the latter.

We shall state Abhinava's arguments in support of the Trika theory of Pradhāna as well as those which he advances in refutation of that of the Sāṅkhya, in the 5th chapter.

BUDDHI.

It is a product of the qualities. It is capable of receiving reflection from all sides so that it receives the reflection of the light of the self from within as well as that of the external objects from without. The objects, which cast their reflection on buddhi, are of two kinds : (I) the external, such as a gross object like jar, the reflection of which is received through the eyes, as at the time of perception ; and (II) the internal, i. e., the images built out of the revived residual traces (saṁskāras) the reflections of which are not got through the eyes, but which affect the buddhi no less, as at the time of free imagination, remembrance and dream. The apparent change of the mirror-like buddhi, due to a reflection, is technically called *buddhivṛtti*, or simply vṛtti or jñāna. We shall dwell at some length on the important part that Buddhi plays in perception, in the next chapter.

THE SĀṄKHYA AND THE TRIKA CONCEPTS OF BUDDHI COMPARED.

Thus, there is an agreement between the Sāṅkhya and the Trika on the conception of Buddhi so far as it is a common meeting place of both, the light of the puruṣa from one side and the reflection of the external object from the other. They, however, fundamentally differ on the nature of the source of internal light. According to the former, it is the pure self, (śuddha puruṣa) that casts its light on buddhi; but, according to the latter, it is one that is affected by two impurities, āṇava and kārma malas. Further, according to the former, it is not objective (asaṁvedya), but, according to the latter, being an instrument of knowledge[1], it is knowable, like any other instrument such as the mind.

AHAṄKĀRA.

It is a product of the buddhi. It is nothing but the identification of the limited self with the buddhi and consequent attribution of the latter's activity to itself. Its distinctive function is to control[2] the five vital airs within the system and so the life itself. It is distinct from self-consciousness (ahambhāva), because while the latter is purely subjective (svātma mātra viśrānti satattvaḥ) and, therefore, without any objective reference; the former is due to superimposition of the self on the buddhi[3].

MANAS.

The manas or mind is a product of ahaṅkāra (egoity). The element of sattva predominates in it. How, without its cooperation with senses, no sensation of any kind is possible, how it carves images out of the blocks of sensations

1. T. A., VI, 192.
2. T. A., VI, 185.
3. T. A., Comm., VI, 185.

and what other important parts it plays in perception we shall show, while dealing with the Trika theory of knowledge in the next chapter.

THE REMAINING TWENTY TATTVAS.

The remaining twenty tattvas are as follows :—

(I) The five senses or powers of perception, called Buddhīndriyas or jñānendriyas, namely, the powers of

(a) smelling (ghrāṇendriya)
(b) tasting (rasanendriya)
(c) seeing (cakṣurindriya)
(d) feeling-by-touch (sparśanendriya) and
(e) hearing (śravaṇendriya.)

(II) The five capacities of activity, called the karmendriyas, (organs of action ?) namely, the capacities of

(a) resting and enjoying passively (upasthendriya)
(b) rejecting or discarding (pāyvindriya)
(c) locomotion (pādendriya)
(d) handling (hastendriya) and
(e) voicing (Vāgindriya)

III. The five subtle elements (tanmātras) of

(a) smell (gandha tanmātra)
(b) taste (rasa tanmātra)
(c) form or colour (rūpa tanmātra)
(d) touch (sparśa tanmātra) and
(e) sound (śabda tanmātra)

IV. The five gross elements of

(a) earth
(b) water
(c) light

(d) air, and
(e) ether.

The first three groups originate from ahaṅkāra with the predominance of sattva, rajas and tamas respectively. And the five of the last group, namely, the gross elements, are the effects of the five of the preceding group of tanmātras respectively.

Indriyas, according to the Trika, are not mere physical organs of smelling and handling etc. They are rather the powers of the individual self which operate through these physical organs. Leaving aside the mind and the intellect, there are ten Indriyas. Five are responsible for the perceptual activities of smelling, tasting, seeing, touching and hearing and as such are mere manifestations of the vidyā, the limited power of knowledge. The remaining five are similarly responsible for the five kinds of the physical activities of handling, locomoting, voicing, rejecting and resting or enjoying passively and as such are simply different forms of kalā, the limited power of action[1].

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1. T. A., VI, 199.

CHAPTER IV.

ĀBHĀSAVĀDA AS THE BASIS OF THE TRIKA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Preliminaries and Presuppositions.

ĀBHĀSAVĀDA AND PRACTICAL LIFE.

Abhinava very clearly says, as has already been stated in the first chapter, that the practical utility of this system is that it explains the real nature of phenomenal existence and so enables its followers to recognise the Ultimate Reality. It is, therefore, meant for only those who are seeking the truth, who want to understand the real nature of the 'apparent'. As for those, who are completely engrossed in the worldly activities of momentary interest and, therefore, seek the explanation only of the apparent nature of the apparent, the view point and the method of the Naiyāyikas is the best.[1] The Ābhāsavāda holds that each object, as we perceive it, is a momentary collocation of a certain number of ābhāsas; that the individual is in reality identical with the Universal Self and as such has no independent will of its own, but acts and moves as the latter makes it do; that whatever is, is ever one with the Universal Self and even when a thing appears to have a separate existence, it is as little independent of the Ultimate as the objects of a dream are of the dreaming self and that the difference between the real and the illusory i. e. between the silver appearing at the sight of a mother-of-pearl and the real silver or between the objects of a dream and those of the wakeful state, is purely conventional; both of them are equally real or unreal; the difference between them is of

1. I. P. V., I. 25.

degree and not of kind. But does a practical man of the world require the knowledge of all these philosophical concepts? Can such a knowledge help him in achieving what he has set his heart on? Abhinava's statement: "In practical every-day life the view point of the Naiyāyikas is the best" seems, therefore, to have been inspired by the following words of Lord Kṛṣṇa :—

"The enlightened should not disturb the minds of the unenlightened, who are given to active life, by talk of knowledge (jñāna)"

Bh. G., III, 26.

In this respect he follows Śaṅkara who in his commentary on the very first Sūtra says:—

"We maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit of one's action both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint and the other means and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it, but not otherwise."

(V. S., Th. 12).

The philosophical knowledge of the phenomena of the external world is of as little use to the practical man of the world as the scientific knowledge of the mechanism of cinema is to one who goes to cinema simply for diversion.

Looking, however, at the world with a philosopher's eye and trying to explain it from the point of view of the Trika, we find that it represents only two kinds of manifestations (ābhāsas) of the Universal Consciousness, and that both of them are of limited nature. The one is sentient (jīva) and the other is insentient (jaḍa). And because the perception,

on which all our ideas of the external phenomena are based, presupposes both, therefore, before attempting an exposition of the theory of perception, we state here the Trika concept of both jīva and jaḍa.

THE LIMITED SENTIENT ĀBHĀSA.

It forms one of the thirty-six categories of this system. We have, therefore, already dwelt on it at some length in the preceding chapter. It may, however, be pointed out here that consistently with the postulate of the Universal Consciousness, the Trika holds, as the strict logic requires, that the limited self has no independent existence and as such has no freedom of will or action. It is the Universal Self that wills and acts through every mind and body. On this point also this system seems to be in agreement with the Vedānta Sūtra and the Bhagavadgītā. Compare, for instance,

"Īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṁ hṛddeśerjuna tiṣṭhati
Bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā."
Bh. G., XVIII, 61.

and also

"Avidyāvasthāyāṁ kāryakāraṇasaṅghātavivekadarśino jīvasya avidyātimirāndhasya sataḥ parasmādātmanaḥ karmādhyakṣāt sarvabhūtādhivāsāt sākṣiṇaś-cetayiturīśvarāt tadanujñayā kartṛtva bhoktṛtvalakṣaṇasya saṁsārasya siddhiḥ." Ś. Bh., 552.

It has, as already pointed out, two aspects, the permanent and the transitory. The consciousness, with the beginningless impurities (malas) and six covers, (kañcukas), which is free from association with body and vital air and is capable of retaining the effects of the external stimuli, received at the time of perception, represents the permanent aspect of the individual consciousness. It is a determinate

consciousness inasmuch as it is limited, though the limitation is not of any particular kind and, therefore, may be said to be as imaginary as describing a bare piece of land as a place without jar (śūnyam bhūtalaṁ ghaṭābhāvaḥ).

This limited consciousness momentarily identifies itself at one time with body, as, for instance, when one has the consciousness "I am fat" at another with vital air as when one feels "I am strong" and at still another with Buddhi as at the time of determinate knowledge "I know this." Even a lay man knows this identification to be momentary, for, the soul gets dissociated, as all know, from the body in the deep sleep state and from the vital air and the buddhi at the time of a fainting fit. Philosophically speaking, however, the dissociation of self from the object of identification is taking place literally every moment. For, according to the Trika, as according to the Bauddha, every object is momentary and both the psychological and the physical activities presuppose the identification of the self with the momentary manifestation of the body and the mind. How can, therefore, the activity of either kind be possible unless the renewal of the identification be admitted to be taking place every moment ? Hence the self in its aspect of identification with body etc. is represented to be transitory.

The fact is that the Trika has accepted the Bauddha theory of momentariness of both the subject and the object and has fitted it in with its own conception of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness, a conception which differs from the Vedāntic conception of the Brahman only inasmuch as the latter, according to Abhinava, is pure light (S'uddha prakāśa), while the former is not only Prakāśamaya but also has Vimarśa, the perfect power of control over what is Prakāśa (Prakāśa vimarśamayaḥ). Abhinava has not tried to hide this fact. He has very clearly stated in his Bṛhatī Vimarśinī

that if dualistic doctrine were given up by the so called Āgamikas; if Māyā were to be taken as the power of the Brahman by the Vedāntins; and if the two Vijñānas, the ālayavijñāna and the pravṛttivijñāna, were to be admitted to be the manifestations of the Ātmeśvara or Maheśvara, the Universal Consciousness, by the Bauddhas, all differences between the Trika on the one hand and the Āgamikas, the Vedāntins and the Bauddhas on the other disappear. The latter become the exponents of the Trika philosophy:

"Āgameṣu dvaitavyākhyāmapāsya, Brahmavāde avidyām māyāśaktīkṛtya vijñānadvayam ātmeśvarābhiprāyeṇa nirūpya siddhyatyeṣa janaḥ"

and also

"Pārameśvareṣu tāvadāgameṣu śaivavaiṣṇavarahasyeṣu Vedānteṣu ca spaṣṭa evoktoyam asmaduktorthaḥ, Tadanusāriṇaiva sugatenoktaṁ 'Cittamātramidam,' yaduta traidhātukamiti tadatra vivaraṇa kārair durabhiniveśavaśena vipratārito janaḥ. Idameva tu tattvamiti tu tātparyam."

We may add here one interesting argument in support of the momentariness of the bodily and the intellectual selves. It is generally admitted that at all hours of the wakeful state some kind of knowledge or another is taking place; that knowledge is simply an affected state of consciousness due to an external stimulus and that a determinate knowledge is invariably preceded by an indeterminate. As we pass from knowledge of one thing to that of another, the transition is not usually sharp. One act of knowledge fades gradually into the next. If, for instance, we look at a coin for several moments, we feel that we have not had a single continuous perception. First we have the knowledge of the coin as a rupee, then that of the figure on it, then of its roughened edge and then of its date and so on. These acts of knowledge

so run into each other that it is ordinarily not possible to say exactly when one act of knowledge begins and the other ends. Another noteworthy point in this connection is that the Trika, like the Vedānta, holds that all is one with the Universal Self at the time of the indeterminate knowledge.

(Aindriyake nirvikalpake sadāśiveśvaradaśābhyudayāt).

Now if a new determinate knowledge is accepted to be taking place every moment and if it is invariably preceded by an indeterminate one, in which all is in a state of unity with the Universal Self[1], the irresistible logical conclusion from all this naturally is that the limited perceiver is manifested anew every moment a knowledge takes place.

THE LIMITED INSENTIENT MANIFESTATION or JAḌĀBHĀSA.

An objective limited insentient manifestation is ordinarily called[2] Jaḍābhāsa: a jar, for instance. It forms the basis of one idea and as such is expressible by one word and has to be separately taken through the whole cognitive process in order that it may be cognised. It is momentary, because like the sentient limited manifestation, it is manifested a-new at the time of every cognition. But if we carefully analyse our knowledge of the jar we find that, though ordinarily taken to be one ābhāsa, it is made up of many ; it embodies as many ābhāsas as there are words which can be used with reference to it by various analytical perceivers, looking at it from different points of view. To an ordinary perceiver it is a combination of ābhāsas of roundness, materiality, externality, blackness and existence. But, if a scientist were to do an atomic analysis of the same, how many acts of perception will

1. I. P. V., II, 66.
2. I. P. V., II, 69-71.

he have to do and how many words will he require to describe the results of his analysis ? Can any body say that the atoms of different kinds are not the constituents of what is ordinarily taken to be one thing ? The Trika, therefore, holds that each ābhāsa, as we perceive it, is a collocation of a certain number of Ābhāsas, each of which requires a separate perceptual activity for its perception, that the causal efficiency (artha kriyākāritva) of each depends upon its being determinately cognised and that the determinate cognition also depends upon the will, the immediate need and the analytical capacity of each perceiver[1].

Imagine, for instance, a farmer hitting upon an oval piece of stone in the course of his farm work and suppose that it is a very precious stone, but that its brilliance is obscured by clay that has been covering it for centuries so that no eye but that of an expert jeweller can see its hidden value. Now the question is : will this piece of precious stone have the same causal efficiency of arousing certain ideas or feelings in the case of the farmer as in that of an expert jeweller ? If not, why ? Let us ask the facts of common experience for a reply. And what reply do we get but that which has just been stated above, viz, the stone is a collocation of a certain number of Ābhāsas: its causal efficiency differs according as a greater or a smaller number of the constituent Ābhāsas is perceived, according to the perceptual capacity etc. of the individual perceiver.

Thus each individual lives in a world of his own, a world consisting not of shadows and apparitions, as the Vivartavāda would have us believe, nor of the momentary creations of the beginningless Vāsanā of the individual, as the subjectivism of the Vijñānavāda would represent it to be, but of Ābhāsas, the apparent objects of perception or conception which

1. I. P. V, II, 85-6.

have got a separate existence from himself. Let it, however, not be forgotten that the world is not exclusively his own, as it would be if the Subjectivist's explanation of the universe be accepted, but that it has much in common with similar worlds of others. These are the common factors or the common elements in each individual world of Ābhāsas which make possible all the worldly transactions, which depend upon the cooperation of many.

The phenomenon of knowledge has been described in the 2nd chapter as very much like the rise of two waves, one subjective and the other objective, in the sea of the Universal Consciousness. The former has nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection, so that when it rises facing the latter and receives the reflection of the same, the phenomenon of knowledge takes place. This phenomenon is of various kinds. It is not always that the objective wave affects only one subjective wave, nor is it that even when it affects more than one, the affection that it causes, is always the same in all cases. The objective wave is a collocation of ābhāsas and, therefore, only those constituents of it are reflected on a particular subjective wave which are in relation of knowability to the latter.

Buddhi is held to be like a mirror. The analogy of mirror, therefore, will clear the point in hand. If we take four mirrors and place them in different positions facing an object, we find that the reflection in all cases is not the same, though in each case there is enough common element to give us the idea of the reflecting object being the same in all cases. Why is there this difference ? Is it not because of the difference in the position of each mirror ? And if so, then the same can be said to be the cause of reflection of only some of the constituent ābhāsas of an objective wave on a certain subjective wave.

Imagine, for instance, two persons, one purchaser and the other seller, looking at the same thing, as we would ordinarily say. Does the article appear to be the same in every aspect to both ?[1] Do both the persons have the same perception and conception of the object as a whole and in its parts ? Experience says "no" to this and the Ābhāsavāda explains by saying that the constituent Ābhāsas of a collocation which cast reflection, differ according to the will, the need, and the motive force of the perceptual or the cognitive activity, in short, the point of view of the percipient.

THE CONSTITUENT ĀBHĀSAS.

Each constituent ābhāsa is a separate entity and as such it is ever the same[2]. All the talk of change refers only to combination[3]. And the difference in the causal efficiency of a collocation depends upon the ābhāsa with which it is combined or associated. The idea will become clear if we were to bear in mind that, according to this system, each idea, for which a word stands, is a separate ābhāsa. Thus "seeing", "embracing" (āliṅgana), "present", "past", "far", "near", etc. are separate ābhāsas. Suppose, for instance, that a person is in love with a lady. He meets her in one fine moon-lit night in a beautiful garden. They remain together for a few hours. Now the question arises : will the causal efficiency of the lady in arousing certain feelings in the mind of her lover be the same throughout this time ? Will there be no difference in her causal efficiency at the moment when she is embracing her lover from that when she sits apart, with her eye-brows knit ? Will she not please her lover in the former and pain him in the latter case ? If she

1. I. P. V., I, 261.
2. I. P. V., I, 320.
3. I. P. V., I, 322.

will the question arises, why? Ābhāsavāda replies that it is[1] not because of any change in the individual ābhāsas, but because of difference in the combination. In the first case, when the lady is a source of pleasure, she, as a collocation, is combined with the "embracing" and the "near", but in the second case, with the "frowning" and the "far". What we mean to point out is this, that in both the cases, when the lady is embracing and when she is frowning, the mode, the form that consciousness assumes, is the same in respect of the lady, but the difference lies only in this, that in the former case she is combined with the ābhāsas of "embracing" and "near", but in the latter with those of "frowning" and "far". Thus the difference in the causal efficiency of the principal ābhāsa in a combination depends upon the constituent or the associated ābhāsas. In fact, the causal efficiency also is a separate ābhāsa[2]. Just like the causal efficiency the externality (bāhyatva) also does not constitute the essential nature of the manifested. In both the states, viz., of internality and externality i. e. at the time when it is within the Universal Consciousness and that when it is manifested as apparently separate from it, an object is essentially the same. Externality is simply an associated ābhāsa. And for the unification of these ābhāsas, as also for their manifestation, it is the Lord's will, the element of the will power in the Universal Consciousness, that is responsible.

The above statement makes it clear that one cognisable ābhāsa is a collocation of many, that its causal efficiency differs with difference in the constituent or the associated ābhāsas and that the combination of ābhāsas is the work

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1. I. P. V., I, 329-30.
2. I. P. V., I, 330.

of the Lord's Svātantrya śakti. Here it may be asked: if each cognisable ābhāsa is a collocation of many why is it called one and if the unification of ābhāsas by the Lord's will is a necessary antecedent condition of all cognitions, is there any limit to this unification? In reply to this Abhinava says that the ordinarily innumerable uncognizable ābhāsas form a cognizable one exactly in the manner in which innumerable unilluminative particles of light form an illuminating flame and, therefore, just as the latter is spoken of as one because of one causal efficiency, namely, that of dispelling darkness, so, for the same reason, the former also is so spoken of. A jar, for instance, though it is made up of many ābhāsas such as big, round, bright, golden and heavy etc. yet, because it is conceived as having one causal efficiency at the time of cognition, it is spoken of as one. As regards the limit in the unification, he says that only such ābhāsas are united as are not of a conflicting nature. The ābhāsa of air, for instance, will not find union with that of form.[1]

REFUTATION OF THE RIVAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION.

In the philosophical works of Abhinava where he criticises rival theories, the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, for instance, the Bauddha figures as the chief opponent. In fact, the whole of the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, with the exception of the Āgamādhikāra and the introductory Āhnika, is practically a reply to the Bauddha objections, recorded in the second Āhnika of the first chapter. The Sāṅkhya theories also have been criticised at places both in the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and the Tantrāloka, but that is only by the way. Here we propose to follow our author's maxim that to begin with the refutation of the rival theories, is the

1. I. P. V., II, 96.

best way of establishing one's own. Therefore, before taking up the Trika theory of perception for an exposition, we first briefly state and then refute the Sāṅkhya and the Bauddha theories mostly with the help of the material collected from Abhinava's own works.

SĀṄKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION.

According to the Sāṅkhya, the Buddhi is made up of three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It is predominated by the Sattva and, therefore, is possessed of the natural nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection on all sides. And though, in the condition of bondage, it is shrouded by the tamas, yet it can partly receive the reflection of external objects, because the shroud of the tamas is partly removed by the activity of the rajas. It is insentient, because the qualities of which it is made are so, but still, being partly capable of receiving reflection, because of the working of the Rajas, as just pointed out, it receives light from the self-luminous self within. Thus a person is said to be knowing when the light of the self within, falling on the jaḍa Buddhi, comes in contact with the reflection of an external object falling on the same. Knowledge, (jñāna) therefore, according to the Sāṅkhya, is nothing else than a form which, like a mirror, Buddhi assumes because of its being a meeting place of both, the light of the self-luminous self within and the reflection of an external object[1] without.

THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH AN ASSUMPTION.

The subject and the object are of fundamentally opposite nature. The former is self-luminous but the latter is devoid of all light. The one is changeless but the other is changing. Therefore, if the puruṣa, who is unaffectable pure

1. I. P. V., I, 71.

light, be the illuminator of the objects which in themselves are devoid of all light it would be difficult to explain why things are perceived in succession and why a jar shines (prakāśate) as distinct from a piece of cloth :—

"Sa ca prakāśa ityetāvat svabhāvaḥ svabhāvāntaram aprakāśarūpam bhogyam............Sa ca prakāśamātra-svabhāvatvenaiva yadi viśvasya prakāsaḥ tarhi viśvaṁ yugapat prakāśeta ghaṭaprakāśopi paṭaprakāśaḥ syāt iti viśvaṁ saṁkīryeta" I. P. V., I, 74.

The supposition of the self-luminousness of the object cannot explain the phenomena of knowledge. For, in that case it would be difficult to account for the limit and the degree of the individual kuowledge. If every thing is self-luminous why should it not, like the self-luminous self, be always equally known to all ? Even the supposition that the perception is consequent upon the illumination of the object by the light of self cannot improve the position ; for, in that case also, when the object has once become illuminated, it is difficult to find reason why it should not become equally manifest to all. About the sense contact as the cause of perceptibility of the object to some and not to all and its refutation by Abhinava, we shall write in the course of our treatment of the Prakaṭatāvāda of the Mīmāṁsaka. The Sāṅkhya, therefore, puts forward the Buddhivṛtti theory of knowledge, as explained above.

REFUTATION OF THE SĀṄKHYA THEORY.

The above theory of the Sāṅkhya is not sound, firstly, because the analogy of mirror and jar, on which it is based, requires the reflecting and the reflected to be similar in their nature ; but Buddhi and self are of fundamentally opposite nature ; the one is sentient, but the other lacks sentiency ; secondly, because, ordinarily that which is less bright casts

its reflection on what is more so, but even the Sāṅkhya will not be prepared to admit that in point of nairmalya buddhi exceeds self (But what about the reflection of a flame in a mirror or that of the sun in water ? It is perhaps because of the consciousness of this defect in his above argument that he puts forth another, the last and strongest) and thirdly, because the Sāṅkhya cannot satisfactorily answer the question that naturally arises in this connection as to whether buddhi, in consequence of the reflection of the light of self, itself becomes light or not. In the latter case it will not be able to illumine the object exactly as the material light, reflected in a mirror, cannot, and, therefore, even when there is the reflection of the light of self on Buddhi the external object will not be illuminated (nārtha prakāśatā) Hence perception will be impossible. But if the case be the former i. e. Buddhi itself becomes an illuminant, the postulate of an illuminating Puruṣa becomes useless, because then all the objections to remove which a separate Buddhi Tattva is assumed by the Sāṅkhya will stand as before[1].

BAUDDHA THEORIES OF PERCEPTION AND THEIR REFUTATIONS.

Out of the four schools of Buddhism only two, the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavāda, have been taken up for criticism by Abhinava in connection with the theory of perception.

SAUTRĀNTIKA THEORY.

According to the Sautrāntika, every thing is momentary. The subject, the self-luminous consciousness (Bodha), is no less momentary than the object. But each of these gives rise to another, which, in its essential nature, is similar to itself, in the second moment. Thus a jar of the preceding

1. I. P. V., I, 77,

moment, being in touch with a sense organ, eye, for instance, gives rise to knowledge in the following moment which, in form, is similar to the object which casts its reflection. But the fact that the external object exists and that it is of a certain form, is a matter of inference only, drawn from the form of knowledge itself, because direct touch with it is not possible. Every thing is momentary and so must be the jar also. Logically, therefore, it ceases to exist immediately after casting its reflection. But the direct touch requires the coexistence of the object and the affected consciousness which is the effect of the reflection of the former (sākāraṁ cittaṁ jñānaśabdavācyam). How can the two co-exist ? The one is the cause and the other is its effect. The cause must precede the effect ; therefore, if the object, which is the cause of the affected consciousness, precedes the existence of the latter, as it must, it cannot remain in existence at the time of its effect. The direct touch with the object, therefore, is not possible*.

THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH A SUPPOSITION.

The chain of momentary self-consciousness, called ālayavijñāna, is of the nature of pure light. It is uniform in its nature and is devoid of all diversity :

"Aṇumātramapi na rūpāntaram asya asti iti abhinno bodhaḥ".

But the object is admittedly of the opposite nature and as such is not self-luminous. How is then the phenomenon of the varying knowledge to be accounted for ? It cannot be said that it is the very nature of the limited consciousness to assume a variety of forms in succession ; for, in that case, it would not be possible to explain such an unaffected state

*S. D. S, Abhyankar's edition.

as we experience at the time of deep sleep or as a yogin does in the state of Samādhi. Therefore, the explanation of the occasional varying affection of the limited consciousness (vicitrābhāsa) that the Sautrāntika gives is that it is due to the reflection of the external object on the self due to the contact of the latter with the former. The object, however, that casts the reflection, is momentary and therefore, is not directly perceived as we have already stated. For this reason this school is also known as Anumeyārthavāda[1].

ITS REFUTATION.

All determinate cognitions presuppose the direct perception of their respective objects and so does the inference, because it is a determinate cognition. We, for instance, can infer fire from smoke, but not without first knowing their universal concomitance from daily perception of fire and smoke together in kitchen or elsewhere. Therefore, if the external object is never perceptible no inference either can be possible of it.

The Bauddha may say here that an inference does not always presuppose the direct perception of the inferred, because it is unnecessary in the case of a generic inference, (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa) where the nature of an invisible thing is inferred from a previously known general law such as that of causality. Soul, for instance, is inferred by the Naiyāyikas from the necessity that Buddhi and other qualities must reside in a substance, according to the general law that every quality must have a substratum. Similarly, to take another instance, senses are inferred from the fact of perception, because of the general law that every event must have a cause, though senses as such are never directly perceived. But it can be pointed out to him

1. I. P. V., I, 166.

that in the case of the generic inference also the inferred is held to be not such as has never been directly known. Rather the fact is that it is always maintained to be as it has directly been perceived. If we take the instance of the inferred senses, we find that they are inferred not as of some definite nature, but simply as certain causes which are responsible for the events of perception; and the cause as such we daily perceive directly, as for instance, when we see a seed change into a sprout or threads into a piece of cloth[1]. And even if, for the sake of argument, it be admitted that an inference can be drawn even in the case of the unperceived, how will it be possible for the object, which is external to and in nature opposite from the self, to shine (ābhāsate) in the latter; because, as we have pointed out in the 2nd chapter, when we divide the subject from the object, the question of building the bridge from one to the other becomes difficult[2].

VIJÑĀNAVĀDIN'S THEORY.

The sensationalists (Vijñānavādins) do not believe in the existence of the external world. According to them, there is a chain or stream of momentary self-consciousness, called ālaya vijñāna santati or dhārā. This differs in the case of every individual and has an existence exclusive and independent of the rest of the innumerable similar chains which are ordinarily known as souls. It has got a certain power, technically called vāsanā, the capacity to give rise to the innumerable presentments (pravṛttivijñāna) or sensations which constitute the variety of daily cognitions. This vāsanā also is momentary, like the stream of self-consciousness, and each vāsanā of the chain thereof has got an independent capacity to give rise to a certain presentment.

1. I. P. V., I, 188.
2. I. P. V., I, 190.

In fact, the presentment is due to the maturescence (Paripāka) of a link of the chain of vāsanā. Thus, according to the sensationalists, a cognition is nothing but, as said just now, a presentment brought about by maturescence of a link of vāsanā[1].

ITS REFUTATION.

According to the Vijñānavādin, the existentiality is of two kinds, real and apparent, (paramārtha sattvam and Saṁvṛti sattvam). The vijñāna alone is real and all that appears in it (ābhāsate)has only an apparent existence. Now, although the apparent may be spoken of as unreal, yet its cause has, of necessity, to be admitted to be real, because, how can one reasonably speak of what is non-existent in reality, as the cause of the apparent. How can, what is nothing in itself, be the cause of something ? But if to get out of this difficulty the Vijñānavādin were to admit the separate real existence of the vāsanās, which are the cause of all that appears, he ceases to be Vijñānavadin; his theory, in that case, would be no better than that of the Bāhyārthavādin who believes in the existence of the external world as the cause of variations in consciousness. The[2] only difference which then remains is that he calls what is external by the name of vāsanā and not by that of artha (object) as the Bāhyārthavādin does. Nor can the opponent say that these vāsanās are the cause of presentments in that aspect of theirs in which they are real (yena rūpeṇa satyatā tena kāraṇatā). For, vijñāna, which, according to the opponent, represents the real aspect of vāsanā, has no variety in itself ; the plurality of vāsanā in its real aspect, therefore, is out of question. How can then the variety in the presentment be explained ? And even if, for the sake of

1. I. P. V., I, 167.
2. I. P. V., I, 167-8.

argument, variety in vāsanā be admitted, then also, there being nothing like time, place or object, which may serve as the immediate cause of maturescence of a certain vāsanā, how can the rise of only a certain presentment at a certain time to the exclusion of all the rest be explained ?[1].

Moreover[2], if each stream of self-consciousness is different from all the rest ; if the sensations (pravṛtti-vijñāna) of each, being caused by its own vāsanā, are exclusive and independent and if each soul is living in a world of its own, how can the collaboration of many persons be possible in respect of the same object, as for instance, in lifting up of a heavy log ? Thus the Vijñānavadin's theory fails to explain both the varying experiences of an individual and the common experience of a group. In fact, if we accept the Vijñānavādin's theory our world should be no better than the one, if there can be such a one, in which every soul, being, as it were, under the influence of a certain spirit, is living in a world of its own creation and, therefore, being completely cut off from the rest, is incapable of any attachment to or coopeation with any other.

TRIKA THEORY OF PERCEPTION.

The defects in the theories of knowledge of the rival systems, as pointed out above, are that the Sāṅkhya and the Anumeyārthavādin leave a gulf between the subject and the object by holding them to be mutually exclusive and perfectly independent; and the Vijñānavādin fails to explain the common and the individual experiences on which depend all worldly transactions. The Trika, therefore, holds that the phenomenon of knowledge owes its

1. I. P. V., I, 168.
2. I. P. V., I, 174.

being solely to the will power of the Universal Consciousness which at the time of each cognition manifests externally anew the subject, the object and the means of cognition very much lke a yogin who brings immediately into existence the innumerable objects, which he desires, by sheer force of will, without the assistance of any external thing whatsoever. In fact, if, in order to satisfactorily account for the phenomena of knowledge, the objects are to be admitted to exist, as they must be, if the facts of experience have not altogether to be ignored. they have necessarily to be admitted to be the creation of the Universal Subject. The modern philosophic thinkers also hold this to be the only sound philosophical view of the subject-object relation as the following statement of Prof. Radhakrisnan shows :—

"When we divide the subject from the object the question of building the bridge from one to the other becomes difficult. Either we have to hold that the object is the creation of the subject or that there is no object at all"

(I. Ph., Vol. I, 135)

Abhinava has justified the above conclusion as follows:—

The object is not self-luminous (svātma vaśenaiva na tāvadvyavatiṣṭhate). For, had it been so, like self, it would have always been equally manifest to all and would not have stood in the relation of knowability only to some percipient or percipients at a particular time as the following judgments indicate :—

"This is now known to me".

"This shines (avabhāsate) to Caitra".

It has, therefore, to be admitted that manifestedness of the object depends upon some entity which is not only perfectly independent of but also of fundamentally opposite nature from the object inasmuch as it is self-shining. For,

otherwise, it would as little help in the illumination of the object as one blind man can another. Again, this self-luminous entity, the subject, cannot be supposed to illumine the object without any connection with i. e. without being affected in any way by, the latter; for, in that case, its unaffectedness with regard to all being the same, it would be difficult to account for its illumining only some and not others. It is, therefore, held that when the self-luminous self faces some object or objects it throws its light on the latter. This light being reflected back by the obstructing object[1], the sensory image, forms an image of the latter on the mirror-like Buddhi which, according to this system, is nothing else than a state of the limited self[2].

(Sopi yadi śuddho nirviśeṣo na tarhi nīlasyaiva vyavasthāhetuḥ bhavet pītādāvapi tasya tathātvāt, tadasau nīloparakto nīlonmukho nīlaprakāśasvabhāva ityābhāsaḥ san nīlasya vyavasthāpakaḥ, tatprakāśasvabhāvataiva hi tadvyavasthāpakatā. (I. P. V., II, 65).

The illumination of only certain object or objects at a time to the exclusion of the rest, presupposes an apparently separate existence of both the subject and the object from the Universal Consciousness; for, if it be supposed to illumine the object which is one with the Universal Self, oneness of all with the latter being the same, the illumination of one to the exclusion of the rest will be inexplicable. Again, the illumining subject also, in order that the illuminable object may have separate existence from it, must itself be at least apparently separate from the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness; for, otherwise, there being nothing outside the Universal Consciousness, the talk of separate existence of the

1. T. A., VI, 156.
2. P. H., 11-2.

illuminable from the illumining would be meaningless. But how can the separate existence of the subject be possible unless the Universal Consciousness itself were to assume some limitations and so to manifest its limited form separate both from itself and the manifested object ?

Here it may be asked : If the subject and the object are so separate from each other, what is it that connects them, what is it that places the latter in the relation of knowability to the former, or, in other words, what is it that brings about the phenomenon of knowledge ? The Trika says in reply that it is the means of knowledge (Pramāṇa). It is, as we pointed out above, the light proceeding[1] from the self-luminous self facing the object, the light which comes in touch with the object and being affected by the latter in a certain way, is reflected back and so gives rise to image in the Buddhi; the light which transforms into a psychic state the stimulus of an external object on the sense organ which is resolved into a form of mechanical contact. About the momentariness of the subject and the object we have already spoken. They being so, the momentariness of the means of knowledge is a matter of course, because it will naturally change, as said above, according as it will be affected by the object which changes every moment even from the point of view of an ordinary observer, at least in respect of time, if in no other respect. Thus, according to this system, both, the creation, which is an act of[2] the Universal Consciousness to manifest without, as apparently separate from itself, what exists within, and the dissolution, which is nothing but merging back in the Universal Consciousness of what is so manifested, are taking place every moment.

1. I. P. V., II, 66.
2. I. P. V., II, 144.

Indeterminate and Determinate Knowledge.

Indeterminate knowledge is that which is not characterised by genus, admits of no specification and has no attribute of time, place and form etc. in common with any thing else[1]. It has no variety, because one knowledge can be said to be different from another only when the use of language is possible with regard to them; but it is impossible in the case of indeterminate knowledge. The first experience of the world by a just born baby is generally accepted to be a typical instance of this kind of knowledge. Determinate knowledge is the reverse of the indeterminate. The substitution of the negative part of the definition of the latter by the positive assertion gives a clear definition of the former.

The Process.

The Trika makes a very clear distinction between the physical and the psychological activities involved in perception. It recognises the optical sense to be separate from the eyeballs. It believes that not only the optical sense but others also receive the reflection of their respective external objects[2] and that an image, that is formed on the retina, is different from that on the real optical sense Further, an image that is formed on a particular sense is different from another similar image on the Buddhi. The former is the cause and the latter is the effect; one is physical and the other is psychological. Therefore, when we speak of the object of illumination of the light of the self-luminous self we mean thereby the image on the sense.

What happens, when a certain perception takes place, is that[3] the mind (manas) sets a certain sense to work; so

1. I. P. V., I, 53-4.
2. T. A., II, 45-7.
3. T. A., II, 50.

long as there is no prompting by or the cooperation of the mind, the object, though reflected on the external sense, retina for instance, does not cause any sensation[1]. The sense comes in touch with its object which is nothing but the reflection of the external object on sense organ and receives its reflection[2], which may be said to consist of a number of sensations[3]. This physical image is illumined by the light of knowledge proceeding from the self-luminous self, and casts its reflection through the medium of that very illuminating light as explained above, on the Buddhi. The latter may be called a psychological image in contrast to the former. This gives rise to the indeterminate consciousness i. e. the consciousness of the light of knowledge having been affected. It is called indeterminate knowledge, because it is not possible to say at this stage as to what exactly is the cause of the affection of the pure light of knowledge.

The psychological activity involved in perception corresponds to the physical in almost every way. It is, therefore, admitted by the Trika that the so called one act of perception is not really one action but a large number of them taken to be one because of their leading to one result, the judgment (pramiti):

(Na ekaikataḥ pramāṇāt sā pravṛttiḥ api tu
pramāṇa samūhādeva.)

Taking, for instance, the physical action, the formation of an image on the retina, for a critical analysis, we find that it is caused not by a simple but a complex action; an action which has clearly marked divisions, though they are not ordinarily recognised. It is admitted that no object is perfectly smooth nor every

1. T. A., II, 47-8.
2. T. A., VI, 223.
3. T. A., VI, 224.

part thereof has the same reflecting power, Naturally, therefore, different rays of the illuminating light meet not only different objects in succession, according to the respective distance of each of them from the source, but the various parts also of the same object in the same way. Different rays then undergo different changes due to partial absorption of light by the objects or parts thereof and similar other causes. Thus they, (different rays) because of their meeting obstructions at different points of time, howsoever imperceptible, are reflected back in succession and so come in touch in the same succession with the object, on which the image is formed. Now, since the reflected rays are responsible for the formation of an image on the retina, it has naturally to be admitted to have taken place not all at once, without any order or succession, but gradually, point by point, in the same order in which each of the points is formed by a separate affected and reflected ray coming in touch with the retina. It is another matter that owing to the tremendous velocity of light time-lag between one ray and another is imperceptible. We are here simply pointing out its theoretical existence which can, by no means, be denied.

Suppose a person is having three or four things in his fist and is showing them to another person by exposing them to the latter's view for the shortest possible time that the quickest movement of fingers can make possible. In such a case the percipient will get no idea whatsoever of the things so exposed. And suppose that next time he keeps the fist open for a little while so that the perceiver can have just a vauge idea of its contents, and so on. Now the question is what is it that gives rise to various kinds of perception, according as the things are kept exposed for shorter or longer time ? Is it not because at different times the light rays, responsible for the rise of images on which the perceptual

judgement is based, are affected differently because of the contact with different things or different parts of the same thing, which alone could be touched, because of the comparative shorter or longer exposure ?

Thus, according to the Trika, whatever appears, whatever is capable of affecting the light in any way and so of contributing something, it may be a point, to the formation of an image on the retina, of causing a separate sensation, of being distinctively imaged in the Buddhi and ultimately, at the time of the most analytical determinate knowledge, of being referred to by a separate word, requires a separate perceptual activity from the time it affects a particular ray of light to that when it is cognised to have got a separate existence and is given a name :

> "Tatra ca pratyakṣam pratyābhāsam prāmāṇyam bhajate vimarśalakṣaṇasya pramitivyāpārasya ekaikaśabdavācyerthe viśrānteḥ, tadanusāritvācca pramāṇasya"
>
> I. P. V., I, 188-9.

It may be pointed out here that these innumerable perceptions, which take place within that which prompts the percipient to some kind of motor response, are not always conceived separately. Their separate conception as such depends upon, as we pointed out before, the individual will, liking and analytical capacity.

THE DISTINCTIVE PROCESS OF THE DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE.

The whole process from the time of illumination of the object by an external light to that of its mirroring on the Buddhi, leads only to an indeterminate knowledge which consists in the consciousness of the Buddhi having been affected ; a consciousness with regard to which the use of language is not possible. After this, begins the process which is distinctive of the determinate knowledge.

When a person says "I am seeing a jar" it is not that he sees the jar alone. There are many other objects which are reflected on the Buddhi through the retina. Of these also he has some sort of consciousness, which, of course, is different from that of the jar. Why then does he make a definite statement about the jar to the exclusion of the rest of the presentation? The Trika replies that it is because on that part alone of the whole of the presentation the mind has acted, because that alone has been carried through the process leading to determinate knowledge.

The determinative process begins with the selection by mind (manas) of some points out of the mass reflected on the Buddhi.[1] It is like carving an image out of a big piece of stone. This is not all. For, every time a person sees a jar he does not feel it to be an altogether new thing; he sees many points in it in common with his previous perceptions; he knows it to belong to a familiar class, gives it a name, conceives liking or dislike for it and accordingly tries to gain or shun it. How does all this happen? The explanation, which the Trika offers, is that soon after the carving out of an image from the block or mass of points or sensations there takes[2] place a revival of the memory of a similar object perceived before; then, because of the law of association, wakes up the memory of its name and the feelings that it aroused in the past (Eka sambandhi jñānam apara sambandhi smārakam bhavati), then follow the comparison of the presented and the revived images, the classification of the former with the latter and finally the attribution of the latter's name and qualities to the former and consequent liking or aversion for it according as it is associated with pleasant or unpleasant memories.

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1. I. P. V., II, 40-1. 2. I. P. V., I, 54-5.

This is what takes place in the case of the perception of an extremely familiar object. The determinative process in the case of the unfamiliar is a little more complex inasmuch as it involves elimination. Suppose a fossil botanist has to classify a new fossil, the structure of which has no marked similarity with any, known before, so that there is no clue as to its class. In such a case, there arise many images of previously perceived fossils which may have some similarity with the present. And although ultimately it is identified with only one of them, yet the judgement is not reached till after the identification with the rest has been found to be unreasonable as a result of a careful comparison[1]

DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE AND EXTERNAL OBJECT.

Determinate knowledge has no direct reference to the external object. (Arthāsaṁsparśino vikalpāḥ). This is in reality a Buddhist idea. But it has come into the Trika as a logical consequence of its having accepted the Buddhist theory of momentariness as far as the 'apparent' is concerned. If the object is momentary and the determinate knowledge follows the indeterminate, it is obviously inconsistent with the theory of momentariness to say that the object of the indeterminate knowledge exists at the time of the determinate ; still more so is the notion of its forming an object of the latter. But the Trika holds this view for an additional psychological reason, namely, that the determinative process consists in a reaction[2] of the mind on the sense data recorded (to speak figuratively) on the Buddhi, in making a selection of a certain group of 'points' from the whole mass, in adding to the selected something from the old store of memory and in giving it a definite shape and name. It is the second process which leads to the

1. I. P. V., I, 240.
2. I. P. V., II, 103

judgement in regard to the object of perception, a process, without which[1] no subsequent recollection of a simply sensed object is possible, as, for instance, in the case of the innumerable objects, sensed through the window of a mail train when she is running at a speed of fifty miles per hour. Thus the determinate knowledge is quite different from sensation which precedes it ; and as such it is purely internal and is in no way directly connected with any thing that is external.

SUPERSENSUOUS EXPERIENCE OR ANUBHAVA.

What we have said above in regard to the psychic movements consequent upon the reflection of an external object on a sense, say, optical, in short means that knowledge or cognition is the result of a causal action of an external object on the self, that all its contents are purely subjective states of the cognising self, that the causal objective manifestation does not form a part of knowledge and that knowledge, if it reproduces reality, can contain only copies of the real and not the objects themselves. Thus it is clear that the self never comes in direct touch with the external object. It knows only the copies of the real and not the real. It cannot satisfy itself that the copies are true by comparing them with the original. Therefore, according to the psychic process described above, it is not possible to be certain that our knowledge is correct. Further, if all that the self can know are the reflections on the retina which, being proportionate to the dimension of the eye-ball (in the case of an ocular perception, for instance) are much smaller than the original, how can the above explained theory of perception satisfactorily account for our common experience of such a huge thing as a mountain ?

1. I. P. V., I, 141-2.

It cannot be said to be a matter of inference, because inference presupposes the direct knowledge of the inferred and, according to the above theory, the real is known only through the copies. The theory of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness may explain the fact of self and not-self coming together much in the same way as the sea accounts for the meeting of two logs which are floating on it, but it cannot explain the above difficulties.

Abhinava, therefore, holds that the all-inclusiveness of the Universal Consciousness consists not in its being simply a substratum of things of diverse kinds and of opposite nature, but in its being the essence of all that has existentiality (sattā) exactly as the earth is of all that is earthy. He asserts that just as earthiness of a jar depends upon its being essentially earthy i. e. being made up of earth ; and that just as jar, in order that it may have its being on earth must essentially be earth, so all that is indicated by the word "all" in "All-inclusive Universal Consciousness", in order that it may have its being in the Universal Consciousness, should essentially be itself consciousness. This is what a strictly logical explanation of the phenomenon of knowledge requires. This is what Professor Radhakrishnan seems to imply when he says in his Indian Philosophy :—

"If truth means agreement of ideas with reality and if reality is defined as that which is external to thought what is not thought or made up of thought then truth seeking is a wild goose chase".

In the above quotation the learned professor seems to imply not only what we have already stated but also that the ascertainment of the correctness of our idea of the external, requires the object to be within the thought or consciousness to make the comparison possible. In this he seems to echo Abhinava's view on the matter. Abhinava

holds that before the commencement of the above described psychic process, that is, at the time of rise of desire for perception, the cognising self becomes pervasive as far as the object or objects of perception and that the objects also appear in their essential nature of being made up of consciousness and become one with the self much in the same manner as the reflection does with the object that has the capacity to receive it. Thus a phenomenon of knowledge may be said to be a union of the subjective and the objective waves of consciousness in the sea of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness. This supersensuous knowledge is technically called 'anubhava', which implies the subject's becoming what the object is. Just as when we say that Devadatta imitates Yajñadatta (Devadattaḥ Yajñadattam anukaroti) we mean that the former does the same or similar thing as does the latter, so when we say "John experiences (anubhavati) a jar," it means, if we take the word "anubhavati" literally, that John becomes what the jar is. This is exactly what Abhinava has said in slightly different words in the Bṛhatī Vimarśinī quoted in a foot note in I. P. V., I, 42 as follows :-

> "Tathā ca ghaṭo mama sphuratīti korthaḥ, madīyaṁ sphuraṇaṁ spandanam āviṣṭaḥ madrūpatāmāpanna eva cinmayatvāt."

To clear the point let us quote Bhāskarakaṇṭha's explanation of Abhinava's text on which the above statement is based :—

> "Grahaṇasamaye bhāvasya māyayā bhāvatvena bhāsitaṁ nijaṁ sahajaśuddhaprakāśākhyaṁ svarūpameva pramātāram prati sphuṭībhavati, yataḥ tadā pramātā tadvastu prati didṛkṣāsamaye vyāpakībhavati yaduktam :—
>
> "Didṛkṣayeva sarvārthān yadā vyāpyāvatiṣṭhate
> Tadā kiṁ bahunoktena svayam evāvabhotsyate"

Vyāpakībhavaṁśca tadvastu svātmasātkaroti tanmayībhāvāsādanañca vastunaḥ śuddhaprakāśarūpatvāsādanameva pramātuḥ śuddhaprakāśamātra rūpatvāt."

Criticism of the Rival Theories.

The typical rivals of the above theory of subject-object union, as propounded by Abhinava, are the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The rival theory of knowledge of the former is known as Prakaṭatāvāda and that of the latter as Kāraṇatāvāda. We take them here separately for criticism.

Prakaṭatāvāda.

This theory is said to have been founded by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila. He holds that a phenomenon of knowledge presupposes some kind of relation between the subject and the object. This relation is brought about by the movement of the knowing self and is an object of internal perception (mānasapratyakṣa) alone. His conception of knowledge is that it is simply an act of the cognisor, which produces cognisedness (jñātatā) or manifestedness (prakaṭatā) in the object. The action of the agent, the cognition, is not directly perceptible; it can only be inferred from the quality of cognisedness produced by it in the object.

(Itthaṁ tadvādaḥ :—

Jñānaṁ nāma kriyā, sā ca phalānumeyā phalaṁ ca prakaṭatākhyaṁ viṣayadharmaḥ saiva vedyatā iti Kaumārilāḥ procuḥ I. P. V., I, 155).

He is a dualist and, therefore, in order to maintain the independent existence of the object, he denies the self-luminosity to knowledge. He cannot either admit the cognition to be directly cognisable, for, it would then require another cognition to cognise it and that too another still and so on ad-infinitum. His theory, therefore,

in short is that the objects are known through cognition which has the capacity of manifesting them, though in itself it is only inferrable.

Its refutation.

If the subject and the object have an exclusive existence even at the time of cognition and if manifestedness, though produced, belongs to the object exactly as do the other qualities such as blackness, for instance, in the case of a jar, it is difficult to explain why it is manifest only to some and not to others. If it gets manifestedness i. e. if it is made manifest, there is no reason why it should not become equally manifest to all. But, if the Mīmāṁsaka were to say that mere manifestedness of an object does not necessarily mean its connection with all perceivers so as to give rise to the particular consciousness "It is known to me" in each case, he has to be asked :—"Is the manifestedness of the object self-confined ?" Of course, it is not reasonable to suppose that the mere being of a thing makes it known to a perceiver without the subject's being connected with the object in some way ; for, if it were so, all should be all-knowing. If, therefore, he were to admit the manifestedness of the object to be self-confined he will still find his position much the same, because then the object will not be known even to the person whose cognitional activity has produced cognisedness. For, the manifestedness of the object would be as much self-confined for him as for any one else. There should, therefore, be perfect ignorance of the objective world according to the Mīmāṁsaka theory. Nor can it be said that the relation of causality will determine the relation of knowability, that is to say, the object will have manifestedness, will shine, to him only whose cognitive activity has given it manifestedness ; because, our experience tells us that an effect, after it has come into being, need not depend for its existence

upon or shine only to him, who has been instrumental in bringing it into existence. For, if it were so, a jar, made by a potter, should have no existence independent of him and should shine only to him, just as the Mīmāṁsaka would wish the manifestedness to be manifest only to its creator. Mīmāṁsaka theory of knowledge, therefore, is not acceptable, because it cannot explain the fact of individual experience.

THE NAIYĀYIKA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

We are not here concerned with the Naiyāyika view of the process involved in perception. The point under discussion is the part that an object plays in the production of a phenomenon of knowledge. We, therefore, state here only that part of the Naiyāyika theory of knowledge which has immediate bearing on the question in hand. According to the Naiyāyika, the relation between knowledge and its object is that of the illuminator and the illuminated, much the same as between a lamp and the object on which it sheds its light.

("Jñānasyārtha prakāśatvaṁ nanu rūpam pradīpavat" I. P. V., I, 156).

He also holds that variety in cognition is caused by variety of the instruments and objects.

ITS REFUTATION.

If the light of knowledge is to be taken as different from the object it has of necessity to be supposed to be uniform in its nature; because, it is the common element in all the multifarious cognitions, such as those of the red, the blue and the black. The red etc. cannot be considered to be the very forms of knowledge, for, then all the notion of independence of the object becomes baseless. If, however, they are taken to be separately existing entities the question arises: if it is with the help of the light of knowledge

that we know the difference between the black and the blue, and if that light of knowledge is one and uniform in its nature how can the blue be known as blue with the help of that very light, by means of which the black is known as black ? The opponent cannot say that the difference in knowledge is caused by that in the objects ; because, that is just the point under discussion. The objects, as they have no luminosity of their own, cannot be apprehended as different from one another. As for knowledge, it is admittedly of uniform nature. How can, then, the variety of consciousness, which is a matter of every body's experience, arise ? Moreover, how can, what is not shining, be made to shine ? Because, causal action of the agent presupposes, on the part of its object, the capacity for that action which the former makes the latter do. For instance, when a driver makes a horse go, he does so because the horse has itself got the capacity to go. Therefore, if the luminosity of the object of knowledge is to be taken to be the result of causal action of the light of knowledge, the object must be supposed to have some luminosity of its own. And if it be admitted to have that, there would cease to be any essential difference between the Naiyāyika and the Ābhāsavādin. The acceptance of this would mean giving up by the Naiyāyika of his original theory of essential difference between knowledge and its object.

The analogy also of a lamp to show the manner in which an object is illuminated by the light of knowledge, is not quite appropriate. Because, while a lamp shines independently of all objects, knowledge does not. Moreover, a lamp casts its light on the object and thus imparts to the latter its own luminosity, so that the appearance of the object varies with the light ; but the opponent does not hold that knowledge affects its object in any such way.

THE POINT OF DIFFERENCE.

The chief point of difference between the theory of knowledge of the Ābhāsavāda and the rival theories of other systems discussed above, is, that, while, according to latter, the object is separate from the subject and is related to the latter by some such relation as that of the instrumental cause with the effect or that of the illuminator with the illuminated; according to the Ābhāsavāda, subject and object are essentially one and the phenomenon of knowledge is simply a result of their unification, i.e. merging of the object in the subject. It has been pointed out in the preceding chapter how every thing is essentially of the nature of consciousness, object being no less so than the subject, and how phenomenon of knowledge is due to the momentary rise of the subjective and the objective waves, in the sea of the Universal Consciousness.

Now the question may be asked: if the object is essentially of the nature of consciousness why is it not equally manifest to all the subjects? To this Ābhāsavāda replies that a phenomenon of knowledge is not the result of mere existence of the subject and the object but that of the unification of the two by the relation of identity (tādātmya sambandha). We know that a thing, which is connected with another by such relations as the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas suppose to exist between the subject and the object, can exist independently of the related, but not certainly what is connected by relation of identity. This explains why an object always shines on the back-ground of the cognising self, and why, though self-manifest, it is not equally manifest to all.

REMEMBRANCE.

The Trika psychology hinges on its central theory of the permanence of the experiencing self. In fact, the psychological

problems are introduced in the philosophical works of the system only to show that their satisfactory explanation is not possible without the assumption of permanence as one of the most essential attributes of the self. The phenomenon of remembrance is supposed to be one of the strongest proofs in its support. In this case also, as in that of the perception, the Buddhist theory is pointed out to be wholly unsatisfactory. We have seen what an important part the remembrance has to play in the determinate perception and so in practical daily life; how the image, which is cut out of the block of sensations, received from an external stimulus, and which as such, is no better than the one on a canvas or in a cinema show, is made into a living one with the material supplied from the already existing stock in the memory; how, unless this image be associated with the past experiences of a similar object, it can neither give rise to any feeling nor to the consequent activity either to gain or to shun it; and lastly, how, without remembrance, no use of language of any kind is possible with regard to any thing whatsoever.

BUDDHIST THEORY OF REMEMBRANCE.

Remembrance[1] is a representative consciousness; it is a mere reproduction of a former state of consciousness. Unlike the indeterminate and the determinate cognitions, it has no object of its own; its object is the same as that of the former experience. For, if it were to have an object of its own it would cease to be remembrance, because, then the consciousness would not be expressible as "that" (saḥ).

Here the question arises: if knowledge is a momentary phenomenon every experience would naturally pass away the very next moment after its coming into being;

1. I. P. V., I, 60-1.

how can then there be a representation of a former state of consciousness so as to make the phenomenon of remembrance possible? The assumption of a permanent self cannot explain it. For, even if the self be permanent its experiences shall still have to be admitted to be momentary. This is what the facts of common experience require. Because in remembrance the consciousness of its object is associated with the idea of its absence. We refer to the object of remembrance as "that" and not as "this". But how[1] can we have the idea of absence if the experience together with its object as such be having a continuous existence from the time of its production to that of its reproduction; or to say the same thing in other words, how can there be any talk of its reproduction which is the characteristic feature of remembrance? The former experience, therefore, with its object, being no more at the time of remembrance, what we require to produce the characteristic consciousness of remembrance is some such thing as can reproduce the object. It is, therefore, assumed that when we have a certain experience, a link of the chain of self-consciousness is affected in a certain way; and because each momentary self-consciousness before its destruction produces a similar one in the next moment, naturally, therefore, the subsequent self-consciousness carries a residual trace (saṁskāra) of the past experience. This residual trace, when revived at a later time because of a subsequent cognition, which has some common element with a past experience, has the capacity[2] of placing the subject-consciousness of that particular moment in the same relation to the object of the former experience as that in which it was when that experience first took place, exactly as that particular capacity, which is ordinarily known as elasticity, places

1. I. P. V., I, 63.
2. I. P. V., I., 64.

the branch of a tree, which is perforce kept down for some time, back in its former position as soon as it is let off.

BAUDDHA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYĀYIKA THEORY.

The Bauddha raises the following question to refute the Naiyāyika theory of the self as a permanent substratum of saṁskāra, which as a quality, cannot exist independently:- Does the self change as a result of the production of the saṁskāra or not? In the former case it ceases to be eternal, because eternality and changeability cannot coexist. In the latter case the assumption of saṁskāra is useless. But if it be said that it admits of no other change than that of saṁskāra and as such is different from other changing things, then it is nothing else than a chain of consciousness which, as has been said above, being affected by a stimulus, retains its residual trace and being combined with other factors produces the particular phenomenon of knowledge, called remembrance, at a subsequent time.

REFUTATION OF THE BAUDDHA THEORY.

There are two points to be noted in connection with remembrance here; one, that the consciousness of remembrance is expressed in judgement as "that" and not as "this"; and the other, that all our subsequent activities with regard to the object of remembrance are determined not by mere consciousness of the object as such, but by that of the pleasant or unpleasant experiences with which it was associated at the time of its former knowledge. Thus, if we accept the Buddhist explanation of remembrance as due to mere revival of residual traces of the former knowledge, not only we shall not have its characteristic consciousness "that" but also there will be nothing to determine our subsequent action; because, the only thing that the residual traces can do is to place the subject in its former relation with that particular object the residual trace

of which has been revived, and if so, there is no reason why the former subject-object relation having been restored there should not consequently be the former consciousness expressible as "this". Moreover, the residual traces can represent the object alone and not its former experiences also; this consciousness, therefore, would lead to no action. The reason is obvious: we try to gain or shun an object according as we know it to have been the cause of pleasure or pain. This knowledge depends upon the representation of the past experience which, according to the Buddhist theory, is not possible. It cannot be assumed here that the residual trace will represent the past experience also, because, according to the Buddhist, self being nothing but knowledge (jñāna), it cannot have the former experience, which is but a form of knowledge, as its object; because, knowledge is self-luminous and cannot become an object of another knowledge (Dṛk svābhāsā nānyena vedyā). Nor can the Buddhist say that although the experience does not form an object of remembrance yet it seems to do so exactly as an object does in an erroneous perception; because, the chief feature of remembrance is the true reappearance of the object of former experience in all its associations. Therefore, if the appearance of the object in remembrance be taken to be false, remembrance would cease to be remembrance. It would become an erroneous perception.

REMEMBRANCE AND ERROR.

Let us, for the sake of clearness, point out the distinction between remembrance and erroneous perception. In the former case the object of mental reaction or inner perception (adhyavasāya) is the same image as was produced by former perception or sense-contact and is associated with all the then experiences. What happens is simply this that the psychic image of the object, which was cognised with

all its distinction of time and place and name and form at the time of the former perception, does not merge again in the Universal Consciousness soon after the perception, but remains with all its associations of time, place and the then momentary manifested perceiver, under a veil as it were, in the permanent aspect of the individual self. The existence of the objective manifestation (Bhāvābhāsa) in this condition is technically known as Saṁskāra, and its revival consists simply in the removal of the veil from over it, so that as soon as the veil is removed, the object shines in all its past glory and associations. Thus, it is because of the reappearance of the object in all its former associations, particularly that of the time, that the consciousness is expressed as "that". But in the case of the perceptual error what appears is a new form and as such has no association with the past time and, therefore, is referred to as "this". The fact is, as we have already pointed out, that the mind is very quick in its work of carving an image out of the block of sensations and completing it in an unspeakably short time with the material taken from the old stock of memory. Thus, the image that appears in the mirror of Buddhi at the time of an erroneous perception is erroneous, not because it has no existence, nor even because it is not made up of the material supplied by an external stimulus, but because the material taken from the old stock of memory is so much that the little that is taken from the block of sensations may be considered to be too insignificant to justify its being called and considered to be an image of an external object. It is this little material taken from the immediate sensations which accounts for only a certain kind of affection of consciousness at the sight of a certain object even in erroneous perception; but for this, it would be difficult to explain why at the sight of a mother-of-pearl there is the erroneous perception of silver only and of nothing else.

To clear the point in hand further, it may be pointed out here that imagination is still a different thing from both remembrance and erroneous knowledge, because it is due neither to unveiling of an already existing image with all its associations, as in the case of remembrance, nor to building up of an image with material mostly taken from the old stock of memory, but a perfectly independent creation of the mind without any element taken from the immediate external stimulus, if there be any, and without any clear association with the past time. It is because of the new presentations in the erroneous perception and the imagination that their objects are conceived as "this". But the consciousness of the object of remembrance is expressed as "that" because it is a mere representation.

THE TRIKA THEORY OF REMEMBRANCE.

Remembrance is a complex phenomenon. It requires an object, not a new presentation but a reproduction or representation of what has already been an object of some kind of determinate cognition. Further, in order that this object may lead to the characteristic judgement of remembrance "that", and determine the activity of an individual rememberer with regard to itself, the remembrance requires the represented object to be associated with the time of its former perception and with the feelings of pleasure or pain which it then aroused. The Buddhist explanation, based on the assumption of saṁskāra, can place the momentary subject-consciousness in the same relation to the object in which it was on the occasion of the perception, but it can neither account for the characteristic judgement "that" nor the future activity with regard to the remembered. The Trika, therefore, puts forth the theory of unification of the ābhāsas.

The remembering subject.

The limited individual self, as we pointed out before, has two aspects, the momentary and the permanent. The first dissolves with the dissolution of the momentary identification with the body etc.; but the second lasts even through universal dissolution (Pralaya). And the objects of determinate cognition, i. e. the images made up of the material taken from the sense presentations and the old stock of memory, are also of two kinds. Some merge back into Universal Consciousness soon after the cognition but others continue to have separate existence with their associations of time, place and limited momentary individual perceiver, with which they were manifested as separate from the Universal Consciousness at the time of the former perception. They remain wrapped up, as it were, in the veil of darkness, (Shall we say they exist in a subconscious state ?) in the permanent aspect of the individual self exactly in the manner in which the ābhāsas which get merged back into the Universal Consciousness live there. An object in this state is technically called saṁskāra as we have already pointed out.

(Yo bhāvaḥ pūrvam anubhavakāle taddeśakālapramātrantarasācivyena pṛthak kṛto na ca ahantāyām eva vilīnīkṛtaḥ sa tādṛg eva tamasevācchādya avasthāpitaḥ saṁskāraśabdavācyaḥ I. P. V., I. 118-9).

(Etena punaḥ smṛtiviṣayam anāgatya bhāvajātam ahantāyām eva līyata iti dyotitam. (Bhāskarī)

The remembering subject has got full power to unite or disunite the ābhāsas of which it is a permanent abode just as the Universal Consciousness has over those which it contains within.

THE REMEMBERED OBJECT.

Remembrance is a determinate knowledge and as such cannot have an object of its own, because all the determinative activity is a kind of reaction on what has already been mirrored on Buddhi (gṛhīta grahaṇa svabhāvatvāt). Its object is the same as that of the former experience. From the time of the direct perception to that of remembrance, this object, this psychic image, has a separate veiled existence in the permanent limited perceiver and, being revived at the sight of something similar, reappears.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE REMEMBERED EXPLAINED.

The remembered is not an object in the sense that it is illumined by the light proceeding from the remembering self, because it is an essential part of the experience itself, which, being a kind of knowledge (Jñāna), is self-luminous and as such cannot be the object of another knowledge. Now naturally the question arises: if not in the above sense in what sense is it an object, or rather if the experience is self-shining and so is the object, how is it connected with remembrance; in short, how does the phenomenon of remembrance arise? The Trika replies that when the revival takes place the object shines as associated with the time of its former perception and the feelings of pleasure or pain which it then aroused. This is united with the momentary self-luminous self as identified with the body or the vital air etc. according to the nature of the thing remembered. This remembering self also has its own limitation of time of its manifestation. Thus when the constituent and the associated ābhāsas of the object of former experience are united with those of the limited self of the time of remembrance there arises a new phenomenon, called remembrance, similar to that which is produced by hundreds of small lights shining

together at one place[1]. The object of the former experience is called the object of remembrance because at the time of remembrance it shines in the additional light of the self-luminous remembering self. It is called object of remembrance exactly in the manner in which an object, though illumined by various lights, is said to have been illumined by the one which illumines it in such a manner as is necessary for the immediate purpose.

This unification of ābhāsas is responsible for the peculiar consciousness of the object as "that", because in remembrance there is the consciousness of both the times i.e. the time of the first appearance of the object in the past perception and that of its reappearance now in the additional light of the momentary remembering self as associated with the present time :

Tadānīntanāvabhāsana pṛthakkṛta śarīrādi sambandham anavadhūyaiva hi tatprakāśaḥ. Tataśca idānīntanāvabhāsana kālaparāmarśopi na nimīlati iti etat parāmarśa bhitti prādhānyena pūrva kāla parāmarśaḥ, iti viruddha pūrvāpara parāmarśa svabhāva eva "sa" iti parāmarśa ucyate.

I. P. V., I, 119.

Another point of interest in this explanation is that, according to this system, the object of the former experience can reappear with all its associations of past feelings of pleasure or pain, that it then generated, and be a prompter of the subsequent activities of the perceiver without involving the violation of the principle that one knowledge does not shine as an object of another ; because, the Trika theory of unification of ābhāsas as the cause of remembrance does not place the former experience in the relation of an object to remembrance. According to this, the self-luminousness of the experience, which reappears at the time of remembrance,

1. I. P. V., I, 124.

remains as much unaffected as the light of a lamp does remain even at the time when it illumines its former object in conjunction with other new lights. This unification of ābhāsas is the work of the permanent limited perceiver, who is no other than the Maheśvara, now called by a different name, because of his appearing as the remembering self[1], which retains within, all the former experiences with their associated objects, and appears at the time of remembrance[2], as identical with the body or the vital air etc. according to the need of the occasion.

Thus the Trika seems to give a satisfactory explanation of English words "recollect" and remember" which stand for the activities (of the self) involved in the production of the phenomenon, we are discussing. It is a recollection, because it requires the old separately manifested ābhāsas to be collected again as we pointed out above. And it is a remembrance because it involves the reunification into one whole of the old ābhāsas of the time of perception with the new ones of remembrance i. e. the old ābhāsas which formed constituent parts (members) of the former complex ābhāsa which served as the object of perception, are again made the necessary constituents of the new complex ābhāsa of remembranee.

1. I. P., V., I, 119-20.
2. I. P. V., I. 129.

CHAPTER V.

THE THEORIES OF EFFECTABILITY CAUSAL AND KARMA.

THE ĀBHĀSAVĀDA AND THE PHYSICAL PHENOMENA.

The two powers of the Maheśvara, namely, the powers of knowledge and action (jñāna and kriyā śakti) are most prominently mentioned in the Śaiva literature. The Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, for instance, is primarily concerned with the exposition of these two powers in its first two voluminous adhikāras. In the preceding chapter we have dealt with the power of knowledge. In this, therefore, we propose to give a brief idea of the power of action.

The[1] Ābhāsavādins, like some of the modern thinkers, have conceived the universe as broadly consisting of mind and matter. They attribute the psychological phenomena, as we have shown in a preceding chapter, to the omniscience (jñātṛtva śakti) of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness (Parā saṁvid) and the physical to another similar universal power, namely, omnipotence (Kartṛtva śakti). "Kriyāśakti" is an aspect of the latter. We have shown in the third chapter how it is responsible for such manifestations as give rise to the idea of action. Here we shall show how it manifests physical phenomena in general.

This conception of the Kriyā śakti forms the chief point of difference between the different schools of Buddhism and the Ābhāsavāda. For, the former, perhaps finding it impossible to explain the variety of experiences referring to the same thing at different times, have confined themselves

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1. I. P. V., II, 134-5.

solely to the explanation of the knowability of the "knowable". They are significantly silent about what happens to the object after it ceases to be the object of a perception and why it is that every time we perceive it there is found some difference in it; or rather, what it is that causes the difference in the thing which in its turn brings about a change in perception. If, for instance, we take the subjectivists, who hold that each cognition is due to the waking up of a certain vāsanā, we find that they have failed to explain why only a certain vāsanā wakes up at a certain time and no other:

"Na vāsanāprabodhotra vicitro hetutāmiyāt
Tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kiṁ nibandhanam"
I. P. V., I, 165.

Similarly, if we take the case of the Bāhyārthānumeyavādin, we find that though he accounts for difference in cognition by saying that it is due to difference in the external inferrable object, yet he too is silent as to why there is this change in the object itself.

EFFECTABILITY.

The thinkers of the Trika had noticed this weak point in the earlier systems and, therefore, took enough pains in their presentation of the system to explain this side also of the problem of human experience. In addition to the relation of 'knowability' of the contents of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness to its power of knowledge, they believe in another relation, which for want of a better word we call here the relation of 'effectability' to another aspect of the same Universal Consciousness, namely, the power of action. The relation of knowability in this case consists in these contents being the objects of the operation of the power of knowledge of the Universal Consciousness, which at the time of each cognition manifests some object or objects out of the mass, which lies merged within, as

separate both from itself and from the individual perceiver. It is momentary. But the relation of effectability is constant, so that even when the object is not being known, that is, not being manifested as apparently separate from the Universal Consciousness to an individual perceiver, it does not altogether lose its separate existence; because it is still the object of operation of the power of action which involves its separate existence no less than does the power of knowledge. Just as the latter (the power of knowledge) is concerned with giving rise to the subjective and objective waves in the sea of the Universal Consciousness and uniting them so as to give rise to the phenomena of knowledge, so the power of action may be said to be concerned with effecting that which is necessary for the rise of the objective wave. To make the point clear let us suppose that each object of the physical universe is like an under-current or sub-current, which at times, because of the influence of the power of knowledge appears as a wave over the surface of the sea of Universal Consciousness and serves as one of the necessary constituents of a phenomenon of knowledge. Therefore, just as the under current is not co-existent with the wave so the physical phenomenon is not (co-existent) with the psychological, which is based upon the former. That power which produces the innumerable currents and keeps them going is the power of action: (Kriyāśakti.)

........................."Sāntarviparivartinaḥ
Ubhayendriyavedyatvaṁ tasya kasyāpi śaktitaḥ",

Kumbhakārahṛdaye antarmanogocaratvāt pūrvam api svasaṁvidekātmatayā vicitratvena viśvasya bhedābhedātmanā parivartamānasya spandanena sphurataḥ yat antaḥkaraṇa bahiṣkaraṇavedyatvam ābhāsyate................Naca kumbhakāre prāṇapuryaṣṭakabuddhidehaprāye tadetat sthitaṁ tasyāpi jaḍatvāt tataḥ saṁvid eva viśvam ātmani bhāsayati śaktivaicitryāt, I. P. V., II, 141.

THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE AND THE ULTIMATE REALITY.

On the basis of what we have stated above it would not be wrong to say that the Trika conceives the Ultimate Reality not only as Universal Consciousness but also as Universal Energy. It is the latter, which, because of the Creative Desire (icchāvaśāt) appears in the forms of the innumerable physical phenomena much in the same way as the electric energy, because of the resistance, appears in the form of various lights. The Universal Energy and the Creative Desire, working in the aforesaid manner represent "kriyā-śakti". Thus the physical universe, with all its varieties, is a mere manifestation of the Universal Energy and is connected with it exactly in the manner in which light is connected with electric energy. Just as innumerable lights, being mere forms of electricity, do not break up its unity, so the physical phenomena leave the unity of the Universal Energy undisturbed :

"Eṣa cānanta śaktitvād ayam ābhāsayatyamūn
Bhāvān icchāvaśād eṣā *kriyā nirmātṛtāsya sā*."

Eṣa purāṇaḥ pramātā amūn bhāvān ābhāsitapūrvān ābhāsamānān ābhāsayati avichinnena prabandhena, katham, icchāyā īśiturabhinnāyā avikalparūpāyā akramāyā vaśena sāmarthyena. Kutrāsya te bhāvāḥ sthitāḥ ? āha "ananta-śaktitvāt" iti, viśve hi bhāvāstasyaiva śaktirūpeṇa svarūpāt-matvena sthitāḥ" I. P. V., II, 136.

CAUSALITY.

The Trika conception of causality is not the same as that of the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya, which holds that the effect is present in the cause exactly as oil is in a sesame seed, nor as that of the pūrvāparībhāvavāda of the Bauddha, which holds that of the two things, which come in the order of invariable im mediate precedence and succession, the former

is the cause and the latter is the effect. It is different from the Naiyāyika concept which differentiates between the material and the instrumental causes even in reference to the universal creation, as well as from that of a certain school of the Vedānta, which holds that the Brahman, as pure consciousness, without the power of control, is the cause of the universe.

It may be of interest to note in this connection that there is a complete agreement between the S'āṅkara Vedānta and the Trika in respect of the nature of the ultimate cause of the universe. Both hold it to be not only all-inclusive but also all-controlling. In support of this opinion we quote below some interesting passages from the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī and the S'āṅkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra for a comparative study :—

"Nanvetāvatā vijñānam eva brahmarūpam imām viśvarūpatāvaicitrīm parigṛhṇātu kim īśvaratāparikalpanayā ? ityāśaṅkyāha"

"Vāstavepi cidekatve na syād ābhāsabhinnayoḥ
Cikīrṣālakṣaṇaikatvaparāmarśaṁ vinā kriyā.
.....................Tasmāt vāstavaṁ cidekatvam
abhyupagamyāpi tasya kartṛtvalakṣaṇā bhinnarūpasamāveśātmikā kriyā nopapadyate parāmarśalakṣaṇaṁ tu svātantryaṁ yadi bhavati tadopapadyate sarvam, parāmarśo hi cikīrṣā rūpā icchā tasyāṁ ca sarvam antarbhūtaṁ nirmātavyam abhedakalpenāste

I. P. V., II, 178-81.

and

"Prathamedhyāye sarvajñaḥ sarveśvaro jagata utpattikāraṇam mṛtsuvarṇādaya iva ghaṭarucakādīnām, utpannasya jagato niyantṛtvena sthitikāraṇam māyāvīva māyāyāḥ"

V. S. S'. Bh, 345.

"Brahmāsya jagato nimittakāraṇam prakṛtiśca ityetasya pakṣasyākṣepaḥ smṛtinimittaḥ parihṛtaḥ." V. S. S. Bh, 354.

Like the Buddhist, the Trika also holds that the 'apparent' is momentary. Its conception of causality, however, is different, because the process which, according to this system, leads to the phenomenal existence is so. It holds that the Universal Energy under the influence of the Creative Desire appears in the forms of innumerable objects of the universe which, before their external manifestation exist within the Universal Consciousness exactly as our own ideas do within ourselves, when we are about to deliver a very thoughtful speech. The life of each object, with all its innumerable changes, is constituted by a separate current of that Universal Energy which manifests itself in the innumerable successive forms, each of which represents a separate moment of existence in the so called life of that object. These forms come one after another with such quickness or velocity that their succession is not marked. Rather, the impression is that the same object is having continuous existence, as it is in the case of the flame of a lamp or in that of moving figure in a cinema-show.

Creation, according to this system, takes place in two ways. It may be in a regular order of successive manifestations according to the universal law, technically called Niyati, which fixes the order of invariable immediate precedence and succession in which the things, which are conceived as related to each other by the relation of cause and effect, ordinarily appear. All the effects ordinarily take place in this way. A seed, for instance, appears as a gigantic tree after the successive manifestations of sprout etc. Or it may be in contravention of this law of Niyati i. e. without any succession of manifestations as also without any ordinarily necessary material, as for instance, when a

yogin creates a city with all its palatial buildings and beautiful gardens, with all kinds of living beings, by sheer force of his supernatural power.[1] In all manifestations working of the sentient principle is the most important factor. This being so, the Trika naturally holds that the causal relation, as it is ordinarily conceived, is a mere convenient conventional assumption based upon what is apparent and, therefore, cannot refer to reality. The real relation between the manifestor and the manifested is not that of cause and effect in the sense that the former constitutes the material of the latter, as does the Prakṛti of all her evolutes, according to the Saṅkhya ; nor in that the manifestor works upon something that exists independently of it, as the God of the Naiyāyikas does on the independent atoms. The relation is similar to that which exists between the thinking self and the thought ; it is a subject-object relation (kartṛkarmabhāva sambandha).

The Trika concept of causality offers one explanation for all kinds of creations or manifestations. It is the same energy, it says, which is the cause of the sudden (akramika) and the successive (kramika) as well as the universal and the limited creations or manifestations. It tells us of the most essential common factor in all. It also explains the basis of the popular conception of the material cause of an effect in ordinary creation.[2] Because, ordinarily whatever invariably unconditionally and immediately precedes the existence of a certain thing, is taken to be the material cause of what follows, provided that the qualities, which characterise the one that precedes, characterise also the other that follows.[3] A seed, for instance, is taken to be

1. I. P. V., II, 150-1.
2 T. A. VI, 30.
3 T. A. VI, 10.

the cause of a sprout. And according to the Trika conception also of the causality, in the Niyati-controlled creation, the form, which is ordinarily taken to be the material cause of what follows, must precede that which is taken to be its effect, exactly as it must, according to the Satkāryavāda.

NECESSITY FOR SUCH A SUPPOSITION.

From what has been stated above it follows that the causal relation is in reality nothing but the subject-object relation. ("Kartṛ karmatva tattvaiva kārya kāraṇatā tataḥ" T. A., Comm. 24). It is the Universal Energy, which, being moulded by the Creative Desire, appears in the multifarious forms of the objective universe, just as the clay does in the forms of a jar, a dish and a cup and so on, as the potter's will moulds it. Let it not, however, be forgotten that the Universal Energy and the Creative Desire are non-different from the Universal Consciousness. They can, at the most, be spoken of as the different aspects of the same Ultimate Reality.

Action is of two kinds. The one relates to an object and the other is confined within the agent. In the former case a conscious relation of the agent with the object, to which his action relates, is necessary. A potter, for instance, must have conscious relation with what he intends to produce. Both the theories of causality, namely, the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya and the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya and others, therefore, cannot stand. For, how can the insentient, which is devoid of the capacity of placing itself in a conscious relation with that object, to which its productive activity relates, produce an effect? The two, the seed and the sprout, are separate from each other, and, being insentient, are self-confined, i. e. there is no conscious relation similar to that which exists between the potter and the

jar, that is to be created, so that if such things be supposed to be related to each other as cause and effect, there is no reason why any two things should not be supposed to be so related ?[1] Moreover, if the essential nature of the effect before it comes into being is non-existence, as the Nyāya holds, it can never become existent in any way, for nature does not change[2] ; but, if it be existence, as the Sāṅkhya maintains, what is then to be effected by the cause. It cannot be said that the cause effects manifestation; for, the same question can be raised with regard to the manifestation also[3] i. e. does the manifestation exist before manifestation or not ? If it does, the activity to bring it about ceases to have any meaning. But, if it does not, how can it then be brought about ? For, according to the Satkāryavāda, nothing that does not already exist can be brought about. The Trika, therefore, puts forth its own theory of causality.

CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHISTIC CONCEPTION

The Buddhistic causal conception also cannot explain the above difficulty. The Bauddha holds that whenever phenomena happen in a series, each particular phenomenon, as soon as it takes place is invariably followed by another ; that of the two phenomena the one that invariably unconditionally and immediately precedes the other is called "the cause" and that which follows "the effect", and that, every thing being momentary, the latter is altogether a new production and is in no way materially connected with the former as in the case of the Sāṅkhya conception of causality, called the Satkāryavāda.[4] The unsoundness of the above view is apparent. For, according to this, there is nothing which can justify one phenomenon being called the cause of another. The invariable precedence cannot be regarded

1 T. A., VI, 23. 2 T. A., VI, 25 ;
3 I. P. V., II, 139. 4 I. P. V., II, 168.

as sufficient reason, for, in that case any two phenomena, one of which is perceived following[1] the other, the two lunar mansions Kṛttikā and Rohiṇī, for instance, shall have to be accepted as being connected by causal relation, or, for that matter, we shall have to suppose the pictures of a cinematographic reel, coming invariably one after the other, as connected with one another by causal relation. The Buddhist cannot say that it is not because of a mere incidence of invariable precedence that one phenomenon is called the cause, but because of its capacity to cause; and that it is not because of mere succession that the other is called the effect, but because of its capacity to be effected. For, such a causality, in order that it may serve its purpose, presupposes conscious relation of the cause, which has the capacity to effect, with the object of its operation. According to the Buddhist hypothesis, however, the object is non-existent at the time of the causal activity. The causal operation, therefore, because of its being dependent upon its object, would not take place. And even if it be supposed to take place, it would lead to no result because of its being objectless :

Atha pūrvatā nāma prayojaka sattākatvam paratā ca nāma prayojya sattākatvaṁ tarhi bījasya aṅkura prayoktrī sattā aṅkura viśrāntā aṅkurāntarbhāvamātmanyānayati, aṅkurābhāve prayoktṛtva mātraṁ syāt tadapi na kiñcit anyāpekṣatvāt tasya. I. P. V., II, 168-9.

CRITICISM OF THE SĀṄKHYA.

The exaplanation of the causal relation as given by the Sāṅkya is no better. It holds that the cause and the effect are connected by the relation of identity (tādātmya). The defect of the theory is obvious ; because, if the seed and the

1 T. A., VI, 17.

sprout be supposed to be identical, then the notion of their duality becomes meaningless. Therefore, either the seed or the sprout only can be said to exist; because, identity and separateness cannot co-exist.[1] Thus, according to the Sāṅkhya also, the causal activity will remain objectless. Nor can the assumption of evolution of one into multifarious forms improve the position of the Sāṅkhya; because, evolution in itself is an action inasmuch as it consists in the assumption of multifarious successive forms by one at different points of time; therefore, if the ultimate nature (prakṛti) be supposed to evolve it ceases to be pure material cause. It becomes an agent[2] (kartṛ). Nor can it be said that the idea of authorship (kartṛtva) of the ultimate nature is not against the Sāṅkhya conception: for, although the Sāṅkhya admits the prakṛti to be an agent, yet such an admission is in conflict with its own theory of insentiency (jaḍatva) of the ultimate nature. The chief characteristic of an insentient thing is that it is of a certain fixed appearance and that by itself it cannot manifest itself in any other than the fixed form. A stone, for instance, cannot assume multifarious forms of a man, a tree and a mountain etc and again after some time regain its original form; therefore, if Prakṛti be insentient its manifesting itself in diverse forms at the time of creation and again assuming the state of equilibrium of qualities at the time of universal dissolution would be as impossible as the assumption by stone of its original condition as stated above:

"Abhinnarūpasya dharmiṇaḥ satatapravahadbahutaradharmabhedasambheda svātantryalakṣaṇam pariṇamanakriyākartṛtvaṁ yaduktaṁ tat pradhānāderna yuktaṁ jaḍatvāt, jaḍo hi nāma pariniṣṭhitasvabhāvaḥ prameyapadapatitaḥ." I. P. V., II, 176-7

1. I. P. V., II, 173.
2. I. P. V., II, 174.

CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTIN'S THEORY.

Even the assumption of the principle of pure Cit as the cause of the universe cannot explain the manifest variety. Manifestation is a causal action and as such necessarily presupposes desire and this in order that it may lead to some definite action, must have an object of its own. This object before creation cannot have existence apart from the desiring self. It has, therefore, necessarily to be supposed to be one with the Self much as the words, that we utter, are one with ourselves at the time when we are preparing ourselves for some utterances. Hence the manifestation of the universe by pure Cit is out of question.

THE TRIKA THEORY OF CAUSALITY.

In opposition to the Śuddhabrahmavādin, the exponents of the Trika, therefore, hold that the Ultimate Reality is Prakāśavimarśamaya i. e. it is not only all-inclusive but also all-controlling[1]. It is by virtue of the latter aspect that it manifests the universe, which is ever within itself in the form of universal energy, as apparently separate from itself on the back-ground of itself without losing its oneness[2], much in the same manner as that in which a mirror manifests what is reflected on it. The most important difference between the two cases is that, while, in the case of an ordinary mirror, reflections are cast by an external object, in that of the mirror of the Universal Consciousness they are caused by its own powers (śaktis) which constitute different aspects of its Svātantrya śakti[3].

Thus, according to the Trika, all that we see is a mere manifestation of the Universal Energy under the control of the Creative Desire. When for instance, a seed develops into

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1. I. P. V., II, 278-9
2. I. P. V., II, 177.
3. T. A., II, 72.

a sprout, it is the Universal Unergy underlying the seed[1] soil and water etc. that manifests itself as a sprout; or when a potter, who also is a manifestation of the same energy, makes a jar, it is the Creative Desire that works through him on the Universal Energy, underlying the so called instrumental and material Causes, and, according to the law of Niyati, brings the jar into existence through various stages.

THE TRIKA THEORY OF KARMA.

Here it may be asked: if it is the Creative Desire that is working in and through the individual, if all that is accomplished is the work not of the individual but of the Universal Self, how can then any merit or demerit attach to the former; how can the individual's experiences, good or bad, be attributed to his previous actions; and how can this concept of Kriyāśakti be reconciled with the accepted theory of Karma? To this Abhinava replies in the 9th and the 13th Āhnikas of the Tantrāloka. His conclusion on this point is based on the combined authority of Śambhunātha[2] and Somānanda.[3]

The theory of karma is meant to explain not only the variety of an individual's associations and experiences and his freedom from them but also the variety that we find in the so called physical universe. Just as individual karma determines individual experiences, so the sum total of all karmas of all the individual selves determines the variety to be found in the physical universe which supplies the necessary stimuli for innumerable experiences. The physical universe is not a capricious creation. It is created with a purpose. Its creation, therefore, is controlled by the necessities of that purpose. It is meant for meeting the innumerable

1. I. P. V., II, 146.
2. T. A., VIII, 69.
3. T. A. VIII, 72.

shades of countless desires of an unimaginable number of limited selves; the selves which are mere limited manifestations of, or mere appearances assumed by, the Universal Consciousness by virtue of its power of obscuration (tirodhāna). To assume such appearances, is, according to the ābhāsavāda, as also, according to the monistic Vedānta, a mere sport of the Supreme.

The limitedness of an individual self consists in the limitation of its powers of knowledge and action[1]. It is called svarūpākhyāti, because it is due to the ignorance of the real nature of the individual self. This limitation necessarily involves another, namely, limitation in desire; for, desire presupposes the knowledge of the desired, and, therefore, cannot refer to what is beyond the reach of knowledge. The latter being limited the former also has necessarily to be so. This limited desire before the creation of the physical universe is objectless; it is a mere eagerness on the part of limited self to use its limited powers. It is the one cause of the future association of the soul with different kinds of bodies suited for its realisation. It is responsible for the limited associations of the limited self. It is the cause of transmigration. It is the root of all actions or Karmas. It does not presuppose a connection with a body, because it is a function of the self and not of the body. If it were not so, a yogin, having once reached the transcendental state i. e. having risen above the limitation of the body, would not be able to resume his connection with the same; because, to break the transcendental state requires a conscious effort which presupposes the rise of desire, so that if the latter were always to presuppose a connection with the body vyuthāna would never take place. This limited desire is called Kārmamala, because it leads to

1. I. P. V., II, 220.

action of a limited nature. It is determined by the Lord's will :—

> Īśvarecchāvaśād asya bhogecchā samprajāyate.
> Bhogasādhanasaṁsiddhyai bhogecchorasya mantrarāṭ
> Jagadutpādayāmasa māyāmāviśya śaktibhiḥ."
>
> T. A., Comm., VI, 56.

The[1] limitation of desire is as beginningless as that of the powers of knowledge and action; and both are due to the All-Controlling Universal Will. Not only this, even the freedom from these limiting conditions and the regaining of godhead are due to the same[2] cause. It cannot be objected that if the Lord be responsible for the variety of limitation in respect of powers of knowledge and action and therefore of desire and other conditions and circumstances, in which we find the living beings, it would naturally follow that He is partial and cruel; for, some He has placed in very favourable circumstances, but others in the extremely adverse; some He has made so happy that they are envied by all who see them, but others so miserable that their very sight is heart-rending; some He liberates but others He keeps in bondage. The reason is that this is a non-dualistic system and, therefore, the so called differently circumstanced individuals have no being apart from Him. And cruelty is cruelty and so partiality is partiality only if it be done to another. Therefore, according to this system, there being no being having a separate being from the Universal Being, the notion of partiality and cruelty being practised by Him is baseless.[3] Nor can it be questioned why He manifests this apparent diversity. Because to do so is His essential nature and it is absurd to question[4] it. It is as meaningless as asking why fire burns ?

1. T. A., VIII, 74.
2. T. A., VIII, 82.
3. T. A., VIII, 71.
4. T. A., VIII, 72.

KARMA AND CREATION.

In addition to the three functions of the Brahman accepted by S'aṅkarācārya, who interpreted the Brahma Sūtras according to the teachings of the Upaniṣads, namely, creation maintenance and dissolution (sṛṣṭi, sthiti, saṁhāra) the Trika, in common with all other āgamic schools, believes in two more, namely, obscuration and grace (tirodhāna and anugraha). It has to be very carefully noted here that only the last two functions are independent of Karma. Only the obscuration and the liberation are brought about by the Lord's independent force of will. The rest i. e. creation etc. depend upon the main prompting cause, the Kārmamala,[1] the sum total of the limited desires of the limited selves; because, the satisfaction of these is the only purpose of the creation, as we have already pointed out above. In fact, in the Tantrāloka the question is raised as to why the creation etc. also are not attributed to the free will of the Lord, and why the malas are assumed to be the prompting causes? And Abhinava has replied to this as follows :—

The Creation is of two kinds, the impure and the pure i. e. with and without limitation. In the latter case S'iva himself is the creator and it is the work purely of His independent power of will. But the former is created by Ananta, who requires prompting causes, the malas, to determine his creative activities.

("Nanu yadyevaṁ tat kim ebhiḥ antargaḍuprāyaiḥ malādibhiḥ, Īśvarecchaiva viśvasargādau nirapekṣā nimittam astu ityāśaṅkya āha :—

Itthaṁ sṛṣṭisthitidhvaṁsatraye māyām apekṣate
kṛtyai malaṁ tathā karma śivecchaiveti susthitam.

Iha khalu uktayuktyā viśvatra sṛṣṭisthitisaṁhāralakṣaṇaṁ

1. T. A., VI, 56.

nijaṁ kṛtyatrayaṁ kartum īśvarecchaiva pragalbhate, kintu malaṁ karma māyāñca apekṣya, yat parameśvaraḥ

"Śuddhedhvani śivaḥ kartā
proktonantosite prabhuḥ."

ityuktyā māyīyedhvani anantamukhena sṛṣṭyādi vidadhyāt, na ca tasya īśvaravat ananyāpekṣameva svātantryaṁ samasti iti avaśyam eva malādyapekṣaṇīyam, anyathā hi katham pratipuṁ vicitraṁ sṛṣṭyādi syāt iti sarvaṁ susthaṁ"
T. A., VIII, Comm., 76-7.)

In our humble opinion, therefore, in view of what has been stated above, Prof. Radhakrishnan's statement in the very brief summary of the Pratyabhijñā system in his Indian Philosophy, requires some modification in respect of the prompting causality of Karma in creation. His statement runs as follows :—

"The existence of a prompting cause, like karma, or material cause, like prakṛti, for the creation of the world is not admitted. Nor is Māyā the principle which creates illusory forms. God is absolutely independent, and creates all that exists by the mere force of His will."
I. Ph. Vol. II 732.

As regards the quotation from the Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, given by the learned professor, we may point out that it is connected with the discussion on the theory of perception and is meant to show how the objective wave is suddenly given rise to at the time of perception. And the illustration of yogin refers to the sudden creation (akramikābhāsa) i. e. creation in violation of the law of Niyati, and is meant to show that this system does not believe in the material cause, like atoms, of the objective universe. This

point we have already discussed at some length in the preceding pages, and we think that the Professor means to substantiate by this quotation only that part of his statement which denies a separate material cause and not that which is concerned with the denial of Karma as a prompting cause of the creation. And if so. we fully agree with him on that point.

It may be pointed out here that Śaṅkara agrees with Abhinava that the creation of universe is merely a sport of the Lord, that sportiveness is His nature and is unquestionable and that the grace is solely dependent upon the Lord's will. To support this statement we may give the following extracts from Thibaut's translation of the Śāṅkara Bhāṣya :—

"But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport such as we see in common life"

............We see in every day life that certain doings of princes and other men of high position, who have no unfulfilled desires left, have no reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as for instance, their recreations in places of amusement ....Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of scripture can we construe any purpose of the Lord. Nor can His nature be questioned." (356-7)

"And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord in creating this world with its various conditions, is not bound by regards, we reply that scripture declares that. Compare, for instance, the two following passages. "For He (the Lord) makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed." (359)

No doubt, this passage speaks of the grace being dependent upon the action of the recipient (Prāṇikarma-sāpekṣam eva īśvarasyānugrahītṛtvam), but the question is: on what does the action itself depend ? Does it not on the Lord's will ? How can then the ultimate dependence of the grace on the Lord's will be denied ?

Thus, when, in accordance with the limitations of powers of knowledge, action and desire, an individual self gets associated with body, senses, vital air and mind and is placed in the requisite circumstances for the realisation of the limited desire, the universal will works through it. In reality, therefore, the individual self is not independent in its action nor does any merit or demerit, consequent upon the so called pious or sinful acts, attach to it ; because, their piety and sinfulness are imaginary and conventional[1]. But among other effects of the universal will, there is this also that under its influence the individual self arrogates the authorship (kartṛtva) of the actions, so performed, to itself and is perfectly oblivious of the fact of its being simply a tool of the universal will. It is this self-arrogation of the individual which is responsible[2] for the attachment of merit and demerit. On this the idea of the individual piety or sinfulness is based.

One can very pertinently ask here : why is the limited desire of the individual self spoken of as Karma and whether it is not strange to suppose the Lord to be perfectly independent in some of His functions but in others to be entirely dependent upon mala etc. ? To the former Abhinava replies that Karma is that which results in some limited experience and so in further obscuration of the real

1. T. A., VIII, 70.
2. I. P. V., II, 149

nature of the experiencer. It is a different matter that in the ordinary use the word means something else:

"Karma tallokarūḍhaṁ hi yadbhogam avaraṁ dadat
Tirodhatte bhoktṛrūpaṁ saṁjñāyāṁ tu na no bharaḥ."
T. A., VIII, 161.

The limited desire of the limited individual is, therefore, spoken of as karma because it is the primary cause of all kinds of its associations and experiences, as shown above. And to the latter question he replies that it is unreasonable to assume one and the same thing to be productive of opposite effects. How can a thing, which is the cause of bondage, be the cause of liberation also? It is to satisfy the demand of reason that the Trika holds the Lord's grace, independent of any thing that is connected with mala, māyā and karma, to be the only cause of liberation:

"Aṇusvarūpatāhānau tadgatāṁ hetutāṁ katham
Vrajenmāyānapekṣatvam ata evopapādayet."
T. A., VIII, 77.

KARMA DEFINED.

It is necessary here to point out the distinction between the Kārmamala and the Karmasaṁskāra. The former is the limited desire, as we have just stated, which is responsible for the future limited association of an individual self, after the Mahāpralaya, when the universe is created anew. The latter, the Karmasaṁskāra, is a certain effect that is produced on a limited self; an effect, not that which, being revived, is responsible for the rise of phenomenon of remembrance, but that which is caused by the personal conviction of the potentiality of a particular action to lead to certain experiences at the time of its maturation[1]. Both these, the Kārmamala and the Karmasaṁskāra, may be spoken of as two aspects

1. T. A., VI, 85

of the same thing. In fact, when the distinction of the former from the latter is not intended to be emphasised i. e. when the idea of both of them is intended to be conveyed, the simple word "Karma" is used. Karma in general, therefore, means that unseen factor which is responsible for the difference in the fruition of the same action done by a number of persons. Certain boys join the same school, are placed under the same teacher, are given the same facilities and opportunities, and read the same courses for the same number of hours daily, but the result is not the same in all cases[1]. Why ? Certain children are born to certain parents, their surroundings are the same ; the care that the parents bestow on each is the same and there is no difference in their external life. Will the result be the same in all cases ? And if not, why ? The Trika, in common with other systems of Indian philosophy, replies that it is due to Karma[1] in general, as defined above.

CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR FRUITION OF KARMA.

Karma is like a seed and as such does not fructify soon after it is sown. It requires the fertile soil of self-arrogation[2] and the manure of similar actions to help its growth ; therefore, unless a person arrogates an action to himself it would not fructify. In fact, this is the chief point of distinction between the two kinds of experiencers, the pralayākalas and the vijñānākalas. The former arrogate their action to themselves and, therefore, are affected by the impurity called kārmamala, but the latter do not and so are free from it. It is this very absence of self-arrogation that keeps the persons, who are out of their senses[3], unaffected by the actions done in that state, as all the scriptures unanimously declare. The

1. T. A., VI, 98.
2. T. A., VI, 85.
3. T. A., VI, 86.

self-arrogation is thus the soil without which the seed of Karma cannot grow.

THE ASSOCIATED IDEA AND FRUITION.

The result of an action, however, even when it is associated with the self-arrogation, is not always the same. It is greatly influenced by the associated ideas. When, for instance, a person practises certain austerities and desires that their fruit should go to the other person for whom he performs them, it is the other that gets the fruit and not the performer[1]. This idea is common to most of the religions. It is on this that engaging of the priests for prayer, fasting and other kinds of austerities to effect a certain desired end is based. Leaving the religious questions aside, if we analyse our daily experiences we find that the nature of the effect of an action in the form of a mental state of some kind depends not on the action itself but on the idea with which it is associated. Suppose, for instance, that two new motor cars are driven by two different persons; one is a servant, driving his master to a certain place, and the other is the owner himself. The act of driving is the same; both the cars are equally new; they are of the same maker and have similar accessories; but will the pleasure of driving be the same in both the cases, and if not, why? Is not the difference due to the associated ideas? Is not the littleness of the servant-driver's joy, as compared to that of the master, in driving a new car, due to the association of the idea of service? Thus, as in ordinary life so in the sphere of religion and morality, an act by itself is productive of no fruit; its productivity differs with the difference in the associated ideas.

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1. T. A., VI, 87.

DIFFERENT STATES OF KARMA

Karma is associated not with the body but with the limited self, and, therefore, is not destroyed with the destruction of the body. It transmigrates with the soul and determines the soul's associations with the future body and its circumstances. It waits till it gets circumstances favourable for its growth and then it asserts itself. The state of Karma, when it is about to assert itself, is called the state of its maturity. When once this state is reached, nothing can stop it from running its course. Even self-realisation cannot prevent it from fruition. Even the enlightened souls have to undergo the experiences[1] which follow the maturity of Karma. Even they cannot escape it. It is this maturity of the past karma which is responsible for the difference in the result of the same action done by a number of persons, as in the above stated case of school children. This state of Karma is technically called "Phalonmukhatā" As opposed to this, there is the other state in which, the circumstances being extremely unfavourable for its growth, a karma remains dormant; it is called "Phalānunmukhatā". The[2] fructifiability of a karma in the latter state can be destroyed by a counter-action such as charity austerity and knowledge. The preventive measures against the fructification of Karma are like inoculations to safeguard a person against the attack of a certain disease. And just as inoculation, though effective, if it be done long before the attack, is yet useless when the attack has come, so charity, austerity and penance can prevent the fruition of a karma, only if they be done long before its maturity or Phalonmukhatā. But they are of no use when it has attained maturity. The mature

1. T. A. VI, 103.
2. T. A., VI, 102.

Karma is like a boulder, slipped from the top of a mountain, which knows no obstruction and must have its course till it reaches a table land.

KARMA AND LIBERATION.

The destruction of karma is one of the most essential antecedent conditions of the liberation of soul. But let it be noted here that, according to this system, this is neither the only condition nor is this in itself Mokṣa. Even when the karma is destroyed there remains another impurity, called āṇavamala, associated with the self; and so long as this also is not destroyed there can be no emancipation[1]. In fact, the only difference between the experiencer, known as Vijñānākala and Śiva, is, that, while both are equally free from karma, the former has still got the āṇavamala but the latter is free from that also. This is another point of difference between the Vedānta and the Trika conceptions of Mokṣa. According to the former, liberation means simply liberation from the bondage of karma (Naiṣkarmya), but, according to the latter, it means freedom from both kārma and āṇava malas. It cannot be objected here that if the āṇavamala is the cause of the association of the soul with karma why does not Vijñānakevala get into the bondage of karma ? Because in the Vijñānākala state the āṇavamala is about to be destroyed and, therefore, loses its causal efficiency[2].

HOW IS THE DESTRUCTION EFFECTED ?

We have pointed out above that the individual self is not free in its volition and action. These are the universal powers of will and action which are working in and through the individual. It is thus a mere tool and not a free agent.

1. T. A., VI, 77.
2. T. A., VI, 79-80

Under the influence of His will, however, it arrogates to itself the authorship of all that is done through the body with which it has identified itself. But, when through His grace true light dawns upon it, it realises its oneness with the Universal Self. As a necessary consequence of self-realization, the identification with the body, together with the effect of self-arrogation of the deeds done in the state of ignorance (Moha) comes to an end. The[1] fruition of the past action, therefore, naturally becomes out of question. This[2] nullification of the effect of self-arrogation of action which follows the cessation of identity of the self with the body, is technically called karmadāha in the Trika literature :

"Karmaṇaśca iyān dāho yad dehāhambhāvasaṁskāraguṇībhāvo nāma iti, sa ca vaiśvātmyam āśritāyāṁ saṁvidi ātmābhimānasya mukhyatvād bhavet ityuktam."

T. A., Comm., VI, 108.

CRITICISM OF THE RIVAL THEORY OF THE SĀṄKHYA.

According to the Sāṅkhya, liberation is nothing but the cessation of the activity of prakṛti towards a particular puruṣa. But it may be asked: if puruṣa is never really affected in any way and is simply pure consciousness, (puṣkarapalāśavannirlepaḥ kintu cetanaḥ) in itself it must ever be the same; why is it then that prakṛti is not active towards the so called liberated ? It cannot be said that the activity of prakṛti requires the presence of the old habits of experience of Buddhi (karmasaṁskāra) as a prompting cause, and because all the saṁskāras of the past actions of the liberated are destroyed, there is, therefore, nothing to prompt prakṛti to work for the liberated; for, the opponent then may be asked : "what is it that is responsible for the destruction of

1. T. A., VI, 106-7.
2. T. A., VI, 108.

saṁskāras ?" It cannot be experience of the fruit by the doer, because experience in itself is an act and, therefore, rather than destroying the saṁskāras, would lead to the formation of another. Nor can the knowledge be the cause of destruction, because if the word "knowledge" means something which is to be got by performing the acts of piety, enjoined by the scripture, then it is only a fruit of a certain action and as such cannot rightly be represented to be the cause of destruction of the past karmas. For, if fruition of one action is supposed to destory another action there is no reason why fruition of those actions, by virtue of which one attains heaven, should not destroy those which result in knowledge[1]. Nor can this be said that knowledge does not destroy karma, but simply sterilises it by removing ignorance, which is the most essential condition of its fruition. For, then the opponent may be asked to state what he means by ignorance. Is it a negation of knowledge which precedes the existence of knowledge (prāgabhāva) or that which follows its destruction (dhvaṁsa), In the former case again, is it the negation of all kinds of knowledge or only of some ? The former position is, of course, impossible, for, to deny all kinds of knowledge to a limited self is to deny sentiency and selfhood to it. The latter also is no better, because the absence of some kind of knowledge preceding its coming into being will always exist in the cases of both the bound and the liberated ; for, according to the Sāṅkhya, the Puruṣa is simply sentient but not omniscient as the real self of the Vedāntin, so that even after liberation it can be spoken of as being without a certain knowledge preceding its existence. Nor can ignorance mean the absence of knowledge consequent upon its destruction, for, such an ignorance there will always be in the case of the liberated.

1. T. A., VIII, 9.

But if the opponent were to say that ignorance means not the absence of all knowledge, but simply wrong knowledge, then also it has to be made clear whether its causal relation to the fruition of an action depends upon its presence at the time of performance of the action or at that of the fructification. In the latter case, the accepted theory of each creation after dissolution being according to the individual karmas falls to the ground ; for, association of a puruṣa with a body is a sort of fruition of certain karmas, but how can the karmas fructify unless there be ignorance and how can there be ignorance unless there be the association of self with a body ; because ignorance, according to the Sāṅkhya, is a quality of buddhi, an evolute of prakṛti, and as such it is non-existent at the time of dissolution. In the former case there is no reason why all karmas should not fructify in the case of the ignorant and the enlightened alike, because the ignorance was present in both the cases at the time of performance. Nor can it be said that ignorance is co-existent with sentiency[1] and because sentiency lasts even through dissolution, ignorance also, therefore, is naturally present ; for, in that case it will not be possible to deny the presence of ignorance even in the case of the enlightened ; because the enlightened are no less sentient than the unenlightened and therefore, it would be hard to explain why the karma of of the latter does not fructify.

SĀṄKHYA CONCEPTION OF IGNORANCE.

The evolution of Prakṛti has got a twofold purpose to serve, namely, (I) to supply the necessary stimuli for the varying experiences which the puruṣas have helplessly to suffer or to enjoy, according to their individual karmas, and (II) ultimately to effect their salvation. The former is called

1. T. A., VIII, 20.

bhoga and is due to the identification of the self with Buddhi. The latter is called apavarga and consists in the knowledge of difference between the self and the Buddhi and consequent cessation of the activity of the nature (pradhāna) with reference to a particular self. Bhoga depends upon the arrogation by puruṣa of the work of buddhi to itself. Buddhi, according to the Sāṅkhya, is like a mirror, capable of receiving reflection from both the sides. Its capacity to receive reflection of the external object, however, depends upon its receiving light from puruṣa. Thus Buddhi, though insentient in itself, appears to be sentient because of the reflected light. And puruṣa too, though in reality indifferent to all the works of prakṛti, yet, because of the co-evality of the reflection of the external objects on buddhi with the reflection of its own light, arrogates to itself the agency of assuming the form of the external object, which, in fact, belongs to buddhi. Apavarga similarly depends upon the distinctive knowledge that buddhi is of changing nature and that puruṣa is unchangeable and something different from Buddhi.

The beginningless ignorance of difference between the self and the prakṛti is the prompting cause of the evolution of the latter for bhoga.[1] After the rise of the knowledge of distinction, therefore, there remains nothing to prompt it to further action. Hence its evolutive activity towards that particular puruṣa, on whom the knowledge has dawned, automatically comes to an end.

Refutation of the Sāṅkhya Theory.

From what has been stated it is clear that, according to the Sāṅkhya, release is nothing but cessation of the evolutive activity of prakṛti consequent upon the disappearance of the prompting cause, the ignorance of distinction between

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1. T. A., VIII, 21-2.

puruṣa and buddhi. But the defect of the Sāṅkhya theory is obvious. The Sāṅkhya is silent on the question of the relation of this ignorance. It cannot satisfactorily answer the query: "To whom does the ignorance belong?" For, it cannot be attributed to puruṣa, because that would make freedom from it impossible. Puruṣa, according to the Sāṅkhya, does not change. The loss of an attribute certainly means a change in the possessor; therefore, if it be said that ignorance belongs to puruṣa who loses it at the time of liberation, the Sāṅkhya theory of unchangeability of the puruṣa would fall to the ground. But if it be said that it belongs to prakṛti, then puruṣa being ever free from it, the notion that evolutive activity of prakṛti is for the liberation of puruṣa becomes absurd. Further, the Sāṅkhya cannot satisfactorily answer another question: if the ignorance lasts only so long as the knowledge of distinction between puruṣa and buddhi does not arise, when does this knowledge arise? It cannot be said that it arises when all the effects of prakṛti have been seen, because they are limitless and, therefore, it is impossible to see all of them. Nor can a general knowledge of the nature of prakṛti's evolute be represented to be the cause of liberation, for, that being possible even from seeing one evolute there is no reason why any puruṣa should be in bondage.

DUALISTIC ŚAIVA THEORY OF IGNORANCE.

According to the dualist school of Śaivaism, the recognised exponent of which is Kheṭapāla,[1] ignorance is something like a cover which hides the perfection of self in respect of the powers of knowledge and action. It is one, but possesses innumerable varieties of concealing power. It hides the perfection of each soul by a separate variety of its power. This, according to the dualist S'aivas, accounts

1. T. A., Comm., VIII, 36.

for the difference in knowledge or ignorance of one soul from that of another. This also explains why at the liberation or destruction of ignorance of one soul, all do not get liberated or enlightened.[1] It is not a creation of māyā, for, if it be so, there would be no reason why māyā should not create it for the liberated also. It is not a mere negation or not-being of knowledge, but a positive entity, because it has the causal efficiency of hiding the perfection of the powers of knowledge and action of the Self. It is beginningless in itself and so is its association with the souls. It is insentient and is the cause of association of karma and māyā with the self. When the concealing power of this ignorance is nullified by divine grace (śaktipāta) in the case of a certain soul, it (soul) shines forth in its true glory. This removal of the vei! of ignorance, this recovery of the hidden powers, this freedom from all kinds of limitations, is called mokṣa, in the dualistic śaiva literature.

REFUTATION OF THE DUALIST THEORY.

But what is the cause of the maturity (pāka) or destruction of this ignorance? It cannot be action (karma), because it is accepted to be the cause of the variety of pleasant or unpleasant experiences which a person enjoys or suffers. It is, therefore, unreasonable to represent it to be the cause of their cessation also. Nor can the Lord's will be said to be responsible for the said maturity, for, He is free from all partiality, and, therefore, if He be admitted to be the cause of destruction of ignoraace it would be difficult to explain why He frees only some and not all. Further, according to the dualist, the ignorance is beginningless and causeless. Assumption, therefore, of its destruction, whatever be its cause, is against our common experience;

1. T. A., VIII, 30.

for, there is no instance of another thing which though both beginningless and causeless is yet destructible. The not-being of a thing before it actually comes into being, (prāgabhāva) has, of course, to be left out of consideration, because it is a non-entity and as such belongs to a different category from that of the ignorance which is an entitative being and possesses causal efficiency. It cannot be said that there is no destruction of ignorance but that its power falls into abeyance, like the fatal biting power of a snake in a charmed circle, because then there would follow simultaneous liberation of all and there will also be the possibility of all coming again back to bondage at the revival of the concealing power of ignorance.

There is a further question : how and what does the ignorance conceal ? Souls are eternal and unchangeable. The ignorance, therefore, cannot be supposed to affect them in any way, for, such a supposition would bring them down to the level of transitory things. Therefore, if it be said to conceal powers of knowledge and action by its mere presence in the proximity of the self, then there is no reason why it should not do so in the case of S'iva and other liberated souls. Moreover, if it conceals the powers of the self it conceals the very being of self, because self is nothing more than the said powers. How can then we know the very existence of the self ?

DUALIST THEORY OF KARMASĀMYA

Now, leaving aside the question how and what the concealing power of ignorance conceals, if we were to take into consideration the question, "why does it fall into abeyance ?" we find the dualist's position no better. They hold that the Lord's will, prompted by the equilibrium or equipoise of karmas (karma-sāmya), puts in

abeyance the concealing power of ignorance. The karmasāmya, according to them, is a state of maturity of two equipotential karmas of opposite nature. In this state each of the two karmas is equally mature for fruition, but is prevented from yielding its fruit by another which also is equally mature and is trying to push its way to fruition. Because both are equally strong, therefore, neither can assert itself over the other. And the result is that not only neither of these two can fructify but others also, which would have borne their fruits in ordinary course, are prevented from so doing, because of their way to fruition having, as it were, been stopped by the struggle of the two equipotential karmas. It is a case like that of two equally strong wrestlers trying to push their way through a small door through which only one person can pass at a time. The result is, as we often see at the opening of a barrier to a third class railway booking office window, that neither can pass; and while they are fighting, each trying to assert his right over the other to purchase his ticket first, other poor passengers have helplessly to wait behind. This state is marked by the absence of feeling of both pleasure and pain alike. The reason is obvious, Mind can have only one experience at a time (Yugapaj jñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam). The fruition of a karma is nothing but an experience. And because two experiences are not simultaneously possible, reasonably therefore, two karmas cannot be supposed to fructify at the same time. Karmasāmya, therefore, according to the dualists, is both natural and logical.

REFUTATION OF KARMASĀMYA.

There are three kinds of action, pious, sinful and mixed. Two fructifiable actions cannot take place simultaneously. Because an action, in order that it may have its necessary result, according to the law of karma, must have the

cooperation of mind, must be associated with some idea. In fact, the moral fruition of an action depends not on the action itself so much as on the associated idea. It is because of this that motiveless action (niṣkāma karma) does not fructify. As the mind can have only one idea at a time so naturally two fructifiable actions cannot take place simultaneously. The performances of actions being in succession, their maturity also must necessarily be in succession. How can then two actions simultaneously attain maturity and produce karmasāmya ? Further, even if simultaneous maturity of two equipotential actions be admitted, there arises a very important question as to whether other actions do or do not fructify after the karmasāmya. In the former case, inspite of this karmasāmya, the bondage of karma will remain. In the latter case, cessation of the fruition of all actions being necessary, even those actions, which are responsible for the existence of the body, the life, and other circumstances of the liberated, should necessarily stop fruition and, therefore, there should be instantaneous death of the freed.[1] Further, if the equilibrium of two actions can prevent the fruition of all other actions, what does there remain for the Lord's will to accomplish, what is then the S'aktipāta assumed for ? Even if śaktipāta be assumed to be necessary, the karmasāmya being the same in all cases, it is difficult to account for difference of śaktipāta in different cases. The life of renunciation and other religious practices cannot explain it, because the limited selves cannot be assumed to be independent in their performance. For, if it were so, it would be difficult to explain why all do not perform them. If, therefore, it be supposed to be dependent on something else,

1. T. A., VIII, 49.

that also logically will require something else still as a prompting cause and so on ad-infinitum.

The Trika, therefore, holds that, while obscuration and liberation are the works of the independent will of the Lord, creation, maintenance and destruction are dependent upon innate ignorance and karma, and that this ignorance is not an insentient independent entity, as conceived by the dualists, but is a production of the Lord's will.[1]

1. T. A., Comm., VIII 75.

APPENDIX A.

Textual authorities indicated by foot-notes.

Page 2.

1. तदनन्तरमेष कामरूपानधिगत्याभिनवोपशब्दगुप्तम् ।
अजयत्किल शाक्तभाष्यकारं स च भग्नो मनसेदमालुलोचे ॥

Ś. D., ch. XV, Ś. 158.

2. स च भग्नोऽभिनवगुप्ताचार्यो मनसेदं वक्ष्यमाणं विचारयामास ।

Ś. D. Comm., ch. XV, Ś. 158

Page 3.

1. अन्तर्वेद्यामत्रिगुप्ताभिधानः प्राप्योत्पत्तिं प्राविशत्प्राग्र्यजन्मा ।
श्रीकाश्मीरांश्चन्द्रचूडावतारैर्निःसंख्याकैर्पावितोपान्तभागान् ॥

P. T. V., 280.

Page 4.

1. निःशेषशास्त्रसदनं किल मध्यदेशस्तस्मिन्नजायत गुणाभ्यधिको द्विजन्मा ।
कोप्यत्रिगुप्त इति नामनिरुक्तगोत्रः शास्त्राब्धिचर्वणकलोद्यदगस्त्यगोत्रः ॥
तमथ ललितादित्यो राजा स्वकं पुरमानयत् ।
प्रणयरभसात् कश्मीराख्यं हिमालयमूर्धगम् ॥

T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

2. तस्मिन् कुबेरपुरचारु शितांशुमौलिसांमुख्यदर्शनविरूढपवित्रभागे ।
वैतस्तरोधसि निवासममुष्य चक्रे राजा द्विजस्य परिकल्पितभूमिसम्पत ॥

T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

3. तस्यान्वये महति कोऽपि वराहगुप्तनामा बभूव भगवान् स्वयमन्तकाले ।
गीर्वाणसिन्धुलहरीकलिताग्रमूर्धा यस्याकरोत्परमनुग्रहमाग्रहेण ॥

T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

तस्यात्मजः चुखुलकेति जने प्रसिद्धश्चन्द्रावदातधिषणो नरसिंहगुप्तः ।
यं सर्वशास्त्ररसमज्जनशुभ्रचित्तम् माहेश्वरीपरमलङ्कुरुते स्म भक्तिः ॥

T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

Page 5.

1. विमला इति वर्णकला आश्रयः आलम्बनं यस्याः विमलकलाभिधाने-
त्यर्थः...............

अस्य हि ग्रन्थकृतः नरसिंहगुप्तविमलाख्यौ पितरौ इति गुरवः ।

T. A. Comm., I, 14.

Page 6.

1. शिवशक्त्यात्मकं रूपं भावयेच्च परस्परम् ।
न कुर्यान्मानवीं बुद्धिं रागमोहादिसंयुताम् ॥
ज्ञानभावनया सर्वं कर्तव्यं साधकोत्तमैः ॥
.................तदेवम्
एवंविधसिद्धयोगिनीप्रायपितृमेलकसमुत्थतया
तादृङ्मेलककलिकाकलिततनुर्यो भवेद्गर्भे ।
उक्तः स योगिनीभूः स्वयमेव ज्ञानभाजनं भक्तः ॥

इत्युक्तनीत्या स्वात्मनि निरुत्तरपदाद्वयज्ञानपात्रतामभिदधता ग्रन्थकृता निखिलषडर्धशास्त्रसारसंग्रहभूतग्रन्थकरणेऽप्यधिकारः कटाक्षीकृतः ।

T. A. Comm., I, 14-15

Page 7.

1. वसुरसपौषे कृष्णदशम्यामभिनवगुप्तः स्तवमिममकरोत् ।

Bh. S.

2. षट्षष्ठिनामके वर्षे नवम्यामसितेऽहनि ।
मयाभिनवगुप्तेन मार्गशीर्षे स्तुतः शिवः ॥

K. S.

Page 8.

1. इदमत्र रहस्यम्, पुरा किल काचिद्वलभौ पठतां बहूनां ब्राह्मणबालकानामध्ययनशाला आसीत् । तत्र पठन् कश्चिद् गौडबालोऽतिसौबुद्ध्यान्मुखरत्वाच्च निखिलबालानां भयप्रदत्वेन बालवलभीभुजङ्ग इति गुरुणा व्यपदिष्टः । स चाचार्यतामुपगतः, इति सकलरहस्याभिज्ञः श्रीवाग्देवतावतारो (मम्मटः) गूढं तन्नाम अभिनवगोपानसीगुप्तपाद इति वैदग्ध्यमुखेनाभिव्यनक्ति ।

B. B., 95.

Page 9.

अहमप्यत एवाधःशास्त्रदृष्टिकुतूहलात् ।
नास्तिकार्हतबौद्धादीनुपाध्यायानसेविषम् ॥

T. A., VIII, 206.

Page 10.

1. एते सेवारसविरचितानुग्रहाः शास्त्रसारम् ।
प्रौढादेशप्रकटसुभगं स्वाधिकारं किलास्मै ॥
यत्संप्रादुः.................

T. A., Ah. 37 (MS.)

2. कश्चित् दक्षिणभूमिपीठवसतिः श्रीमान् विभुर्भैरवः
पञ्चस्रोतसि सातिमार्गविभवे शास्त्रे विधाता च यः ।
तस्याभूत्सुमतिस्ततः समुदभूत्तस्यैव शिष्याग्रणीः
श्रीमाञ्छम्भुरिति प्रसिद्धिमगमज् जालन्धरात्पीठतः ॥

T. A. Comm., I, 236.

3- कुलप्रक्रियागुरुमप्युत्कर्षयति । भगवत्या सह शम्भुनाथ एकः ।

T. A. Comm., I, 31.

श्रीशम्भुनाथभास्करचरणनिपातप्रभापगतसंकोचम् ।
अभिनवगुप्तहृदम्बुजम्..................

T. A., I, 51.

5. पित्रा स शब्दगहने कृतसंप्रवेशः ।

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

6. आमर्दसन्ततिमहार्णवकर्णधारः सद्देशिकैरकवरात्मजवामनाथः ।

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

7. श्रीनाथसन्ततिमहाम्बरघर्मकान्तिः श्रीभूतिराजतनयः स्वपितृप्रसादः ।

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

8. अथोच्यते ब्रह्मविद्या सद्यःप्रत्ययदायिनी ।
शिवः श्रीभूतिराजो यामस्मभ्यं प्रत्यपादयत् ॥

T. A. Comm., III, 194.

Page 11.

1. देवी त्रिंशतिकेपि अस्य श्रीसोमानन्दपादेभ्यः प्रभृति त्रिकदर्शनवदेव गुरवः ।

T. A. Comm., III, 194.

त्रैयम्बकप्रसरसागरवीचिसोमानन्दात्मजोत्पलजलक्ष्मणगुप्तनाथः ।

T. A., Ah. 37., (MS.)

2. भट्टेन्दुराजचरणाब्जकृताधिवासहृद्यश्रुतोऽभिनवगुप्तपदाभिधोऽहम् ।

Dh. L., I,

3. सद्भिप्रतोतवदनोदितनाट्यवेदतत्त्वार्थमर्थिजनवाञ्छितसिद्धिहेतोः ।

A. Bh., I.

4. श्रीचन्द्रचन्द्रवरभक्तिविलासयोगानन्दाभिनन्दशिवभक्तिविचित्रनाथाः ।
अन्येऽपि धर्मशिववामनकोद्भटश्रीभूतीशभास्करमुखप्रमुखा महान्तः ॥

T. A., Ah. 37., (MS.)

5. तत्र हास्याभासो यथास्मत्पितृव्यस्य वामनगुप्तस्य :—
लोकोत्तराणि चरितानि न लोक एष संमन्यते यदि किमङ्ग वदाम नाम ।
यत्त्वत्र हासमुखतत्त्वममुष्य तेन पार्श्वोपपीडमिह को न विजाहसीति ॥

A. Bh., 297

6. सोऽनुग्रहीतुमथ शाम्भवशक्तिभाजं स्वभ्रातरं निखिलशास्त्रविमर्शपूर्णम् ।
यावन्मनः प्रणिदधाति मनोरथाख्यम्·····················
T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

Page 12.

1. अन्ये पितृव्यतनयाः शिवशक्तिशुभ्राः क्षेमोत्पलाभिनवचक्रकपद्मगुप्ताः ।
ये संपदं तृणममंसत शम्भुसेवासंपूरितं स्वहृदयं हृदि भावयन्तः ॥
T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

2. माता व्ययूयुजदमुं किल बाल्य एव दैवो हि भावि परिकर्मणि संस्करोति ।
······················

माता परं बन्धुरिति प्रवादः स्नेहोतिगाढीकुरुते हि पाशान् ।
T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

3. तारुण्यसागरतरंगभरानपोह्य वैराग्यपोतमधिरुह्य दृढं हठेन ।
T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

4. साहित्यसान्द्ररसभोगपरो महेशभक्त्या स्वयंग्रहणदुर्मदया गृहीतः ।
स तन्मयीभूय न लोकवर्तनीमजीगणत् कामपि केवलं पुनः ।
तदीयसंभोगविवृद्धये पुरा करोति दास्यं गुरुवेश्मसु स्वयम् ।
T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

दारासुतप्रभृतिबन्धकथामनाप्तः
I. P. V. V., (MS.)

Page 13.

1. इति कालतत्त्वमुदितं शास्त्रमुखागमनिजानुभवसिद्धम् ।
T. A., IV, 202

Page 14.

1. तद्दृष्टिसंसृतिच्छेदिप्रत्यभिज्ञोपदेशिनः ।
श्रीमल्लक्ष्मणगुप्तस्य गुरोर्विजयते वचः ॥
अप्यसंख्यनवास्वादचमत्कारैकदुर्मदा ।
येनानुत्तरसंभोगतृप्ता मे मतिषट्पदी ॥
M. V. V., 2.

2. देवीत्रिंशतिकेपि अस्य श्रीसोमानन्दपादेभ्यः प्रभृति त्रिकदर्शनवदेव गुरवः ।
T. A. Comm., III, 194.

3. एवं क्रमकेलावप्येतद्गर्भीकारेण यदनेन ग्रन्थकृता व्याख्यातं तत्रापि अन्यथा न किंचित् संभावनीयम्·································यदुक्तं तत्रैवानेन

यथैकः श्रीमान् वीरवरः सुगृहीतनामधेयो गोविन्दराजाभिधानः.........
यत्प्रसादादासादितमहिमभिरस्माभिरेतत्प्रदर्शितम् ।

T. A. Comm., III, 191-2.

4. एवं तंत्रप्रक्रियोपासन्नगुर्वभिमुखीकरणानन्तरम्
विश्रान्तिस्थानतया कुलप्रक्रियागुरुमप्युत्कर्षयति ।

T. A. Comm., I, 31.

5. श्रीभट्टनाथचरणाब्जयुगात्तथा श्रीभट्टारिकाङ्घ्रियुगलाद् गुरुसन्ततिर्या ।
बोधान्यपाशविषनुत्तदुपासनोत्थबोधोज्वलोऽभिनवगुप्त इदं करोति ॥

T. A., I, 16.

Page 16.

1. रुद्रशक्तिसमावेशस्तत्र नित्यं प्रतिष्ठितः ।
सति तस्मिंश्च चिह्नानि तस्यैतानि विलक्षयेत् ॥
तत्रैतत्प्रथमं चिह्नं रुद्रे भक्तिः सुनिश्चला ।
द्वितीयं मंत्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सद्यः प्रत्ययकारिका ॥
सर्वतत्त्ववशित्वं च तृतीयं लक्षणं स्मृतम् ।
प्रारब्धकार्यनिष्पत्तिश्चिह्नमाहुश्चतुर्थकम् ॥
कवित्वं पञ्चमं ज्ञेयं सालङ्कारं मनोहरम् ।
सर्वशास्त्रार्थवेत्तृत्वमकस्माच्चास्य जायते ॥

T. A. Comm., VIII, 136.

2. समस्तं चेदं चिह्नजातमस्मिन्नेव ग्रन्थकारे प्रादुरभूदिति प्रसिद्धिः ।
यद्गुरवः

अकस्मात्सर्वशास्त्रार्थज्ञत्वाद्यं लक्ष्मपंचकम् ।
यस्मिञ्छ्रीपूर्वशास्त्रोक्तमदृश्यत जनैः स्फुटम् ॥

T. A. Comm., VIII, 137.

Page 17.

1. तस्मिन् कुबेरपुरचारु शितांशुमौलिसाम्मुख्यदर्शनविरूढपवित्रभागे ।
वैतस्तरोधसि (मूर्धनि) निवासममुष्य चक्रे
राजा द्विजस्य परिकल्पितभूमिसंपत् ॥

T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

2. प्रवरपुरनामधेये पुरे पूर्वं काश्मीरिकोऽभिनवगुप्तः ।
मालिन्यादिमवाक्ये वार्तिकमेतद्रचयति स्म ॥

M. V. V., 135.

Page 18.

1. विक्षिप्तभावपरिहारमसौ चिकीर्षन् मन्द्रः स्वके पुरवरे स्थितिमस्य बब्रे ।
T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

Page 20.

1. गुरुभ्योपि गरीयांसं युक्तं श्रीचुखुलाभिधम् ।
वन्दे यत्कृतसंस्कारः स्थितोऽस्मि गलितग्रहः ॥
M. V. V., 1.

2. पूर्वश्रुतान्याकलयन् स्वबुद्ध्या शास्त्राणि तेभ्यः समवाप सारम् ।
T. A., Ah. 37, (MS.)

Page 38.

1. सच्छिष्यकर्णमन्द्राभ्यां चोदितोऽहं पुनः पुनः ।
वाक्यार्थं कथये श्रीमन्मालिन्यां यत्कचित्कचित् ॥
M. V. V., 2.

2. प्रवरपुरनामधेये पुरे पूर्वं काश्मीरिकोऽभिनवगुप्तः ।
मालिन्यादिमवाक्ये वार्तिकमेतद्रचयति स्म ॥
M. V. V., 135.

3. एतदष्टादशे तत्त्वमधिकारे भविष्यति ।
M. V. V., 58.

अष्टादशे तत्पटले तत्त्वं सम्यग् विभाव्यते ।
M. V. V., 104.

4. निर्णीतमेतदन्यत्र मयैव विततं यतः ।
तदलं प्रकृतं ब्रूमः
M. V. V., 33.

एतावानत्र संक्षेपो विस्तरोऽन्यत्र दर्शितः ।
M. V. V., 33.

5. भैरवं यामलं चैव मताख्यं मंगलं तथा ।
चक्राष्टकं शिखाष्टकं बहुरूपं च सप्तमम् ॥
वागीशं चाष्टमं प्रोक्तमित्यष्टौ वीरवन्दिते ।
T. A., I., 42.

6. ब्रह्मयामलमित्युक्तं विष्णुयामलकं तथा ।
स्वच्छन्दश्च रुरुश्चैव षष्ठं चाथर्वणं स्मृतम् ॥
सप्तमं रुद्रमित्युक्तं वेतालं चाष्टमं स्मृतम् ।
T. A., I., 42.

Page 39.

1. श्रीसोमानन्दकल्याणभवभूतिपुरोगमाः ।
तथा हि त्रीशिकाशास्त्रविवृतौ तेऽभ्यधुर्बुधाः ॥
T. A., VIII, 96.

2. इतीदृग् व्याख्यानं त्यक्त्वा यदन्यैर्व्याख्यातम्, यद्यपि पदवाक्यसंस्कार-विहीनैः सह क्रीडावहा गोष्ठी कृता भवति·········

P. T. V., 93.

3. त्रिंशिका इत्यपि गुरवः पठन्ति, अक्षरवादसाम्यात् न तु त्रिंशच्छ्लोकयोगात् त्रिंशिका ।

P. T. V., 17.

4. त्रीशिका इति तिसृणां शक्तीनां इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाणां············ईशिका ईश्वरी ।

P. T. V., 16-17.

Page 40.

1. उक्तं श्रीत्रिकसूत्रे च T. A., Ah. XII. P. 101.
श्रीत्रिकसूत्रे इति—त्रिकप्रमेयसूचिकायां श्रीपरात्रीशिकायामित्यर्थः ।
T. A. Comm., Ah. XIII. P. 101.

2. अनुत्तरप्रक्रियायां वैतत्येन प्रदर्शितम् । अनुत्तर प्रक्रियायामिति—श्रीपरा-त्रीशिकाविवरणादौ इत्यर्थः ।

T. A., VI, 249.

Page 41.

1. प्रत्यवमर्शश्च अन्तरभिलापात्मकशब्दनस्वभावः, तच्च शब्दनं संकेतनिर-पेक्षमेव अविछिन्नचमत्कारात्मकं··············अकारादिमायीयसांकेतिक-शब्दजीवितभूतं नीलमिदं चैत्रोहमित्यादिप्रत्यवमर्शान्तरभित्तिभूतत्वात् ।
I. P. V., I, 205.

Page 44.

1. परमेश्वरः पंचविधकृत्यमयः सततमनुग्रहमय्या परारूपया शक्त्या आक्रान्तो वस्तुतोऽनुग्रहैकात्मैव न हि शक्तिः शिवाद् भेदमामर्शयेत् । सा च शक्तिः लोकानुग्रहविमर्शमयी प्रथमतः परामर्शमय्या पश्यन्त्या आसूत्रयिष्यमाणा-नन्तशक्तिशताविभिन्ना प्रथमतरं परमहामंत्रमय्याम् अदेशकालकलितायां संविदि निरूढा, तावत् पश्यन्त्युद्भविष्यदुक्तिप्रत्युक्त्यविभागेनैव वर्तते । सैव च सकलप्रमातृसंविदद्वयमयी सततमेव वर्तमानरूपा । ततस्तु पश्यन्ती यद्यदभीप्सितं तत्तदेव समुचितकारणनियमप्रबोधितं बोधसूत्र-मात्रेणैव विमृशति, यथा अनेकभावाभावज्ञानसंस्कारसंस्कृताया मेचक-

धियः स्मृतिबीजप्रबोधकौचित्यात् किंचिदेव स्मृतिर्विमृशति न हि प्रथमज्ञानकाले भेदोऽत्र अस्फुरत्, यत्र वाच्यवाचकविशेषयोरभेदः। मध्यमा पुनः तयोरेव वाच्यवाचकयोर्भेदमादर्श्य सामानाधिकरण्येन विमर्शव्यापारा। वैखरी तु तदुभयभेदस्फुटतामप्येव।

P. T. V., 4-5.

Page 45.

1. अनुत्तरं कथं देव सद्यः कौलिकसिद्धिदम्।
येन विज्ञातमात्रेण खेचरीसमतां व्रजेत्॥

P. T. V., 3.

2. वक्ष्यमाणग्रन्थस्य कुलतंत्रप्रक्रियात्मकत्वेन द्वैविध्येऽपि।

T. A. I., 24.

Page 46.

1. "तस्य मे सर्वशिष्यस्य नोपदेशदरिद्रता"
इत्यादि दृशा सर्वत्रैव गुरूपदेशस्य भावात् आत्मनि भूयोविद्यत्वं दर्शयता ग्रन्थकृता अस्य ग्रन्थस्यापि निखिलशास्त्रान्तरसारसंग्रहाभिप्रायत्वं दर्शयति।

T. A. Comm , I., 29.

2. ……………दृश्यंते तच्छिवाज्ञया। मया स्वसंवित्सत्तर्कपतिशास्त्रत्रिकक्रमात्॥

T. A. I., 149.

3. इति सप्ताधिकामेनां त्रिंशतं यः सदा बुधः
आह्निकानां समभ्यस्येत्स साक्षाद्भैरवो भवेत्।

T. A. I., 288.

Page 47.

1. इत्थं गृहे वत्सलिकावतीर्णे स तन्निबन्धं विदधे महार्थम्।

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

2. आचार्यमभ्यर्थयते स्म गाढं संपूर्णतंत्राधिगमाय सम्यक्।

T. A., Ah., 37., (MS.)

3. सोप्यभ्युपागमदभीप्सितमस्य यद्वा स्वातोद्यमेव हि निनर्तिषतोऽवतीर्णम्।

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

4. न तदस्तीह यन्न श्रीमालिनीविजयोत्तरे।
देवदेवेन निर्दिष्टं स्वशब्देनाथ लिंगतः॥

T. A., I., 35.

Page 49.

1. सद्भिप्रतीतवदनोदितनाट्यवेदतत्त्वार्थमर्थिजनवाञ्छितसिद्धिहेतोः ।
माहेश्वराभिनवगुप्तपदप्रतिष्ठः संक्षिप्तवृत्तिविधिना विशदीकरोति ॥

A. Bh., I.

2. तस्मात् सतामत्र न दूषितानि मतानि तान्येव तु शोधितानि ।

A. Bh., 280.

3. उपादेयस्य संपाठस्तदन्यस्य प्रतीकनम् ।
स्फुटव्याख्या विरोधानां परिहारः सुपूर्णता ॥
लक्ष्यानुसरणं श्लिष्टवक्तव्यांशविवेचनम् ।
संगतिः पौनरुक्त्यानां समाधानसमाकुलम् ॥
संग्रहश्चेत्ययं व्याख्याप्रकारोत्र समाश्रितः ।

A. Bh., 1-2.

Page 50.

1. एवं भरतमुनिः परवदात्मानं प्रकल्प्येयन्तं ग्रन्थमभिहितवान्, अन्येत्वियन्तं ग्रन्थं कश्चित् शिष्यो व्यरीरचत्..................तदसत्, एकस्य ग्रन्थस्यानेकवक्तृवचनसन्दर्भमयत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । स्वपरव्यवहारेण पूर्वपक्षोत्तरपक्षादीनां श्रुतिस्मृतिव्याकरणादिशास्त्रेष्वेकविरचितेषु अपि दर्शनात् ।

A. Bh., 8.

Page 51.

1. संशितव्रता इति—अभ्यासे शक्ताः ।

A. Bh., 17.

2. मामाहेत्यादरातिशयः ।

A. Bh., 17.

वेदज्ञा इति ग्रहणधारणसामर्थ्यम् ।

A. Bh., 16.

3. ऋषय इति दर्शादृषिरिति ऊहापोहयोग्याः ।

A. Bh., 17.

4. अनेन झटिति कविहृदयग्रहणयोग्यत्वं नाट्याचार्यगुण इति सूचयति ।

A. Bh., 21.

5-6. कुशला इति ग्रहणधारणयोग्याः ।
विदग्धाः ऊहापोहसमर्थाः ।
प्रयोगः परिषदि प्रकटीकरणम् ।

A. Bh., 16.

7. विनेयानां तत्र। रागद्वेषमध्यस्थतादिना तन्मयीभावाभावे प्रीतेरभावेन।
A. Bh., 27.

8. रूपमिति मुखरागस्य वलमित्याङ्गिकस्य।
A. Bh., 28.

9. यावन्निजहृदयरसविलसद्विकस्वरनिर्वारचमत्कार………………तावच्छिक्षा-शतैरपि वैचित्र्यमनाहार्यम्।
A. Bh., 22.

10. विदूषकतापसादिनाम्नां तथाकर्मिणां निर्वचनलब्धार्थयुक्त्या भूमिका-विशेषोपयोग इति।
A. Bh., 19.

11. प्रगल्भाः परिषद्यभीरवः।
A. Bh., 16.

Page 52.

1. मण्डपस्य सर्वस्याधिष्ठाता सौम्यप्रकृतिः सोमप्रधानो योज्य इति दर्शयति चन्द्रमा इति।
A. Bh., 31.

2. वेदिका रंगवेदिका तत्र तीक्ष्णोऽधिष्ठातेत्यर्थः।
A. Bh., 31.

3. अनेन चैतत्तुल्या एव मंडपरक्षका केचिन्नियोज्या इति दर्शयति।
A. Bh., 31.

4. पार्श्वे स्वयमिति राजादेस्तत्स्थानमित्युक्तम्।
A. Bh., 32.

Page 53.

1. भट्टेन्दुराजादाम्नाय विविच्य च चिरं धिया।
कृतोऽभिनवगुप्तेन सोऽयं गीतार्थसंग्रहः॥
Bh. G. S., Introd., Ś. 6.

2. तच्चरणकमलमधुपो भगवद्गीतार्थसंग्रहं व्यदधात्।
अभिनवगुप्तः सद्द्विजलोटककृतचोदनावशतः॥
Bh. G. S., Concl., Ś. 2.

3. कृत्यमिदं बान्धवार्थम्।
Bh. G. S., Concl., Ś. 3.

4. तास्वन्यैः प्राक्तनैर्व्याख्या कृता यद्यपि भूयसा।
न्याय्यस्तथाप्युद्यमो मे तद्गूढार्थप्रकाशकः॥
Bh. G. S., Introd., Ś. 5.

Page 54.

1. येऽप्यन्यदेवताभक्ता इत्यतो गुरुरादिशत् ।

T. A., I, 162.

Page 65.

1. तत्र किञ्चित्कविनिबद्धप्रमदारूपवक्तृकं वंशः किञ्चित् कविनिबद्धतत्सखी-भाषितं किञ्चित्कविनिबद्धदूतीभाषितम् ।

Gh. V., (MS.)

2. अत्र कर्ता महाकविः कालिदास इत्यनुश्रुतमस्माभिः ।

Gh. V., (MS.)

3. जीयेय येन कविना यमकैः परेण तस्मै वहेयमुदकं घटकर्परेण ।

Gh., P. 26.

4. तत्परामर्शधवलमनाः कोकनदो मनाक् ।
काव्येभिनवगुप्ताख्यो विवृतिं समरीरचत् ॥

Gh. V., (MS.)

5. नचास्य काव्ये तृणमात्रमपि कलङ्कपात्रमुत्प्रेक्षितवन्तो मनोरथेऽपि स्वप्नेऽपि सहृदयाः, तस्मात्प्राक्तन एव समाप्तिश्लोकः ।

Gh. V., (MS.)

6. धन्वन्तरिक्षपणकामरसिंहशंकुवेतालभट्टघटकर्परकालिदासाः ।
ख्यातो वराहमिहिरो नृपतेः सभायां रत्नानि वै वररुचिर्नव विक्रमस्य ॥

T. V.

Page 67.

1. श्रीतन्त्रालोके बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बवादः सम्पूर्णः

B. P. V., (MS.)

2. अत्राभिनवगुप्तेन भासितं तदनुत्तरम्

T. C., P. 6361.

Page 71.

1. भैरवो भैरवी देवी स्वच्छन्दो लाकुलोऽणुराट् ।
गहनेशोऽब्जजः शक्रो गुरुः कोट्यपकर्षतः ॥

नवभिः क्रमशोऽधीतं नवकोटिप्रविस्तरम् ।
एतैस्ततो गुरुः कोटिमात्रात्पादं वितीर्णवान् ॥

दक्षादिभ्य उभौ पादौ संवर्तादिभ्य एव च ।
पादं च वामनादिभ्यः पादार्धं भार्गवाय च ॥

पादपादं तु वलये पादपादस्तु योऽपरः ।
सिंहायार्धं ततः शिष्टात् द्वौ भागौ विनताभुवे ॥

भागं वासुकिनागाय खण्डाः सप्त दशत्वमी ।
स्वर्गादर्धं रावणोऽथ जह्रे रामोऽर्धमप्यतः ॥

विभीषणमुखादाप गुरुशिष्यविधिक्रमात् ।
खण्डैरेकान्नविंशत्या विभक्तं तदभूत्ततः ॥

खण्डं खण्डं चाष्टखण्डं प्रोक्तं पादादिभेदतः ।
पादौ मूलोद्धरावुत्तरवृहदुत्तरे तथा कल्पः ।
सांहितकल्पस्कन्धवन्नुत्तरं व्यापकं त्रिधा तिस्रः ॥

देव्योऽत्र निरूप्यन्ते क्रमशो विस्तारिणैव रूपेण ।
नवमे पदे तु गणना न काचिदुक्ता व्यवच्छिदा हीने ॥

रामाच्च लक्ष्मणस्तस्मात् सिद्धास्तेभ्योऽपि दानवाः ।
गुह्यकाश्च ततस्तेभ्यो योगिनो नृवरास्ततः ॥

तेषां क्रमेण तन्मध्ये भ्रष्टं कालान्तराद्यदा ।
तदा श्रीकण्ठनाथाज्ञावशात्सिद्धा अवातरन् ॥

त्र्यम्बकामर्दकाभिख्यश्रीनाथा अद्वये द्वये ।
द्वयाद्वये च निपुणाः क्रमेण शिवशासने ॥

आद्यस्य चान्वयो जज्ञे द्वितीयो दुहितृक्रमात् ।
स चार्धत्र्यम्बकाभिख्यः सन्तानः सुप्रतिष्ठितः ॥

अतश्चार्धचतस्रोऽत्र मठिकाः सन्ततिक्रमात् ।

T. A., Ah. 35 (MS.)

Page 73.

1. ततः स भगवान् देवादादेशं प्राप्य बलवान् ।
ससर्ज मानसं पुत्रं त्र्यम्बकादित्यनामकम् ॥

तस्मिन् संक्रमयामास रहस्यानि समन्ततः ।
सोऽपि गत्वा गुहां सम्यक् त्र्यम्बकाख्यां ततः परम् ॥

तन्नाम्ना चिन्हितं तत्र ससर्ज मनसा सुतम् ।
खमुत्पपात संसिद्धस्तत्पुत्रोऽपि तथा तथा ॥

सिद्धस्तद्वत्सुतोत्पत्त्या सिद्धा एवं चतुर्दश ।
यावत्पञ्चदशः पुत्रः सर्वशास्त्रविशारदः ॥

स कदाचिल्लोकयात्रामासीनः प्रेक्षते ततः ।
वहिर्मुखस्य तस्याथ ब्राह्मणी काचिदेव हि ॥

रूपयौवनसौभाग्यबन्धुरा सा गता दृशम् ।
दृष्ट्वा तां लक्षणैर्युक्तां योग्यां कन्यामथात्मनः ॥

स धर्मचारिणीं सम्यक् गत्वा तत्पितरं स्वयम् ।
अर्थयित्वा ब्राह्मणीं तामानयामास यत्नतः ॥

ब्राह्मणेन विवाहेन ततो जातस्तथाविधः ।
तेन यः स च कालेन काश्मीरेष्वागतो भ्रमन् ॥

नाम्ना स संगमादित्यो वर्षादित्योपि तत्सुतः ।
तस्याप्यभूत् स भगवानरुणादित्यसंज्ञकः ॥

आनन्दसंज्ञकस्तस्माद् उद्बभूव तथाविधः ।
तस्मादस्मि समुद्भूतः सोमानन्दाख्य ईदृशः ॥

Ś. Dṛ., Ch. 7. (MS.)

Page 95.

1. श्री कल्लटाय................

एवं रहस्यमप्येष मातुलीयाय चावदत् ।
श्रीमत्प्रद्युम्नभट्टाय सोऽपि स्वतनयाय च ।
श्रीमत्प्रज्ञार्जुनाख्याय प्रादात्सोऽप्येवमावदत् ॥

श्रीमहादेवभट्टाय स्वशिष्यायाप्यसौ पुनः ।
श्रीमच्छ्रीकण्ठभट्टाय प्रददौ स्वसुताय च ॥

तस्मात्प्राप्य करोम्येष सूत्रवार्तिकमादरात् ।
दैवाकरिर्भास्करोहमन्तेवासिगणेरितः ॥

Ś. S. V., Introd.

Page 97.

1. इति प्रकटितो मया सुघट एष मार्गो नवो
गुरुभिरुच्यते स्म शिवदृष्टिशास्त्रे यथा ।

तदत्र निदधत्पदं भुवनकर्तृतामात्मनो
विभाव्य शिवतामयीमनिशमाविशन् सिद्धयति ॥

I. P. V., II., 271.

2. श्रुत्वा सौजन्यसिन्धोर्द्विजवरमुकुलात् कीर्तिवल्यालबालात् ।
काव्यालंकारसारे लघुविवृतिमधात् कौंकणः श्रीन्दुराजः ॥

K. Sa.

भट्टकल्लटपुत्रेण मुकुलेन निरूपिता ।।सूरिप्र बोधनायेयमभिधावृत्तिमातृका ॥

B. R. C. XXVIII.

त्र्यम्बकप्रसरसागरवीचिसोमानन्दात्मजोत्पलजलक्ष्मणगुप्तनाथः ।
T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

Page 98.

1. इति कथितमशेषं शैवरूपेण विश्वं जगदुदितमहेशांघ्र्याज्ञया स्वप्रभाजा ।
Ś. Dr., Ch. 7, (MS.)

2. प्रतिपादितमेतावत् सर्वमेव शिवात्मकम् ।
न स्वबुद्ध्या शिवोदाता शिवो भोक्तेति शाश्वतः ॥
Ś. Dr. Ch. 7., (MS.)

3. श्रीमदूर्मिमहाशास्त्रे सिद्धसन्तानरूपके ।
इदमुक्तं तथा श्रीमत्सोमानन्दादिदेशिकैः ॥
T. A. Ah. II., P. 39.

Page 99.

1. श्रीसोमानन्दमतं विमृश्य मया निबद्धमिदम् ।
P. T. V., 282.

तदुक्तं श्री सोमानन्दपादैः............निजविवृतौ, तद्ग्रन्थिनिर्दलनार्थ एव अयमस्माकं तच्छासनपवित्रितानां यत्नः ।
P. T. V., 16.

Page 100.

1. वृत्त्यातात्पर्यं टीकया तद्विचारः सूत्रेष्वेतेषु ग्रन्थकारेण दृब्धम् ।
I. P. V., 1, 3.

2. सूत्रं वृत्तिर्विवृतिर्लध्वी बृहतीत्युभे विमर्शिन्यौ ।
प्रकरणविवरणपंचकमिति शास्त्रं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः ॥
S. D. S., P. 191.

3. विश्रमाकरसंज्ञेन स्वपुत्रेणास्मि चोदितः ।
पद्मानन्दाभिधानेन तथा स ब्रह्मचारिणा ॥
ईश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञोक्तविस्तारे गुरुनिर्मिते ।
शिवदृष्टिप्रकरणे करोमि पदसंगतिम् ॥
Jammu Cat., MS. No. 4178.

Page 101.

1. श्रीशास्त्रकृद्घटितलक्ष्मणगुप्तपादसत्योपदर्शितशिवाद्वयवाददक्षः ।
B. V., (Conclusion)

Page 102.

1. आसोक्तिरागमस्सोपीत्येवं पौष्करसंहिता ।
नादरूपतया पूर्वं शिवेनाविष्कृतः पुनः ।
सदाशिवादिरूपेण तेनैवासौ पृथक् पृथक् ॥
कामिकादिप्रभेदेन शिष्येभ्यः संप्रकाशितः ।
अष्टाविंशतिसंख्योसौ सिद्धान्त इति संज्ञितः ॥

Mr. T., Introd. 2.

2. सिद्धान्ते कर्म बहुलं मलमायादिरूपितम् ।

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

3. सैद्धान्तिकास्तु नैतदनुमन्यन्ते ।

T. A. Comm., VI. 221.

Page 103.

1. सिद्धान्ते कर्म बहुलं मलमायादिरूपितम् ।
स्वल्पपुण्यं बहुक्लेशं स्वप्रतीतिविवर्जितम् ।
मोक्षविद्याविहीनञ्च विनयं त्यज दूरतः ॥
(विनयं तंत्रप्रधानं शास्त्रम्)

T. A., Ah, 37. (MS.)

Page 104.

1. ग्राह्यमवश्यं शिवशासनम् ।
द्वावासौ तत्र च श्रीमच्छ्रीकण्ठलकुलेश्वरौ ॥
द्विप्रवाहमिदं शास्त्रं सम्यङ् निश्रेयसप्रदम् ।
प्राच्यस्य तु यथाभीष्टभोगदत्वमपि स्थितम् ॥
तच्च पंचविधं प्रोक्तं शक्तिवैचित्र्यचित्रितम् ।
पंचस्रोत इति प्रोक्तं श्रीमच्छ्रीकण्ठशासनम् ॥
तदष्टादशधा स्रोतःपञ्चकं यत्नतोप्यलम् ।
उत्कृष्टं भरवाभिख्यं चतुःषष्टिविभेदितम् ॥

T. A., Ah, 37. (MS.)

2. तथा चाह गुरुः सिद्धस्सद्योज्योतिः "खेट पालाद्यैः" इति । सद्योज्योति-
प्रभृतिभिरित्यर्थः ।

T. A. Comm., VI. 211.

3. यं चानुशाशयामास भगवानीशसंमतः ।
उग्रज्योतिर्गुरुः श्रीमान् सर्वविद्यासरित्पतिः ॥

M. K., 63.

Page 105.

1. "इत्यवदत्तत्त्वानि सद्योज्योतिः सुवृत्तिकृत्" इति। श्रीमद्रौरववृत्तेरेव-
सुवृत्तित्वेन प्रसिद्धत्वात्।

T. T. N., Comm., 2.

2. इत्यवदत्तत्त्वानि सद्योज्योतिः सुवृत्तिकृत्।

T. San., Comm., 52.

Page 107.

1. ततोभूल्लाट उत्तुङ्गशिवो विन्ध्ये व्रतीश्वरः।
कल्याणनगरीवासी गुरुः पद्धतिकृत्सुधीः॥
सर्वविद्याधिपो यस्य कनीयानार्यदेशजः।
सर्वागमार्थनिर्णेतुः श्रीभोजनृपतेर्गुरुः॥

T. P., Introd., 14.

2. शांकरकंठश्रीमद्विद्याकंठादनुग्रहं लब्ध्वा।
नारायणकण्ठ इमां तत्पुत्रो व्यरचयद् वृत्तिम्॥

Mr. T., 456.

Page 108.

1. इति नादसिद्धिमेनामकरोच्छ्रीभट्टरामकण्ठोऽत्र।
नारायणकण्ठसुतः काश्मीरे वृत्तपंचविंशत्या॥

N. K., 240.

साक्षाच्छ्रीकण्ठनाथादिव सुकृतिजनानुग्रहायावतीर्णा-
च्छ्रुत्वा श्रीरामकण्ठाच्छिवमतकमलोन्मीलनप्रौढभास्वान्।
श्रीविद्याकण्ठभट्टस्तदिदमुपदिशन् नादिदेशैतदेनां
स्पष्टार्थामत्र लघ्वीं विरचय विवृतिं वत्स सर्वोपयोग्याम्॥

Mr. Vr. P. 4.

रामकण्ठमहाकण्ठकण्ठीरवपदानुगः।
न कुतार्किकमातङ्गगर्जितेभ्यो बिभेम्यहम्॥

Mr. Vr. Di.

2. श्रीरामकण्ठसद्वृत्तिं मयैवमनुकुर्वता।
रत्नत्रयपरीक्षार्थः संक्षेपेण प्रकाशितः॥

R. Tr., 107.

3. रामकण्ठकृतालोकनिर्मलीकृतचेतसा।
रत्नत्रयपरीक्षेयं कृता श्रीकण्ठसूरिणा॥

R. Tr., 107.

Page 109.

1. स्तोत्रकारस्य पितामहः परमेश्वराख्यः अपराजितः पिता ।

S. C. Comm., 10.

2. तत्त्वसंग्रहचन्द्रस्य प्रकाशाय वितानिता ।
श्रीनारायणकण्ठेन वृहट्टीका शरन्निशा ॥

T. San., 1

Page 110.

1. श्रीमदूघोरशिवाह्वयेन गुरुणा श्रीजन्यया व्याख्यया
लोकेऽपि प्रथितेन कुण्डिनकुलं चोलेष्वलंकुर्वता ।
श्रीसर्वात्मशिवांध्रिपद्मरजसामाराधकेनामला-
च्छ्रीतत्त्वत्रयनिर्णयस्य विवृतिर्लेशादियं निर्मिता ।

T. T. N., 22.

Page 111.

1. येनाकारि कवीश्वरेण रसवान् आश्चर्यसाराह्वयः
पाखण्डापजपश्च काव्यतिलको भक्तप्रकाशस्तथा ।
नाट्येष्वभ्युदयश्च सुन्दरगिरा शैवेषु सद्वृत्तय-
स्तेनाघोरशिवेन साधु रचिता रत्नत्रयोल्लेखिनी ॥

R. Tr., 108.

Page 112.

1. केचन माहेश्वराः शैवागमसिद्धान्ततत्त्वं यथावदीक्षमाणाः ।

S. D. S., Introd.

Page 118.

1. शेषं प्रस्तारतन्त्रेण कोहलः कथयिष्यति ।

Bh. Su., Ch. 37. *Ś*. 18.

Page 120.

1. परोक्षेऽपि हि वक्तव्यो नार्या प्रत्यक्षवत् प्रियः ।
सखी च नाट्यधर्मोयं भरतेनोदितं द्वयम् ॥

A. Bh., 172.

Page 121.

1. व्याख्यातारो भारतीये लोल्लटो भट्टशंकुकः ।
भट्टाभिनवगुप्तश्च श्रीमत्कीर्तिधरोऽपरः ॥

H. S. P., Vol. I. 27.

Page 131.

1. काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्व-
स्तस्याभावं जगदुरपरे भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये ।
केचिद्वाचां स्थितमविषये तत्त्वमूचुस्तदीयम्
Dh. L., 3.

2. विनापि विशिष्टपुस्तकेषु विवेचनात् ।
Dh. L., 3.

न चास्माभिरभाववादिनां विकल्पाः श्रुताः ।
Dh. L., 3.

3. पूर्वग्रहणेनेदंप्रथमता नात्र संभाव्यते इत्याह ।
Dh. L., 3.

4. दर्शयता इति भट्टोद्भटवामनादिना ।
Dh. L , 10.

5. ग्रन्थकृतसमानकालभाविना मनोरथनाम्ना कविना ।
Dh. L., 8.

Page 134.

1. वृत्त्या तात्पर्यं टीकया तद्विचारः सूत्रेष्वेतेषु ग्रन्थकारेण दृब्धम्
I. P. V., I. 3.

Page 141.

1. वल्लभदेवायनितश्चन्द्रादित्यादवाप्य जन्मेमाम् ।
कय्यटनामा रचयद्विवृतिं देवीशतस्तोत्रे ॥
वसुमुनिगगनोदधिसमकाले याते कलेस्तथा लोके ।
द्वापंचाशे वर्षे रचितेयं भीमगुप्तनृपे ॥
D. Ś., Comm.

2. इत्यलं पूर्ववंश्यैः सह विवादेन बहुना ।
Dh. L., 185.

3. किं लोचनं विना लोको भाति चन्द्रिकयापि हि ।
तेनाभिनवगुप्तोऽत्र लोचनोन्मीलनं व्यधात् ॥
Dh. L., 233.

Page 143.

1. श्रीमान् कात्यायनोऽभूद् वररुचिसदृशः प्रस्फुरद्बोधतृप्त-
स्तद्वंशालंकृतो यः स्थिरमतिरभवत् सौशुकाख्योतिविद्वान् ।

विप्रः श्रीभूतिराजस्तदनुसमभवत्तस्य सूनुर्महात्मा
येनामी सर्वलोकास्तमसि निपतिताः प्रोद्धृता भानुनेव ॥

Bh. G. S., (Concl.)

Page 145.

1. अन्ये पितृव्यतनयाः शिवशक्तिशुभ्राः क्षेमोत्पलाभिनवचक्रकपद्मगुप्ताः ।

T. A., Ah. 37. (MS.)

2. यथास्मत्पितृव्यस्य वामनगुप्तस्य ।

A. Bh., 297.

Page 146.

1. अनन्तापरटीकाकृन्मध्ये स्थितिमसृष्यता ।
विवृतं स्पन्दशास्त्रं नो गुरुणा नो मयास्य तु ॥

S. N., 77.

2. स्पन्दामृते चर्वितेऽपि स्पन्दसन्दोहतो मनाक् ।
पूर्णस्तच्चर्वणाभोगोद्योग एष मयाश्रितः ॥

S. N., 1.

3. मयैव स्पन्दसन्दोहे वितत्य निर्णीतस्य ।

S. N., 7.

Page 148.

1. श्रीमतः क्षेमराजस्य सद्गुर्वाम्नायशालिनः ।
साक्षात्कृतमहेशस्य तस्यान्तेवासिना मया ॥
श्रीवितस्तापुरीधाम्ना विरक्तेन तपस्विना ।
विवृतिर्योगनाम्न्येयं पूर्णाद्वयमयीकृता ॥

P. S. Comm., 199.

2. व्यधुस्तंत्रालोके किल सुभटपादा विवरणम् ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

Page 149.

1. श्रीविश्वदत्तपौत्रस् त्रिभुवनदत्तात्मजः कुलक्रमतः ।
श्रीसुभटदत्त आसीत् अस्य गुरुर्यो ममाप्यकृत दीक्षाम् ॥

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

2. इह केषांचिदपि व्याख्यान्तराणामसामञ्जस्यमतीव संभवदपि न प्रकाशितम्········इह चास्माभिस्तद्व्याख्यासारोच्चयस्यैव प्रतिज्ञातत्वात् ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. I., 15-16.

3. इह मम गतस्तंत्रालोके विवेचयतो यतो
निरवधिमभिप्रेतोत्साहः स एव निमित्तताम् ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

4. श्रीसुभटदत्त आसीदस्य गुरुर्यो ममाप्यकृत दीक्षाम् ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

5. शिवाद्वैतज्ञप्तिप्रकटितमहानन्दविदितम्
गुरुं श्रीकल्याणाभिधमसुमवाप्यास्तरजसम् ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

6. तस्माच्छ्रीशंखधरादवाप्तविद्यः कृती जयरथाख्यः ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

7. जयरथजयद्रथाख्यौ सकलजनानन्दकौ समगुणर्द्धी ।
अमृतशशिनाविवाब्धेरस्मात्कमलाश्रयादुदितौ ॥
ज्येष्ठोनयोरकार्षीत्तंत्रालोके विवेकमिमम् ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

8. तथा स श्रृंगाररथाभिधानो बालो विवृद्धिं गमितो जनन्या ।
सत्त्वाख्यया ख्यातगुणः क्रमेण श्रीराजराजः सचिवं व्यधात्तम् ॥

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

Page 150.

1. श्रीमान् यशस्करनृपः सचिवं समस्त-
धर्म्यस्थितिष्वकृत पूर्णमनोरथाख्यम् ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37. (MS.)

2. तस्यानन्तक्षितीन्दोर्बलवहलदरद्राजविद्रावणस्य
प्रापत् साचिव्यमाप्योत्पलरथ उचितां पद्धतिं मुक्तिमार्गे ।

T. A. Comm., Ah. 37, (MS.)

Page 151.

1. स्तवपंचिकाकारस्तु "वसुरसपौषे" वसु धनं त्रिविधं भवति अतएव तृतीय-संख्या लिख्यते । रसशब्देन जलानि लक्ष्यन्ते । तानि पञ्च । अतएव पञ्चेति संख्या लिख्यते । ततस्त्रिपञ्चाशत्तमः संवत्सरो ज्ञायते "अकृष्णदशम्याम्" इति·············शिवरात्र्याम् ।

Bh. S. Comm., (MS.)

Page 152.

1. यः कण्ठधौम्यायनताप्रसिद्धविशुद्धराजानकवंशजातः ।
स भास्कराख्यो द्विज एष टीकां करोति शास्त्रेऽभिनवोदितेऽस्मिन् ॥
Bh. (MS.)

2. श्रीमद्राजानकवैडूर्यकण्ठात्मजश्रीमदवतारकण्ठपुत्रो
भास्करकण्ठोहं......कौलनरोत्तमेभ्यश्च विद्योपदेशमासाद्य·········
Bh. (MS.)

Page 154.

1. एकाधिकेऽब्दे विहितचत्वारिंशे स कार्तिके
राज्ये कलशभूभर्तुः कश्मीरेष्वच्युतस्तवः ।
D. C., (Concl.)

Page 158.

1. चोलास्ते सततोत्सवा जनपदाः श्लाघ्यो गुणैर्माधवो
रेतोधाः··················
M. M., 202.

Page 159.

1. नमो निखिलमालिन्यविलापनपटीयसे ।
महाप्रकाशपादाब्जपरागपरमाणवे ॥
M. M., 1.

2. सत्संवित्समयमहाब्धिकल्पवृक्षान् आचार्यानभिनवगुप्तपादनाथान् ।
आमूलादमलमतीनुपास्यत्या वाग्वल्याः प्रचुरफलो ननु प्ररोहः ॥
M. M., 202.

3. साहित्याब्धौ कर्णधारोहमासं काव्यालोकं लोचनं चानुशील्य ।
तद्वत्स्वच्छं लब्धवानस्मि बोधम् पान्थो भूत्वा प्रत्यभिज्ञापदव्याम् ॥
M. M., 202.

Page 160.

1. महामाहेश्वरश्रीमत्क्षेमराजमुखोद्गताम् ।
अनुसृत्यैव सद्वृत्तिमंजसा क्रियते मया ।
वार्तिकं शिवसूत्राणां वाक्यैरेव तदीरितैः ॥
Ś. S. V., 1-2.

प्रागुक्तवार्तिकांशेन सहितं वार्तिकान्तरम् ।
S. S. V., 48.

2. मधुराजकुमाराणां महाहन्ताधिरोहिणाम् ।
मया वरदराजेन।मायामोहापसारकम् ।
कृतिना कृष्णदासेन व्यञ्जितं कृपयाञ्जसा ॥

S. S. V., 48.

Page 166.

1. तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्यायानुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवन्न निवार्यते । श्रुत्यैव सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् ।

Ś. Bh., 8.

2. इति प्रकटितो मया सुघट एष मार्गो नवो ।
गुरुभिरुच्यते स्म शिवदृष्टिशास्त्रे यथा ॥

I. P.:V., II., 271.

Page 167.

1. वृत्त्या तात्पर्यं टीकया तद्विचारः सूत्रेष्वेतेषु ग्रन्थकारेण दृब्धम् ।
तस्मात्सूत्रार्थान्मन्दबुद्धीन् प्रतीत्थं सम्यग् व्याख्यास्ये·········॥

I. P. V., I, 3.

2. श्रीशाम्भवाद्वयपदे जनतां नियोक्तुमभ्युद्यतः सकलसंपदुदारवृत्तौ ।
टीकाविमर्शमकरोल्लधुना नयेन स्पष्टेन चाभिनवगुप्तपदप्रतिष्ठः ॥

I. P. V. V. (MS.)

3. न तदस्तीह यन्न श्रीमालिनी विजयोत्तरे ।
देवदेवेन निर्दिष्टं स्वशब्देनाथ लिङ्गतः ॥

T. A., I., 35.

Page 168.

1. इति यज्ज्ञेयसतत्त्वं दर्श्यते तच्छिवाज्ञया ।
मया स्वसंवित्सत्तर्कपतिशास्त्रत्रिकक्रमात् ॥

T. A. I., 149.

2. आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रियाचितिकर्तृता ।
तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥

I. P. V., I. 200.

3. सा स्फुरत्ता महासत्ता देशकालाविशेषिणी । स्फुरणं स्पन्दनम् ।

I. P. V., I., 208-9.

Page 169.

1. अतोऽत्रान्तर्गतं सर्वं सम्प्रदायोज्झितैर्बुधैः ।
अदृष्टं प्रकटीकुर्मो गुरुनाथाज्ञया वयम् ॥

T. A., I., 50.

Page 170.

1. दशाष्टादशवस्वष्टभिन्नं यच्छासनं विभोः ।
तत्सारं त्रिकशास्त्रं हि तत्सारं मालिनीमतम् ॥

T. A., I, 35.

तच्च (त्रिकशास्त्रम्) सिद्धानामकमालिन्याख्यखण्डत्रयात्मकत्वात्त्रिविधम्।

T. A., I. 49.

2. शिवशक्तिसंघट्टात्मकं परत्रिकशब्दवाच्यम् ।

T. A., I. 7.

इदानीमपरमपि त्रिकं परामृष्टुमाह
स्वातंत्र्यशक्तिः क्रमसंसिसृक्षा, क्रमात्मिका
चेति विभोर्विभूतिः । तदेव देवीत्रयम्··············· ॥

T. A., I., 20.

तदेवं परं त्रिकं परामृश्य परापरमपि परामृष्टुमाह ।

T. A., I. 20.

3. वक्ष्यमाण षडर्धशास्त्रार्थगर्भीकारेण ।

T. A., I. 3.

Page 171.

1. तयोर्यद्यामलं रूपं स संघट्ट इति स्मृतः
आनन्दशक्तिः सैवोक्ता············
सैव प्रक्षुब्धरूपत्वादीशित्री संप्रजायते·········
ज्ञेयांशः प्रोन्मिषत् क्षोभं यदैति बलवत्त्वतः
ऊनताभासनम्···············

T. A., II, 81-6.

2. भोग्यं भोक्तरि लीनं चेद् भोक्ता तद्वस्तुतः स्फुटः ।
अतः षण्णां त्रिकं सारं चिदिष्युन्मेषणात्मकम् ॥

T. A., II., 186.

3. अनुत्तरा परेच्छा च परापरतया स्थिता ।
उन्मेषशक्तिर्ज्ञानाख्या त्वपरेति निगद्यते ॥

T. A., II., 233.

4. यस्य कस्यचिज्जन्तोरिरिति नात्र जात्याद्यपेक्षा काचित् ।

I. P. V., II. 276.

Page 172.

1. किन्तु मोहवशादस्मिन्दृष्टेप्यनुपलक्षिते ।
शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदश्यते ॥

I. P. V., I, 35.

Page 176.

1. स्वात्मप्रकाशो हि न अननुभूतपूर्वोऽविच्छिन्नप्रकाशत्वात् ।

I. P. V., I, 20.

2. इहापि प्रसिद्धपुराणसिद्धान्तानुमानागमादिविदितपूर्णशक्तिके ईश्वरे सति·········

I. P. V., I. 21.

Page 177.

1. दीक्षापि बौद्धविज्ञानपूर्वा सत्यं विमोचिका ।
तेन तत्रापि बौद्धस्य ज्ञानस्यास्ति प्रधानता ॥

T. A., I. 83.

2. स्वातंत्र्यहानिर्बोधस्य स्वातंत्र्यस्याप्यबोधता ।
द्विधाणवं मलमिदं स्वस्वरूपापहानितः ॥

T. A., I. 55.

Page 179.

1. दीयते ज्ञानसद्भावः क्षीयते पशुबन्धना ।
दानक्षपणसंयुक्ता दीक्षा तेनेह कीर्तिता ॥

T. A., I. 80.

2. यदा तु दूतीवचनाद्वा तल्लक्षणाभिज्ञानाद्वोपायान्तराद्वा तानुत्कर्षान् हृदयङ्गमीकारेणामृशति ।

I. P. V., II. 275.

3. दीक्षया मुच्यते जन्तुः प्रातिभेन तथा प्रिये ।
गुर्वायत्ता तु सा दीक्षा बध्यबन्धनमोक्षणे ।
प्रातिभोस्य स्वभावस्तु केवलीभावसिद्धिदः ॥

T. A., VIII. 107.

4. इत्थं श्रीशक्तिपातोयं निरपेक्ष इहोदितः ।

T. A., VIII. 173.

5. स्वातंत्र्यमहिमैवायं देवस्य यदसौ पुनः ।
स्वं रूपं परिशुद्धं सत्स्पृशत्यप्यणुतामयः ॥

T. A., VIII. 163.

Page 180.

1. अज्ञानं किल बन्धहेतुरुदितः शास्त्रे मलं तत्स्मृतम् ।
T. S., 5.

2. अज्ञानमिति न ज्ञानाभावश्चातिप्रसंगतः ।
स हि लोष्टादिकेप्यस्ति न च तस्यास्ति संसृतिः ।
T. A., I. 58.

3. विशेषणेन बुद्धिस्थे संसारोत्तरकालिके ।
सभावनां निरस्यैतदभावे मोक्षमब्रवीत् ॥
T. A., I. 56.

Page 181.

1. मलमज्ञानमिच्छन्ति संसारांकुरकारणम् ।
T. A., I. 54.

2. परमावरणं मल इह सूक्ष्मं मायादिकंचुकं स्थूलम् ।
बाह्यं विग्रहरूपं कोशत्रयवेष्टितो ह्यात्मा ॥
P. S., 55.

तुषकम्बुककिंशारुकमुक्तं बीजं यथांकुरं कुरुते ।
नैव तथाणवमायाकर्मवियुक्तो भवाङ्कुरं ह्यात्मा ॥
T- S., 57.

3. अस्य कार्ममलस्येयन्मायान्ताध्वविसारिणः ।
प्रधानं कारणं प्रोक्तमज्ञानात्माणवो मलः ॥
T. A., VI. 111.

4. या त्वस्य कर्मणश्चित्रफलदत्वेन कर्मता ।
प्रसिद्धा सा न संकोचं विनात्मनि मलश्च सः ॥
T. A., VI. 82-3.

Page 182.

1. यथैवाव्यतिरिक्तस्य धरादेर्भावितात्मता ।
तथैवास्येति शास्त्रेषु व्यतिरिक्तः स्थितो मलः ॥
T. A., VI. 61.

2. अथानादिर्मलः पुंसां पशुत्वं परिकीर्तितम् ।
T. A., VI. 60.

ईश्वरेच्छावशक्षुब्धभोगलोलिकचिद्गणान् ।
संविभङ्क्तुमघोरेशः सृजतीह सितेतरम् ॥
T. A., VI. 55.

3. तदज्ञानं न बुद्ध्यंशोऽध्यवसायाद्यभावतः ।

T. A., VI. 76.

Page 183.

1. निरुद्धे चेतसि पुरा सविकल्पसमाधिना ।
निर्विकल्पसमाधिस्तु भवेदत्र त्रिभूमिकः ॥
व्युत्तिष्ठते स्वतस्त्वाद्ये द्वितीये परबोधितः ।
अन्ते व्युत्तिष्ठते नैव सदा भवति तन्मयः ॥

S. C., 455. (Bhūmikā).

Page 184.

1. योग्यतामात्रमेवैतत भाव्यवच्छेदसंग्रहे ।
मलस्तेनास्य न पृथक् तत्त्वभावोस्ति रागवत् ॥
....
निरवच्छेदकर्मांशमात्रावच्छेदतस्तु सा ।
रागः पुंसि धियो धर्मः कर्मभेदविचित्रता ॥
अपूर्णमन्यता चेयं तथारूपावभासनम् ।

T. A., VI, 57-9.

2. शुद्धेऽध्वनि शिवः कर्ता प्रोक्तोऽनन्तोऽसिते प्रभुः ।

T. A., VI, 56.

Page 185.

1. निष्कर्मा हि स्थिते मूलमलेऽप्यज्ञाननामनि ।
वैचित्र्यकारणाभावान्नोर्ध्वं सरति नाप्यधः ॥
केवलं पारिमित्येन शिवाभेदमसंस्पृशन् ।
विज्ञानकेवली प्रोक्तः शुद्धचिन्मात्रसंस्थितः ॥

T. A., VI. 77.

मैवं स हि मलो ज्ञानाकले दिध्वंसिसुः कथम् । हेतुः स्यात् ....

T. A., VI. 81.

2. दिध्वंसिषुध्वंसमानध्वस्ताख्यासु तिसृष्वथ ।
दशास्वन्तःकृतावस्थान्तरासु स्वक्रमस्थितेः ॥
विज्ञानाकलमंत्रेशतदीशादित्वकल्पना ।

T. A., VI. 80.

Page 186.

1. शरीरभुवनाकारो मायीयः परिकीर्तितः ।

T. A. I, 56.

2. यत्तु ज्ञेयसतत्त्वस्य ज्ञानं सर्वात्मनोज्झितम् ।
अवच्छेदैर्न तत्कुत्राप्यज्ञानं सत्यमुक्तिदम् ॥

T. A., I, 72.

3. क्षीणे तु पशुसंस्कारे पुंसः प्राप्तपरस्थितेः ।
विकस्वरं तद्विज्ञानं पौरुषं निर्विकल्पकम् ॥

T. A., I, 78.

विकस्वरात्मविज्ञानौचित्येन यावसा । तद्बौद्धम्............
औचित्येन इति तद्वत्पूर्णेनात्मना इत्यर्थः ।
अतश्च सर्वो ममायं विभव इत्येवंरूपत्वमस्याः ।

T. A., I, 79.

4. तत्र दीक्षादिना पौंस्नमज्ञानं ध्वंसि यद्यपि ।

T. A., I, 79.

Page 187.

1. बौद्धज्ञानेन तु यदा बौद्धमज्ञानजृंभितम् ।

T. A., I, 81.

विलीयते तदा जीवन्मुक्तिः करतले स्थिता ।
बौद्धज्ञानेन—इति, परमेश्वराद्वयशास्त्रश्रवणाद्युद्भूतेन ।

T. A., I, 82.

2. दीक्षापि बौद्धविज्ञानपूर्वा सत्यं विमोचिका ।
तेन तत्रापि बौद्धस्य ज्ञानस्यास्ति प्रधानता ॥

T. A., I. 83.

3. इति ज्ञानचतुष्कं यत् सिद्धिमुक्तिमहोदयम् ।

T. A., I. 258.

4. एवं शक्तित्रयोपायं यज्ज्ञानं तत्र पश्चिमम् ।
मूलं तदुत्तरं मध्यमुत्तरोत्तरमादिमम् ॥
ततोऽपि परमं ज्ञानमुपायादिविवर्जितम् ।
आनन्दशक्तिविश्रान्तमनुत्तरमिहोच्यते ॥

T. A., I. 255.6.

5. उपायोपेयादिना द्वारद्वारिभावेन शाम्भवोपाय एव प्राधान्येन विश्रान्तः ।

T. A., I. 203.

6. साक्षादुपायेन इति—शाम्भवेन । तदेव हि अव्यवहितं परज्ञानावाप्तौ निमित्तम् । स एव परां काष्ठां प्राप्तश्चानुपाय इत्युच्यते ।

T. A., I. 182.

7. आवेशश्चास्वतंत्रस्य स्वतद्रूपनिमज्जनात् ।
परतद्रूपता शंभोराद्याच्छक्त्यविभागिनः ॥
T. A., I. 205.

Page 188.

1. भूयो भूयो विकल्पांशनिश्चयक्रमचर्चनात् ।
यत्परामर्शमभ्येति ज्ञानोपायं तु तद्विदुः ॥
यत्तु तत्कल्पनाक्लृप्तबहिर्भूतार्थसाधनम् ।
क्रियोपायं तदाम्नातं भेदो नात्रापवर्गगः ॥
T. A., I. 186-7.

Page 189.

1. बहिर्भूतोऽवच्छिन्नो य उच्चारादिः ।
T. A. Comm., I. 188.

2. सामानाधिकरण्यं हि सद्विद्याहमिदंधियोः ।
I. P. V., II. 196.

Page 190.

1. एवं परेच्छाशक्त्यंशसदुपायमिमं विदुः ।
शाम्भवाख्यं समावेशं सुमत्यन्तेनिवासिनः ॥
T. A., I. 235.

2. यथा विस्फुरितदृशामनुसन्धिं विनाप्यलम् ।
भाति भावः स्फुटस्तद्वत् केषामपि शिवात्मता ॥
T. A., I. 186.

3. इदमुक्तं तथा श्रीमत्सोमानन्दादिदेशिकैः ।
T. A., Ah, II, 39.

सकृज्ज्ञाते सुवर्णे किं भावना करणं व्रजेत् ।
एकवारं प्रमाणेन शास्त्राद्वा गुरुवाक्यतः ॥
ज्ञाते शिवत्वे सर्वस्थे प्रतिपत्त्या दृढात्मना ।
करणेन नास्ति कृत्यं नापि भावनयापि वा ॥
T. A. Comm., Ah, II, 40.

4. अनुपायमिदं रूपं कोर्थोदेशनयात्र वै ।
सकृत्स्यादेशना पश्चादनुपायत्वमुच्यते ॥
T. A., Ah, II, 3.

Page 191.

1. स्वतंत्रात्मातिरिक्तस्तु तुच्छोऽतुच्छोपि कश्चन ।
न मोक्षो नाम तन्नास्य पृथङ् नामापि गृह्यते ॥

T. A., I, 62.

2. मोक्षो हि नाम नैवान्यः स्वरूपप्रथनं हि तत् ।
स्वरूपं चात्मनः संवित् नान्यत् ··········॥

T. .A, I. 192.

Page 192.

1. रागादिकलुषं चित्तं संसारस्तद्विमुक्तता ।
संक्षेपात्कथितो मोक्षः प्रहीणावरणैर्जिनैः ॥

T. A., I, 64.

2. चित्तमात्रमिदं विश्वमिति या देशना मुनेः ।
तत् त्रासपरिहारार्थं बालानां सा न तत्त्वतः ।
सापि ध्वस्ता महाभागैश्चित्तमात्रव्यवस्थितिः ॥

T. A., I, 66.

Page 194.

1. बौद्धाः एकमेव संविद्रूपं हर्षविषादाद्यनेकाकारविवर्तं पश्याम इत्याद्युक्त्या बुद्धिवृत्त्यात्मकं ज्ञानमेव तत्त्वं प्रतिपन्नाः इति बुद्धितत्त्वावाप्तिरेवैषां मोक्षः················।
सांख्याश्च सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकप्रकृतिपृथग्भावेन पुंस एव स्वरूपेणावस्थानं तत्त्वं प्रतिपन्ना इति पुंस्तत्त्वप्राप्तिरेवैषां मोक्षः ।

T. A., I, 69.

2. सांख्यपातञ्जलयोः प्रकृतिपृथग्भावेन पुंज्ञानस्य साम्येऽपि सांख्येभ्यः पातञ्जलानामीश्वरप्रणिधानात् तद्विशिष्यते इति तेषां पुंस्तत्त्वोर्ध्ववर्तिनियतितत्त्वप्राप्तिरुक्ता ।

T. A., I, 70.

Page 195.

1. इति यज्ज्ञेयसतत्त्वं दर्श्यते तच्छिवाज्ञया ।
मया स्वसंवित्सत्तर्कपतिशास्त्रत्रिकक्रमात् ॥

T. A., I, 149.

Page 196.

1. ईश्वरस्वभाव आत्मा प्रकाशते तावत् तत्र च अस्य स्वातंत्र्यम् इति न केनचिद्वपुषा न प्रकाशते तत्र अप्रकाशात्मनापि प्रकाशते प्रकाशात्मनापि ।

I. P. V., I. 35-6.

Page 197.

1. "अनुत्तरम्" इति। न विद्यते उत्तरमधिकं यतः। यथा हि तत्त्वान्तराणि षट्त्रिंशत् अनाश्रितशिवपर्यन्तानि परभैरवबोधानुप्रवेशासादिततथाभावसिद्धीनि संविदमधिकयन्ति, नैवं परा परिपूर्णा संवित्, तस्याः सदा स्वयमनर्गलानपेक्षप्रथाचमत्कारसारत्वात्।

P. T. V., 19.

2. उत्तरं च शब्दनं तत सर्वथा "ईदृशं तादृशम्" इति व्यवच्छेदं कुर्यात्। तद् यत्र न भवति अव्यवच्छिन्नमिदमनुत्तरम्।

P. T. V., 21.

Page 199.

1. उक्तं च कामिके देवः सर्वाकृतिर्निराकृतिः।

T. A., I, 104.

सर्वाकृतिः विश्वमयः निराकृतिः विश्वोत्तीर्णः।

T. A. Comm., I, 105.

Page 202.

1. अतोऽसौ परमेशानः स्वात्मव्योमन्यनर्गलः।
इयतः सृष्टिसंहाराडम्बरस्य प्रकाशकः॥
निर्मले मुकुरे यद्वत् भान्ति भूमिजलादयः।
अमिश्रास्तद्वदेकस्मिंश्चिन्नाथे विश्ववृत्तयः॥

T. A,, II, 3-4.

2. इह तावत् स्वप्नस्मरणमनोराज्यसंकल्पादिषु नीलाद्याभासवैचित्र्यं बाह्यसमर्पकहेतुव्यतिरेकेणैव निर्भासते............यत्पुनरिदं योगिनाम् इच्छामात्रेण पुरसेनादिनिर्माणं दृष्टम्, तत्र उपादानं प्रसिद्धमृत्काष्ठशुक्रशोणितादिवैचित्र्यमयं न संभवत्येव............

तत अस्ति संभवः यत् संविदेव अभ्युपगतस्वातंत्र्यलक्षणात इच्छाविशेषात् अन्तःस्थितमेव भावजातम् इदमित्येवं बाह्यत्वेन आभासयति।

I, P. V., I. 182-5.

Page 205.

1. सर्वाः शक्तीः कर्तृत्वशक्तिः ऐश्वर्यात्मा समाक्षिपति सा च विमर्शरूपा इति युक्तम् अस्या एव प्राधान्यम्।

I. P. V., I, 214.

2. आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रियाचितिकर्तृता ।
तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥

I. P. V., I, 200.

3. स्पन्दनं च किंचिच्चलनम् एषैव किंचिद्रूपता यत् अचलमपि चलम् आभासते। प्रकाशरूपं हि मनागपि नातिरिच्यते। अतिरिच्यते इव इति अचलमेव आभासभेदयुक्तमेव च भाति।

I. P. V., I, 208-9.

4. सत्ता च भवनकर्तृता सर्वक्रियासु स्वातन्त्र्यम्, सा च खपुष्पादिकमपि व्याप्नोति इति महती।

I. P. V., I, 209.

5. चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा वाक् स्वरसोदिता।

I. P. V., I, 203.

Page 212.

1. ईश्वरस्य चिकीर्षावशात् परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते। ततः परमाणुद्वयसंयोगे सति द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्यते। त्रिभिर्द्व्यणुकैस्त्र्यणुकम्। एवं चतुरणुकादिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी.........उत्पद्यते।

Ta. San., T. D., 9.

Page 213.

1. "प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्" ब्रह्म च "जन्माद्यस्य यतः" इति लक्षितम्। तच्च लक्षणं घटरुचकादीनां मृत्सुवर्णादिवत् प्रकृतित्वे कुलालसुवर्णकारादिवन्निमित्तत्वे च समानमित्यतो भवति विमर्शः।

Ś. Bh., 337.

2. न चेदन्तःकृतानन्तविश्वरूपः।

I. P. V., I, 106.

3. स्वरूपान्तर्ब्रुडितमर्थराशिम् अपरमपि भिन्नाकारम् आत्मनि परिगृह्य कञ्चिदेव अर्थं स्वरूपादुन्मग्नमाभासयति।

I. P. V., I. 108.

Page 214.

1. स एव हि स्वात्मा सन्वक्तव्यो यस्य अन्यानुपाहितं रूपं चकास्ति।

I. P. V. I., 42-3

Page 216.

1. माया पदं हि सर्वं भ्रान्तिः तत्रापि तु स्वप्ने स्वप्न इव गण्डे स्फोट इव अपरेयं भ्रान्तिः ।

I. P. V., II., 114.

Page 217.

1. अनपेक्षस्य वशिनो देशकालाकृतिक्रमाः ।
नियता नेति स विभुर्नित्यो विश्वाकृतिः शिवः ॥
विभुत्वात्सर्वगो नित्यभावादाद्यन्तवर्जितः ।
विश्वाकृतित्वाच्चिदचित् तद्वैचित्र्यावभासकः ॥

T. A., I, 98-9.

2. तेन सर्वक्रियास्वतंत्रे सर्वशक्तिके इति यावदुक्तं भवेत् तावदेव कर्तरि ज्ञातरि इति ।

I. P. V., I. 32.

Page 218.

1. तस्य देवातिदेवस्य परापेक्षा न विद्यते ।
परस्य तदपेक्षत्वात् स्वतंत्रोयमतः स्थितः ॥

T. A., I. 98.

2. स्वम् आत्मीयम् उपकरणम् ईरयति स्वकर्तव्येषु अवश्यं तच्छीलः । स्वं च आत्मानमीरयति न पुनः स्वकर्तव्ये प्रेरकमपेक्षते इति "स्वैरी" स्वतन्त्रः ।

I. P. V., I. 118.

3. न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोयमग्निः ।
तमेवभान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥

I. P. V., I. 277.

4. कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे ।
अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः ॥

I. P. V., I. 29.

5. सर्वापह्नवहेवाकधर्माण्येवं हि वर्तते ।
ज्ञानमात्मार्थमित्येतन्नेति मां प्रति भासते ॥

T. A., I., 95.

6. स एव हि तेन तेन वपुषा जानाति स्मरति विकल्पयति च । यथोक्तमाचार्येणैव :—

यद्यप्यर्थस्थितिः प्राणपुर्यष्टकनियन्त्रिते ।
जीवे निरुद्धा तत्रापि परमात्मनि सा स्थिता ॥

I. P. V., I. 111.

Page 219.

1. शक्तिश्च नाम भावस्य स्वं रूपं मातृकल्पितम् ।
तेनाद्वयः स एवापि शक्तिमत्परिकल्पने ॥
T. A., I. 109.

Page 220.

1. मातृकल्पने हि देवस्य तत्र तत्र वपुष्यलम् ।
को भेदो वस्तुतो वह्नेर्दग्धृपक्तृत्वयोरिव ॥
T. A., I. 110.

Page 221.

1. स्वरूपान्तर्ब्रुडितम् अर्थराशिम् अपरमपि भिन्नाकारम् आत्मनि परिगृह्य कंचिदेव अर्थम् स्वरूपादुन्मग्नम् आभासयति इति आपतितम् । सैषा ज्ञानशक्तिः । उन्मग्नाभाससंभिन्नं च चित्स्वरूपं बहिर्मुखत्वात् तच्छायानुरागात् नवं नवं ज्ञानमुक्तम् ।
I. P. V., I. 108-9.

2. न केवलं नीलादिरूपमेव ज्ञेयम् यावत् अत्यक्तकर्तृभावं स्वातंत्र्येण अपरित्यक्तमेव सन्तम् आत्मानं निर्माय·········
I. P. V., I. 215.

Page 222.

1. एवमपि नवनवाभासाः प्रतिक्षणमुदयव्ययभाजः इति सैव व्यवहारनिवहहानिः । तेन क्वचित् आभासे गृहीतपूर्वे यत्संवेदनं बहिर्मुखमभूत् तस्य यत् अन्तर्मुखं चित्स्वरूपं तत्कालान्तरेऽपि अवस्थास्नु स्वात्मगतं तद्विषयविशेषे बहिर्मुखत्वं परामृशति इति एषा स्मृतिशक्तिः ।
I. P. V., I. 109.

Page 223.

1. मायाप्रमातरि तदेतत्स्मरणमुच्यते । तत्र यत्तथाविधं प्रमात्रादिनिर्माणसामर्थ्यम् तद्भगवतः स्मृतिशक्तिरिति भावः ।
I. P. V., I. 109. F. N.

2. यत्किल आभास्यते तत्संविदो न विच्छिद्यते संविच्च ततः संविच्च संविदन्तरात् संवेद्यं च संवेद्यान्तरात् । न च विच्छेदनं वस्तुतः संभवतीति विच्छेदनस्यावभासमात्रम्···············एष च परितश्छेदनात् परिच्छेद उच्यते । तदवभासनसामर्थ्यमपोहनशक्तिः ।
I. P. V., I. 111.

3. तथा च यथा भगवतः स्वातंत्र्यशक्त्या मायीयप्रमातुर्विकल्परूपं विज्ञानं सा अपोहनशक्तिरिति फलितार्थः ।

I. P. V., I. 110. F. N.

Page 225.

1. मूर्तिवैचित्र्यतो देशक्रममाभासयत्यसौ ।
क्रियावैचित्र्यनिर्भासात्कालक्रममपीश्वरः ॥

I. P. V., II. 13.

2. यदा तु गाढप्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रकाशबलात् तदेव इदं हस्तस्वरूपमिति प्रतिपत्तौ मूर्तेर्न भेदः अथ च अन्यान्यरूपत्वं भाति तदा एकस्मिन्स्वरूपे यदन्यत् अन्यत् रूपं तद्विरोधवशादसहभवत् क्रिया उच्यते ।

I. P. V., II. 14.

Page 227.

1. एकात्मनो विभेदश्च क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा ।…………
तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलेन यदेकात्मकमनेकस्वभावं तस्य यो भेदोऽन्यान्यरूपता इयमेव सा क्रियोच्यते ।

I. P. V., II. 174-5.

2. तौ च आभासानां भावाभावौ न बाह्यहेतुकृतौ इति विस्तार्यं उपपादितम् इति य एव संवित्स्वभाव आत्मा स्वप्नसंकल्पादौ आभासवैचित्र्यनिर्माणे प्रभुः प्रभविष्णुः इति स्वसंविदितस्तत एव तौ भवतः ।

I. P. V., II. 12.

3. तत्क्रमोपश्लिष्टा भाति दर्पणतलमिव विततप्रवहन्नदीप्रवाहसमाश्लिष्टम् । अत्र केवलं दर्पणस्य तथा इच्छा नास्ति इति उभयथा अस्य क्रियाशक्तिः । क्रमरूपक्रियानिर्माणसामर्थ्यम् क्रमरूपक्रियोपरागयोगश्च ।

I. P. V., II. 23-4.

4. क्रियाशक्तेरेवायं सर्वो विस्फारः ।

I. P. V., II. 42.

क्रियासम्बन्धसामान्यदेशदिक्कालबुद्धयः ।

I. P. V., II. 28.

Page 228.

1. यो यावति ज्ञाता कर्ता च स तावति ईश्वरो राजेव । अनीश्वरस्य ज्ञातृत्व-कर्तृत्वे स्वभावविरुद्धे यतः । आत्मा च विश्वत्र ज्ञाता कर्ता च, इति सिद्धा प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।

I. P. V., I. 44.

Page 229.

1. न हि प्रत्यक्षं मायाप्रमातुः सर्वत्र क्रमते अनुमानमप्येवम्। न हि यद्यदस्ति तत्र तत्र लिंगव्याप्त्यादिसंभवः। आगमस्तु अपरिच्छिन्न-प्रकाशात्मकमहेश्वरविमर्शपरमार्थः किं न पश्येत् इति तदनुसारेण पदार्थनिर्णयम्।

I. P. V., II. 186.

Page 230.

1. शिवः स्वतंत्रदृग्रूपः पंचशक्तिसुनिर्भरः।
स्वातंत्र्याभासितभिदा पंचधा प्रविभज्यते॥

T. A., VI. 48.

तदेवं पंचकमिदं शुद्धोऽध्वा परिभाष्यते।
तत्र साक्षाच्छिवेच्छैव कर्त्र्याभासितभेदिका॥

ईश्वरेच्छावशक्षुब्धभोगलोलिकचिद्गणान्।
संविभंक्तुमघोरेशः सृजतीह सितेतरम्॥

T. A., VI. 55.

Page 232.

1. वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथा हि दर्शयति, यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते स्यातामेतौ दोषौ वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यञ्च न तु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते, किमपेक्षत इति चेत् धर्माधर्मावपेक्षत इति वदामः।

V. S. Ś. Bh., 407.

Page 234.

1. तत्स्वातंत्र्यरसात्पुनः शिवपदाद् भेदे विभाते परम्।
यद्रूपं बहुधानुगामि तदिदं तत्त्वं विभोः शासने॥

T. A., VI. 3.

Page 235.

1. शाम्भवाः शक्तिजाः मंत्रमहेशाः मंत्रनायकाः।
मंत्रा इति विशुद्धाः स्युरमी पंचगणाः क्रमात्॥

T. A., VI. 52.

2. एकैकत्रापि तत्त्वेऽस्मिन्सर्वशक्तिसुनिर्भरे।
तत्तत्प्राधान्ययोगेन स स भेदो निरूप्यते॥

T. A., VI. 49.

Page 237.

1. शिवः स्वतन्त्रद्रूपः पंचशक्तिसुनिर्भरः ।

T. A., VI. 48.

Page 240.

1. निराशंसात्पूर्णादहमिति पुरा भासयति यत् ।

I. P. V., I, 1.

Page 241.

1. तस्य प्रथमसृष्टावस्माकमन्तःकरणैकवेद्यमिव ध्यामलप्रायमुन्मीलितचित्रमात्रकल्पं यद् भावचक्रं तस्य चैतन्यवर्गस्य तादृशि भावराशौ तथा प्रथनं नाम यच्चिद्विशेषत्वं तत्सदाशिवतत्त्वम् ।

I. P. V., II, 192-3.

Page 242.

1. बहिर्भावपरत्वे तु परतः पारमेश्वरम् ।

I. P. V.,:II. 191.

Page 243.

1. सामानाधिकरण्यं हि सद्विद्याहमिदं धियोः ।

I. P. V., II. 196.

2. ये एते अहम् इति इदम् इति धियौ तयोर्मायाप्रमातरि प्रथगधिकरणत्वम्, अहम् इति ग्राहके इदम् इति च ग्राह्ये, तन्निरसनेन एकस्मिन्नेवाधिकरणे यत्संगमनं संबन्धरूपतया प्रथनं तत् सती शुद्धा विद्या अतोऽशुद्धविद्यातो मायाप्रमातृगताया अन्यैव ।

I. P. V., II, 196-7.

3. स पुनः शाम्भवेच्छातः शिवाभेदं परामृशन् ।
क्रमान्मंत्रेशतन्नेतृरूपो याति शिवात्मताम् ॥

T. A., VI. 78.

Page 244.

1. दिध्वंसिषुध्वंसमानध्वस्ताख्यासु तिसृष्वथ ।
दशास्वन्तःकृतावस्थान्तरासु स्वक्रमस्थितेः ।
विज्ञानाकलमंत्रेशतदीशत्वादिकल्पना ॥

T. A., VI. 80.

अवस्थान्तराणि किंचिद्ध्वंसमानकिंचिद्ध्वस्तत्वादिरूपाणि

T. A. Comm., VI. 81.

2. माया च नाम देवस्य| शक्तिरव्यतिरेकिणी ।
भेदावभासस्वातंत्र्यं तथा हि स तया कृतः ॥

T. A., VI. 116.

Page 245.

1. मोहयति अनेन शक्तिविशेषेण इति वा मोहो मायाशक्तिः ।

I. P. V., I, 35.

2. आद्यो भेदावभासो यो विभागमनुपेयिवान् ।
गर्भीकृतानन्तभाविविभासा सा परा निशा ॥

T. A., VI, 116.

3. सा जडा भेदरूपत्वात् कार्यं चास्या जडं यतः ।
व्यापिनी विश्वहेतुत्वात् सूक्ष्मा कार्यैककल्पनात् ॥
शिवशक्त्यविनाभावात् नित्यैका मूलकारणम् ।

T. A., VI, 117.

Page 246.

1. सा माया क्षोभमापन्ना विश्वं सूते समन्ततः ।
दण्डाहतेवामलकी फलानि किल यद्यपि ॥

T. A., VI, 128.

2. सा यद्यप्यन्यशास्त्रेषु बहुधा दृश्यते स्फुटम् ।
तथापि मालिनीशास्त्रदृशा तां संप्रचक्ष्महे ॥

T. A., VI, 129.

Page 247.

1. कला हि किञ्चित्कर्तृत्वं सूते स्वालिंगनादणोः ।
तस्याश्चाप्यणुनान्योन्यं ह्यञ्जनं सा प्रसूयते ॥

T. A., VI, 136.

2. सेयं कला न करणं मुख्यं विद्यादिकं यथा ।
पुंसि कर्तरि सा कर्त्री प्रयोजकतया यतः ॥

T. A., VI, 142.

3. पुंस्कलयोः प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकतया...............

एककर्तृकारकीभूतत्वेन लक्ष्यान्तरत्वेऽपि भगवदनुग्रहात् कस्यचिद्यदानयोर्विवेकज्ञानं जायते तदासौ मायापुंविवेकः सर्वकर्मक्षयात् विज्ञानाकलता च भवेद् येनायं पुमान् मायाधो न संसरेत् ।

T. A. Comm., VI, 143.

4. धीपुंविवेके विज्ञाते प्रधानपुरुषान्तरे ।
अपि न क्षीणकर्मा स्यात् कलायां तद्धि संभवेत् ॥
अतः सांख्यदृशा सिद्धः प्रधानाधो न संसरेत् ।

T. A., VI, 144-5.

Page 248.

1. बुद्धिस्तु गुणसंकीर्णा विवेकेन कथं सुखम् ।
दुःखं मोहात्मकं वापि विषयं दर्शयेदपि ॥

T. A., VI, 151-2.

2. किञ्चित्तु कुरुते तस्मान्नूनमस्त्यपरं तु तत् ।
रागतत्त्वमिति प्रोक्तं यत्तत्रैवोपरञ्जकम् ॥

T. A., VI, 157.

Page 249.

1. नियतिर्नियोजनां धत्ते विशिष्टे कार्यमण्डले ।

T. A., VI, 160.

2. विद्या रागोऽथ नियतिः कालश्चैतच्चतुष्टयम् । कलाकार्यम्—............

T. A., VI, 161.

3. देहपुर्यष्टकाद्येषु वेद्येषु किल वेदनम् ।
एतत्षट्कससंकोचं यद्वेद्यमसावणुः ॥

T. A., VI, 164-5.

Page 250.

1. अत एवेयं प्रोहासहिष्णुं यत इदन्तां भासयति ततः शुद्धा, भासनाच्च विद्या । अत एवाप्ररूढमायाकल्पत्वात् महामायेयम् ।

I. P. V., II, 200.

Page 251.

1. वेद्यमात्रं स्फुटं भिन्नं प्रधानं सूयते कला ।

T. A., VI. 171.

2. ईश्वरेच्छावशाक्षुब्धलोलिकं पुरुषं प्रति ।
भोक्तृत्वाय स्वतंत्रेशः प्रकृतिं क्षोभयेद् भृशम् ॥

T. A., VI, 180.

Page 253.

1. न च बुद्धिरसंवेद्या करणत्वान्मनो यथा ।
प्रधानवदसंवेद्य बुद्धिवादस्तदुज्झितः ॥

T. A., VI. 192.

2. तया पंचविधश्चैष वायुः संरंभरूपया ।
प्रेरितो जीवनाय स्यादन्यथा मरणं भवेत् ॥

T. A., VI. 185.

3. अस्या अहंकृतेः शुद्धस्वातन्त्र्यमयात् स्वात्ममात्रविश्रान्तिसतत्त्वात् स्वरसोदितादहंभावादियान् विशेषो यदियं जडायामनात्मरूपायां बुद्धावभिनिविष्टा ।

T. A. Comm., VI, 185.

Page 255.

1. तेनाशुद्धैव विद्यास्य सामान्यं करणं विदुः ।
ज्ञप्तौ कृतौ तु सामान्यं कलाकारणमुच्यते ॥

T. A., VI. 199.

Page 256.

1. नैयायिकक्रमस्यैव मायापदे पारमार्थिकत्वम् ।

I. P. V., I, 25.

Page 261.

1. तेन शून्यधीप्राणदेहाद्युपाध्याश्रयसंकुचितात् मायाप्रमातुः अनन्तकालान्तमुखसंवेदनरूपात् स प्रमाणाभिमत आभासो यावत् प्रमेयोन्मुखतास्वभावः तावत् प्रमेयस्य देशकालाकाराभाससंभेदवत्वात् सोपि तथैव क्षणे क्षणे अन्यान्यरूपः सृष्टव्यः ।

I. P. V., II, 66.

2. विमर्शबलेन च यतः प्रमाणम्, विमर्शश्च शब्दजीवितः शब्दश्च आभासान्तरैः देशकालादिरूपैरनामृष्टे एकत्रैव आभासमात्रे प्रवर्तते घट इति लोहित इति । ततो देशकालाभासयोः स्वलक्षणत्वार्पणप्रवणयोरनामिश्रणात् सामान्यायमाने आभासे प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते ।

I. P. V., II. 69-71.

Page 262.

1. यथारुचि यथार्थित्वं यथाव्युत्पत्ति भिद्यते ।
आभासोप्यर्थ एकस्मिन्ननुसंधानसाधिते ॥

I. P. V., I, 85-6.

Page 264.

1. यत्किल प्रभुः परस्परं व्यवहारकाले क्रेयविक्रेयप्रेक्षाव्याख्यानादौ चैत्रमैत्रादिसम्बन्धिनो देहप्राणादीन् एकतया तावति आभासे आविशन्

अन्तर्भान्तमेव अनुज्झितान्तःप्रकाशमेव सन्तं बहिः एकाभासतया भासयति ।

I. P. V., I, 261.

2. तात्कालिकाक्षसामक्ष्यसापेक्षाः केवलं क्वचित् ।
आभासा अन्यथान्यत्र त्वन्धान्धतमसादिषु ॥
विशेषोऽर्थावभासस्य सत्तायां न पुनः क्वचित् ।
विकल्पेषु भवेद्भाविभवद्भूतार्थगामिषु ॥

I. P. V., I, 320.

3. एतदुक्तं भवति नीलमिदं पश्यामि, संकल्पयामि, उत्प्रेक्षे, स्मरामि, करोमि, वेद्मि इत्यादौ नीलाभासोसौ स्वरूपतोऽन्यूनाधिकः एवं पश्यत्येवं यः पीतादिषु, ते पुनराभासाः स्वातंत्र्येण यदा भगवता संयोज्यन्ते वियोज्यन्ते च तदा अयं स्फुटत्वाऽफुटत्वादिव्यवहारः । नीलमित्याभासस्य उत्प्रेक्षे इत्याभासान्तरव्यवच्छेदेन पश्यामीत्याभासमिश्रणायां स्फुटताव्यवहारः एवं त्रैकालिकव्यवहारवैचित्र्योत्पत्तिः ।

I. P. V., I, 322.

Page 265.

1. सा हि अर्थक्रिया आभासभेदनियता, तथा च कान्ताभासस्य बाह्यत्वेऽपि सति आभासान्तरस्य आलिङ्गनलक्षणस्य व्यपगमे दूरीभवति, इयम् इति च आभासान्तरस्य उपगमे अन्यैव प्राक्तनाह्लादविपरीता दृश्यते अर्थक्रिया अतः आभासभेदाभावः ।

I. P. V., I, 329-30.

2. अर्थक्रियाभासोपि आभासान्तरमेव इति अर्थक्रियाकारित्वमपि न भावानां सत्त्वम् ।

I. P. V., I, 330.

Page 266.

1. पृथग् दीपप्रकाशानां स्रोतसां सागरे यथा ।
अविरुद्धावभासानामेककार्या तथैक्यधीः ॥

I. P. V., II, 96.

Page 267.

1. अथार्थस्य यथा रूपं धत्ते बुद्धिस्तथात्मनश्चैतन्यम् ।

I. P. V., I, 71.

Page 269.

1. अजडा सैवं जाड्यं नार्थप्रकाशता ।

I. P. V., I, 77.

Page 271.

1. तस्मात् स स विचित्रनीलपीतादिरूप आकस्मिकोऽज्ञातप्रसिद्धहेतुकः सन् बाह्यविज्ञानगतप्रतिबिंबात्मकस्वस्वभावसंपादकम् औचित्यवशात् निजरूपसदृशं क्रमोपनिपतद्रूपबहुतरभेदात्मकं ज्ञानात्सर्वथा पृथग्भूतमनुमापयति ।

I. P. V., I, 166.

Page 272.

1. तत्रापि विकल्पेन यथा सोर्थः स्पृश्यते तथानुमेय इति स्थितिः । विकल्पश्च न इन्द्रियादिकमर्थं केनचित्सन्निवेशविशेषात्मना स्पृशति अपि तु किञ्चिदुपलब्धेः कारणमित्यमुना स्वभावेन, स च स्वभावः कारणतालक्षणः प्रत्यक्षगृहीत एव ।

I. P. V., I. 188.

2. आभासाद् बाह्यः पुनरनाभासरूपः स च आभासत इति विप्रतिषिद्धम् ।

I. P. V., I, 190.

Page 273.

1. अस्तु वा नीलाद्याभाससंपादनसामर्थ्यरूपा ज्ञानस्य योग्यतात्मिका शक्तिः वासना । तस्याश्च स्वकार्यसंपादनौन्मुख्यं प्रबोधः, ततो बोधेषु आभासवैचित्र्यम् ।

I. P. V., I. 167.

2. यद्यपि आभासानां ज्ञानान्तर्वर्तिनाम् अपारमार्थिकम् संवृतिसत्त्वमुच्येतापि तथापि यत् एषां कारणम् तद्वस्तुसदेव अङ्गीकार्यम्, अवस्तुनः सर्वसामर्थ्यविरहितालक्षणस्य कार्यसम्पादनप्राणितसामर्थ्यात्मकस्वभावानुपपत्तेः, एवं स्थिते या एता वासना आभासकारणत्वेन इष्यन्ते तासां बोधाद् यदि भिन्नं रूपं तच्च परमार्थसत् तदयं शब्दान्तरप्रच्छन्नोबाह्यार्थवादप्रकार एव ।

I. P. V., I. 167-8.

Page 274.

1. अथ येन रूपेण आसां पारमार्थिकता तेन कारणता तर्हि ज्ञानमात्रम्, तच्च अभिन्नम् इति नीलाद्याभासस्य कार्यरूपस्य असिद्धिः । एवं वासनानामविचित्रत्वे तत्प्रबोधो विचित्र इति का प्रत्याशा ।

I. P. V., I. 168.

2. यदि प्रमात्रन्तराणि भिन्नानि तदा तन्निष्ठानामाभासानां भेद एव, ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तं चेति न्यायात् । ततश्च एकाभासनिष्ठत्वाभावात् एकाभासविश्रान्तः प्रमातॄणां सम्भूय व्यवहारो न स्यात् ।

I. P. V., I. 174.

Page 276.

1. अयं पुमान् इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया बुद्धौ प्रतिसंक्रान्तं सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकं विषयं विद्यया परस्परवैविक्त्येन जानाति ।

T. A., VI. 156.

2. "चितिरेव चेतनपदादवरूढा चेत्यसंकोचिनी चित्तम्"………चितिरेव संकुचितग्राहकरूपा, चेतनपदादवरूढा—अर्थग्रहणोन्मुखी सती, चेत्येन—नीलसुखादिना, संकोचिनी-उभयसंकोचसंकुचितैव, चित्तम् ।

P. H., 11-2.

Page 277.

1. मायाप्रमातुः अनन्तकालान्तर्मुखसंवेदनरूपात् स प्रमाणाभिमत आभासो यावत् प्रमेयोन्मुखतास्वभावः तावत्प्रमेयस्य देशकालाकार-संभेदवत्वात् सोपि तथैव क्षणे क्षणे अन्यान्याभासरूपः स्रष्टव्यः ।

I. P. V.. II. 66.

2. अन्तराभासमानस्य तथारूपापरित्यागेनैव बहिराभासनं निर्माणम् ।

I. P. V., II. 144.

Page 278.

1. स्वलक्षणाभासं ज्ञानमेकम् परं पुनः साभिलापं विकल्पाख्यं बहुधा………। स्वम्—अन्याननुयायि, स्वरूपसंकोचभागि, लक्षणम्—देशकालाकाररूपं यस्य तस्य आभासः—प्रकाशनम् अन्तर्मुखं यस्मिन् बहिर्मुखीनस्वरूप-धारिणि ज्ञाने तत् अविकल्पकम्, विषयभेदेऽपि एकजातीयं स्वरूपे, तद्वैचित्र्ये कारणाभावात्, विकल्पे हि वैचित्र्यकारणम् अभिलापः स च अत्र नास्ति ।

I. P. V., I, 53-4.

2. …………………प्रतिबिम्बनमर्हति ।
शब्दो नभसि सानन्दे स्पर्शधामनि सुन्दरः ॥
स्पर्शोऽन्योपि दृढाघातशूलकुन्तादिकोद्भवः ।
परस्थः प्रतिबिम्बत्वात् स्वदेहोद्धूलनाकरः ॥
………………………………………
एवं घ्राणान्तरे गन्धो रसो दन्तोदके स्फुटः ।

T. A., II, 45-7.

3. अतोऽन्तिकस्थस्वकतादृगिन्द्रियप्रयोजनान्तःकरणैर्यदा कृता ।
तदा तदात्तं प्रतिबिम्बमिन्द्रिये स्वकां क्रियां सूयत एव तादृशीम् ॥

T. A., II. 50.

Page 279.

1. यथा च रूपं प्रतिबिम्बितं दृशोर्न चक्षुषान्येन विना हि लक्ष्यते ।
तथा रसस्पर्शनसौरभादिकं न लक्ष्यतेऽक्षेण विना स्थितं त्वपि ॥
इह अवभासनमात्रसारमेव प्रतिबिंबसतत्त्वमित्युक्तं बहुशः, अवभासनञ्च तत्तद्विषयग्राहकेन्द्रियानुग्राहकान्तःकरणायत्तम्……… ……………ततश्च दृशोः-दृगिन्द्रियाधिष्ठेययोर्गोलकयोः, प्रतिसंक्रान्तं रूपम्, अन्येन—अन्य-संबन्धिना चक्षुरिन्द्रियेण विना नाभिलक्ष्यते, चक्षुरिन्द्रियान्तरव्यापार-मन्तरेण न निर्भासत इत्यर्थः ।

T. A., II, 47-8.

2. " तथा हि बाह्यवृत्तीनामक्षाणां वृत्तिभासने आलोचने शक्तिः । अन्तर्योजने मनसः पुनः, बाह्यानां चक्षुरादीनां………………

……………………………………………………………………

एषां चाविकल्पनिजवृत्तिभासनात्मन्यालोचनमात्र एव सामर्थ्यमित्युक्तम् " वृत्तिभासने आलोचने शक्तिः ।

T. A., VI. 223.

3. कार्यांशस्पर्शोद्रेकादीषत्परिस्फुरणं नाम कर्मेन्द्रियाणां मुख्या वृत्तिः ।

T. A., VI. 224.

Page 282.

1. अथ ब्रूयात् परो यत् इन्द्रियज्ञाने प्रकाशनीयं स्वलक्षणं तद्विकल्पः कथं स्पृशेदिति । भवेदेवं यदि विकल्पो नाम स्वतंत्रो भवेत्, यावता प्रमातुरसौ व्यापारः प्रमाता च पूर्वानुभवान्तःस्वसंवेदनरूपः । तदस्य च अयमेव पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारो यद्विकल्पनव्यापारकालेऽपि पूर्वानुभवा-त्मत्वमनुज्झन्नेवास्ते । ततः पूर्वानुभवो यावत् स्वलक्षणात्मा तावत् पूर्वानुभवतादात्म्यापन्नप्रमातृतत्त्वव्यापारोपि विकल्पस्तद्विषय एव,…… तस्मात् प्रमातुर्यो व्यापारः एकानेकत्वयोजनात्मा स एव प्रकृतो यत्र तादृशीः क्रियादिकल्पना एकानेकवस्तुविषया……………… मन एव करोति ।

I. P. V., II, 40-1.

2. विकल्पे हि वैचित्र्यकारणम् अभिलापः स च अत्र नास्ति न हि अभिलापो नीलस्य धर्मः न च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यः ततोसौ प्राच्यः स्मर्तव्यः, अप्रबुद्धे च संस्कारे न स्मृतिः तत्प्रबोधश्च वस्तुदर्शनोत्थितः इति ।

I. P. V., I, 54-5.

Page 283.

1. विविधा कल्पना, विविधत्वेन च शंकितस्य कल्पः अन्यव्यवच्छेदनं विकल्पः ।

I. P. V., I, 240.

2. तेषामपि आभासानां यथोचितं यत् अन्योन्यनान्तरीयकत्वं तदेकेन संवेदनरूपेण तदनेकप्रमिताभासविषयपूर्वप्रवृत्तसंवेदनकलापानुप्राणकान्तर्मुखरूपेण निश्चीयते, तच्च ऐक्याभासमात्रे अनुसंधानरूपं प्रमाणम्, अनुसंधीयमानेषु तु आभासेषु गृहीतग्राहित्वादप्रमाणम् ।

I. P. V., II, 103.

Page 284.

1. दृष्टमपि निर्विकल्पेन यावन्न परामृष्टं विमर्शविशेषविश्रान्त्या तावन्न स्मर्यते मार्गदृष्टमिव तृणपर्णादि विशेषरूपेण ।

I. P. V., I, 141-2.

Page 292.

1. स्मृतौ अर्थस्य न प्रकाशः न अध्यवसायः…………
सर्वत्र "अयम्" इति प्रत्ययप्रसंगात्, किन्तु अनुभवप्रकाश एव स्मृतौ प्रधानम् । अनुभवस्य तु अर्थप्रकाशात्मकत्वात् अनुभवप्रकाशनान्तरीयकोऽर्थावभासः ।

I. P. V., I, 60-1.

Page 293.

1. अनुभूतेषु वस्तुषु या स्मृतिः तस्याम् अनुभवो दृगात्मा द्वारम् अर्थांशस्पर्शे, स च सत्यपि आत्मनि नष्टोऽनुभवः, तस्य हि अनाशे "इदम्" इत्येष एवात्रुटितः प्रकाश इति का स्मृतिः, तदनुभविता च स्मृतेः किं कुर्यात् ।

I. P. V., I, 63.

2. अनुभवेन हि संस्कारो जन्यते स्वोचितः, संस्कारश्च प्राक्तनरूपां स्थितिं स्थापयति आकृष्टशाखादेश्चिरसंवर्तितस्य विवर्त्यमानस्य भूर्जादेः ।

I. P. V., I, 64.

Page 300.

1. प्रकाशनं च न तदानीन्तनकालत्यागेन नापि इदानीन्तनकालस्य स्वीकारेण "इदम्" इत्येवावभासनप्रसंगात् । तस्मात् अतीतानुभवकालः पूर्वानुभूतभावस्वालक्षण्याक्षेपकत्वेनापेक्षणीयो वेद्यभागे, प्रकाशात्मकावभासाभिनिवेशितया, स्मर्तृदेहप्राणाद्यवभासश्च आलम्बनीयो वेदकभागे, विमर्शांशाभिनिवेशित्वेन…………तदेव आभासान्तरव्यामिश्रणया दीपसहस्रसंमूर्च्छनवत् स्फुटीभवति ।

I. P. V., I, 124.

Page 301.

1. एवञ्च स एव परमेश्वरः स्मरति । एतदेव हि तस्य स्मरणम् यत् एवंप्रकारपरामर्शोचितकालकलादिस्पर्शसहिष्णुमायाप्रमातृभावपरिग्रहः ।

I. P. V., I, 119-20.

2. अस्मद्दर्शने तु भिन्नकाला अपि संविदः तत्कालात्यागेन एकताभासनेन स्वतंत्रः प्रमाता यावदन्तर्मुखतया तावत्यंशे विमृशति तावत् प्रकाशस्य तात्कालिकबहिर्भावावभासो विमर्शस्य च इदानीन्तनान्तर्मुखा स्थितिरेव। एतदेव वेदनाधिकं वेदितृत्वम् वेदनेषु संयोजनवियोजनयोः यथारुचि करणं स्वातंत्र्यम्।

I. P. V., I, 129.

Page 302.

1. क्रियाशक्तिस्फारप्रायसम्बन्धाभिधानप्रसङ्गात् ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभावस्य तत्त्वं प्रसाध्य कार्यकारणभावस्य तत्त्वं प्रसाधयितुम्।

I. P. V., II. 134-5.

Page 308.

1. योगिनामपि मृद्बीजे विनैवेच्छावशेन यत्।
घटादि जायते तत्तत् स्थिरस्वार्थक्रियाकरम्॥

I. P. V., II. 150-1.

2. यथा हि घटसाहित्यं पटस्याप्यवभासते।
तथा घटानन्तरता किन्तु सा नियमोज्झिता॥
अतो यन्नियमेनैव यस्मादाभात्यनन्तरम्।
तत्तस्य कारणं ब्रूमः सति रूपान्वयेऽधिके॥

T. A., VI. 30.

3. तस्मात चिद्रूप एव परमेश्वरः स्वेच्छावशात् इयद्विश्वम् अवभासयति। किन्तु नियतिदशायाम् प्रथान्तरव्यवधानेन येन "बीजादङ्कुरो मृदो घटः" इत्याद्यात्मिका लोकस्य प्रतीतिः।

T. A. Comm., VI, 10.

Page 310.

1. बीजमंकुर इत्यस्मिन् सतत्त्वे हेतुतद्वतोः।
घटः पटश्चेति भवेत् कार्यकारणता न किम्॥

T. A., VI, 23.

2. असत्स्वभाव वपुषो स स्वभावो न युज्यते।

T. A., VI. 25.

3. यदसत्तदसत् युक्ता नासतः सत्स्वरूपता। सतोऽपि न पुनः सत्तालाभेनार्थः। ....अभिव्यक्तिविषयत्वाद्योऽपि सदसद्रूपतया चिन्त्याः।

I. P. V., II. 139.

4. अस्मिन् सतीदमस्तीति कार्यकारणतापि या ।
साप्यपेक्षाविहीनानां जडानां नोपपद्यते ॥

I. P. V., II. 168.

Page 311.

1. न च बहुशोऽपि दैवयोगाद् पुरुषेण घटानन्तरं पटो दृष्ट इति तयोः परस्पर-निरपेक्षयोरपि तावता किञ्चित् नियामकं ज्ञातेयमुदियात् येनावश्यं पौर्वापर्यं स्यात्। एवं च कृत्तिकारोहिण्युदययोरपि कार्यकारणभावो भवेत् यदुदितासु कृत्तिकासु नियमेन रोहिण्युदय इति ।

T. A. Comm., VI. 17.

Page 312.

1. परस्परस्वभावत्वे कार्यकारणयोरपि ।
एकत्वमेव भेदे हि नैवान्योन्यस्वरूपता ॥

I. P. V., II. 173.

2. एकात्मनो विभेदश्च क्रिया कालक्रमानुगा ।
तथा स्यात्कर्तृतैवैवं तथापरिणमत्तया ॥

I. P. V., II. 174.

Page 313.

1. नन्वेतावता विज्ञानमेव ब्रह्मरूपमिमां विश्वरूपतावैचित्रीं परिगृह्णातु किमीश्वरतापरिकल्पनया इत्याशंक्याह :—
वास्तवेपि चिदेकत्वे न स्यादाभासभिन्नयोः ।
चिकीर्षालक्षणैकत्वपरामर्शं विना क्रिया ॥

I. P. V., II, 178-9.

2. यत्तु प्रमेयदशापतितं न भवति किन्तु चिद्रूपतया प्रकाशपरमार्थरूपं चिदेकस्वभावं स्वच्छं तत्र भेदाभेदरूपता उपलभ्यते, अनुभवादेव हि स्वच्छस्यादर्शादेः अखण्डितस्वस्वभावस्यैव पर्वतमतङ्गजादिरूपसहस्र-संभिन्नं वपुरुपपद्यते ।

I. P. V., II, 177.

3. अतो निमित्तं देवस्य शक्तयः सन्तु तादृशे ।

T. A., I, 72.

Page 314.

1. ततश्चेश्वर एव बीजभूमिजलाद्याभाससाहित्येन अंकुरात्मना भासते ।

I. P. V., II. 146.

2. श्रीशंभुवदनोद्गीर्णां वच्म्यागममहौषधिम् ।

T. A., VIII, 69.

3. आहास्मत्परमेष्ठी च।शिवदृष्टौ गुरूत्तमः ।
T. A., VIII, 72.

Page 315.

1. स्वातंत्र्यहानिर्बोधस्य स्वातंत्र्यस्याप्यबोधता ।
द्विधाणवं मलमिदं स्वस्वरूपापहानितः ॥
I. P. V., II, 220.

Page 316.

1. ईश्वरस्य च या स्वात्म्यतिरोधित्सा निमित्ततां ।
साभ्येति कर्ममलयोरतोनादिव्यवस्थितिः ॥
T. A., VIII, 74.

2. स्वयं बध्नाति देवेशः स्वयञ्चैव विमुञ्चति ।
T. A., VIII, 82.

3. न वाच्यं तु कथं नाम कस्मिंश्चित्पुंस्यसौ तथा ।
न हि नाम पुमान् कश्चिद्यस्मिन्पर्यनुयुज्यते ॥
T. A., VIII, 71.

4. देव एव तथासौ चेत् स्वरूपं चास्य तादृशम् ।
तादृक्प्रथास्वभावस्य स्वभावे कानुयोज्यता ॥
T. A., VIII. 72.

Page 317.

1. देवादीनां च सर्वेषां भविनां त्रिविधं मलम् ।
तथापि कार्ममेवैकं मुख्यं संसारकारणम् ॥
T. A., VI. 56.

Page 320.

1. स स्वयं कल्पिताकारविकल्पात्मककर्मभिः ।
बध्नात्यात्मानमेवेह स्वातंत्र्यादिति वर्णितम् ॥
T. A., VIII, 70.

2. समस्तेतरनिर्माणमध्ये इदमपि परमेश्वरेण निर्मितम् यदविचलस्तस्य कुम्भकारपशोर्मिथ्याभिमानः ।
I. P. V., II. 149.

Page 321.

1. फलिष्यतीदं कर्मेति या दृढा वृत्तिरात्मनि ।
स संस्कारः फलायेह न तु स्मरणकारणम् ॥
T. A., VI. 85.

Page 322.

1. लक्ष्यते सुखदुःखाद्यैः समाने दृष्टकारणे ।
चित्रैर्हेत्वन्तरं किञ्चित् तच्च कर्मेह दर्शनात् ॥
T. A., VI, 98.

2. नाहं कर्तेति मन्वानः कर्मसंस्कारमुज्झति ।
T. A., VI. 85.

3. अप्रध्वस्तेऽपि संकोचे नाहं कर्तेति भावनात् ।
न फलं क्षीवमूढादेः प्रायश्चित्तेऽथवा कृते ॥
T. A., VI, 86.

Page 323.

1. यन्मयाद्य तपस्तप्तं तदस्मै स्यादिति स्फुटम् ।
अभिसन्धिमतः कर्म न फलेदभिसन्धितः ॥
T. A., VI. 87.

Page 324.

1. आरब्धकार्ये देहेऽस्मिन् यत्पुनः कर्म तत्कथम् ।
उच्छिद्यतामन्त्यदशां निरोद्धुं न हि शक्यते ॥
T. A., VI. 103.

2. अत एव कृतं कर्म कर्मणा तपसापि वा ।
ज्ञानेन वा निरुध्येत फलपाकेष्वनुन्मुखम् ॥
T. A., VI, 102.

Page 325.

1. निष्कर्मा हि स्थिते मूलमलेऽप्यज्ञाननामनि ।
वैचित्र्यकारणाभावान्नोर्ध्वं सरति नाप्यधः ॥
केवलं पारिमित्येन शिवाभेदमसंस्पृशन् ।
विज्ञानकेवली प्रोक्तः शुद्धचिन्मात्रसंस्थितः ॥
T. A., VI, 77.

2. ननु कारणमेतस्य कर्मणश्चेन्मलः कथम् ।
स विज्ञानाकलस्यापि न सूते कर्मसन्ततिम् ॥
मैवं स हि मलो ज्ञानाकले दिध्वंसिषुः कथम् ।
हेतुः स्याद् ध्वंसमानत्वं स्वातंत्र्यादेव चोद्भवेत् ॥
T. A., VI, 79-80.

Page 326.

1. अतो मोहपराधीनो यद्यप्यकृत किंचन ।
तथापि ज्ञानकाले तत्सर्वमेव प्रदह्यते ॥
T. A., VI, 106-7.

2. देहस्थमिति देहेन सह तादात्म्यमाश्रिता ।
स्वाच्छन्द्यात्संविदेवोक्ता तत्रस्थं कर्म दह्यते ॥
देहैक्यवासनात्यागात् स च विश्वात्मतास्थितेः ।
T. A., VI, 108.

Page 327.

1. न हि कर्मास्ति तादृक्षं येन ज्ञानं प्रवर्तते ।
कर्मजत्वे च तज्ज्ञानं फलराशौ पतेद् ध्रुवम् ।
अन्यकर्मफलं प्राच्यं कर्म राशिं न किं दहेत् ॥
T. A., VIII, 9.

Page 328.

1. अथ प्रलयकालेऽपि चित्स्वभावत्वयोगतः ।
अणूनां संभवत्येव ज्ञानं मिथ्येति तत्कुतः ॥
स्वभावादिति चेन्मुक्ते शिवे वा किं तथा न हि ।
T. A., VIII, 20.

Page 329.

1. यच्चादर्शनमाख्यातं निमित्तं परिणामिनि ।
प्रधाने तद्धि संकीर्णवैविक्त्योभययोगतः ॥
दर्शनाय पुमर्थैकयोग्यतासचिवं धियः ।
आरभ्य सूते धरणीपर्यन्तन्तत्र यच्चितः ॥
बुद्धिवृत्त्यविशिष्टत्वं पुंप्रकाशप्रसादतः ।
प्रकाशनाद्धियोर्थेन सह भोगः स भण्यते ॥
T. A., VIII, 21-2.

Page 330.

1. "परिभाष्यते" इति श्रीमत्खेटपालाचार्यप्रभृतिभिः स्वसमयेन अवस्थाप्यते इत्यर्थः ।
T. A. Comm., VIII, 36.

Page 331.

1. आवारणात्मना सिद्धं तत्स्वरूपादभेदवत् ।
भेदे प्रमाणाभावाच्च तदेकं निखिलात्मसु ॥
T. A., VIII, 30.

Page 334.

1. रोधे तयोश्च जात्यायुरपि न स्यादतः पतेत् ।
देहो भोगात्तयोरेव निरोध इति चेन्नतु ॥
जात्यायुष्प्रदकर्मांशसन्निधौ यदि शंकरः ।
मलं रुन्द्धे भोगदातुः कर्मणः किं बिभेति सः ॥

T. A., VIII. 49.

Page 335.

1. ननु भेदवादिवन्मलादीनामीश्वरस्य च
"यथानादिप्रवृत्तोयं घोरः संसारसागरः ।
शिवोपि हि तथानादिः संसारान्मोचकः स्मृतः ॥"
इत्यादि नीत्या तुल्यकक्ष्यतयैवानादित्वमुच्यतां किमेवं प्रक्रियागौरवकारिणा हेतुहेतुमद्भावपरिकल्पनेनेत्याशंक्याह ।

T. A. Comm., VIII. 75.

APPENDIX B.

Authorities referred to in the available works of Abhinava.

(I)

Mālinī Vijaya Vārtika.

Name	Page
Abhinavagupta	1, 17, 33, 36, 44, 58, 87, 88, 108, 118, 135
Utpala	1, 25, 27, 66, 127
Karṇaśiṣya	2
Kālapāda	20
Kiraṇa Śāsana	129
Kula Mata	130
Cukhulaka	1
Jantu Cakra	34
Ḍāmara Tantra	16
Trika	3, 38
Trika Śāstra	17, 130
Dvaipāyanamukhya	14
Nara Siṁha	71
Patañjali	19
Pati Śāsana	134
Parameśāna Śāstra	20
Pratyabhijñā	4
Prabodha Pañcadaśikā	36
Bharga Śikhā	17
Bhūtajāntanivāsī	75
Bhūti Rāja	1
Bhairava Kula	130
Bhairava Tantra	38
Mandra Śiṣya	2

(II)

Parā Triṁśikā Vivaraṇa.

(III)

Tantrāloka

(IV)

Tantra Sāra

(V)

Dhvanyāloka Locana.

(VI)

Bhagavadgītārtha Saṅgraha.

(VII)

Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.

APPENDIX C.

Philosophical stotras of Abhinava.

अनुत्तराष्टिका ।

संक्रामोत्र[1] न भावना न च कथायुक्तिर्न चर्चा न च
ध्यानं वा न च धारणा न च जपाभ्यासप्रयासो[2] न च ।
तत्किं नाम सुनिश्चितं वद परं सत्यं च तच्छ्रूयतां
न त्यागी न परिग्रही भज सुखं सर्वं यथावस्थितः ॥ १ ॥
संसारोऽस्ति न तत्त्वतस्तनुभृतां बन्धस्य वार्तैव का
बन्धो यस्य न जातु तस्य वितथा मुक्तस्य मुक्तिक्रिया ।
मिथ्यामोहकृदेष रज्जुभुजगच्छायापिशाचभ्रमो
मा किंचित्त्यज मा गृहाण विलस[3] स्वस्थो यथावस्थितः ॥ २ ॥
पूजापूजकपूज्यभेदसरणिः केयं कथानुत्तरे
संक्रामः[4] किल कस्य केन विदधे को वा प्रवेशक्रमः ।
मायेयं न चिदद्वयात्परतया भिन्नाप्यहो वर्तते
सर्वं स्वानुभवस्वभावविमलं चिन्तां वृथा मा कृथाः ॥ ३ ॥
आनन्दोऽत्र न वित्तमद्यमदवन्नैवाङ्गनासङ्गवत्
दीपार्केन्दुकृतप्रभाप्रकरवन् नैव प्रकाशोदयः ।
हर्षः संभृतभेदमुक्तिसुखभूर्भारावतारोपमः
सर्वाद्वैतपदस्य विस्मृतनिधेः प्राप्तिः प्रकाशोदयः ॥ ४ ॥
रागद्वेषसुखासुखोदयलयाहंकारदैन्यादयो
ये भावाः प्रविभान्ति विश्ववपुषो भिन्नस्वभावा न ते ।
व्यक्तिं पश्यसि यस्य यस्य सहसा तत्तत्तदेकात्मता-
संविद्रूपमवेक्ष्य किं न रमसे तद्भावनानिर्भरः ॥ ५ ॥
पूर्वाभावभवक्रिया हि सहसा भावाः सदाऽस्मिन्भवे
मध्याकारविकारसङ्करवतां तेषां कुतः सत्यता ।
निःसत्ये चपले प्रपंचनिचये स्वप्नभ्रमे पेशले
शङ्कातङ्ककलङ्कयुक्तिकलनातीतः प्रबुद्धो भव ॥ ६ ॥

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१ संकामो न न MSS.
२ जपाभ्यासः प्रयासो MSS.
३ विहर MS., A.
४ संज्ञासत्किल MS., B.

भावानां न समुद्भवोऽस्ति सहजस्त्वद्भाविता भान्त्यमी
निःसत्या अपि सत्यतामनुभवभ्रान्त्या भजन्ति क्षणम् ।
त्वत्संकल्पज एष विश्वमहिमा नास्त्यस्य जन्मान्यतः
तस्मात्त्वं विभवेन भासि भुवनेष्वेकोप्यनेकात्मकः ॥ ७ ॥
यत्सत्यं यदसत्यमल्पबहुलं नित्यं न नित्यं च यत्
यन्मायामलिनं यदात्मविमलं चिद्दर्पणे राजते[1] ।
तत्सर्वं स्वविमर्शसंविदुदयाद् रूपप्रकाशात्मकं
ज्ञात्वा स्वानुभवाधिरूढमहिमा विश्वेश्वरत्वं भज ॥ ८ ॥
इति श्रीमदाचार्याभिनवगुप्तपादैर्विरचितानुत्तराष्टिका समाप्ता ।

परमार्थद्वादशिका ।

शान्तिं[2] संभज नित्यमल्पवचनैर्जल्पक्रमं संहर[3]
तत्संहारगमेन किं कथमिदं कोसीति माचीक्लृपः ।
भावाभावविभागभासनतया यद्भात्यभग्नक्रमम्
तच्छून्यं शिवधाम वस्तु परमं ब्रह्मात्र कोर्थग्रहः ॥ १ ॥
यद्यतत्त्वपरिहारपूर्वकं तत्त्वमेषि तदतत्त्वमेव हि ।
यद्यतत्त्वमथ तत्त्वमेव वा तत्त्वमेव ननु तत्त्वमीदृशम् ॥ २ ॥
यद्यद्भाति न भानतः पृथगिदं भेदोपि भातीति चेत्
भाने सोऽपि न भाति किं जहि [4]ततस्तद्भंगिभंगग्रहम् ।
स्वप्ने स्वप्नतया प्रथां गतवति क्रीडैव नो भीति-
कृच्छस्त्राघातजलावपातहुतभुङ्निर्घातबन्धादिकम् ॥ ३ ॥
ज्ञानक्रियाकलनपूर्वकमध्यवस्ये-
द्यद्भवान् कथय कोऽस्य जडाद्विशेषः ।
स्फूर्जञ्जडोऽपि न किमद्वयबोधधाम
निस्सीमनित्यनिरवग्रहसत्यरूपम् ॥ ४ ॥
भावानामवभासकोसि यदि तैर्मोहः किमातन्यते
किं ते तद्यदि भान्ति[5] हन्त भवतस्तत्राप्यखण्डं महः ।
नोचेन्नास्ति तदेवमप्युभयथा निर्व्याजनिर्यन्त्रणा-
त्त्रुट्यद्विभ्रमनित्यतृप्तमहिमा नित्यं प्रबुद्धोऽसि भोः ॥ ५ ॥

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१ चिद्धर्षणे राजसे MSS.
२ तथ्यातथ्यमकल्पमल्पशयनैः MS., B.
३ संहरंस्तत् MS., B.
४ ततस्त्वद्भंगि MSS.
५ भाति MSS.

दृष्टिं बहिः प्रहिणु लक्ष्यपथातिरिक्तम्
स्यान्द्वैरवानुकरणं वत वञ्चनेयम् ।
निर्द्वन्द्वबोधगगनस्य न बाह्यमस्ति
नाभ्यन्तरं निरवकाशविकासधाम्नः ॥ ६ ॥
वासनाप्रसरविभ्रमोदये यद्यदुल्लसति तत्तदीक्ष्यताम् ।
आदिमध्यनिधनेषु तत्र चेत् भासि भासि तव लीयते जगत् ॥ ७ ॥
मोहो दुःखवितर्कतर्कणघनो हेतुप्रथानन्तर-
प्रोद्यद्विभ्रमशृङ्खलातिबहुलो गन्धर्वपूःसन्निभः ।
द्वैताद्वैतविकल्पनाश्रयपदे चिद्व्योम्नि नाभाति चेत्
कुत्रान्यत्र चकास्तु कास्तु परमानिष्ठाप्यनेकात्मना ॥ ८ ॥
स्वप्नेतावदसत्यमेव सरण[1] सौसुप्तधाम्नि प्रथा
नैवास्यास्ति तदुत्तरे निरुपधौ चिद्व्योम्नि कोऽस्य ग्रहः ।
जाग्रत्येव धरावदर्थनिचयः स्याच्चेत् क्षणे कुत्रचित्
ज्ञानेनाथ तदत्ययेऽपृथगिदं तत्रापि का खण्डना ॥ ९ ॥
ये ये केऽपि प्रकाशा मयि सति परमव्योम्नि लब्धावकाशाः
काशा[2] ह्येतेषु नित्ये महिमनि मयि ते निर्विभागं विभान्ति ।
सोऽहं निर्व्याजनित्यप्रतिहतकलनानन्तसत्यस्वतन्त्र-
ध्वस्तद्वैताऽद्वयारिद्वयमयतिमिरापारबोधप्रकाशः ॥ १० ॥
कालः संकलयन्कलाः कलयतु स्रष्टा सृजत्वादरा-
दाज्ञायाः परतन्त्रतामुपगतो मथ्नातु वा मन्मथः ।
[3]क्रीडाडम्बरमम्बराश्रयमिव स्वोल्लेखरेखाक्रमं
देहाद्याश्रयमस्तु वैकृतमहामोहे न पश्यामि किम् ॥ ११ ॥
कः कोऽत्र भोर्यं कवलीकरोमि कः कोऽत्र भोर्यं सहसा निहन्मि ।
कः कोऽत्र भोर्यं परबोधधामसञ्चर्वणोन्मत्ततनुः पिबामि ॥ १२ ॥
भवोत्थभयभङ्गदङ्गदश्रृगालविद्रावणम्
प्रबोधधुरिधीमतामपि सकृद्यदुद्दीपनम्[4] ।
सुधामगहनाटवीविहरणातितृप्तयुद्गमाद्
अभेदकरिबृंहितं व्यधित रम्यदेवो हरिः ॥ १३ ॥

इत्याचार्याभिनवगुप्तकृता परमार्थद्वादशिका भव्यायास्तुतराम् ।

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१ मरणम् MSS.
२ काशामेतेषु MS., A. काशांह्येतेषु MS., B.
३ क्रीडाम्बर MSS.
४ उद्दीपयन्, MSS.

परमार्थचर्चा ।

अर्केन्दुदीपाद्यवभासभिन्नं नाभात्यतिव्याप्ततया ततश्च ।
प्रकाशरूपं तदियत् प्रकाश्यप्रकाशताख्या व्यवहार एव ॥ १ ॥
ज्ञानाद्विभिन्नो न हि कश्चिदर्थस्तत्तत्कृतः संविदि नास्ति भेदः ।
स्वयं प्रकाशाच्छतमैकधाम्नि प्रातिस्विकी नापि विभेदिता स्यात् ॥ २ ॥
इत्थं[1] स्वसंविद्घन एक एव शिवः स विश्वस्य परः प्रकाशः ।
तत्रापि भात्येव विचित्रशक्तौ ग्राह्यगृहीतृप्रविभागभेदः ॥ ३ ॥
भेदः स चायं न ततो विभिन्नः स्वच्छन्दसुस्वच्छतमैकधाम्नः ।
प्रासादहस्त्यश्वपयोदसिन्धुगिर्यादि यद्वन्मणिदर्पणादेः ॥ ४ ॥
आदर्शकुक्षौ[2] प्रतिबिम्बकारि सबिम्बकं स्याद्यदि मानसिद्धम् । समर्पकं
स्वच्छन्दसंविन्मुकुरान्तराले भावेषु हेत्वन्तरमस्ति नान्यत् ॥ ५ ॥
संविद्घनस्तेन परस्त्वमेव त्वय्येव विश्वानि चकासति द्राक् ।
स्फुरन्ति च त्वन्महसः प्रभावात् त्वमेव चैषां परमेश कर्ता ॥ ६ ॥
इत्थं स्वसंवेदनमादिसिद्धमसाध्यमात्मानमनीशमीशम् ।
स्वशक्तिसंपूर्णमदेशकालं नित्यं विभुं भैरवनाथमीडे ॥ ७ ॥
सद्वृत्तसप्तकमिदं गलितान्यचिन्ताः
सम्यक् स्मरन्ति हृदये परमार्थकामाः ।
ते भैरवीयपरधाम मुहुर्विशन्ति
जानन्ति च त्रिजगतीपरमार्थचर्चाम् ॥ ८ ॥

इति श्रीमदभिनवगुप्तविरचिता परमार्थचर्चा समाप्ता ।

महोपदेशविंशतिकम्

प्रपञ्चोत्तीर्णरूपाय नमस्ते विश्वमूर्तये ।
सदानन्दप्रकाशाय स्वात्मनेऽनन्तशक्तये ॥ १ ॥
त्वं त्वमेवाहमेवाहं त्वमेवास्मि न चास्म्यहम् ।
अहं त्वमित्युभौ न स्तो यत्र तस्मै नमो नमः ॥ २ ॥
अन्तर्देहे मया नित्यं त्वमात्मा च गवेषितः ।
न दृष्टस्त्वं नचैवात्मा यच्च दृष्टं त्वमेव तत् ॥ ३ ॥
भवद्भक्तस्य संजातभवद्रूपस्य मेऽधुना ।
त्वामात्मरूपं संप्रेक्ष्य तुभ्यं मह्यं नमो नमः ॥ ४ ॥

१ एवं स्व MS., B.
२ आदर्शमध्ये MS., B.

एतद्वचननैपुण्यं यत्कर्तव्येतिमूलया[1] ।
भवन्मायात्मनस्तस्य केन कस्मिन् कुतो लयः ॥ ५ ॥
अहं त्वं त्वमहं चेति भिन्नता नावयोः क्वचित् ।
समाधिग्रहणेच्छाया भेदस्यावस्थितिर्ध्वंसौ ॥ ६ ॥
त्वमहं सोयमित्यादि नूनं तानि सदा त्वयि ।
न लभन्ते चावकाशं वचनानि कुतो जगत् ॥ ७ ॥
अलं भेदानुकथया त्वद्भक्तिरसचर्वणात् ।
सर्वमेकमिदं शान्तमिति वक्तुं च लज्जते ॥ ८ ॥
त्वत्स्वरूपे जृम्भमाणे त्वं चाहं चाखिलं जगत् ।
जाते तस्य तिरोधाने न त्वं नाहं न वै जगत् ॥ ९ ॥
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याद्या धारयंश्च निजाः कलाः ।
स्वेच्छया भासि नटवन्[2] निष्कलोऽसि च तत्त्वतः ॥ १० ॥
त्वत्प्रबोधात् प्रबोधोस्य त्वन्निद्रातो लयोस्य यत् ।
अतस्त्वदात्मकं सर्वं विश्वं सदसदात्मकम् ॥ ११ ॥
जिह्वा श्रान्ता भवन्नाम्नि मनः श्रान्तं भवत्स्मृतौ ।
अरूपस्य कुतो ध्यानं निर्गुणस्य च नाम किम् ॥ १२ ॥
पूर्णस्यावाहनं कुत्र सर्वाधारस्य चासनम् ।
स्वच्छस्य पाद्यमर्घ्यञ्च शुद्धस्याचमनं कुतः ॥ १३ ॥
निर्मलस्य कुतः स्नानं वस्त्रं विश्वोदरस्य च ।
निर्लेपस्य कुतो गन्धो रम्यस्याभरणं कुतः ॥ १४ ॥
निरालम्बस्योपवीतं पुष्पं निर्वासनस्य च ।
अप्राणस्य कुतो धूपश्चक्षुर्हीनस्य दीपकः ॥ १५ ॥
नित्यतृप्तस्य नैवेद्यं ताम्बूलं च कुतो विभोः ।
प्रदक्षिणमनन्तस्याऽद्वितीयस्य कुतो नतिः ॥ १६ ॥
स्वयंप्रकाशमानस्य कुतो नीराजनं विभोः ।
वेदवाचामवेद्यस्य कुतःस्तोत्रं विधीयते ॥ १७ ॥
अन्तर्बहिश्च पूर्णस्य कथमुद्वासनं भवेत् ।
भेदहीनस्य विश्वत्र कथं च हवनं भवेत् ॥ १८ ॥
पूर्णस्य दक्षिणा कुत्र नित्यतृप्तस्य तर्पणम् ।
विसर्जनं व्यापकस्याऽप्रत्यक्षस्य क्षमापणम् ॥ १९ ॥
एवमेव परा पूजा सर्वावस्थासु सर्वदा ।
ऐक्यबुद्ध्या तु सर्वेशे मनो देवे नियोजयेत् ॥ २० ॥

इति महामहेश्वराचार्याभिनवगुप्तकृतं महोपदेशविंशतिकम् ।

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१ This verse is obscure. It is very difficult to connect "यत्कर्तव्येतिमूलया" with the rest of the verse.

२ नरवत् MS., B.

क्रमस्तोत्रम् ।

अयं दुःखव्रातव्रतपरिगमे पारणविधि-
महासौख्यासारप्रसरणरसे दुर्दिनमिदम् ।
यदन्यक्र्यक्कृत्या विषमविशिखप्लोषणगुरो-
र्विभोः स्तोत्रे शश्वत्प्रतिफलति चेतो गतभयम् ॥ १ ॥
विमृश्य स्वात्मानं विमृशति पुनः स्तुत्यचरितम्
तथा स्तोता स्तोत्रे प्रकटयति भेदैकविषये ।
विमृष्टश्च स्वात्मा निखिलविषयज्ञानसमये
तदित्थं त्वत्स्तोत्रेऽहमिह सततं यत्नरहितः ॥ २ ॥
अनामृष्टः स्वात्मा न हि भवति भावप्रमितिभाक्
अनामृष्टः स्वात्मेत्यपि हि न विनाऽऽमर्शनविधेः ।
शिवश्चासौ स्वात्मा स्फुरदखिलभावैकसरस-
स्ततोऽहं त्वत्स्तोत्रे प्रवणहृदयो नित्यसुखितः ॥ ३ ॥
विचित्रैर्जात्यादिभ्रमणपरिपाटीपरिकरै-
रवाप्तं सार्वज्ञं हृदय यदयत्नेन भवता ।
तदन्तस्त्वद्बोधप्रसरसरणीभूतमहसि
स्फुटं वाचि प्राप्य प्रकटय विभोः स्तोत्रमधुना ॥ ४ ॥
विधुन्वानो बन्धाभिमतभवमार्गस्थितिमिमां
रसीकृत्यानन्तस्तुतिहुतवहप्लोषितभिदाम् ।
विचित्रस्वस्फारस्फुरितमहिमारम्भरभसात्
पिबन् भावानेतान् वरद मदमत्तोस्मि सुखितः ॥ ५ ॥
भवप्राज्यैश्वर्यप्रथितबहुशक्तेर्भगवतो
विचित्रं चारित्रं हृदयमधिशेते यदि ततः ।
कथं स्तोत्रं कुर्यादथ च कुरुते तेन सहसा
शिवैकात्म्यप्राप्तौ शिवनतिरुपायः प्रथमकः ॥ ६ ॥
ज्वलद्रूपं भास्वत्पचनमथ दाहं प्रकटनम्
विमुच्यान्यद्वह्नेः किमपि घटते नैव हि वपुः ।
स्तुवे संविद्रश्मीन् यदि निजनिजांस्तेन स नुतो
भवेन्नान्यः कश्चिद् भवति परमेशस्य विभवः ॥ ७ ॥
विचित्रारम्भत्वे गलितनियमे यः किल रसः
परिच्छेदाभावात् परमपरिपूर्णत्वमसमम् ।
स्वयं भासां योगः सकलभवभावैकमयता
विरुद्धैर्धर्मौघैः परचितिरनर्घोचितगुणा ॥ ८ ॥
इतीदृक्षै रूपैर्वरद विविधं ते किल वपु-
र्विभाति स्वांशेऽस्मिन् जगति गतभेदं भगवतः ।

तदेवैतत्स्तोतुं हृदयमथ गीर्वाह्यकरण-
प्रबन्धाश्च स्युर्मे सततमपरित्यक्तरभसः ॥ ९ ॥
[1] तवैवैकस्यान्तः स्फुरितमहसो बोधजलधे-
र्विचित्रोर्मिव्रातप्रसरणरसो यः स्वरसतः ।
त एवामी सृष्टिस्थितिलयमयस्फूर्जितरुचां
शशांकार्काग्नीनां युगपदुदयापायविभवाः ॥ १० ॥
अतश्चित्राचित्रक्रमतदितरादिस्थितिजुषो
विभोः शक्तिः शश्वद् व्रजति न विभेदं कथमपि ।
तदेतस्यां भूमावकुलमिति ते यत्किल पदम्
तदेकाग्रीभूयान्मम हृदयभूर्भैरव विभो ॥ ११ ॥
अमुष्मात् सम्पूर्णात् वत रसमहोल्लाससरसा-
न्निजां शक्तिं भेदं गमयसि निजेच्छाप्रसरतः ।
अनर्घं स्वातंत्र्यं तव तदिदमत्यद्भुतमयीम्
भवच्छक्तिं स्तुन्वन् विगलितभयोहं शिवमयः ॥ १२ ॥
इदन्तावद्रूपं तव भगवतः शक्तिसरसं
क्रमाभावादेव प्रसभविगलत्कालकलनम् ।
मनःशक्त्यावाचाप्यथ करणचक्रैर्बहिरथो
घटाद्यैस्तद्रूपं युगपदधितिष्ठेयमनिशम् ॥ १३ ॥
क्रमोल्लासं तस्यां भुवि विरचयन् भेदकलनाम्
स्वशक्तीनां देव[2] प्रथयसि सदा स्वात्मनि ततः ।
[3] क्रियाज्ञानेच्छाख्यां स्थितिलयमहासृष्टिविभवां
त्रिरूपां भूयासं समधिशयितुं व्यग्रहृदयः ॥ १४ ॥
परासृष्टिर्लीना हुतवहमयी यात्र विलसत्[4]
परोल्लासौन्मुख्यं व्रजति शशिसंस्पर्शसुभगा ।
हुताशेन्दुस्फारोभयविभवभाग् भैरवविभो
तवेयं सृष्ट्याख्या मम मनसि नित्यं विलसतात् ॥ १५ ॥
विसृष्टे भावांशे बहिरतिशयास्वादविरसे
यदा तत्रैव त्वं भजसि रभसाद् रक्तिमयताम् ।
तदा रक्ता देवी तव सकलभावेषु ननु माम्
क्रियाद्रक्तापानक्रमघटितगोष्ठीगतघृणम् ॥ १६ ॥
बहिर्वृत्तिं हातुं चितिभुवमुदारां निवसितुं
यदा भावाभेदं प्रथयसि विनष्टोर्मिचपलः ।

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१ तवैकैकस्य MSS.

२ देवः MSS.

३ क्रियाज्ञानेच्छाख्या स्थितिलयमहासृष्टिविभवा त्रिरूपा MSS.

४ विलसेत् MSS.

स्थितेर्नाशं देवी कलयति तदा सा तव विभो
स्थितेः सांसारिक्याः कलयतु विनाशं मम सदा ॥ १७ ॥
जगत्संहारेण प्रशमयितुकामः स्वरभसात्
स्वशंकातंकाख्यं विधिमथ निषेधं प्रथयसि ।
[1]इमं सृष्ट्वेत्थं त्वं पुनरपि च शङ्कां विदलयन्
महादेवी सेयं मम भवभयं संदलयताम् ॥ १८ ॥
विलीने शंकौघे सपदि परिपूर्णे च विभवे
गते लोकाचारे गलितविभवे शास्त्रनियमे ।
अनन्तं भोग्यौघं ग्रसितुमभितो लंपटरसा
विभो संसाराख्या मम हृदि भिदांशं प्रहरतु ॥ १९ ॥ ॥ १० ॥
तदित्थं देवीभिः सपदि दलिते भेदविभवे
विकल्पप्राणासौ प्रविलसति मातृस्थितिरलम् ।
अतः संसारांशं निजहृदि विमृश्य स्थितिमयी
प्रसन्ना स्यान्मृत्युप्रलयकरणी मे भगवती ॥ २० ॥
तदित्थं ते तिस्रो निजविभवविस्फारणवशा-
दवाप्ताः षट्चक्रं क्रमकृतपदं शक्तय इमाः ।
क्रमादुन्मेषेण प्रविदधति चित्रां भुवि दशा-
मिमाभ्यो देवीभ्यः प्रवणहृदयः स्यां गतभयः ॥ २१ ॥
इमां रुन्धे भूमिं भवभयभिदातंककरणीम्
इमां बोधैकांतद्रुतिरसमयीं चापि विदधे ।
तदित्थं संबोधद्रुतिमथ विलुप्याशुभततीं-
र्यथेष्टं चाचारं भजति लसतात् सा मम हृदि ॥ २२ ॥
क्रियाबुद्धयक्षादेः परिमितपदे मानपदवी-
मवाप्तस्य स्फारं निजनिजरुचा संहरति या ।
इयं मार्तण्डस्य स्थितिपदयुजः सारमखिलम्
हठादाकर्षन्ती कृषतु मम भेदं भवभयात् ॥ २३ ॥
समग्रामक्षालीं क्रमविरहितामात्मनि मुहु-
र्निवेश्यानन्तान्तर्बहलितमहारश्मिनिवहा ।
परा दिव्यानन्दं कलयितुमुदारादरवती
प्रसन्ना मे भूयात् हृदयपदवीं भूषयतु च ॥ २४ ॥
प्रमाणे संलीने शिवपदलसद्वैभववशा-
च्छरीरं प्राणादिर्मितकृतकमातृस्थितिमयः ।
यदा कालोपाधिः प्रलयपदमासादयति ते
तदा देवी यासौ लसति मम सा स्ताच्छिवमयी ॥ २५ ॥

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१ यमम् MSS.

प्रकाशाख्या संवित् क्रमविरहिता शून्यपदतो
बहिर्लीनात्यन्तं प्रसरति समाच्छादकतया ।
ततोऽप्यन्तःसारे गलितरभसादक्रमतया
महाकाली सेयं मम कलयतां कालमखिलम् ॥ २६ ॥
ततो देव्यां यस्यां परमपरिपूर्णस्थितिजुषि
क्रमं विच्छिद्याशु स्थितिमतिरसात्संविदधति[1] ।
प्रमाणं मातारं [2]मितिमथ समग्रं जगदिदम्
अती॰ ॥ं क्रोडीकृत्य श्रयति मम चित्तं चितिमिमाम् ॥ २७ ॥
तदेत॰ लस्वात्ममये महेशे तिष्ठन्ति यस्मिन् विभुशक्तयस्ताः ।
त्किमन्तं प्रणमामि देवं मन्थानसंज्ञं जगदेकसारम् ॥ २८ ॥
..य स्वशक्तिकिरणौघनुतिप्रबन्धान्[3]
आकर्ण्य देव यदि मे व्रजसि प्रसादम् ।
तेनाशु सर्वं जनतां निजशासनांशु-
संशान्तिताखिलतमःपटलां विधेयाः ॥ २९ ॥
षट्षष्ठिनामके वर्षे नवम्यामसितेऽहनि ।
मयाऽभिनवगुप्तेन मार्गशीर्षे स्तुतः शिवः ॥ ३० ॥

इति श्री अभिनवगुप्तपादाचार्यकृतं क्रमस्तोत्रं सम्पूर्णम् ॥

भैरवस्तवः

व्याप्तचराचरभावविशेषं चिन्मयमेकमनन्तमनादिम् ।
भैरवनाथमनाथशरण्यं त्वन्मयचित्ततया हृदि वन्दे ॥ १ ॥
त्वन्मयमेतदशेषमिदानीं भाति मम त्वदनुग्रहशक्त्या ।
त्वं च महेश सदैव ममात्मा स्वात्ममयं मम तेन समस्तम् ॥ २ ॥
स्वात्मनि विश्वगते त्वयि नाथे तेन न संसृतिभीतिकथास्ति ।
सत्स्वपि दुर्धरदुःखविमोहत्रासविधायिषु कर्मगणेषु ॥ ३ ॥
अन्तक मां प्रति मा दृशमेनां क्रोधकरालतमां विनिधेहि ।
शङ्करसेवनचिन्तनधीरो भीषणभैरवशक्तिमयोस्मि ॥ ४ ॥
इत्थमुपोढभवन्मयसंविद्दीधितिदारितभूरितमिस्रः ।
मृत्युयमान्तककर्मपिशाचैर्नाथ नमोस्तु न जातु बिभेमि ॥ ५ ॥

1. According the post—Nāgeśa grammarians the root "Dadha" cannot be used in active voice. Abhinava, however, here seems to follow the practice of earlier grammarians who maintained. "अनुदात्तेत्त्वलक्षणमात्मनेपदमनित्यम्" ।

2. मित MSS.

3. प्रबन्धात् MSS.

प्रोदितसत्यविबोधमरीचिप्रेक्षितविश्वपदार्थसतत्त्वः ।
भावपरामृतनिर्भरपूर्णे त्वय्यहमात्मनि निर्वृतिमेमि ॥ ६ ॥
मानसगोचरमेति यदैव क्लेशदशाऽतनुतापविधात्री[1] ।
नाथ तदैव मम त्वदभेदस्तोत्रपरामृतवृष्टिरुदेति ॥ ७ ॥
शङ्कर सत्यमिदं व्रतदानस्नानतपो भवतापविदारि
तावकशास्त्रपरामृतचिन्ता स्यन्दति चेतसि निर्वृतिधाराम् ॥ ८ ॥
नृत्यति गायति हृष्यति गाढं संविदियं मम भैरवनाथ ।
त्वां प्रियमाप्य सुदर्शनमेकं दुर्लभमन्यजनैः समयज्ञम् ॥ ९ ॥
वसुरसपौषे कृष्णदशम्यामभिनवगुप्तः स्तवमिममकरोत् ।
येन विभुर्भवमरुसन्तापं शमयति जनस्य झटिति[2] दयालुः ॥ १० ॥

समाप्तं स्तवमिदमभिनवाख्यं पद्यनवकम्[3] ।

देहस्थदेवताचक्रस्तोत्रम् ।

असुरसुरवृन्दवन्दितमभिमतवरवितरणे निरतम् ।
दर्शनशताग्र्यपूज्यं प्राणतनुं गणपतिं वन्दे ॥ १ ॥
वरवीरयोगिनीगणसिद्धावलिपूजितांघ्रियुगलम् ।
अपहृतविनयिजनार्तिं वटुकमपानाभिधं वन्दे ॥ २ ॥
आत्मीयविषयभोगैरिन्द्रियदेव्यः सदा हृदम्भोजे ।
अभिपूजयन्ति यं तं चिन्मयमानन्दभैरवं वन्दे ॥ ३ ॥
यद्धीबलेन विश्वं भक्तानां शिवपथं भाति ।
तमहमवधानरूपं सद्गुरुममलं सदा वन्दे ॥ ४ ॥
उदयावभासचर्वणलीलां विश्वस्य या करोत्यनिशम् ।
आनन्दभैरवीं तां विमर्शरूपामहं वन्दे ॥ ५ ॥
अर्चयति भैरवं या निश्चयकुसुमैः सुरेशपत्रस्था ।
प्रणमामि बुद्धिरूपां ब्रह्माणीं तामहं सततम् ॥ ६ ॥
कुरुते भैरवपूजामनलदलस्थाऽभिमानकुसुमैर्या ।
नित्यमहंकृतिरूपां वन्दे तां शाम्भवीमम्बाम् ॥ ७ ॥

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1. तनुतामविधाय MS., B.
2. The metre here is apparently defective. We have, however, not corrected it, because this reading is supported by all the MSS., to which we have had access, as well as by the current oral tradition.
3. This "Abhinavākhya padyanavaka" is popularly called "Bhairava Stava".

विदधाति भैरवार्चां दक्षिणदलगा विकल्पकुसुमैर्या ।
नित्यं मनःस्वरूपां कौमारीं तामहं वन्दे ॥ ८ ॥
नैऋतदलगा भैरवमर्चयते शब्दकुसुमैर्या ।
प्रणमामि शब्दरूपां नित्यं तां वैष्णवीं शक्तिम् ॥ ९ ॥
पश्चिमदिग्दलसंस्था हृदयहरैः स्पर्शकुसुमैर्या ।
तोषयति भैरवं तां त्वग्रूपधरां नमामि वाराहीम् ॥ १० ॥
वरतररूपविशेषैर्मारुतदिग्दलनिषण्णदेहा या ।
पूजयति भैरवं तामिन्द्राणीं दृक्तनुं वन्दे ॥ ११ ॥
धनपतिकिसलयनिलया या नित्यं विविधषड्रसाहारैः ।
पूजयति भैरवं तां जिह्वाभिख्यां नमामि चामुण्डाम् ॥ १२ ॥
ईशदलस्था भैरवमर्चयते परिमलैर्विचित्रैर्या ।
प्रणमामि सर्वदा तां घ्राणाभिख्यां महालक्ष्मीम् ॥ १३ ॥
षड्दर्शनेषु पूज्यं षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वसंवलितम् ।
आत्माभिख्यं सततं क्षेत्रपतिं सिद्धिदं वन्दे ॥ १४ ॥
संस्फुरदनुभवसारं सर्वान्तः सततसन्निहितम् ।
नौमि सदोदितमित्थं निजदेहगदेवताचक्रम् ॥ १५ ॥

इति देहस्थदेवताचक्रस्तोत्रम् ।

अनुभवनिवेदनम् ।

अन्तर्लक्ष्यविलीनचित्तपवनो योगी यदा वर्तते
दृष्ट्या निश्चलतारया बहिरसौ पश्यन्नपश्यन्नपि ।
मुद्रेयं खलु शाम्भवो भवति सा युष्मत्प्रसादाद्गुरो
शून्याशून्यविवर्जितं भवति यत् तत्त्वं पदं शाम्भवम् ॥ १ ॥
अर्धोद्घाटितलोचनः स्थिरमना नासाग्रदत्तेक्षण-
श्चन्द्रार्कावपि लीनतामुपगतौ त्रिस्पन्दभावान्तरे ।
ज्योतीरूपमशेषबाह्यरहितं चैकं पुमांसं परम्
तत्त्वं तत्पदमेति वस्तु परमं वाच्यं किमत्राधिकम् ॥ २ ॥
शब्दः कश्चन यो मुखादुदयते मन्त्रः स लोकोत्तरः
संस्थानं सुखदुःखजन्मवपुषो यत्कापि मुद्रैव सा ।
प्राणस्य स्वरसेन यत्प्रवहणं योगः स एवाद्भुतः
शाक्तं धाम परं ममानुभवतः किन्नाम न भ्राजते ॥ ३ ॥
मन्त्रः स प्रतिभाति वर्णरचना यस्मिन्न संलक्ष्यते
मुद्रा सा समुदेति यत्र गलिता कृत्स्ना क्रिया कायिकी ।
योगः स प्रथते यतः प्रवहणं प्राणस्य संक्षीयते
त्वद्धामाधिगमोत्सवेषु सुधियां किं किं न नामाद्भुतम् ॥ ४ ॥

इति अनुभवनिवेदनस्तोत्रम् ।

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